entertain the thought of putting Gibraltar into the hands of Spain, until that court, by a junction of their arms with those of his Ma jesty, shall actually and effectually recover and restore to the Crown of England the island of Minorca, with all its fortresses and har

bours.

With regard to that part of the minutes concerning the establishments made by British, subjects on the Mosquito shore, and in the Bay of Honduras, you will observe, on the perusal of the inclosed copy of M. d'Abreu's last memorial on that subject, that notwithstanding the generality of that paper, yet towards the conclusion of the same, he expressly gives to understand, that his court would for the present content themselves with the evacuation of the Mosquito shore, and the recent establishments in the Bay of Honduras; which he has explained himself to mean, those made, as expressed in the minute, since the conclusion of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle.

I am sorry to find it necessary at this time to mention again the King's great anxiety for the property of his subjects concerned in the Antigallican's prize, which, from the known equity of his Catholic Majesty, the King trusts will receive a decision agreeable to justice and the friendship subsisting between the two crowns.' III.204

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-210.

During the negociations of 1782, the proposal for the cession of Gibraltar was renewed by France, and met with a favourable reception from Lord Shelburne, who believed that the removal of that chief and standing obstacle to a cordial reconciliation between Spain and England, must materially diminish the future influence of France over the Spanish councils.' The proposal was, however, vehemently censured by Mr Fox and the party in opposition; and their disapprobation was reechoed by the voice of the nation, to whom Gibraltar was doubly endeared by its late gallant defence.' This resistance of Mr Fox might have been ascribed to the prejudices of habitual opposition, if it were not the natural result of his general opinions on national honour, which he once, in language which has been charged with exaggeration, called the sole reason of just war. If, indeed, we understand national honour to denote the principle of a nation who, strictly observing the rules of justice herself, will neither do nor endure wrong; who neither brooks insult, nor betrays fear, and rises in pride as her enemies rise in strength; it is difficult to conceive a greater public interest than that of preserving the reality and the reputation of such a lofty spirit: and it requires no violence of expression to comprehend, under national honour, every object of legitimate hostility. It was natural that Mr Fox should be peculiarly tenacious of his principle, at a time of such weakness and danger as 1782: hence it is at

such moments that wise states are most jealous of their honour, and avoid, with the greatest care, any concession that resembles a confession of weakness. Perhaps the coarse instinct of the multitude respecting Gibraltar, is wiser than the calculations of politicians. The mere fact, that a commercial and maritime people should choose, at a great expense, to retain this unproductive rock as a sort of military ornament, and that they should be able to maintain the most renowned fortress in Europe against all the force of two mighty monarchies, for more than a century, may contribute, more than politicians are aware, to spirit at home, and character abroad. The very pride which the multitude feel in the dominion of Gibraltar, and the horror which they have more than once expressed at proposals to relinquish it, are proofs of its moral value. If, indeed, the Spaniards were effectually emancipated from French power, the moment might perhaps be favourable for soothing their pride, and conciliating their friendship by the cession of Gibraltar. It never ought to be given but when the gift may be thought perfectly free.

We are told by Mr Coxe (III. 298), on the authority of a despatch from Lord Rochford at Madrid, of 17th September 1764, that the Duc de Choiseul, and the Marquis Grimaldi, had formed a diabolical scheme to burn the docks and naval arsenals of Portsmouth and Plymouth; and French engineers were already on the spot to superintend the design. The two Ministers (for we do not implicate the Sovereigns) of France and Spain waited with impatience the signal of a conflagra⚫tion which was expected to wither the naval strength of England, that they might renew hostilities.' An Englishman, of the name of Milton, was said to be an agent; and two inhabitants of Portsmouth and Plymouth, whose names, as far as Lord Rochford could conjecture from French orthography, were Worley and Leynit, were supposed to have promised their aid.

Mr Coxe tells us, that the periodical publications of 1765 alluded to the alarm and precautions occasioned by this plot; and he considers the conflagration partly executed by John the Painter as a renewal of this scheme. That Lord Rochford believed this story, must be admitted; but a charge so atrocious ought not to be received into history, without much stronger evidence than the anonymous testimony of a spy; which must have been the ground of the ambassador's belief. The attempt to exculpate Louis XV. and Charles III., is utterly ineffectual; for however courtesy or policy may relieve sovereigns from responsibility for acts of State, it is impossible that the French and Spanish Ministers could have hazarded a crime, of which the

detection must have produced war, without the consent of their masters. However atrocious the mission of John the Painter may have been, it took place during war; while the abomination of 1764 was projected in a period of profound peace and pretended friendship. There are no traces of the discovery of the English accomplices; and the alarm and precautions in our ports, might have originated in Lord Rochford's despatch alone. The mention' of a new kind of fire invented for the purpose,' is a very suspicious circumstance, and throws a discredit over the whole story. Such inventions are not, in the present state of knowledge, capable of being concealed. It seems, therefore, just to reject so horrible an accusation, so slightly supported; and this is most becoming a British writer, on a case respecting his own country, and where the charge affects her rivals and general enemies; particularly as it is repugnant to the character of the age, of the Duc de Choiseul, and of the Bourbon Princes. But if we believe this anecdote, we must confess ourselves unable to match it in all the scenes of the last twenty years; and we are compelled to own, that, in the morality of her Sovereigns and Statesmen, Europe had little to lose by any revolution.

