from the plaintiff bank, and there could be no recovery.-Banco de Lima v. Anglo-Peruvian Bank, 8 Ch. D. 160. above......and B. Newgass & Co.," &c. At the above date, the ship was on record classed "A 1," as above, but subsequently she was Bankruptcy. See Execution; Partnership, 3; declared unseaworthy by the agent of the Sale, 4. Shipping Association, and said classification stricken off. In an action by the owner against the charterer for refusing to load the ship, held, that the above statement was simply a warranty that the ship was classed in said record A 14 on said date, and not a warranty that the classification was correct, or that she should continue of that class.-French v. Newgass, 3 C. P. D. 163. Check.-See Bank, 1; Bills and Notes. Collusion.-See Judgment. Bequest.-S. died in 1628, leaving a will containing a bequest of £1,000 for "the relief and use of the poorest of my kindred, such as are not able to work for their living, videlicet, sick, aged, and impotent persons, and such as cannot maintain their own charge.... And my will is, that, in bestowing....my goods to the poor charitable uses, which is, according to my intent and desire, those of my kindred which are poor, aged, impotent, and any other way unable to help themselves, shall be chiefly preferred." The income from the charity fund became very large. Held, that the bequest was a charity; that the objects of it were primarily the kindred of the testator actually poor; and if, after such were provided for, something remained, it should be applied to the relief of poor persons in general, by the doctrine of cy-près. A wellto-do person among the kindred could not take, although by comparison " poorer" than some of the kindred. Dictum of WICKENS, V. C., in Taylor v. Gillam (L. R. 16 Eq. 581), criticised. -Attorney-General v. Duke of Northumberland, 7ceeding, and the issue of the B shares were Ch. D. 745. Bill of Lading.-See Bank, 2; Sale, 2. Bills and Notes.-A check had been given for a debt, when a trustee or garnishee process was served upon the debtors, whereupon they ordered payment on the check to be stopped. The check had not been presented. Held, that the stopping of payment of the check revived the debt, and the debt was held by the trustee process.-Cohen v. Hale, 3 Q. B. D. 371. Bonus.-See Will, 5. Boundary. See Landlord and Tenant, 2. Cancellation of Stock.-See Company, 1. Common Carrier.-See Railway, 1, 3. Company.-1. In 1860, the N. Company, limited, was formed to insure lives and injuries to health, and "generally" to effect such lawful insurances of all kinds as might "be determined upon by a general meeting" of the company. In 1872, a general meeting voted to add fire insurance to the company's business, and to issue new shares, called B shares, for this purpose. This was to form a separate department, and the assured under it were to be confined in their remedy to the B shares. Eminent counsel afterwards advised the company that this pro ultra vires; and a B shareholder accordingly got an order from chancery removing his name from the list of shareholders. An arrangement was then made by the N. company to form a new company for the fire business; and it was agreed between the N. company and the new fire company that the latter should take all the of the old fire department; that the fire comassets and assume all the risks and liabilities pany should issue its shares to the N. company and the other holders of the B stock, and credit them with the amounts paid thereon, and the N. company should cancel all the old B stock. The appellant, a B stockholder, took stock in the new fire company, got credit for his B stock, and the latter was cancelled. Afterwards, on an order to wind up the N. company, a firepolicy holder, who had insured in the N. company previous to the formation of the fire company, moved to place the appellant on the list of contributories in respect to his B shares. Held, that the issue of the B shares was not ultra vires; and that although the cancelling of the appellant's B shares in the formation of the new company was also valid, yet that, as to creditors of the N. company, whose rights had attached previous to such cancelling, the appellant was liable as a contributory.-In re Norwich Provident Insurance Co, Bath's Case, 8 Ch. D. 334. It is stated that students who are desirous of being called to the Irish Bar, are required to keep a number of terms at one of the London Inns of Court, and also to pay certain fees which go into the funds of the Inns. But, notwithstanding this keeping of terms in England and contribution to English Bar funds, Irish barristers are not recognized by the London Inns, nor admitted to practice before the English Courts. An effort has been made recently to introduce reciprocity, but it has proved a failure. A proposal was male by the Benchers of King's Inn, Dublin, to admit English barristers to practice before the Irish Courts, on condition of a similar privilege being accorded to Irish barristers wishing to prac- | tice in England. It seems, however, that few or no English barristers are desirous of appearing in the courts of the sister isle, and the committee of the four London