12th of July last at their Lodge Room, for the purpose of walking through the streets of the city in a procession likely to endanger the public peace, or having such a tendency. We are now proceeding with the preliminary examination before the Police Magistrate, and the witnesses so far examined to prove the constitution of the Orange Order, the nature of the oath taken by the members of the Order, and the fact that the accused are Orangemen, have refused to answer, on the ground that they may criminate themselves. While convinced that the privilege claimed does not exist in this case, and that the decision of the Police Magistrate to that effect is in acknowledge themselves Orangemen, for fear of We have the honor to be, Sir, EDMUND BARNARD. GENERAL NOTES. TITLES.-The English Court of Appeal, according to the Solicitor's Journal, appears to be somewhat of the opinion of Sir Thomas every way correct, we consider it would be in Smith, who saith: "As for gentlemen, they be the public interest, that a pardon be offered the witnesses in question, so that there be no new pretext for mischievous agitation, in connection with a question which inflames so many passions. We, therefore, have to require that his Excellency, the Governor-General, will grant a pardon in particular to Lieutenant-Colonel George Smith, the witness presently under examination, for any act committed which would made good cheap in this kingdom; for whoso. make him liable to be prosecuted under Chap. was, in fact, a justice of the peace, and that 10 of the Consolidated Statutes of Lower Canada, relating to seditious and unlawful associations and oaths, or under the Common Law, for organizing and engaging in a procession likely to endanger the public peace, or having such a tendency. the "gentleman was a solicitor. Lord Justice Cotton said that though the legal description of a solicitor was "gentleman," that term was very indefinite, and ought not to be used. In such an affidavit a solicitor ought to be described as a "solicitor," in order that the court might know his real position in life. And the term "esquire" was even worse than that of " gentleman," for it conveyed no information whatever to the court. A man who was a justice of the peace should be described by that title. We have authority to speak for our clients only, but we may perhaps be permitted to state that there is a very large and very influential portion of the population of the city of Montreal, who, while taking no part in the controversy between the Orangemen and their opponents, are greatly interested as property owners, and as citizens engaged in trade, in the preservation of the peace of this city and its good name, and that class, no less than ouragain as a bad one." Cecil's despatch of busiclients, are anxious that the question whether the Orangemen have a right to walk in procession should be tested before the Courts. The anomaly of the present state of things is, that while the Orangemen loudly assert the perfect legality of their Order, and claim to be protected by the authorities, at all hazards and at whatever cost, in their attempt to walk in procession, they refuse before the Courts to Method is essential, and enables a larger amount of work to be got through with satisfaction. "Method," said Cecil (afterwards Lord Burleigh), "is like packing things in a box; a good packer will get in half as much shortest way to do many things is to do only ness was extraordinary, his maxim being. “The one thing at once." Henri de Tourville, the Englishman, who was convicted by an Austrian tribunal and sentenced to death for wife murder, and whose sentence was afterwards commuted to one of twenty years' penal servitude, has been disbarred, and his name removed from the list of members of the Honorable Society of the Middle Temple. The Legal News. VOL. I. SEPTEMBER 14, 1878. MR. JUSTICE JETTÉ. We should add that the head notes prefixed to the reports, as we received them from our correspondent, were not in strict accordance with the facts as we view them, but unfortuNo. 37. nately were printed without the emendations which we intended to have made. The vacancy on the Bench of the Superior Court, caused by the death of the late Mr. Justice V. P. W. Dorion, has been filled by the appointment of Mr. L. A. Jetté, of Montreal. Mr. Jetté is a gentleman of high standing in the profession. He was admitted to the bar in February, 1857, and by abilities of a high order, and close attention to professional work, speedily attained a considerable practice. Among the important cases in which he was concerned may be mentioned the celebrated Guibord case, in which he was counsel for the Fabrique in defending the suit. In 1872 he first entered public life, being elected by a large majority, for the division of Montreal East, over his distinguished opponent the late Sir George E. Cartier. In the general election of 1874, Mr. Jetté was returned for the same seat by acclamation. Appointments to the Bench in Canada are probably too much restricted by considerations of politics and nationality, and in the present case advocates of greater distinction are for this reason passed over. But apart from this, Mr. Jetté's appointment is a good one, and will, we