common scold need not set forth the words the "scold" was accustomed to use. United States v. Royall, 3 Cranch, 618; The Commonwealth v. Pray, 13 Pick. 362; James v. The Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & R. 220; and see to same effect 6 Mod. 311; 9 Stra. 1246; 2 Keb. 409. To such an indictment we can readily conceive the same objections to be made as were made against the indictment in Bradlaugh's case. "How do we, the Court of Appeals, know that the words the scold used were really scolding? Is it not possible that, while the jury may have thought they were, we might have thought differently? Is not language of gentle selfassertion on the part of women often called scolding? To convict under such an indictment violates the important rule that, when an offence consists in the use of words, those words should be spread out on the record." Yet convictions on indictments of this class have been numerous, both in England and the United States. In a late North Carolina case the defendant was indicted for disturbing a place of public worship, by singing persistently a hymn to music out of tune. Could it be rightly maintained that the notes of such a tune should be given in the indictment, so that it could be sung before the Court of Error in order to satisfy them of the indecorum ? A common "barrator," to take another illustration, can be indicted without setting forth the particulars of which the barratry consists. The State v. Dowers, 45 N. H. 543; The Com. monwealth v. Davis, 11 Pick. 432; see to same effect 6 Mod. 311; 2 Hale, 182; Chitty's Cr. Law, 230. Yet here, also, a court of error might complain, as did the judges in Bradlaugh's case, that they were asked to pass sentence on an indictment which gave only a conclusion of law, and did not state the facts on which this conclusion rested. and are precluded from having recourse to the document to determine its legal character. We must, therefore, conclude that the law does not require a document which is the basis of a prosecution to be set out in the indictment, when there is sufficient reason given in the indictment to excuse the omission. The question is, what is a sufficient reason? It is plain that loss or possession by the defendant is such a reason. Whether the excessive obscenity of the document is a reason is discussed at large, as we have just seen, by the judges of the Court of Appeals, and, although they have put their decision on the ground that there is no excuse for the omission given in the indictment in the case before them, yet their reasoning is clear to the effect that, no matter how obscene the litigated document may be, on the record it should be spread. This, then, is the issue between the English and the American Courts. As to this issue it is necessary only to remark that obscenity, like noxious sounds and smells, is a matter peculiarly for the determination of a jury. When there has been a finding by the jury, with the approval of the judge trying the case, it is no more necessary for the Court of Errors to have the obscenity reproduced before them than it is necessary that the noxious sounds and smells should be reproduced. And if a common scold's words, or if the words of a person disturbing a religious meeting, need not be set out, why need the words incident to the obscene nuisance, found to be such by a jury? AGENCY-LIABILITY OF AGENT TO THIRD PARTIES-IN TORT. For many years it has been the practice of the Legislature to exempt the private means of commissioners from liability, either by incorporating them or enabling them to sue and be sued in the name of a clerk, and restricting the execution to the property which they hold as commissioners. "I can well understand," said Baron Bramwell, in Ruck v. Williams, 3 H. & N., 308, "if a person undertakes the office or duty of a com But these are not the only cases in which courts of error have been obliged to sustain indictments resting on summaries of documents or acts, instead of on documents or acts themselves. The loss of a document, or its retention by the opposing party, as we have just observed, has been frequently held to be a sufficient ex-missioner, and there are no means of indemnicuse for the omission to set it out. Yet in such case the Court of Error has to accept the finding of the jury as to the character of the document, fying against the consequences of a slip, it is reasonable to hold that he should not be responsible for it. I can also understand that if one of several commissioners does something not within the scope of his authority, the commissioners as a body are not liable; but when commissioners, who are a quasi-corporate body, are not affected (i. e. personally) by the result of an action, inasmuch as they are authorized by act of Parliament to raise a fund for payment of damages, on what principle is it that