mained the last of his school of politicians and of lawyers. Thus he awaited patiently, and even hopefully, the comming of that event which should give him release. He died January 13, 1838, at the age of eighty-six.J. L. HIGH, in Southern Law Review, Aug. Sept. 1878.

RECENT UNITED STATES DECISIONS.

[Continued from page 408.]

Devise and Legacy.-Stock in a company was bequeathed for life, with remainder to several persons, some of whom were also residuary legatees, and others were not. Pending the life-estate, the company increased its capital, giving a new share to the holder of each old one, on making a certain payment. The executor took new shares, equal to the number already held by him, and paid for them out of the estate. Held, as between the special and the residuary legatees, that the former was entitled to so much of the value of the new shares as grew out of the accumulated profits of the company.-Bushee v. Freeborn, 11 R. I. 149.

Divorce.-1. A statute of Utah Territory authorizes the granting of divorces to persons who are not, but wish to become, residents of the Territory. Held, that a divorce granted under this statute was of no validity outside the Territory.-Hood v. The State, 56 Ind. 263. 2. By statute, suits for divorce are to be heard in open court. Held, that such a suit could not be referred, even by consent of parties.-Hobart v. Hobart, 45 Iowa, 501.

3. A citizen of Massachusetts went into Maine, acquiring no domicil there, for the purpose of obtaining, and did fraudulently obtain, a divorce for a cause occurring in, but not a cause of divorce by the law of, his own State; his wife had gone to New York, and there continued. Held, (1) that the court in Maine had no jurisdiction; (2) that its decree, though reciting facts sufficient to give jurisdiction, was not entitled to full faith and credit in Massachusetts; (3) that the husband's domicil remaining in Massachusetts, the wife might sue for a divorce there, though not residing there herself.-Sewall V. Sewall, 122 Mass. 156.

Dower.-A man conveyed land with a mill on it; afterwards the mill was burnt; he died, and the mill was rebuilt; and his wife claimed

dower in the land. Held, that she should have it according to the value of the land when the dower should be assigned, less the amount by which its value was increased by rebuilding the mill.-Westcott v. Campbell, 11 R. I. 378.

Easement.-1. Land was sold, with a house on it having windows overlooking adjacent land of the grantor. Held, that the grantor could not obstruct the windows if they were necessary to give light and air to the house; otherwise, if sufficient light and air could be derived from other windows opened, or which might conveniently be opened, elsewhere in the house.-Turner v. Thompson, 58 Ga. 268.

2. Defendant dug a pit on, and removed soil from, the land of another, for his own benefit, and with the owner's license; and, by the operation of natural causes, plaintiff's adjoining land fell into the pit. Held, that defendant was liable, without proof of negligence, for the injury to plaintiff's land in its natural state, but not for injury to structures on it.-Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 129.

Evidence.-1. On the question of the genuineness of a signature, the opinion of a witness, based on inspection of photographic copies of the signature in dispute was held inadmissible. Eborn v. Zimpleman, 47 Tex. 503.

2. On a criminal trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the written statement of an absent witness, not sworn to, but which a former attorney of the prisoner had consented to have read at the trial. Held, inadmissible against the prisoner's objection, on the ground that he was constitutionally entitled to be confronted with the witness, and that his attorney could not waive this privilege.-Bell v. The State, 2 Tex. Ct. App. 215.

Guaranty.-1. A guaranty was made of payment by another for goods to be sold, not founded on any present consideration passing to the guarantor, and to continue, by its terms, until written notice should be given of its termination. Held, that it was revoked by the death of the guarantor.-Jordan v. Dobbins, 122 Mass. 168.

2. Defendant made a bond to plaintiff, "to be binding one year only from date," conditioned that a third person should pay within five days after maturity any paper discounted by plaintiff for him. Held, that paper discounted within the year, though not maturing till after its

expiration, was within the condition.-Davis v.. Copeland, 67 N. Y. 127.

Husband and Wife. By an ante-nuptial settlement, property was vested in trust to the separate use of the wife during her life, free from the control of her intended or any future husband, and after her death to such persons as she should appoint, and, in default of appointment, to her husband and children, should they survive her. The wife died without making any appointment, having previously obtained a divorce for adultery of the husband. Held, that he took nothing under the settlement, though he survived her.-Barclay v. Waring, 58 Ga. 86. Illegal Contract.-Action by payee against maker of a promissory note. Held, that evidence was admissible to show that the note was made solely to protect defendant's property from his creditors, and under an agreement that it should be cancelled at his request; and that these facts, if proved, were a defence.-McCausland v. Ralston, 12 Nev. 195.

