the two other points of Subsidy and Diversion, on this of diplo matic cooperation she never has complained. Even her manifesto is silent upon it. But in order to do justice to our own character, it will be necessary to advert to some part of our transactions at the court of Vienna: and this we conceive we can now do, without any risk of impropriety, as the time is passed in which the mention of them can affect any other interests than those of truth, or serve any other purpose than that of vindicating the character and consistency of our national counsels from foreign or factious aspersions.

From the moment of Mr Fox's accession to office, the state of the relations between Great Britain and Austria occupied his most serious attention. Here he found every thing to repair. The calamities with which the Austrian monarchy had been afflicted from the very first years of the war of the Revolution, had cooled her affections towards Great Britain. The coalition of 1805 completed this estrangement. Drawn slowly and reluctantly into the schemes of that day, she had paid the whole penalty of their failure; and, besides the loss of a third part of her dominions, had been left, by the peace of Presburg, without a frontier for the protection of the remainder. It will not, therefore, be wondered at, that a great part of the Austrian and Bohemian aristocracy, whose estates were the first exposed to the visits of a French Commissary, should have required the abandonment of a system which they considered as the source of all their present evils, and of mach future danger. Looking only to the stability of the French government; seeing that it had once more put on the forms of royalty; and making no difference between a Bourbon and a Buonaparte, there were not wanting those who, in addition to the peace they had obtained, called openly for a cordial alliance with France, and the re-establishment of the treaty of 1756. These dispositions, concurring with the interests of the old proprietors and claimants of estates in the Netherlands, of which it had been the policy of the French government not to grant out the whole in forfeitures, and with that of the time serving politicians who abound in every court, were greatly forwarded at this time by a violent degree of personal irritation, caused by the publication of Sr Arthur Paget's despatches. Of the chief of these despatches, as an able diplomatic paper, it is impossible to speak too highly. It was written at the end of October 1805; and, together with an undisguised exposition of the then state of affairs, contains a forcible and an honest narrative of the causes which led to the disasters of the campaign. Such a statement was alike necessary for the information of government, and for Sir Arthur's

personal vindication from all share in the transactions which he describes: But that it should have been laid entire upon the table of the House of Commons-that it should have been printed verbatim from the decyphered original, thereby furnishing a key to the disclosure of the whole of the correspondence carried on in that cypher by all our ministers in every court of Europe, -is one of those incredible actions which at first stupify more than they offend us, and which call forth the loud burst of indignation only after we are thoroughly convinced that the act was really committed in cool blood by men, administering, with every appearance of seriousness, the sacred functions of the British government.

In the situation produced by these events, it was no easy mat ter to re-establish any sort of confidential intercourse with the Court of Vienna; still less that degree of it which was necessary for the communication of common views, or the participation in common counsels. Mr Fox, indeed, was too well aware of the distresses of Austria, to think of persuading her to break the treaty of Presburg: But, viewing the conditions of that treaty, and-what to him appeared-her indifference under their pressure, he certainly did think that she was not quite aware of her danger. Yet to impress even this opinion upon her counsels to any purpose, required a degree of mutual good understanding, which Mr Fox had entirely to create. Austria

was to be convinced that the system of rousing was at an end; that England had at last become sensible of the extent of her sacrifices, and would require from her no efforts that might expose her to further losses; while, on the other hand, she was to be encouraged by the well-grounded hope-a hope in perfect conformity with the principle of abstaining from all attempts to push her on to her undoing-that if further sacrifices were exacted from her, and they should be such as she should feel herself under the necessity of resisting, England would always be ready to come to her relief.

The policy of Austria at this time was to make the best of the peace of Presburg. Severe as were its conditions, it was still a deliverance from war; and it was only through the re-establishment of her finances, and the improvement of her military system, that she could hope, for any length of time, to secure even her independence. With regard to England, all she required of us was, to interfere in her concerns as little as possible; and then, only by our good offices, to facilitate friendly intelligence between herself and other powers. Whether this was or was not her true policy, we had no choice as to the part assigned us in it but even in this part, small as it might appear in com

parison with the preponderating influence which we had been accustomed so long to exert in her counsels, there was room enough for the exercise of patience, vigilance, foresight, and of all the qualities that belong to wise administration. Much confusion prevailed in the relations of the several states of Europe with each other: But it was not irreparable; and the cure was, at any rate, worth attempting. Austria had at this time matter for high complaint, and even resentment, against Russia. She had also to complain of Prussia. Yet the evils which both these powers had contributed so largely to inflict upon her, were still within the remedy of moderate and healing counsels; and it was our interest, in every view, to promote the oblivion of these differences. Ill as Prussia was behaving towards us in the affair of Hanover, it was only through her union with Austria in the defence of Germany, that that power could hope to find reposé in the peace of Presburg.

In the differences between Austria and Russia, we had a still nearer interest; and, it might be hoped, greater means of contributing to their removal. Let us see then how the politics of Russia enabled us to assist Austria in removing them, and in thus preserving and securing the harmony of that defensive system through which alone she could hope at any future time to associate herself with Europe in a common concert.