believe, give much satisfaction. SAUVÉ V. SAUVÉ. We thought we had sufficiently explained (ante, p. 385), our opinion that the cases of Sauvé v. Sauvé, and Berthelot v. Theoret were essentially different. An esteemed correspondent, however, overlooking perhaps our brief reference to the cases, writes us on the subject, pointing out the material differences between the two suits. He says: "In the case of Berthelot v. Theoret it is clear that facts were alleged and proved showing the cessionnaire to le proprietor of the debt sued for; hence the cédant could not sue. In Sauvé v. Sauvé there were facts proved, too, showing that the "third party" had no action. His interests, once held by him, he had resiliated by an acte sous seing privé, but to which force had to be given." BANKRUPTCY FRAUDS. The U. S. Bankrupt law passed out of existence on the 1st September, except for pending cases, and there was a considerable rush of debtors, even in the last days and hours of the Act, to bring themselves under its provisions, In the city of New York there were on the last day 394 petitions filed; in the district including Chicago, 375 petitions; in Cincinnati, 100; in Buffalo, 198; and in Philadelphia, 69. Physicians, lawyers, and even clergymen swelled the number of those seeking relief from the demands of their creditors. Advertisements appeared in journals of New York, inserted by attorneys tendering their services to help clients to a full, free and quick discharge from all their liabilities. These, however, are not so remarkable as a daring announcement in the N. Y. Herald, which attracted the attention of a reporter of the World. The notice was as follows: If you contemplate bankruptcy you can procure $48,000 good, genuine, regular securities; no more of same kind exist; have never been offered; terms to suit contingency. Address, confidentially, Attorney, box 112, Herald Office. Acting in that detective capacity which has been called into play by the press in these latter days, the reporter answered the advertisement under an assumed name, and in due time he received the following reply: : HENRY H. HADLEY, Attorney and Counsellor at Law, 307 Broadway, N. Y., Aug. 15, 1878. DEAR SIR,-Your favor referring to bankruptcy, dated 14th inst., was duly received and contents noted. If convenient, please call on me to-morrow at 11 a.m., or from two to three p.m., here at my office, that we may talk the matter over as requested. I remain, confidentially yours. H. H. HADLEY, Attorney, The reporter called on Mr. Hadley at his office, and found him busily engaged with two elderly and eminently respectable-looking gentlemen. After waiting some time the reporter was ushered into the lawyer's office. Upon representing himself as the special partner of a firm of hatters who were about to fail, he "That'll do," said Mr. Hadley, "my client has $50,000 worth of Southern land bonds; they are worth nothing in the market; they may (with a smile) some day be worth their face value. They are for lands granted to him on the Chattanooga and Cincinnati Railroad. He will sell them for $1,000 cash." "Good," replied the reporter, "but how am I to show where I got them from?" "He shall give you a bill of sale, you shall turn over to him some stock in exchange-he will furnish it for you-and you give him the $1,000 besides. His bill of sale will be dated back as far as you like, so as to make the whole transaction look genuine, and, of course, you explain to your creditors that your unfortunate land speculation has led to your failure. You give them a few thousands in cash, then bonds and what stock you have on hand, and go on your way rejoicing. Twig?" Some further conversation occurred with reference to the best mode of covering up the tracks and giving the swindle a genuine look. The reporter was informed of others who had successfully played the same game, and it is stated on good authority that a great deal of business has been done in the way of buying cheap or worthless stocks, and holding them for use, by intending bankrupts who desire to make a show of assets, the purchase in such case being made to date back to the time when the securities were quoted higher. This is but one, and a small, part of the gigantic network of fraud which envelops every part of the bankruptcy system, and it is not wonderful that through such revelations the law has come to have an evil odor, and dies regretted by few save those who have turned it to their profit. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. Ernst v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 9. -Plaintiff's testator was killed while crossing defendants' track with his team, on his way to a ferry at Bath-on-the-Hudson. It had been customary to keep a flagman at this crossing, but on this occasion there was none; at least the evidence strongly preponderated that way. As he approached the crossing, Ernst looked north, above the station-house, and saw no train. The ferryboat was just starting, and a by- stander hailed the ferryman to wait, and beckoned Ernst to hurry on. Signals were made from the boat for him to come on; he started up his horses on a trot, when just as they were within two or three rods of the track, the engine appeared from behind the station-house. At the same instant two men shouted to him from different directions, he vainly tried to rein in his horses, they plunged on the track, and he was struck by the engine and killed. At the circuit the plaintiff was nonsuited, and this was now set aside. The court say, that the omission of the customary signals is an assurance by the company to the traveller on which he may rely that no engine is approaching within eighty rods on either side. If the usual warning is withheld, the wayfarer is not bound to stop and look up and down the track, but may assume that the crossing is safe. It is no answer to his claim for redress for injury, that notwithstanding the omission of the signals, he might, by greater vigilance, have discovered the approach of the train, if he had forescen a violation of the statute instead of relying upon an observance of it. Remarks. This is the most celebrated railroad case in our books. It had been once before to the Court of Appeals, and a new trial had been granted upon a very different state of facts, as we learn from the opinion of Judge Porter on this hearing. The former decision is not reported in the regular series, but one of the opinions was reported in 24 How. 97, with erroneous head notes and statement of facts. In the present decision all the judges concurred. The opinion of Judge Porter is one of the ablest to be found in our reports. He makes these excellent observations on nonsuits: "Our law is framed upon the theory that on such questions the citizen can rely with more security on the concurrent judgment of twelve jurors, than on the majority vote of a divided bench. Unanimity is not required in our decisions on questions of law. It is otherwise with jurors charged with the duty of determining issues of fact; and such issues should not be withheld from the usual arbiters, unless the evidence leads so clearly to one result, that there is no room for difference between honest and upright men. A nonsuit should always be granted where the proof is so clear as to warrant the assumption, in good faith, that if the question were submitted to the jury, they would find that the culpable negligence of the plaintiff contributed to the injury. But we have had occasion, recently, to hear nonsuits of this kind justified on the novel ground, that unless the fact be determined in one way by the judge, it will should be nonsuited. But he concludes that in this case the question was so complicated and detailed, that it was properly left to the jury. Sheridan v. Brooklyn City, etc., Company, 36 N. Y. 39. Deceased was a boy, nine years old, who took a seat in defendants' horse-car, but in order to make room for adults, the conductor put him out of his seat, and the car being crowded, he was pushed by the passengers out on the front platform, and was afterward thrown off by another passenger rushing to get off, and was run over and killed. A verdict for the plaintiff was unanimously sustained. Renwick v. N. Y. Cent. Railroad Co., 36 N. Y. 133. The plaintiff, approaching a crossing, stopped when from four to six rods from the track, looked both ways and listened, and seeing and hearing no indications of a train, started his horses, kept looking for the train, and when on the track was struck by the train which he saw close upon him. This was held not neces affirmed. be sure to be determined the other by the jury. sarily negligent, and judgment for plaintiff was The correctness of judicial opinions on mere questions of fact may well be distrusted, where we find them confessedly opposed to the common sense of mankind." Clark v. Eight Ave. Railroad Co, 36 N. Y. 135. The plaintiff was injured while riding on the steps of the front platform of the defendants' street car, by a passing team. The car was so full that there was no other place for him to stand, and the conductor received his fare and suffered him to stand there. The court said "these facts, if true, authorized the jury to find that the plaintiff had been invited by those having charge of the car to ride in that place, and that an implied assurance had been by them given that that was a suitable safe place for him to ride," and judgment for plaintiff was affirmed; but the court say that without such explanation the position of the plaintiff would have shown him negligent, and it would have been the duty of the court to nonsuit. The case came up a third time in 39 N. Y. 61, when a verdict for the plaintiff was sustained. The views of the court above expressed as to the absence of the flagman were approved; but the judges differ as to the extent that the defendants' negligence excuses the plaintiff's want of vigilance. Judge Clarke thinks the omission of the customary warnings and signals may excuse the plaintiff from looking up and down the track just before crossing; and that "the court, in its last review of this case, in no respect relaxed the salutary rules which it had in many previous cases adopted in relation to the negligence of persons who are on railroads." Judge Woodruff, in a following opinion, on the other hand, says: "Neg-excellent example of what is called an obiter ligence in the railroad company in the giving of signals or in omitting precautions of any kind