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course. Although she had, at first, agreed to accept the mediation when it should be offered, she now returned a cold and evasive answer ; and, instead of meeting the views of Austria, she called categorically upon her to accede to the convention of Bartenstein, which she had herself' entered into with Prussia on the 14th of April. By this demand, she not only required of Austria instantly to change her character of mediatrix into that of belligerent, but to accede to a convention, embracing objects in which she had no interest,--and, although containing likewise an article in favour of Turkey, rendered dependent for its execution on hér accession to all the others, for which it was well known that she was not prepared. Austria saw through the maneuvre. This convention contained demands so high, and so unsuited to the means of the confederates, that it was evident to her they were not serious in advancing them,---but that the whole was a contrivance to get rid of her intervention, grounded as it was upon sacrifices that Russia was not prepared to make. The consequence was obvious. Austria rejected the invitation, and fell back into those habits of shyness and jealousy towards the Court of St Petersburg, which it had been the object of such long and persevering exertion on the part of the British Government to remove.

There remain only the Turkish war, and the expedition to Constantinople.--and we have done with the charges against the foreign administration of 1806.

The matchless ingratitude of imputing separate purposes to Great Britain in her attack upon Egypt, was well answered by the British Counter Declaration of December 18th, 1807. That paper, after ably and satisfactorily exposing the falsehood of the assertion contained in the declaration of war, to which it is an answer--that Russia had been ' fighting our battles rather than • her own,'-goes on thus—The war with the Porte is still . more singularly chosen to illustrate the charge against Great { Britain, of indifference to the interests of her ally; a war f undertaken by Great Britain, solely at the instigation of Russia,

and solely for the purpose of maintaining Russian interests against the influence of France.' Being at war with the Porte for the interests of Russia alone, it scemed sufficiently obvious that to conquer, and hold, one of the principal provinces of the enemy's empire, from whence his capital derived the chief part of its daily food, would be no inefficacious aid to the Russian operations on the Danube. It was greatly to be apprehended also, and information was not wanting to justify the apprehension, that the newly acquired influence of Sebastiani would succeed in obtaining the consent of the Porte to the rç. occupation of Egypt by the French. Each of those motives, and still more the two united, pointed out the propriety of taking possession of the principal port of Egypt, provided the force to be employed in that expedition should not be wanted for some more eligible service: And though we are accused, in the Russian manifesto, of not having sent this force to take Naples, it is perfectly notorious that this idle and ridiculous notion was put into the heads of the Russian ministers by their envoy at the Court of Palermo, a man notoriously devoted to the Queen.

But the defence of what is called the Expedition to Constantinople, stands on other grounds. In fact that defence is already made. The motives and the policy of this measure are to be found in the preceding narrative of the causes which had so fatally operated to perpetuate the disunion of Europe. In these will be seen, not the justice and expeiliency alone of supporting an ally, according to the ternis of a treaty, but the necessity that then existed of removing a cause of discontent between Russia and Austria, which was leading them on from jealousy to discord, and from discord to war. The restoration of the Hospodars afforded the only basis on which these differences could be composed ; and England, when she procured the order for it in November, through her ambassador Mr Arbuthnot, gained a most important triumph. Nor is there any reason to doubt that their actual restoration would have taken place, if, in consequence of the orders hastily issued to Michelson on the first news of their deposition, that general had not marched his army into Moldavia. When the account of his march reached Constantinople, all was to begin over again; and to be. gin under the sad auspices of the destruction of the Prussian monarchy.

The passage of the Dardanelles, and the sailing up to Constantinople by the British fleet under Sir Thomas Duckworth, has been unaccountably mistaken for a mere military expedition, and as such has been condemned for some supposed military faults, such as neglecting to occupy the forts along the straits by a body of troops. No military man, however, who has ever seen those forts, will sanction such a censure. They are all open on the land side, commanded in every direction, untenable against the martial population of the surrounding country, and without the means of supporting their garrisons, who must have drawn all their supplies from their ships, as long as they could keep up any communication with them. But it never was with a view of conquest or diversion that the British fleet appeared before Constantinople. It came to enforce the demands of the British ambassador, who, calculating that he

would have a better chance of success by negociating from on board the fleet, than by negociating on shore, with the fleet to support him, had quitted the Porte to search for Sir Thomas Duckworth, and had returned with the squadron to propose his terms. Now, whether this was, or was not, the most judicious course to take, or whether the ambassador had any choice, are matters absolutely foreign to the general question of the wisdom of the proceeding itself; and all that the Government at home could possibly be required to make out, may be summed up in the five following points :-- First, that the object should be worthy the effort ; secondly, that the means should be equal to enforcing it; thirdly, that tiie means should be of a nature adapted to the end desired ; fourthly, that the orders for employing them should be so distinct and positive, as to leave no room to doubt when and how they were to be executed; and, fifthly, that no time should be lost, either in issuing the orders, or in despatching the force. If their proceedings shall be found to answer to all those conditions, it is conceived that they must stand acquitted, even in the eyes of Mr Eustaphieve and his English abettors. We shall run them shortly over.

