change and alteration, both in the jurisprudence and constitution of the realm, but in its probable consequences likely, beyond any that has ever in our times been adopted, to work a general and fundamental change in the system. But it is not for its novelty that we blame this project: The change which it is to make, we consider not merely to be extensive, but pernicious; it af fords an inadequate remedy to the evil; and a remedy, as far as it is one, of a kind inapplicable to the evil. We are therefore willing to examine it in this point of view, through the medium of the tracts now before us, whereof the first and third are the almost avowed works of Sir S. Romilly, and the second of Lord Redesdale.

The unexampled delays of late years experienced in legal proceedings, both before the House of Lords and the Court of Chancery, and the great accumulation of business in those courts, whether that be the result or the cause of the delays, are well known to every person moderately versed in the recent history of parliament. Under the late administration, a reform of the Scotish Courts was proposed, as an effectual remedy for the worst part of the evil, the delay in appeal business; and it was hoped, that the improvement in the administration of justice in the courts below, would so far satisfy the suitors, as to diminish the number of appeals. Such an improvement would undoubtedly, in the course of time, produce this salutary effect; but it was not very likely to afford any immediate relief to the pressure so much complained of. The ministry being changed while the plan was in agitation, after the bill had gone through several stages, it was thrown out, and a plan of the new ministers substituted in its place. It differed from the former in two material particulars: it divided the Court of Session into two, instead of three courts, and it omitted the intermediate Court of Review. Our readers are aware, that we did not think very highly of either of those distinguishing features of the first project, and considered them as liable to some very unpleasant suspicions, connected with matter of patronage. It will not therefore be supposed that we could feel very hostile to the modifications under which the plan of their predecessors was by the present ministers carried into effect.

Whatever may have been the advantages obtained by the new arrangement, it has certainly not contributed, in any degree, to the object which the authors of it had principally in view. It has not diminished the number of appeals. The average yearly number of appeals from Scotland, during nine years ending 1808, was 37; and exclusive of 1807, in which the extraordinary number of 65 was entered, the average was only 33. In 1808, the new arrangement of the courts was in operation

but only during six weeks. Its effects, therefore, could not be materially felt during the early part of the Session 1809. The number presented in that session, viz. 43, is not therefore to be taken as a fair criterion either way. But 1810 affords a more unexceptionable test, because by law no appeal could be entered, during any part of that year, from any judgment pronounced while the old system was in operation. In 1810, however, before the middle of April, there were entered 45 appeals; and though the accounts before both Houses of Parliament are defective, in the returns for the remaining part of the session, inasmuch as they only give those entered after April, and remaining undisposed of in June 1811, yet as there then stood in that predicament nine cases, we may infer, that the whole entry for 1810 was upwards of 54 cases. In the same way we find, that at least 56 appeals were entered in 1811. It is therefore manifest, that the new arrangement has not diminished, but increased the number of appeals. The increase of trade, or rather of commercial difficulties, may no doubt have had some share in augmenting the number of lawsuits in Scotland, as every where else. But we are disposed to think, that much of the increase of appeals is owing to the new arrangement itself, and arises from one of the chief advantages of that arrangement, the greater despatch of busines which it has produced, and the consequent increase in the number of causes heard and determined;-a prodigious benefit unquestionably to the country, but attended with an increase instead of a diminution of the evil, to remedy which the plan was originally proposed. In a word, it signifies not, as far as regards the evil in question-the pressure of appeal business in the Lords-whether the augmentation since 1808 is owing to the diminished confidence in the Courts below, or (as we are sure will be found to be the case) to the greater despatch of business: The remedy has been tried, and found ineffectual; nay, it has been found to remove an evil which it was not so much intended to meet, as another, which it has considerably augmented.

During the two last Sessions, the attention of Parliament has been drawn to this important subject with laudable perseverance, by several distinguished members of both houses; and it speedily appeared, that together with the accumulation of appeals in the House of Lords, the only evil inquired into upon the former occasion, an equal accumulation of suits in Chancery had all the while been going on, under the auspices of the same learned and eminent person who presides in the House of Lords. Various were the suppositions resorted to for the purpose of explaining this fact. Some contended, that the vast increase of trade, the progress of luxury, the augmented population, the

improved agriculture and extended commerce of land, must equally affect the business in all the Courts; and that the number of suits in Equity, as well as the number of appeals from all the Courts, must consequently, and in the same proportion, increase. Others contended, that the fact was otherwise; and that the increase was not so much in the number of suits brought into the Court of Chancery, as in the number left undetermined in any given time, by the noble Chief of the Court. It was remarked, that the Courts of Common Law, in which business had really increased beyond all doubt, and in a high proportion, had met the augmented pressure by increased exertion; and that "there was, notwithstanding the vast multiplication of suits at law brought, little or no increase of arrear on suits left undecided. It was suggested, also, that the other departments of the Court of Chancery, and particularly the court where the Master of the Rolls presides, suffered in no respect from the augmentation of business, although of late years a great part of the Chancellor's business had gone there ;-that the Privy Council, where similar circumstances should have produced an equal arrear, but where the same judge, Sir W. Grant, also sits, suffered no such inconvenience ;-that the inferior judicatures all over the kingdom went on as formerly, notwithstanding the increase of trade, and crimes, and litigation ;-and that the arrear of unheard causes waiting for a hearing, and of causes heard, -but waiting for decision, was confined to those courts in which the chief legal character in the country presides. The same persons who noted those distinctions in the different judicatures, observed others in the different departments which the Chancellor himself superintends. They remarked, that he had political as well as legal functions; and that, generally speaking, his law business was in arrear, and in nearly an equal degree; while his Cabinet and Parliamentary business went on with the proper despatch, and indeed almost as easily and regularly as the mere disposal of his patronage, which can scarcely be classed among the duties of the office, but belongs rather to its enjoyments. And so (they contended) would it be with court intrigues, if any Chancellor should ever engage in such matters; for they reasoned thus-A man cannot be at work the whole night, and the whole day; and if he must be always debating in Parliament, or deliberating at councils, he can have little time left for hearing causes. Now, the political business relates to the tenure and security of the office-the legal to the execution of its duties; and a man will be very apt to regard the former first. Nay, some went so far as to trace the delays complained of, to the character and habits of the individual who hath so