Indictment.-An indictment for forgery of a check on the City Bank of Dallas purported to set out the tenor of the check, whereby it appeared to be drawn on the City Bank, without designation of place. Held, that the indictment was bad for repugnancy.—Roberts v. The State, 2 Tex. Ct. App. 4.

Insurance (Fire).-1. The lessees of land erected thereon a building, which, by the terms of the lease, was to belong to the lessor at the expiration of the lease, insured the building, describing it as "their building, occupied by them, situated on leased land," by a policy conditioned to be void, unless the interest of the assured as owner, assignee, factor, lessee, or otherwise, should be truly stated. Held, that the policy was valid.-Fowle v. Springfield Ins. Co., 122 Mass. 191.

2. A policy was conditioned to be void if there should be other insurance, not mentioned in it, on the property; and contained a permission for $6,000 other insurance. In an action on the policy, held, that the insured might show that he notified the insurers of, and they consented to, other insurance to the extent of $8,000, and that $6,000 was written in the policy by mistake.-Greene v. Equitable F. & M. Ins Co., 11 R. I., 434.

3. Partnership property was insured by policy conditioned to be void in case of any transfer

by sale or otherwise. One partner retired from the firm, and sold his interest therein to the others; after which a loss happened. Held, that the policy remained in force.-Texas Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 47 Tex. 406.

4. Goods stored in a town occupied by the United States troops during the war were insured against fire by a policy exempting the insurers from liability for damage by fire arising by any invasion, insurrection, riot, or civil commotion, or by the act of any military or usurped power. The town, being attacked by a superior force of the enemy, was abandoned by the troops, who, by the order of their commanding officer, set fire to a building containing military stores, to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands. The fire spread to the building containing the goods insured, and destroyed them. Held, that the insurers were not liable.-[Ætna] Ins. Co. v. Boon, 95 U. S. 117; reversing s. c. 12 Blaichf. 24; 40 Conn. 575.

5. The owner in fee of land caused the buildings on it to be insured by policy conditioned to be void, "if the interest of the assured be other than the entire unconditional and sole ownership of the property, or if the buildings insured stand on leased ground,” unless it should be so expressed in the policy. The land was in fact let for a term of years, and this was not expressed in the policy. Held, no breach of the condition.-Insurance Co. v. Haven, 95 U. S. 242.

6. The owners of certain whiskey procured insurance on "L whiskey, their own or held by them on commission, including government tax thereon for which they may be liable." They were so liable as sureties on the bond of the distiller in whose warehouse the whiskey was. Held, that this interest was insurable, and covered by the policy; and judgment having been recovered against the assured in a suit on the bond, which the insurers had been requested, and had declined, to defend, held, that the insurers were liable for the amount of that judgment.-[Germania] Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 95 U. S. 547.

Insurance (Life).-1. By a policy of insurance the statements in the application were made warranties. These statements were written by the medical examiner of the insurers, to whom the assured told the truth about his health, but

by whose advice some of the questions were untruly answered. Held, that the physician was not the insurer's agent to fill out the application, and that they were not bound by his acts.—Flynn v. Equitable L. Assurance Society, 67 N. Y. 500.

2. An assignment of a policy of life insurance to one who had no interest in the life of the assured, held, valid.—Clark v. Allen, 11 R. I.

439.

Insurance (Marine).-A vessel was insured at and from Honolulu, via Baker's Island, to a port of discharge in the United States, "the risk to be suspended while the vessel is at Baker's Island loading." Held, that extrinsic evidence was admissible to show that Baker's Island was a dangerous anchorage, with no harbor, visited only for the purpose of loading guano; and that, in view of these facts, the effect of the policy was to suspend the risk while the vessel was at the island, whether actually engaged in the process of loading or not.-Reed v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 95 U. S. 23.

Interest.-An agent had in his custody for many years, among other property of his principal, a bond made by himself to the principal. He computed the interest, and compounded it every year, and charged the amount against himself on his books; and, at the termination of his agency, stated an account with his principal, including the amount so due on the bond with compound interest. He had made payments from time to time on the bond, which would have more than satisfied it if simple interest only had been reckoned on it. In an action on the account stated, held, that no promise to pay compound interest was implied by the statement, or, if any was implied, that it was without consideration.-Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162.

Judge-A prisoner convicted and sentenced by a judge who had been regularly appointed, and who had continued to act as such publicly, no other person having been appointed in his stead, sought to be discharged by habeas corpus, on the ground that the judge was disqualified under the Constitution, by reason of having taken a seat in the legislature. Held, that he was at any rate a judge de facto, and that his title could not be inquired into on this process. -Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass. 445; Ex parte Call, 2 Tex. Ct. App. 497, s. P.