if an individual member of the public suffers from an act bona fide but erroneously done, he is not to be compensated? It seems to me inconsistent with actual justice, and not warranted by any principle of law." Chief Justice Best pointed out in Hall v. Smith, 2 Bing., 156, that it is harsh and impolitic to cast on individuals gratuitously a public duty, and make them responsible out of their private means for the non-fulfilment of it. But for many years it has been the practice of the Legislature to exempt the private means of commissioners from liability. The basis of the above reasoning therefore fails, and debile fundamentum fallit opus: per Blackburn, J., in Mersey Docks etc., v. Gibbs, sup. The case of the Postmaster-General is like that of all other public officers, such as the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, the Commissioners of the Customs and excise, the Auditors of the Exchequer, who are not liable for any negligence or misconduct of the inferior officers in their several departments: per Lord Mansfield in Whitfield v. Lord Le Despencer, Cowp., 754. The reason assigned by Lord Holt (12 Mod., 489) for holding a principal liable for the acts of his deputy is that, as he, as principal, has power to put him in, so he has power to put him out. In general merchant ships the captains have a power of hiring their sailors, and so far are considered as independent of their owners; and the reason given by Molloy (b. 2, c. 13, s. 13) why the master of a ship is held responsible for the acts of the mariners within the scope of their authority, is that they are of his own choosing, and he may reimburse himself any injury they may have committed out of their wages. But the master is not liable for the wilful act of one of the crew: Bowcher v. Nordstrom, Taunt, 568. There is no analogy between the case of a captain of a ship of war and that of a master of a ship. The former has no power of appoint ing the officers or crew on board; and is compellable to enter upon the performance of the duties upon the ship to which he is appointed. Hence he is not answerable for damage done by his vessel running down another vessel, the damage having been done during the watch of the lieutenant, and when the captain was not upon deck, nor called by his duty to be there: Nicholson v. Mouncey and Symes, 15 East, 384. In all cases deputies are answerable for their own personal misfeasances; hence, a deputy postmaster is liable for non-delivery of letters gratis in a country post town: Rowning v. Goodchild, 2 W. Bl., 909. Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym., 646; Whitfield v. Lord Le Despencer, 2 Cowp., 754, the cases of the Postmaster General; and Nicholson v. Mouncey, 15 East, 384, the case of the captain of the man-of-war, are authorities that when a person is a public officer in the sense that he is a servant of the government, and as such has the management of some branch of the government business, he is not responsible for any negligence or default of those in the same employment as himself. But these cases were decided upon the ground that the government was the principal, and the defendant merely a servant. All that is decided by this class of cases is that the liability of a servant of the public is no greater than that of the servant of any principal, though the recourse against the principal, the public, cannot be by an action. The principle is the same as that on which the surveyor of the highways is not responsible to a person sustaining injury from the parish ways being out of repair, though no action can be brought against his principals, the inhabitants of the parish: per Blackburn, J., in the Mersey Docks and Harbor Board v. Gibbs, 35 L. J., 225, Ex. As to an action on the case lying against the party really offending, there can be no doubt of it; for whoever does an act by which another person receives an injury is liable in an action for the injury sustained. If the man who receives a penny to carry letters to the post office, loses any of them, he is answerable; so is the sorter in the business of his department. So is the postmaster for any fault of his own: per Lord Mansfield, Whitfield v. Lord Le Despencer, Cowp., 754.-W. Evans, in London Law Times. CURRENT EVENTS. INDIA. A SINGULAR CRIMINAL CASE.