The port and territory of Cattaro were convenient to Russia in her views on Dalmatia and the Adriatic. Austria, however, had ceded that place to France by the treaty of Presburg. The French Commissioners, empowered to take possession, not being on the spot on the day appointed to receive it, a Russian and Montenegrin force contrived to seize, and persisted in spite of every representation to retain, it. The first consequences of this ill timed proceeding, were, that Buonaparte seized Ragusa,-refused to restore Brannau, the Austrian frontier fortress on the side of Bavaria,-threatened to occupy Trieste and Fiume,--and, what was still worse, made this act a pretence for keeping that very army in Germany, which a Russian negociator, four months afterwards, signed a separate treaty at Paris to remove, and which afterwards conquered Germany and the Prussian monarchy. Threat followed threat, insult succeeded to insult, remonstrance to remonstrance in the correspondence between the three Courts, on this unlucky subject; until at last Austria was under the necessity of issuing orders for the advance of a body of troops to attack and drive out the Russian garrison; and thus found herself on the brink of a new war either with France or Russia, or perhaps with both,

VOL. XXI. NO. 41.

Q

without having done any one act which could in the slightest degree provoke the hostility of either.

The effect of this misunderstanding, on any plan of common concert-if Russia looked forward to such a plan-requires no comment. But it was a mere trifle, compared to her almost incredible conduct towards Austria immediately after the battle of Jena. It has already been seen by what a course of fatal errors Prussia had precipitated herself into a war with France, without either concerting her measures with other powers, or preparing for her own defence. Yet the part to be taken by Austria when Buonaparte should carry the war into Polandas he was about to do, after the battle of Jena-was not of less. importance either to Europe or to herself. If she remained neuter, she saw Prussia, and all the north of Germany, together with Saxony and Prussian Poland, pass into the hands of Buonaparte. If she, should attempt to arrest his progress, and fail, she was undone for ever. And where had she to look for concert? Prussia had already begun to negociate;--Russia had not passed her frontiers ;-It was even doubtful how she would act in the existing emergency. The business of Cattaro had interrupted all confidential intercourse between the two Courts; and no overture, of any kind soever, had been made since the Prussian preparations, which could lead Austria to a certain knowledge of the future system of the Court of St Petersburg.

In this critical, and indeed decisive juncture, what was the conduct of that Cabinet?-Will it be credited when told? ---Yet we can affirm it to be the fact, that the very first accounts received by the Austrian government from that Court, and written after the battle of Jena was known there, not only announc ed no determination on the part of Russia to come forward effectually to the succour of the Prussian monarchy, or even to increase her efforts for the defence of Poland, but contained an official notification that the Russian army on the Dniester had been ordered to march into Moldavia!!!

The dismay, the disgust, the indignation excited at Vienna by this intelligence, was beyond all description: and its immediate consequence was, the compliance with every demand of Buonaparte. A corps of 60,000 men had been assembled in Bohemia to protect the frontiers, and, in spite of every representation from the French ambassador, had been kept in readiness to advance. They were now disbanded. Facilities for the transport and subsistence of the French army were granted,all hope of concert vanished at once,-and the common cause, ever the victim of separate interests, received a blow from which it has not recovered to this day.

All

To remedy this mischief, was quite out of the question. that could be done, was to prevent it from spreading farther, and throwing Austria entirely, and with her whole weight into the arms of France. Such efforts as could be made upon the spot, however, were not wanting to explain, to excuse, and even to justify, by the apparent necessity of the case-grounded on the motions of Sebastiani at the Portethis unfortunate proceeding. These efforts succeeded for the time; and matters, if not remedied, did not become worse. Soon afterwards, the Russian Government, apprized by this time of the sentiments of the British Cabinet-aware perhaps, itself, of the folly of lighting up a war in Turkey while the French were advancing into Poland-and clearsighted enough to see its consequences at the court of Vienna, in addition to all other causes of complaint from that quarter, had at last authorized an overture, with a view of engaging Austria to join in the common defence. In this overture, all matters of grievance were brought forward in an amicable manner; the prospect of great advantages to Austria was held out as the price of her accession; assurances were given, that the Emperor of Russia would bring his whole forces into the field; and explanations were offered for the entrance of the Russians into Moldavia: The whole, however, was accompanied with an intimation, not very unlike a menace, that if this invitation was not complied with, the system of the Russian Cabinet might take an opposite • direction. This, let it be well remembered, was stated to the Court of Vienna so early in December, as to make it clear that the instruction for it must have been given in the very first days of that month. Now it appears, from the papers presented to Parliament, that the application for a loan from England was not received by Lord Howick until the 1st of December; nor the requisition for diversions on the coasts of France and Holland until the 2d of January 1807;-consequently, Lord Howick's answers to these proposals could not have influenced the instruction under which Austria had been previously threatened with this opposite direction' of the Russian system.

,

Here, however, was a moment, the first that had offered, in which the intervention of the British Government appeared likely to be of effectual service to her ally. The chance was eagerly seized. The Russian propositions were supported with decision and zeal. The time appearing to be arrived, at which Austria might declare herself with greater advantage then at any future period of the war, not a moment was lost in oliering her the most ample and effectual support, in the event of her acceding to the Russian invitation. On the question which had