In the Count de Florida Blanca's Apologetical Account of his administration, he claims the credit of having led the Russian Court into the plan of the Armed Neutrality, which was eagerly adopted by Catharine, but of which she soon grew weary, and which she used to ridicule under the name of the Armed Nullity.' This was effected by detaining all neutral vessels in the Straits, under pretence of the blockade of Gibraltar; and by answering to the complaints of the neutral Ministers at Madrid, that if their Sovereigns would resist the similar claims of England, such pretensions would be relinquished by Spain. Whether the account be true, may be doubted. It is more reasonable to suppose, that Spain detained these ships in pursuance of those maxims which she, in common with all other belligerent powers, had invariably adopted; for Mr Coxe is mistaken in supposing, that France had before contended for the principles of the neutral system. No power had more uniformly professed, or more rigorously enforced, diametrically opposite maxims. The controversy is of too legal a character, to be precisely stated by popular writers of history.

The offer of the British Ministers, to purchase the interposition of Catharine by the cession of Minorca, is a fact little known; but the proposal seems perfectly agreeable to the general maxims of sound English policy. The possession of Minorca would have naturally rendered Russia more the ally of England, the

mistress of her communication with her new acquisition; and more the rival of the House of Bourbon, who considered themselves as the lords of the Mediterranean, and who must have viewed with jealous eyes the establishment of a new Power in their own sea.

ART. IX. Report of the Finance Committee, and Trustees of the Royal Lancasterian Institution for the Education of the Poor. London, 1812.

First Annual Report of the National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church. London, 1812.

A Vindication of Mr Lancaster's System of Education, from the Aspersions of Professor Marsh, the Quarterly, British, and Antijacobin Reviews, &c. By a Member of the Royal Institution. London, 1812.

Schools for all, in Preference to Schools for Churchmen only: Or, the State of the Controversy between the Advocates for the Lancasterian System of Universal Education, and those who have set up an exclusive and partial System, under the Name of the Church and Dr Bell. London, 1812.

IT T surely speaks a strange language on the part of the Church of England, that her existence should at this moment be held up as inconsistent with two of the grandest objects to which the eyes of mankind can be directed-religious liberty and ge neral education.

They who exert themselves to place her in this suspicious attitude, do no doubt deny that she is hostile to either:-And when was the time that persons in a dubious cause did not bestow a good name upon their own proceedings? But can they, who strain every nerve to hold a large portion of their fellow-citizens under unequal laws-that is, to a certain degree, to outlaw them, on account of religious opinions, be justly designated by any other name than intolerant? And can they, who rise up against the most efficient system for the instruction of the body of the people that ever was promulgated; who first endeavour to prevent entirely any such instruction; and, after that is found impracticable, exert themselves to supplant a more efficient by a less efficient system; in other words to prevent, if not all education, at least a great degree of it, be considered in any other light than that of its enemies?

We know very well, that many of the persons who oppose themselves to the best scheme of education, are men of pure, and even of philanthropic intentions. It is also perfectly true, that the steps which have been taken in the name of the Church, might at one time have been, regarded as a national advantage; and that they are bad, now only in so far as they tend to deprive the nation of a still greater good. But, in a matter like this, a difference in degree is every thing; and we entreat our readers to consider, but for a moment, the striking effects produced by a slight shade of superiority in the moral and intellectual training of a whole nation.

It is not necessary that they should compare a Turkish and a British population. Let them only reflect upon the state of the Irish, as compared with the English population,-both living under the same constitution,-both governed by the same laws, yet differing to so prodigious an extent in what they respectively contribute to the common good. Let them consider the population of Scotland, between whom and the English, though the difference is far less wide, the comparison is, perhaps, still more instructive. We desire our opponents to tell us, in what respect the circumstances of the English population have not been more favourable than those of the Scotish, except in the article of schooling alone? For we do not suppose it will be asserted, in the quarter to which we are addressing ourselves, that the religious instruction of the Scots has been better than that of the English, or its Church-establishment of a better description. Scotland was the poorest country. The lower orders in Scotland were a less regarded race. They had fewer political privileges; and the long continuance of the feudal system, had left there a more marked and degrading distinction between the productive classes and those immediately above them, than there is any conception of in England. All these causes of elevation to the. minds of the English populace, were highly favourable both to their intellectual and moral virtues; and yet their inferiority to the Scots in both, has ceased to be a matter of dispute. On the subject of its consequences,-on the importance of such a difference, two facts speak a language which cannot be disregarded. Ist, There is no poor-rate in Scotland. In England, every, eighth or ninth man is a pauper; and the poor's rate, which was a little under five millions ten years ago, is probably as much more than six at present. 2d, According to the criminal calendars of the two countries, for every single criminal in Scotland, in an equal quantity of the population, you have eleven in England. The account then stands thus.

Violations of the law eleven times less frequent in Scotland,