Inns of Court, believing that the advantages of such an arrangement would be all on the side from which the offer proceeded, rejected the proposal. SELF-CRIMINATION. A good deal has been heard lately about witnesses declining by their answers to furnish evidence against themselves. While the point is engaging attention, reference may be made to a somewhat dramatic incident which occurred a short time ago in a court of Tennessee. In a prosecution for murder, an over-zealous Attorney-General, with a view to establish that a foot-print, observed near the scene of the murder, was made by the prisoner, caused a pan of soft mud, which was proved by a witness to be of the consistency of the mud where the track was made, to be brought into court, and the prisoner was asked to put his foot in it. In complying with this invitation he might have done so in a double sense. At all events, the case was carried, on a writ of error, to the Supreme Court of the State, and that tribunal has held that, notwithstanding the trial court told the prisoner, he need not put his foot in the mud unless he chose to do so, the fact that the mud was brought into court, and the prisoner asked to put his foot in it, was calculated to influence the jury improperly against him, and was, therefore, error, for which the verdict against the prisoner should be set aside. The desired evidence might probably have been obtained without objection from a detective, or other intelligent witness, who had carefully compared the prisoner's boot or foot with the track. A DIES NON. Why the 29th of February should be blotted out from the book of days juridical it would be hard to guess. Coming only once in four years it might seem to be worthy of special honor. It might be conjectured that at some remote time it was regarded on that very account as a high festival, and therefore not to be counted as a business day. Cowell's Law Dictionary, however, states that it was to prevent ambiguity. Leap-year was called bissextile, "because the sixth day before the Calends of March is twice reckoned, viz., on the 24th and 25th of February: so that the bissextile year hath one day more than other years, and happens every fourth year . . . and to prevent all ambiguity that might grow therefrom, it is ordained by the statute De Anno Bissextili, 21 H. 3, that the day increasing in the leap-year, and the day next before, shall be accounted but one day." The Supreme Court of Indiana, in the case of Helphinstine v. The Vincennes National Bank, had the point before it recently, and the ancient statute just referred to was quoted to support the rule followed by the Court. The action was to set aside a judgment in favor of the defendant, on the ground of insufficient service of summons. The service, it was admitted, would be good, if the 29th February, 1876, which intervened between the service and the return day, was to be counted as an ordinary day. The common law of England and statutes passed prior to 4th James I. being in force in Indiana, the judge held that the statute 21 Henry III. was in force in the State. By this statute, he remarked, it was provided, in refer ence to the 29th February, in leap-year, "Et computitur dies ille, et dies proxime precedens, pro unico die"-that day and the next preceding shall be counted as one day. This rule has been repeatedly laid down in the Courts of Indiana, and the Supreme Court, adhering to the previons decisions, declared the service insufficient. REPORTS AND NOTES OF CASES. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Present:-DORION, C. J., MONK, RAMSAY, TESSIER and CROSS, JJ. MCKINNON, appellant, and THOMPSON, Insolvency-Appeal-Security for Costs—Assignee. The appellant, defendant in the court below, appealing from a judgment against him, in favor of the respondent, who had become insolvent, moved that all proceedings on the part of respondent be suspended until he should have given security for costs, or until his assignee should have taken up the instance; and in default of this, that he (appellant) be permitted to proceed ex parte. Held, that the appellant was not entitled, under sec. 39 of the Insolvent Act of 1875, to demand security from an insolvent respondent, or to call upon the assignee to take up the instance, and in any case such motion could not be entertained without notice thereof to the assignee. McKinnon, the appellant, who had been condemned in the court below to pay the respondent the sum of $400, appealed from the judgment. The plaintiff had become insolvent, and the appellant moved in the first place, that, inasmuch as the respondent was insolvent and an assignee had been appointed to his estate, the respondent be declared incapable of proceeding, and that, he, appellant, be permitted to proceed ex parte: This motion was rejected. He now moved that all proceedings on the part of respondent be suspended until he should have given security for costs, or until the assigned should have taken up the instance, and that in the event of security not being given, or the instance not being taken up, he be permitted to proceed ex parte.If biod DORION, C. J., said the section referred to enacted that an insolvent