don. However, a pretty satisfactory idea may be formed of its progress, from the fact, that the funds of the Institution are insufficient to breed masters in sufficient numbers to keep pace with the demand; and every month applications are reeeived for teachers, with which it is impossible to comply.

- This is an obstruction which it is impossible sufficiently to lament; and which the friends of education and of liberality cannot be called upon too earnestly to remove. The vast work of education is now brought to that happy state, that a very inconsiderable annual sum is wanted to render its triumphs universal. The minds of the people are prepared to second our endeavours; and the expense is reduced to a mere trifle. Surely the liberality of the propertied classes, when the burden is so small which they are called upon to bear, will not be the only thing wanting to the accomplishment of this great and phi lanthropic purpose. A sum far less than is annually expended in many a single workhouse, would ensure the erection of schools, on the comprehensive principle, in every district in the kingdom; would supersede the assistance of the Government; and would finally place the education of the great body of the people, on that foundation on which it must always be most desirable to place it, the unconstrained support of those who have becn brought to desire it.

ART. X. The Resources of Russia, in the Event of a War with France; and an Examination of the prevailing Opinion relative to the Political and Military Conduct of the Court of St Petersburgh; with a short Description of the Cozaks. By M. Eustaphieve, Russian Consul at Boston. Third Edition.. America, printed. London, Reprinted by John Stockdale, Piccadilly. 1813.

ON

[With a Copyright notice, entered at the District Clerk's Office in Massachusets, in conformity to two acts of Congress' for the encouragement of learning,' &c. &c. &c.]

N inspecting the title-page of this work, and observing the defensive securities with which Mr Eustaphieve has thought fit to surround it, it naturally occurred to us to inquire who Mr Eustaphieve was. He tells us that he is a Russian Consul at Boston; and we have been able to learn nothing more of him, except that, about five years ago, he was a chorister in the chapel of Count Woronzow in London. Though neither of these stations scemed particularly favourable for the acquisition

of statistical information about Russia, we turned with some impatience to the work which he had guarded with so much care from the piracy of American booksellers.

The account of his statistical treasures, however, is very soon rendered. They consist of statements of the revenue, population, mines, shipping, &c. &c. of Russia, taken from an elementary book of geography lately published at St Peterburghof the number of troops, regular and irregular, with which she can oppose an invading army, borrowed from the same authentie source of information-and of the means by which she can pay and subsist these troops within her territories. The conelusion which the learned author draws from this abstract of his Gazetteer, is, that Russia cannot possibly be conquered on her own soil-a conclusion so extremely comfortable, that we are but little disposed to quarrel with it-although more captious critics might suggest, that Bonaparte forced his way to Moscow, last autumn, in spite of the Gazetteer; and that his progress was arrested, less by the troops regular and irregular of his Imperial Majesty, than by the severity of the season, and the conflagration of the Eastern metropolis. A good deal might be said upon these topics; but we really have not the heart to insist on them. And as the result of the campaign has been, that, somehow or other, the invader has lost his army, we think a zealous disputant-especially if he be a Russian—may be indulged, like his brother Cossacks of the war, in a few irregular advantages; and allowed to evade explaining minutely how so great a good has been achieved, or on what principle of national power Russia may rely for the successive discomfiture of similar attacks.

We should have but little to say, indeed, to Mr Eustaphieve, if we had nothing to complain of but the want of originality, or anthority, in his Russian statistics. Such as they are, they probably give most of his readers a better idea of the truth, than they ever had before; and we are very willing to excuse a national champion for partialities and exaggerations, which are so easily engendered between patriotism and ignorance. But this writer, we are sorry to say, comes before us in the character of an English ministerial pamphleteer; and, far as such a thing seem ed to lie out of the way of a Russian Consul in America, the main scope of his work is undoubtedly to traduce and vilify the Administration that directed the affairs of this country in 1806, and the early part of 1807. We cannot say that we at any time approve of the interference of aliens in our domestic factions and party quarrels ;-and most certainly there is nothing in the style or manner of Mr Eustaphieve, which tends

to reconcile us to the calling in of such auxiliaries. He has adopted both the manner and the matter of our worst party newspapers; and has imitated his models with such complete success, that we have more than once been tempted to doubt his individuality even as a Russian Consul; and to suspect, that he must be some unprosperous member of the paragraphic corps, who has assumed this disguise, in order to disseminate in the New World the scurrilities which can no longer find readers in the Old.

