The power of the courts to grant limes divorces is well settled in this country. Cre and inhuman treatment and abandonment a frequent grounds of action; there must be either actual violence committed, attend. with danger to life, limb or health, or reaser JOHNSON, J. It appears that Barsalou is in insolvency, and the plaintiff's claim is made there, so that it is really only the costs that depend on the judgment now to be given. I do not think that the defendant is liable. The action was on an alleged suretyship; and the defendant pleaded that it was given condition-able apprehension of such violence. A singl ally, that is, Barsalou only undertook to pay whatever balance might remain in hand after the completion of the work by the men for whom he went security. There is no legal proof of the suretyship alleged. It was urged that the defendant had included the plaintiff's claim in his list of liabilities; but it was done at the request of the assignee, and without any admission of liability.. Action dismissed with costs. Hutchinson, for plaintiff. DIVORCE. (Continued from page 611.) Ordinarily divorces are sought upon grounds, or for causes arising after marriage; but there are cases in which the cause may have existed before and at the time of the marriage, as in the case of incurable impotency. Impotency arising from idiocy is no cause for divorce in Vermont. Norton v. Norton, 2 Aiken, 188 Vide Devanbagh v. Devanbagh, Paige, 550; 6 id. 175; Newell v. Newell, 4 id. 25. Adultery is a good ground for an absolute divorce in all the States of the Union except South Carolina. The statutes of the various States differ in matters of detail, and, therefore, require your examination. There has been an exception to this general rule, where it has been held that adultery committed by an insane wife did not furnish grounds for divorce in Vermont, Massachusetts and Alabama. The contrary was held in Pennsylvania. Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Penn. St. (6 Barr.) 332. Divorces have been granted by some of our State legislatures, but it has not been generally practised. And in some cases the State courts have denied the power of the legislature to grant divorces. In many of the State constitutions there are prohibitory clauses against such rights and confer the power upon the courts alone. act of cruelty, unless it is a very aggravati one, is not of itself sufficient ground of separ tion; the acts must be persistent, or reasona ground for believing that they will be cortinued. If the husband has offered s indignities to his wife's person as to render be condition intolerable and life burdensome. ye such indignities need not be such as to e danger her life, to cause a good ground fors divorce. In Tennessee it was considered good ground of a divorce a menså et thoro, when the husband made gross and unfounded charge of adultery against his wife, and endeavored w criminate her in adultery with a servant. If a husband whip his wife, or threatens or attemp to commit adultery; or if he curses or abases her, or uses insulting and opprobrious language; or when the husband is in the habit of using vile and abusive language towards his wife, causing her much mental suffering and fits of illness, threatening permanent injury to her health, or making groundless charges f adulterous intercourse against his wife, are grounds of cruel treatment. Austerity of temper, sallies of passion. abusive language, and mere indignities to the moral character or reputation of his wife, vulgar, obscene or harsh language, with such epithets that deeply wound the feelings and excite the passions, without any menace indicating violence to the person, do not afford sufficient grounds of divorce; nor will a divorce be granted on the ground of extreme cruelty where it appears that the party complaining provoked the violence or misconduct complained of, unless such violence was extremely out of proportion to the provocation. If a wife render her husband's "condition intolerable and his life burdensome," or if her conduct is so violent and outrageous as to render the proper discharge of the duties of married life impossible, it is a good ground of separation from her. Such abuse or indignities offered by the wife to the husband would not justify him in turning her out of doors; he must show ach cruel or barbarous treatment or danger of is life, as would entitle him to a divorce. Dertion or abandonment by either husband or ife is one ground for divorce; but the esertion or abandonment must be intentional, r wilful and malicious, with an intent to enounce and disregard the marriage relation. The length of time required to justify a divorce on the above grounds is not uniform in the several States. Abandonment must be the deliberate act of the party and done with the intent of breaking up the conjugal relationship; and where it is mutual and deliberate on both sides no divorce a vinculo will be granted to either party. Where a husband has intentionally and against the consent of his wife, abandoned all matrimonial intercourse and companionship with her and denied her the protection of his home, although at the same time he may have contributed to her support during the time, yet it is a good ground for a divorce. A wife who, without just and reasonable cause, refuses to accompany her husband, is guilty of desertion; but if the husband persist in taking her to a place where her health may be endangered, or near his relatives where she believes she could not live happily, such desertion would not be considered wilful. To constitute desertion on the part of the wife, she must absent herself from her husband on her own accord, without his consent and against his will. course. The refusal of a wife to remove with her husband to a foreign country is not a wilful desertion. A husband is not justified in deserting his wife because she refuses him marital interRefusal of such intercourse for five years consecutively, although not justified by considerations of health, is not in Massachusetts "desertion." Nor is it any ground for desertion or divorce by the wife that her husband's marital intercourse is very frequent, if she has no peculiar debility or physical infirmity, and there is no violence or compulsion on the part of the husband. If a husband should go away and live apart from his wife, it is not considered a desertion within the meaning of the statutes of New Jersey. It seems to me it would be more equitable and humane that some limit of time should govern