Judgment. After a general verdict of guilty on an indictment containing several counts for distinct offences, the prisoner was sentenced on some of the counts to imprisonment, and was imprisoned, and the case was not continued. Held, that he could not be brought up at another term, and sentenced on another count, though the first sentence was erroneous.-Commonwealth v. Foster, 122 Mass. 317.

Jury. The judge presiding at a criminal trial set aside a juror as unfit, of his own motion, without challenge by either party. Held, proper.-State v. Lartigue, 29 La. Ann. 642.

Larceny.-1. The prisoner sold an impounded horse, claiming to own it, but in fact knowing that he had no right to it; and the purchaser took it away from the pound. Held, that the prisoner was guilty of larceny.-State v. Hunt, 45 Iowa, 673.

2. The prisoners, by fraudulent devices, and with felonious intent to convert the prosecutor's money to their own use, induced him to deliver it temporarily, for a specific purpose, to one of them, and then, without his consent, converted it to their own use. Held, that they were guilty of larceny.-Loomis v. People, 67 N. Y. 322.

Lease. See Insurance (Fire), 1, 5, Tax, 2.
Legacy. See Devise and Legacy.

Limitations, Statute of-An indorsement of part payment on a note was written, but not signed, by the maker; it being orally agreed between him and the holder that such indorsement should be deemeḍ a payment; but no money or other valuable consideration was actually paid. Held, that such indorsement would not take the note out of the Statute of Limitations.-Blanchard v. Blanchard, 122 Mass.

558.

Lost Property.-Plaintiff bought an old safe, and left it with defendant to sell, permitting him to use it in the mean time. On examining it, defendant found a roll of bank-bills hidden between the outer casing and the lining. Held, that, as against plaintiff, he had a right to keep the bills.-Durfee v. Jones, 11 R. I. 588.

Master and Servant.-1. A servant of a railway company, employed to work on its track, was run over and injured by a locomotive, through the negligence of the engineer. Held, that the company was liable; but that evidence that the servant had a family, whom he could not support by his labor since his injury, was inadmis

sible on the question of damages.-Pittsburg, Ft. Wayne, & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Powers, 74 III. 341.

2. A servant, hired for a year to work in the lumber trade, embarked in the same trade on his own account. Held, that his master might discharge him within the year, though he gave his whole time and attention to the master's business. Dieringer v. Meyer, 42 Wis. 311.

Mortgage.-A power of sale in a mortgage was executed after the death of the mortgagor, and a surplus remained, after paying the debt, in the hands of the mortgagee. Held, that the administrator of the mortgagor could maintain no action to recover it.-Chaffee v. Franklin, 11 R. I. 578.

Municipal Corporation.-1. A city owned a wharf, and was entitled to take tolls for its use. A vessel lying at the wharf was injured by striking a stake under water, which could not be seen at low tide. Held, that the city was liable, and none the less so because another corporation was required by statute to remove obstructions from the stream, or because the United States occasionally dredged the stream, or because the city received no tolls from the owners of the vessel.—Petersburg v. Applegarth, 28 Gratt. 321.

2. A child attending a public school in a school-house provided by a city, under the duty imposed on it by general laws, cannot maintain an action against the city for an injury suffered by reason of the unsafe condition of a staircase in the school-house, over which he is passing.— Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344. [See this case for a very full discussion of the liability of cities and towns to a private action for neglect of public duty.] And see Alarich v. Tripp, 11 R. I. 141, contra.

3. A city, by changing the grade of a highway, as it had power by statute to do, caused surface water to flow into the plaintiff's cellar. Held, that the city was liable to the plaintiff.Inman v. Tripp, 11 R. I. 520.

4. The Constitution of Missouri forbids municipal corporations to become stockholders in, or to loan their credit to, any company, unless two-thirds of the qualified voters of such municipal corporation, at a regular or special election to be held therein, shall assent thereto. Held, that the assent of two-thirds of the voters actually voting at the election was sufficient. Cass County v. Johnston, 95 U. S. 360.

Negligence. The steerage of a ship at quarantine was fumigated, after excluding passengers, by order of the health officers, with a poisonous substance, put in open vessels; afterwards, the steward sent the passengers back, but neglected to remove one of the vessels, as he had been directed by the health officer to do, though he removed the others; and the child of a passenger drank from the vessel, fell sick, and died. Held, that the master of the ship was liable.— Kennedy v. Ryall, 67 N. Y. 379.

New Trial.-A. and B. were indicted and tried jointly. A. was acquitted; and B. was convicted, and moved for a new trial, on the ground that A. could give evidence for him. But as it did not appear that a severance was asked for before trial, or an acquittal of A. during the progress of the trial, to enable him to testify, nor that B. was ignorant till after trial, of the fact that A. could give evidence, a new trial was refused. -State v. Woodworth, 28 La. Ann. 89.