will not excuse his omission to be diligent in such use of his own means of avoiding danger," and that if by such use he might have avoided the danger, notwithstanding the omission of the signals, his omission is concurring negligence, and where proof of it is clear, he Remarks. The observation last quoted is an dictum, although, at the risk of being accused of uttering the same thing, we will say that the learned judge was quite right in that position. Curran v. The Warren Co., 36 N. Y. 153.Defendants were distillers of coal tar. The deceased was engaged by them in manufacturing boilers, and was obliged to work inside of the defendants' boiler, entering through an orifice holding that the question for the jury was, "had the plaintiff sight enough to go, with reasonable assurance of safety, through the streets if they were kept in good condition?" Wolfkiel v. Sixth Ave. Railroad Co., 38 N. Y. 49.-Plaintiff was injured while getting on the front platform of a street car run by defendant. The testimony was conflicting as to whether the car was then in motion, and the question was properly submitted to the jury. Nichols v. Sixth Ave. Railroad Co, 38 N. Y. opened for the purpose. He entered the boiler as usual, and instantly fell dead in consequence of inhaling the poisonous gas collected in it. It appeared that the ventilator in this boiler, which acted as a safety valve for the escape of the noxious gas, had been closed by the direction of the deceased. This was held contributory negligence, and a verdict for plaintiff was set aside. As there was no dispute about these facts, it was held that a nonsuit should have been granted as requested. Ferris v. Union Ferry Co., 36 N. Y. 312.-131.—Plaintiff, while on the front platform of Plaintiff was a passenger on defendant's boat. On the arrival of the boat at the slip, the guard chain was let down before the boat was completely fastened, and the plaintiff proceeding to leave the boat, her foot slipped into an opening between the boat and the floating dock or bridge, and she was injured. She was held not negligent, the dropping of the chain being an assurance to passengers that the boat was properly secured and exit was safe. Milton v. Hudson River Steamboat Company, 37 N. Y. 210.-Defendant agreed to tow plaintiff's boat to New York and to place it between two other boats. Defendant did not place the boat between two others, and part of the cargo was washed overboard. The referee found that the crew on plaintiff's boat did not exercise proper care over the boat, but that, if defendant had placed the boat between two others as he had agreed, the injury would nevertheless not have happened, and he reported in favour of plaintiff. This judgment was reversed. McIntyre v. N. Y. Cent. Railroad Co., 37 N. Y. 287-Deceased was a passenger on defendants' train, and had no seat. He was directed by one of defendants' servants to pass forward, while the train was in motion, to another car where there were unoccupied seats. In attempting to do so, in some unknown manner, he fell between the cars and was killed. A recovery was affirmed, the court holding that it was for the jury to decide whether the deceased was guilty of any negligence in attempting to carry out the defendants' directions. Davenport v. Ruckman, 37 N. Y. 568.-The plaintiff, who was partially blind, walking on the sidewalk, fell into an excavation suffered by defendant to exist on his premises and was injured. A recovery was approved, the court defendants' street car, asked the driver to stop, and the driver brought his horses down to a walk when the plaintiff stepped down on the step to get off, and the car stopped; while he stood there, a sudden start of the car threw him off. The court held that the plaintiff had a right to occupy the step, and whether he was negligent while in that position was a question for the jury. They say: "While passengers have no right to jump off a car while in motion, or to make an attempt to do so, yet they are authorized to prepare to leave when there is evidence of an intention to stop or any signal given for such a purpose." Gonzales v. N. Y. & Harlem Railroad Co., 38 N. Y. 440.-Deccased, in stepping from a car, was killed by an express train on an adjoining track. It appeared that he must have been a passenger on this train, lived in sight of the station, and must have known that the express was then due. The court held that, if he did not look out for this train, he was guilty of negligence, and if he did look, he must have seen the train within a few feet of him, and his attempt to cross in front of it was reckless. Judgment for plaintiff reversed. Wilcox v. Rome, etc., Railroad Co., 39 N. Y. 358.-The plaintiff's intestate was killed at a village street crossing with which he was familiar, and where, if he had looked, he could have seen a train for seventy or eighty rods. There was evidence that there was no bell rung or whistle sounded. It was held that it must be presumed that he did not look for the train, and thus was negligent, and that the defendant's omission of signals did not excuse him. Remarks. Here, for the first time, we find an explicit avowal of Judge Porter's doctrine in the Ernst case. Judge Miller says, of that case : |