should not be allowed to sue out a writ, or commence or continue any proceeding, until he had given security. This was to prevent an insolvent from occasioning the other side useless costs. But the law nowhere said that if the opposite party is proceeding, he can call upon the insolvent to give security or the assignee to take up the instance. An assignee was not bound to take up the instance unless he considered it in the interest of the estate that he should do so. There was another fatal objection to the motion: the assignee had not received notice, and without notice he certainly could not be deprived of his right to intervene. Wotherspoon, for appellant. Butler, for respondent. Motion rejected. MONTREAL, Sept. 18, 1878. RASCONY, (defendant in the court below) appellant; and THE UNION NAVIGATION COMPANY, (plaintiffs below) respondents. Company, Subscription of Shares before formation of is not binding. A subscription of shares in a company to be formed The company sued the defendant, Rascony, for $500, calls due on stock subscribed by him. Rascony pleaded that he never subscribed for stock in the present company, but in an antecedent one which was being organized. The court below sustained the action. TESSIER, J., said the question was whether the defendant was really a shareholder. In the case of the same company and Macdougall, Macdougall bought shares on which there were calls paid, and after the letters patent had been obtained. But in the case of Couillard, 21 L.C.J. p. 71, the court exonerated Couillard because he had in no way bound himself after the company was incorporated. He merely subscribed to a company to be formed. The court would follow the same principle as that laid down in Couillard's case, and under this Rascony must be exempted from liability. Consequently the judgment of the court below must be reversed and the action dismissed with costs. T Doutre, Doutre, Robidoux, Hutchinson & Walker, The appellant relied on sec. 39 of the Insol- for appellant. 14. site oldnoh a ar os spolu vent Act of 1875. it uti Jette, Beique & Choquet, for respondent. COOLEY, (plaintiff in the Court below), appellant, and THE DOMINION BUILDING SOCIETY, (defendant below), respondent. set aside a donation from one brother to another, and excluding his brothers and sisters. The grounds on which the action rested were, first, that the deceased was in an unsound state Building Society—Note given as collateral security. of mind, secondly, that the donation had been Held, that a note given by a buildin gsociety as collateral security for an advance to the society, is not an ordinary negotiable note, and if lost the holder is not compelled to give security before he can exact repayment of the advance. obtained by manoeuvres and undue influence. The Court below, although it was proved that the donor was suffering from the peculiar disease called softening of the brain, maintained the donation. His Honor thought it was proved beyond all doubt that for three or four years preceding the donation this man was in a state of imbecility, and was incapable of making a valid disposition. The matter was fully examined in the case of Flanigan and Sir George Simpson, which, however, differed from the present. Here the donor was in such a state of imbecility that he could not conduct his business, and his relations thought to improve the condition of things by giving him a The appellant, as sole executor and universal legatee, represented the late John Buxton, who had advanced to the Building Society $1,000, | payable at the expiration of a year, with interest at 8 per cent. The Society admitted the indebtedness, but alleged that they had delivered to Buxton, as collateral security, a note for the $1,000, and that by the conditions they were entitled to get this note back before the amount was repaid. It appeared that the note could not be found among the papers of the deceased. The plaintiff offered to deposit Mer-judicial counsel. This was a mitigated form chants' Bank stock to the nominal value of $1,500 in the hands of a third party, as security that the Society would not be troubled by reason of the note, but this offer was declined, and the Court below being of opinion that the security offered was insufficient, dismissed the action. DORION, C. J., after stating the circumstances under which the action was brought, said the note here was not an ordinary negotiable note. By itself it was nothing. It was given as collateral security, and was nothing when the debt was acquitted. The appellant, therefore, could not be required to give security, but simply to give up the deposit book. Judgment reversed. Archibald & McCormick, for appellant. Abbott & Co., for respondent. Montreal, September 21, 1878. BRAULT, Appellant, and BRAULT, Respondent. Donation-Judicial Counsel. Held, where a person had expressed an intention to make a particular donation, and subsequently, while afflicted with softening of the brain and of feeble inteiligence, he made the donation with the assistance of a judicial counsel, that the donation was valid. MONK, J., dissenting, observed that the appeal was from a judgment dismissing an action to of interdiction, and