and should unquestionably have been better authenticated, at least by a reference to some name.

This work opens with reflexions, or rather references to facts, respecting the share taken by Gustavus in the war which was preparing almost from the conclusion of the treaties of Luneville and Amiens. No power in Europe, it is justly observed, had so little interest as Sweden in the renewal of hostilities; and none was so little adapted, by situation and circunstances, to take any share in them. She had perhaps some interest, though not of a very honourable kind, in the renewal of a maritime war between the other states; but by this she could only gain as long as she remained neutral herself. To count upon her gaining by the Continental war, would have been ridiculous; but no man of common sense could pretend that she had the smallest chance of doing any thing else than expose herself to contempt, as well as certain loss, and the greatest risk of destruction, by affecting to take a part in the quarrels of the greater powers. A prince of ordinary prudence would have taken these obvious points into his consideration. But they chiefly related to the interests of the kingdom,-and the neglect of them must, in the first instance, ruin his country :-and therefore Gustavus foolishly thought they were below his notice-forgetting that his own ruin could not long be delayed after his people should be undone. His motives for interfering in the affairs of Germany, were all personal and selfish. He was desirous, we are told, and all his state papers prove it, of humbling a person, who, from a private station, had dared to aspire to sovereignty: He was in hopes of sharing in the glory of restoring the family of the Bourbons; and he expected the same success that attended his illustrious ancestor, whom he resembled literally in nothing but the name. The present publication is peculiarly delicate in one respect; it begins no earlier than the subject requires. Every one acquainted with the Swedish history, from the period when the regency of the Duke of Sudermania (the present King) ended, must be aware, that if personal attack had been the object of the work; or even if, in prosecuting its real design-the vindication of Gustavus's expulsion-great pains had not been taken to give only those things which were necessary for proving the case, a vast deal of condemnatory matter might easily have been collected, and would greatly have assisted the defence of the party opposed to the unhappy Prince.

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Having been seized with the silly desire of making a parade of warlike measures (for it never seems to have gone much beyond this point), he hurried away to Germany in July 1803, and remained there about a year and a half. The total neglect of

his kingdom during this period, is all that is laid to his charge by the authors of the work before us. They abstain from any account of his conduct while rambling up and down the German courts, where it is very well known he only exposed himself to ridicule by his extravagant pretensions-his unavailing personal abuse of Buonaparte, whom he always treated with contempt-and his little pertinacious squabbles about matters of etiquette. He then, unfortunately, made himself personally known to almost all the statesmen, who might otherwise have only communicated with him through some judicious and able negociators. Indeed, from what has been seen of Princes in modern times, one is frequently tempted to think them of the class of persons who gain extremely by making themselves scarce. However, Gustavus thought otherwise; and having no small idea of his military genius, as well as political acumen, he used to treat all the coteries of Germany with his resolutions to destroy Buonaparte, and restore the Bourbons.

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Upon the lamentable death of the Duc D'Enghien,' (the expression is a remarkable one considering from whence it proceeds), Gustavus instantly recalled his minister from Paris, and prohibited all political intercourse with France. • He was even strongly inclined (we are told) to declare war against that erful country;' and required the aid of Russia and England, we presume, as little auxiliaries in his Swedish Majesty's quarrel. This fume, however, evaporated; and the French mission was still suffered to remain in Stockholm, until the Moniteur mentioned the behaviour of Gustavus disrespectfully; whereupon the mission was ordered out of the country, and all French and Danish newspapers prohibited, together with some English ones-and, in general, every journal where unwelcome remarks were to be found. With his usual inconsistency, however, he suffered the commercial intercourse to remain uninterrupted; and he received constant irritation from the forbearance of the French government, under all his little ebullitions; for he construed it, nor was he much mistaken, into a sign of contempt. In truth, he was treated as a child by all parties; for all were aware of his imbecility, and only smiled at his own seeming ignorance of it.

Unhappily this royal personage was not a child (in power of doing mischief at least) in his own country. Buonaparte assumed the title of Emperor; the King of Prussia recognized it, and sent him the order of the Black Eagle; and Gustavus, indignant at having so low a fellow for his associate in the or der, lost not a moment in sending back his own to Berlin. This led to the recal of the Prussian mission from Sweden. The

Emperor Alexander having sent to Stockholm the badge of a Swedish order, worn by Paul, Gustavus refused to receive it because the bearer was not of a sufficient rank. He likewise sent back a Russian minister who was travelling through Sweden; and, by way of a conquest and extension of territory, he painted with the Swedish colours, the Russian side of a bridge on the frontiers of Finland. The Russian government took offence at this piece of decoration, and a considerable sum was spent in putting Swedish Finland in a state of defence: But in the end, Russia thought it better to let Gustavus have his own way; and, instead of making war, concluded a treaty with him, in which it would be hard to determine whether the two high contracting parties showed most folly or criminality in neglecting the obvious interests of their respective subjects. The chief stipulation was, that the King of Sweden should command a joint expedition against the Batavian Republic, composed of 25,000 Swedes, and 15,000 Russians,-and that war with France should be immediately declared, apparently without, any other cooperation. Indeed the dream in which Gustavus lived, and lost all recollection of his real existence, or of the age of the world in which France and Sweden were, seems on this occasion to have been extended to the Russian court.