At all events it must be admitted, that the charges against the Government of 1806 have not gained any thing, in point of temperance or dignity of manner, by the foreign residence and consular dignity of the person by whom they are renewed; and that his accuracy, consistency, and decorum, are barely on a level with those of his coadjutors of the London daily press. What shall we say, for instance, of the candour of a writer, who attacks a Ministry for the loss of Dantzick, when Dantzick was not taken until nearly three months after they were out of office ?-What shall we think of his intellect or his information, when he insists upon the gross neglect of not relieving Dantzick from England in the middle of the winter ?-What of his decorum and knowledge of character, when he tells us that Lord Hutchinson sent home false representations of the state of affairs, because he was disappointed of being made Commander in Chief of the Russian forces ?-Or of his knowledge of English politics, when he gravely informs the Americans, that the Administration which he so much decries, was turned out of office on account of the peace of Tilsit,-though all the world knows that they were displaced on account of the Irish Catholics, and that the change of Ministry happened in March, and the peace of Tilsit in the July following? The whole work, indeed, is of the same stamp: nor should we have thought of entering into any examination of its contents, had it not been for reasons similar to those which we have stated in entering upon our late review of Mr Leckie. The most fatal sign of the times, perhaps, is that disposition to distrust and discredit all public characters, of which the spirit of servility never fails to take advantage, to detach the people from their natural leaders and protectors:-And, considering who the men were who conducted the Government in 1806, the third edition of a renewed attack upon them in 1812, is a symptom which ought not to be neglected. The vindication of calumniated ministers, too, becomes more of a public duty, the more we see of that system of recrimination which has been introduced of late years into our debates-which has crept from our debates into our councils-and seems now to be considered as one of the ordinary and

legitimate defences of an existing administration. The principle of this system, is, that if one set of ministers have mismanaged the public affairs-this is to give full warrant and sanction to their opponents, when they come into office, to mismanage them still more. Against such a principle, which converts the lowest species of polemic logic into the chief engine for directing the affairs of a mighty empire, we might be permitted to enter our protest, even if we were forced to admit the existence of the malversations, which were thus preposterously brought forward to match and excuse the malversations by which they have been followed. There is no room, however, for such an admission. And considering for how many fatal blunders the supposed blunders of 1806 have been proposed as a set-off and compensation, it is really of some consequence to inquire a little into the evidence of their existence ;-more especially as we cannot unfold the system which regulated our foreign policy at that memorable period, without bringing into notice principles that ought never to be forgotten, and facts which appear to be but imperfectly known in the country which they principally concern. We have long wished, therefore, for an opportunity of explaining, in a few words, the true system of our foreign policy in 1806, and think it desirable that an intelligible account of it should be preserved somewhere among the accessible materials of our history.

If we are to trust to Mr Eustaphieve and his followers, indeed, the origin of that system is to be found at once in the villany and baseness of a Jacobin connexion-a tenderness for France-a disregard of our national honour-and a desertion of our proper place in the great European commonwealth. This, however, will not go down we believe even among the American admirers of the Russian Consul at Boston: And we are sure that there is not a man in England who will feel any thing but contempt at the imputation of such sentiments to Lord Grenville, Lord Spencer, Lord Fitzwilliam, and the late Mr Windham. Nay, the day is now past in which such calumnies, if indeed they ever were seriously listened to, can prevail against the honest fame of Mr Fox. The fact is, that that illustrious statesman, to the last moment of his life, never relaxed from that extreme jealousy of the power and preponderance of France, which he had imbibed in his youth; and indeed a great part of his opposition to the war of 1793, arose from his strong conviction of its tendency to increase that among the other evils against which it was directed. Wide and fundamental differences had indeed subsisted between himself and some of his best friends, as to the true policy of this country at the breaking out of the French Revolution; but all the

great questions to which those differences gave rise, had long been set at rest. Those of the Whig party who had sided with Mr Burke, now saw that the high tone with which they had set out, could no longer be maintained to any practical purpose; and that tone indeed had been abandoned by the great body of the nation. The peace of Amiens had settled for ever the question of principle, in any future contest we might have with France: And nothing, therefore, stood in the way of a reconciliation which the public cause demanded, and for which their affections never were unprepared. Accordingly when, upon the death of Mr Pitt, they were called to the direction of the public affairs, they formed a Cabinet with Lord Grenville and Lord Sidmouth-thoroughly and cordially united on all the great principles both of peace and of war.

This important question of peace being thus finally disencumbered of all its revolutionary difficulties, and reduced to a question of terms between two established governments, Mr Fox, speedily after his acceptance of the Foreign Seals, and with the unanimous concurrence of the Cabinet, entered upon a negociation on principles which will be found in the State Papers of that time, and which being there recorded, are placed beyond the reach of cavil or misrepresentation. It is of importance however to remark, that, in his correspondence with Talleyrand, will be found the most distinct and peremptory assertion of the undoubted right of this country to take an interest and a share in every thing that affected the general interests of Europe,-and to bear a part, as of old, in its continental as well as its maritime concerns. Here Mr Fox cast anchor. From this birth he never was driven; and when he died, his successor kept the same station. It has indeed been affirmed, somewhere, by Buonaparte, that if this illustrious man had lived, the peace would have been concluded; thereby insinuating a disagreement between Mr Fox and his colleagues on the terms offered by France. Nothing, however, can be more remote from the truth. Long before his death, Mr Fox was convinced that the negociation was conducted on the part of France, in a spirit inconsistent with any sincere desire for a pacification. We have the testimony of all his colleagues to the perfect unanimity of the Cabinet upon this, and indeed every other point.

The basis, then, of their external policy was, that peace was desireable, and ought to be sought by negotiation, as well as by war. The principles asserted in the negotiation have been already alluded to; but as there were, from the beginning, considerable doubts of obtaining the object by that course of pro