the proof that the act was done in a lucid interval was on the other party. His Honor thought this appointment of a judicial counsel was for the express purpose of doing what they thought there was no chance of effecting otherwise, and of making the donation all right. The man was in a hopeless state of imbecility, and died of the disease. Under the circumstances, his Honor thought the donation should be set aside. DORION, C. J., said that when the proof was contradictory, as to whether a person had intelligence enough to do an act, the Court must see whether the act was reasonable in itself, and if so, the Court might say that the man had sufficient intelligence to do it. In a case previously adjudged to-day, (Chapleau v. Chapleau, ante p. 473,) the testator was in delirium tremens, and the pretended will had been made only three days before his death. Here the circumstances were different. The donor was afflicted by a disease which did not render him M. E. Charpentier, for appellant. SUPERIOR COURT. [In Chambers.] Montreal, September 30, 1878. In re MONTREAL CENTRE ELECTION. Election-Count-Ballots Opened by Returning Officer. Rep. N. S., 261, which gives yet a larger authority to the principles enunciated in the cases lately but previously decided. The first, and perhaps the most important point which has been raised, and more or less set at rest by these recent decisions, is the meaning of the term "proceeding to sea," or of the reverse one, "proceeding into port" or "into dock." It is true that these questions have been raised pri Held, where the returning officer opened the enve-marily on certain statutes, but as a matter of lopes containing the ballots as transmitted by the deputy returning officers, that the Judge could not re-count the ballots under section 55 of the Dominion Election Act. An election having been held for Montreal Centre, and an application having been made under section 55 of the Election Act for a count of the ballots by a Judge, it appeared that the returning officer had removed the ballots from the envelopes in which they had been transmitted to him by the deputy returning officers, and had made them into two packages. RAINVILLE, J., said the law was very clear and precise, that the ballots as transmitted by the deputy returning officers should remain in the same state until opened by the judge, on a demand being made for a count. The returning officer in the present case had, therefore, exceeded his duty in opening the envelopes. Under the circumstances, his Honor said he could do nothing, and he would declare the impossibility of taking any action, and leave the returning officer to adopt such course as he might be advised. Each party to pay his own costs on this application. Devlin, and Archambault, Q.C., for petitioner. Lacoste, Q.C., and Curran, Q.C., for respondent. THE LAW IN REGARD TO VESSELS PROCEEDING TO SEA, AND THE COMPULSORY EMPLOYMENT OF PILOTS. There have recently been several notc-worthy cases decided in regard to points connected directly with compulsory pilotage, which indirectly touch upon and make clearer the general law in regard to the employment of pilots, and especially as to their employment in vessels proceeding to or from sea. The most recent of these cases which are of no little importance in maritime law-is The Princeton, 38 L. T. fact they have, in regard to this point, turned upon the meaning which is to be attached to these words. Nor is it indeed necessary to regard them as confined merely to such sentences as we have set out above; had they been so limited they would have had no more general importance than any case decided upon the construction of a particular statute. But they have a wider bearing than this, for, assuming that pilotage is compulsory on a vessel going out to sea, they have made it clear what time and what events are to be included in this process, and they must consequently have a bearthan those touching simply on compulsory ing upon cases which may involve other points pilotage. No actual principle in so many words has been laid down in regard to this matter; but, comparing the various decisions, we should formulate one somewhat in this form: A vessel is proceeding to sea from the moment she leaves the dock till the moment she reaches the open sea, except during such intervals as she is voluntarily stationary for sea. purposes other than those connected with and necessary for the actual transit from dock to will apply to the opposite movement, that is, And equally, of course, this definition from the open sea to the dock. We do not say that this definition might not be improved; but it is what may be termed a good working principle, and embodies in a reasonably concise form the result of the cases which serve as examples of it, and to which some reference must be made.. The first case of importance occurred in the Common Law Courts, and that is of Rodrigues v. Melhuish, 10 Ex. 110. The question arose out of an accident in the river Mersey. On the 2nd of December the ship went out of dock, and the pilot went on board on the 3rd; the master was not on board, the riggers were completing the rigging out of the ship, which lay |