When the negotiation with England was far advanced, and the subsidy on the point of being concluded, he had well nigh withdrawn from the coalition, because he could not admit of any other reason for the war being assigned, than the restoration of the Bourbons. But every thing with this small king appears to have been very near' and threat and almost- -The subsidy was agreeable, and the treaty was completed. Some money was paid for the fortifications at Stralsund; and England. was to pay for 12,000 men, of whom only 10,000 were to serve. This treaty was signed during the war in Swabia; and its object was to send an army of Russians and Swedes into the north of Germany. Their combined force scarcely amounted to 25,000; but they had many thousand copies of an ostentatious proclamation' by Gustavus, and another by Lewis XVIII.

The King of Prussia had not as yet declared himself; and every thing turned upon him. Accordingly a numerous corps of foreign ministers, all sent on special missions, were then collected at Berlin. Frederick William was beset by the greatest powers in the world. England, France, Austria and Russia, assailed him unceasingly with the most tempting offers, and held out the most alluring alternatives. In this delicate and hesitating state was he placed,-all those mighty nations awaiting in breathless suspense the fate of their coalitions and cam

paigns from his resolution,-when the valiant Gustavus, at this critical moment, thought proper, of himself, unasked, without concert or communication, to send the Prussian monarch a letter, peremptorily desiring to know his intentions, and announcing to him that a combined Russian and Swedish army was going to take possession of Hanover! Immediately before the arrival of this epistle, the Emperor of Russia, then in person at Berlin, had in a manner secured the cooperation of Frederick Wiliam;-and the Prussian minister, aware that Gustavus knew nothing of this important change when he wrote, and alarmed at the consequences the letter might produce, withheld the delivery of it; while the Swedish minister who had been sent with it, despatched the strongest representations to his master (now arrived at Stralsund) to recall it. Gustavus, however, would not listen to such a proposition, but wrote on the despatches with his own hand, that his minister should inform the Prussian Secretary, Que le Roi de Suede n'etoit pas fait pour que ses lettres ne fussent pas reçues.' This, we fancy, he thought a piece of infinite decision; and expected that it would gain him the credit of having determined the King of Prussia, the world not being aware that his resolution had been previously formed. The Swedish minister softened these expressions, and used them as his own. He was immediately recalled. Emperor of Russia, too, was accused by Gustavus, of helping to stop the current of his anger, or at least of not having done his utmost to hasten the delivery of this insane letter; and to punish him, he positively refused to command the combined army. He also refused to send any of his troops till he had in writing the King of Prussia's sentiments, and was so much irritated, that nothing could pacify him, till the Russian minister Alopæus received the letter, and promised to send it.'

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We have given this anecdote at length, because it marks, better than any general description, the kind of man whom the allies had to deal with, and the Swedes to suffer under. But there is scarcely a page of the narrative before us that is not illustrative of the same character,-varying between drivelling and madness, through all the stages of caprice, vanity, enthusiasm, and fury; but never passing the bounds of personal discretion, or exhibiting, even in its utmost extravagance, any symptoms of a rashness uncontrolled by fear. To appear a great man, was this weak Prince's perpetual object; and to attain it, he was inclined to do just enough to set himself adreaming, and to give a slight pretext for issuing proclamations and bulletins. No better illustration of this can be conceived, than his proceedings on the occupation of Lauenburg. During

the negotiations with Berlin, and after having well ascertained that his troops would not be molested, he approached them towards Luneburg. He went into the most minute details himself, always fancying that he had a universal military genius, though ignorant of the very rudiments of war. The Governor-General' (we are told), and others acquainted with the country, were not consulted concerning the order of march; and thus it often happened, that the troops were ordered to • take up their quarters in villages which were no where to be found but on paper. Thus, the battalions of Guards, and the King's regiment, were left without shelter on the 26th of November, and in the most dreadful weather. The same improvidence existed with regard to provisions; and those who were ordered to form magazines, were left ignorant where they were to be situated.

p. 21.

After a delay of five weeks, arising from such miserable folly, the Swedish army were ordered to march; and a body of troops seized on Harburg, where they were commanded by the King to double the customs, and appropriate one half to the military chest. This occasioned many complaints, being directly contrary to the Treaty of Westphalia, which was so constantly appealed to in the Swedish proclamations. It was accordingly repealed, and the measure' abandoned, after yielding, with much difficulty, the sum of twenty-six rix-dollars, or about 47. 16s. 8d. to the Swedish conqueror. While he was thus carrying on his great plans in the North, that upstart creature, whom he had treated with such a dignified contempt under the name of Mr Buonaparte, took occasion to destroy the Austrian and Russian armies at Austerlitz. The immediate consequence of this discourteous and low-bred behaviour was, that the Swedish army was left alone upon the wrong bank of the Elbe, unsupported by either Russians, Prussians or English, and in the certainty, if it were worth any body's while, of being surrounded and taken. The English had left Hanover to its fate; and their Minister represented to the King of Sweden the folly of making any farther attempt, under existing circumstances, to defend it. Gustavus considered that this was the fit moment for him to assume the title of Protector of the territory of Lauenburg. For this reason (continues our author), he required that the King of England should officially desire him to retreat. It was in vain to represent, that, by this step, the King of England would, as Elector of Hanover, appear to authorise the occupation of this country by Prussia. Gus"tavus Adolphus had resolved to await the determination of <the Court of London, and, rather than retire, expose himself

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