1. The object of the expedition was to procure that to be done by the Turkish government which, in its immediate consequences, would have restored a most beneficial treaty of defensive alliance between Great Britain, Russia, and the Porte; have destroyed the intrigues and influence of France; have set at liberty a considerable Russian army to act against France in Poland, at the most critical instant of the campaign ; and terminated the differences between the Courts of Vienna and St Petersburgh.

2. The means were an English fleet; and the proof of their adequacy to the end proposed is, that the fleet silenced and passed the Turkish forts at the Dardanelles, and along the Straits ;. arrived to within a very few miles of the seraglio ; and might have anchored under its walls without the smallesť obstacle.

3. The proof that these means were adapted to the end desired, is furnished from evidence acquired since the transaction has lost its interest as an affair of party, and is become matter of history. Both the ambassador who accompanied the squadron, and his successor who negotiated the peace two years afterwards, have borne testimony to this point ; and in particular the latter, who had the opportunity of verifying the facts upon the spot, stated in Parliament, that when the British squadron appeared in sight, the Sultan sent a message to the French ambassador, Sebastiani, to tell him irankly, that much as he wished to keep well with his master, Napoleon, he would not for his

He was

sake expose his capital to be destroyed; and that in consequence of his having resolved to grant the terms demanded by the English, one of which was, the departure of the French embassy, he had sent the Ambassador his passports, and required him to lose no time in making use of them. Sebastiani prepared to obey the order, and told the French merchants to shift for themselves as well as they could; when, to the surprise of every body, the English squadron changed its course, and instead of sailing straight up to the Seraglio Point, bore away for the Princes' Islands, and took a station three miles from any spot from whence offensive operations could be undertaken. There the squadron was kept wind-bound for 12 days. A negociation was indeed begun; but the opportunity for action being lost, of course it failed.

4. On the distinctness of the orders given by Lord Howick to Mr Arbuthnot, there never has been a controversy. to require the removal of Sebastiani; but he was to insist peremptorily on the restoration of the Hospodars, and the passage for Russian ships of war with stores and transports through the canal of Constantinople, according to treaty. He was told, that peace or war would be the consequence of the answer of the Porte ; and that, if satisfaction on these two points should be refused, he was to declare his mission at an end, and signify to the British admiral that hostilities were to commence.

5. With regard to time, these orders, with a squadron to enforce their execution, followed, within six days, Lord Howick's first despatch to Mr Arbuthnot, written immediately on his being made acquainted with the state of affairs at Constantinople ; -a despatch in which Mr Arbuthnot was distinctly informed, that his whole preceding conduct in support of Russia had been approved, and that both orders and squadron would be sent to him in four or five days from the date of it. By the papers laid before Parliament, it appears that Mr Arbuthnot received this first despatch on the 22d of January, but that he did not stay to receive the second; having judged it expedient to quit the residence in the night of the 29th. Whether, in this, he was right or wrong, is nothing to the present question. The Government, no more than they did: they could but send him a force, adequate to the object to be attained-adapted in its quality to the end desired-accompanied by precise instructions how to use it ;-and it has been seen that they did send it in six days after they had received the information that rendered the measure necessary.

Here we close our remarks on the conduct of foreign affairs during the short administration of 1806, so far as they concerni the charge brought against Great Britain of abandoning Russia, and, with Russia, the common cause of Europe. We think it has been clearly proved, that Rassia separated herself from this common cause, by the pursuit of objects incompatible with it in every shape, and in every sense. But we cannot dismiss the subject, which is become doubly interesting at the present hour by the events which have recently occurred, and the prospects which are opening before us, without some observations on the policy to which the slightest reflection upon the transactions we have developed obviously and irresistibly points. A Revolution, we can call it by no other name, has taken place in the military state of Europe, by the destruction of the mightiest combination of its armies that it ever put forth against a single state ; and we see that state, in return, advancing to avenge its own injuries; and, we will hope, to restore peace to the world, on solid and equitable foundations. Let not our hopes, however, incline us to reject our knowledge. The days of magnificent promise, and of sanguine expectation, are again arrived—and with them the hazard of rash enterprize and ruinous disappointment. Without discouraging Russia from the pursuit of her present pathwithout suffering a doubt of her motives to arrest our land, wherever we can extend it with effect, let us not, in the cordiality of our present exultation, disdain the lessons of the past. If the time be favourable to the reestablishment of our connexions with the Continent, it is highly necessary that we should fix some definite principles on which they may rest, that the trae benefits to be derived from their renewal may not be lost in visionary projects and unfruitful triumphs, or be utterly cast away as soon as a moment of reverse shall rekindle those

passions and jealousies and interests, which a moment of good fortune has extinguished.

It is for this reason that we must be more than ordinarily cautious in our advances on this doubtful ground: and, without depriving our system of the power of expansion, necessary to embrace any advantages which may present themselves in times so full of uncertainty, we should do well to take our ideas of good rather low,--so that all we may effect beyond them may be counted as clear gain. There is no other state but Russia that can yet be said to be out of hazard of French conquest and occupation—and we shall do well, therefore, to look to Russia alone in our present

projects for the restoration of the ancient system of Europe. Then we should take great care to stipulate for nothing we cannot be sure may be performed. England and Russia cannot deliver the world—But they can maintain their alliance in spite of it. A treaty for such an alliance, taking for its basis the principle of joint war and joint peace, would appear

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