Notary. A notary public certified an acknowledgment on documents which he knew to be forged. Held, that the sureties on his official bond were liable for damages caused by his act.-Rochereau v. Jones, 29 La. Ann. 82.

Nuisance.-Action for suffering water to collect on defendant's land, whence it overflowed on and injured plaintiff's land. Held, that defendant was liable, though he had done all in his power to carry the water off safely.-Jutte v. Hughes, 67 N. Y. 267.

Officer.-Defendant, a sheriff, having attached goods as the goods of A., at plaintiff's suit, afterwards released them, on B.'s claiming them as his, though plaintiff offered to indemnify him for holding them. Held, that defendant was not liable at all events; but that the burden was on him to show that the goods did not belong to A.-Wadsworth v. Walliker, 45 Iowa, 395.

Power.-A will appointed three executors, with power to sell land; and land of the testator was sold and conveyed, with the consent of all, but by the deed of one alone. Held, that the power was defectively executed, but that equity would aid it.—Giddings v. Butler, 47 Tex. 535. See Mills v. Mills, 28 Gratt. 442.

Trade-mark. The name "Bethesda," applied to a mineral spring, and used as a mark on barrels in which water from the spring is sold, held, entitled to protection as a trade-mark.— Dunbar v. Glenn, 42 Wis. 118.

ENGLISH JUDICIAL CIRCUITS. Those who have lived in long and familiar contact with a system seldom feel disposed to thrust it aside, whatever may be its patent disadvantages and defects. In legal reforms the judges are often the last to summon energy to press for a change which seems desirable to outsiders, and even when one member of the bench assumes the task of urging reforms, his brethren are apt to treat his efforts coldly. The report of the English judges on the subject of Circuits seems to afford a fresh illustration of this. A committee of six members of the bench - Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, Lord Justice Brett, Mr. Justice Lush, Mr. Justice Manisty, Mr. Justice Lindley, and Baron Huddleston-was recently appointed to consider, in conjunction with the Attorney and the Solicitor General, the working of the present Circuit system. It answered the questions submitted to it in April, and a Parliamentary Return has now been issued containing the answers of the judges and some comments by the Home Secretary upon them. Five questions had been propounded by Lord Cairns and Mr. Cross, to which they invited replies from the eminent personages we have named. They desired to know what, on the assumption that there are to be four gaol deliveries yearly, are the most convenient seasons for holding them; how Quarter Sessions can be best made to work in with the Assizes; whether it is desirable to enlarge the jurisdiction of Quarter Sessions; how the system of grouping counties for Assizes has worked in practice; whether, by the total or partial abolition of commission days, by the despatch of a single judge to certain Circuits, or in any other way, judicial time on Circuits can be economized; and, lastly, how the judicial needs of Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, and Surrey for the trial of Nisi Prius cases can be met.

In reply, the Committee, who must be taken to represent pretty fairly the mind of the English Bench, agree in recommending very little,

and seek, by expressing dissent and doubt on several of the changes contemplated or adopted, to check the ardor of the Lord Chancellor for reform. If there are to be four annual circuits, the Committee think that there should be a winter circuit and a summer circuit for the trial both of civil and of criminal business, and spring and autumn circuits for criminal trials only. But the Committee all agree in disputing the assumption that four gaol deliveries are necessary. The reasoning by which they support their views, according to the Times summary, is peculiar. "They cannot deny that prisoners are sometimes at present detained too long in gaol, but they assert that it is a question altogether of relative inconvenience. Prisoners, the judges declare, are generally guilty. Even of those who are acquitted only a minority are innocent. Of the very few innocent prisoners, an inconsiderable minority are kept in gaol unreasonably long. Such grievances as are suffered might be rendered infinitesimal by a more liberal use of the power of setting persons accused of minor offences at liberty on bail or even on their own recognizances. The Committee deprecates with almost unjudicial vehemence the transfer from guilty shoulders of what it considers the present very slight and avoidable inconvenience to the undoubtedly innocent judges, barristers, solicitors, sheriffs, grand and petty jurors, prosecutors, and witnesses. Are all these respectable and, many of them, prosperous gentlemen, who, the report indignantly puts it, as a rule, are much better than even the innocent prisoners in worth and character,' to be kept loitering about a court or rushing about the country every three months in order that an innocent girl may not be held for five months grinding her heart out in gaol on suspicion of a larceny she is proved after a ten minutes' trial never to have committed?" On this point, however, the report is not likely to have much weight. Mr. Cross expresses himself as confident that no Minister on either side of the House "would venture to propose such a retrograde measure as the abolition of the fourth Assize which has now been provided for by Parliament."

On the question of grouping counties, in order to save judicial time, the Committee entreat, that "at whatever cost of inconvenience to the judges," the system be abandoned.