the separation, otherwise the marriage may become a failure and the many attributes arising out of the contract are rendered nugatory. The failure to supply the wife with such necessaries and comforts as are within the husband's circumstances and thus by cruelty compelling her to quit him, amounts to actual abandonment and desertion. In Scotland a divorce may be obtained by the husband or the wife on the ground of adultery or wilful desertion for four years without just cause, after adopting the forms of the act 1873, c. 55, so far as these are required. In Scotland the wife has precisely the same rights as the husband. Such actions are conducted before the Court of Sessions. As a preliminary, the pursuer is required to make oath that the suit is not collusive. The summons must be served upon the defendant personally when he is not a resident in Scotland: but upon evidence satisfactory to the court, that the defendant cannot be found, edicto citation will be held sufficient; but in every case of edictae citation the summons must be served on the children of the marriage, if any, and one or more of the next of kin of the defendant, exclusive of their children, when the children and next of kin are known and resident within the United Kingdom; and such children and next of kin, whether cited or so resident or not, may appear and state defences to the action. In suit of adultery the husband may cite the alleged adulterer as a co-defendant, and the court may order him to pay the whole or any part of the costs, or may dismiss him from the action, as may seem just. Divorce is barred by condonation, as well as by collusion or connivance. Recrimination cannot be pleaded as a defence to exclude the suit; but it may be stated in a counter action, as the mutual guilt may affect the patrimonial interests of the parties. The legal effect of divorce on the ground of wilful desertion under the act of 1573, c. 55, is that the offending husband is bound to restore the tocher (dos) and to pay or implement to the wife all her provisoes, legal or conventional; and the offending wife forfeits all her terce and all that would have come to her had the marriage been dissolved by the predecease of the husband. After divorce both parties are at liberty to marry again; but the act of 1600, c. 20, annuls any marriage contracted between the adulterer and the person with whom he or she is declared by the sentence of divorce to have committed the offence.-From lectures by Isaac Van Winkle. CURRENT EVENTS. IRELAND. LORD JUSTICE CHRISTIAN'S SUCCESSOR.-Mr. Gerald Fitzgibbon, Q.C., Solicitor General for Ireland, has been appointed Lord Justice of Appeal, in room of Lord Justice Christian, resigned. | Mr. Fitzgibbon, who is in his forty-ninth year, took his degree in 1859, was called to the bar in 1860, rose rapidly in his profession, and was made Queen's Counsel in 1872. He is a son of Master Fitzgibbon, who, before his appointment as a Master of Chancery, had enjoyed a very high position at the Irish bar as a lawyer and Nisi Prius advocate. The London Law Journal says, that the moderation of Lord Justice Fitzgibbon's political views before his removal to the bench and his great legal reputation will render his appointment a most satisfactory one to the public. CANADA. THE LINCOLN ELECTION.-The protracted litigation in the Lincoln local election case appears to be drawing to a close. The judgment of the Court of Appeal, on reserved points, given on Monday, Dec. 23, says a daily journal, adds 22 votes to the respondent's previcus majority, making it three more than declared by the returning officer three years ago. The votes had all been struck off by the registrar, against whose rulings the appeal was taken. This virtually decides the case in Mr. Rykert's favor, but as he resigned his claim two years ago to the seat, all it does now is to keep Mr. Neelon out. Mr. Hodgins has several appeals to be heard against the registrar's rulings, but at the most these can only amount to half a dozen, and cannot, therefore, reverse the main result. The question of costs will likely take some time to decide, so that it may be a twelvemonth yet before this most remarkable case is finally disposed of. The cost in witnesses' fees, &c., up to the present, is said to amount to $17,000. THE LATE MR. JUSTICE DOUCET.-P. A. Donca Esq., Judge of the Sessions of the Pea, Quebec, died on Saturday, Dec. 21. The da ceased was a son of Pierre Doucet, Esq. merchant, of Quebec. He was born in that city on the 15th of February, 1815, and received his education there. In 1848 he married Me Marie Thérèse Delphine, daughter of Hon. J. C. Bruneau, late a Judge of the Superior Court. Mr. Doucet studied law with J. G. Baird, Esq. and the late G. Drolet, Esq. He was called to the bar in 1838, and practised in the city of Quebec until appointed Clerk of the Court of Requests at Lotbinière on the 13th May, 1839. This Court having been abolished on the 28th January, 1842, Mr. Doucet was appointed Clerk of the District Court for the inferior District of Dorchester. He returned to the bar in 1844, and practised in partnership with the late Auguste Soulard, Esq. On the 20th Nov.. 1846, he was appointed Joint Clerk of the Peace for the District of Quebec, conjointly with the late F. X. Perrault. After the death of Mr. Perrault, Mr. Doucet was appointed Clerk of the Peace and of the Crown, conjointly with the late James Green, and after Mr. Green's decease, he was, on the 19th May, 1858, appointed sole Clerk of the Peace and of the Crown. On the 19th September, 1868, he was appointed Judge of the Sessions of the Peace. He was ex-officio one of the members of the Police Board of the city of Quebec, under 26 Vict. cap. 57. He was created a Knight of the Royal Order of Isabella Catolica, 9th Dec., 1871. He was also elected a member of the Royal Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation of Madrid, 1st June, 1876, and on the 30th June, 1876, a corresponding member of the Academy, with the rank of Professor. The Paris correspondent of the Times gives a list of names circulated in 1848 from the central police-office of Berlin as those of men politically dangerous. Among them are James Fazy, subsequently for seventeen years Dictator of Geneva, and in policy a Cæsarist; Louis Blanc, now philanthropic member of the Chamber; Herr Bluntschli, Heidelberg professor and devotee of Prince Bismarck's ideas; and Herr Bucher, permanent head of the Ger.nan foreign office, and Prince Bismarck's best servant, |