long held the seals. They showed, that it had all arisen since he came into office; and that, though no one could in the least degree question his purity as a judge, his turn of mind was not that of decision--at least in legal matters; in which all the praise bestowed by Dryden on Lord Shaftesbury was applicable to him, except swiftness of despatch.'*

But whatever may be the nature of the present Chancellor's connexion with the delay and arrear in question, no doubt can exist, that he is so far connected with it, as to be called upon for a full consideration of the subject. Now, he has not only confessed the justice of this call, but he has gone farther; or, at least he has done that which ought to have been preceded by the most ample inquiry and the most mature reflection. He has proposed a specific remedy, as it appears to us, of a most perilous nature; and the merits of this measure we are now to consider. They form the subject matter of the interesting tracts before us. We may premise, in a single sentence, the outline, or rather the whole body of the plan; for, unquestionably, it has the merit of extreme simplicity. It consists in creating a new office, subordinate to that of the Chancellor and somewhat mysteriously connected with it-in some sort vicarious to it. The duties belonging to this new office are omitted in the scheme;-they are stated at least so generally, that they might as well have been left wholly in blank. They are to be such as the Chancellor shall from time to time appoint. The new officer is to do as the old one bids him; and that is all we know about the trifling matter of his functions. The rest is sufficiently definite: The important points of his title, rank, and salary, are adjusted with an admirable precision. He is to be called "Vice-Chancellor of England." He is to have precedence next after the Master of the Rolls, and his salary is to be five thousand a-year,-which we may remark, in passing, will either be too much or too little, according as the Chancellor pleases. The bill does not set forth by what style he is to be addressed; which, considering its fullness on every other particular, is somewhat odd: But it has been whispered, that "His Honour" is the phrase-although there are not wanting suspicions that he may only turn out to be "His Worship.' For the sake of despatch, and in order at

*In Israel's courts ne'er sat an Abethdin

With more discerning eyes, or hands more clean;
Unbribed, unsought the wretched to redress,
Swift of despatch, and easy of access,
Oh! had he been content to serve the crown,
With virtues only suited to the gown.' &c. &c.
Absalom and Achitophel.

once to relieve the Chancellor from business, and to diminish the cost and delay of litigation, an appeal is allowed from this deputy-keeper to his principal.

This project was first submitted to the consideration of Parliament last Session, and had actually passed the Lords; but no discussion at all worthy of its importance took place before the dissolution; and the controversy (if so we may call a dispute so unequal) began with the first of these Tracts, which was published, upon the bill being again introduced, early in the present Session. There is much reason to regret that the eminent lawyer, from whose pen it comes, had not sufficient leisure to take a more detailed view of the subject; but he gives a most clear and satisfactory summary of the principal heads of the argument, and states the points in a manner at once enlightened and practical. It is a statement which could only have proceeded from actual experience in the branch of the profession upon which it is proposed to legislate; and would on this account deserve the greatest attention, even if its own merits were less prominent.

The author distinctly sets before us the nature of the change which the plan will effect in the administration of justice in our chief Court of Equity; and in truth we need go no farther for an exposition of its imperfections. The professed object of the arrangement is to give the Chancellor more time for attending to appeals in the House of Lords. For this purpose a Vice-Chancellor is created, that the Chancellor may have a second assistant Judge, upon whom he may devolve as much of his other duties, as shall leave him the time required for appeals in Parliament. It is at present optional with the suitors, whether they shall set down their causes before the Master of the Rolls, or the Chancellor; but the new Judge is to be so mere a deputy, that suitors shall have no option in the matter; but all who mean to set their causes down before the Chancellor, shall do it liable to this contingency, that he may send the whole, or a part, or none, as he pleases, before his new assistant. Then, by the supposition, he must send a sufficient number to gain a considerable portion of time: since, if he does not, the plan effects nothing. What part of his duties will he so delegate? The business of the Chancellor consists of causes, interlocutory proceedings, of motions and petitions, and appeals from the rolls. The latter branch could with no propriety or consistency be transferred, for obvious reasons; and it forms but an inconsiderable branch of the Chancellor's duty, those appeals not exceeding nine in a year, on an average of the last ten years. The second, though considerable, especially of late years, is much less extensive than the first branch. That must, therefore, with a part probably of the second, be transferred; but our author appears persuad