-A criminal case has recently come before the courts of India which is exciting great interest in that country by reason of the position of the parties implicated. The Rajah of Poorree, who is the hereditary guardian of the temple of Juggernaut, and the secular head of the Hindoo religion in Oressa, and who is worshipped by vast numbers of people as the visible incarnation of Vishnu, became possessed with the idea that a Hindoo ascetic of great sanctity who enjoyed a special reputation for curing diseases was attempting to perform some work of incantation against him. He therefore induced the ascetic to visit his private apartments, and, with the aid of his servants, put him to the torture and then cast him out into the street. The injured man was found by the police, but died from his injuries within a few days. The Rajah was arrested, tried for murder, convicted and sentenced to transportation for life. An appeal was taken, but it is probable that the conviction will be sustained. ENGLAND. the contract was bad, whether as one to stifle a prosecution, or as induced by a misrepresenta tion that a prosecution was to be stifled when no prosecution was intended, plaintiff was not precluded from relief: first, because the money being in medio, something must be done with it; second, because illegality, arising from pressure or from an attempt to stifle a prosecution, is not sufficient to make the court stay its hand. The decision is not in conflict with that principle of law which forbids the courts from interfering to save a party who has entered into an illegal contract from the consequences of a failure by the other party to fulfill. In case of an agreement to compound a felony, the plaintiff, seeking to recover back money paid, cannot even claim relief on the ground of pressure. Sheppard v. Dornford, 1 K. & J. 401; Sharp v. Taylor, 2 Ph. 801; Thompson v. Thompson, 7 Ves. 470; Farmer v. Russell, 1 B. & P. 296. But see Tennant v. Elliott, 1 B. & P. 3: Williams v. Bayley, 4 Giff. 638. Such a contract, being one of suretyship, is not one uberremæ fidei to be upheld only in the case of there being the fullest disclosure by the intending creditor. But the contract must be based on the full and voluntary agency of the individual who enters into it, and when there is no consideration, as in the case at bar, a very little will do to authorize the court to interfere. Therefore, anything like pressure upon the part of the intended creditor will have a very serious effect on the validity of the contract and still more so where that pressure is the result of maintaining a false impression on the mind of the person impressed. See, also, Hill v. Gray, 1 Stark. 434; Carter v. Boehm, 3 Burr, 1905; Peek v. Gurney, L. R., 6 H. L. 377 ; Keates v. Cadogan, 10 C. B. 591; Turner v. Harvey, Jac. 169. Pulsford v. Richards, 17 Beav 87; Rees v. Berrington, 2 Ves. Jun. 540. CONTRACT TO STIFLE A PROSECUTION.-In Davis v. London & Provinc. Marine Insurance Co., 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 468, decided on the 2nd of March last by the Chancery Division of the English High Court of Justice, one Evans, an insurance agent of defendant having become liable to it for certain sums of money, plaintiff, who was his friend, having been given to understand that defendant could and was about to prosecute him criminally, and that the police had been instructed to arrest him, agreed to and did deposit £2,000 in a bank as an indemnity and security for Evans' liabilities, under the belief that the criminal prosecution would in consequence be abandoned. Before the agreement and deposit were made the defendant was informed by his legal advisers, that the prose-carriers does not apply in the case of luggage cution against Evans could not be maintained, and had withdrawn its instructions to the police to arrest, but plaintiff had not been informed of these facts. The court held that the agreement must be rescinded and the money repaid to plaintiff. The court concludes, that although LIABILITY OF CARRIERS.-In the case of Berghum v. Great Eastern Ry. Co, 38 L. T., Rep. (N.S.) 160, decided by the English Court of Appeal on the 14th January last, it is held that the liability of railway companies as common over which they have not absolute control. In this case plaintiff went to defendant's station some time before the train started. A porter, by plaintiff's direction, placed his bag in the carriage. Plaintiff went away for a short time, and on his return the bag was gone. He brought action to recover the value of the bag, and the jury found that neither defendant nor plaintiff had been guilty of negligence. The Court of Appeal held, affirming the decision below, that defendant was not liable as a common carrier, and therefore was entitled to judgment. The general rule has heretofore been supposed to be that a carrier of passengers is liable for baggage the traveller takes into the same carriage with him. "If a man travel in a stage coach" says Chambre, J., in Robinson v. Dunmore, 2 B. & P. 419, "and take his portmanteau with him, though he has an eye upon the portmanteau, yet the carrier is not absolved from his responsibility but will be liable if the portmanteau be lost." See, also Le Conteur v. Lond. & S. W. Ry., L. R., 1 Q. B. 54; Richard v. Lond. & S. W. Ry. Co., 7 C. B. 39; Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co. v. Swift, 12 Wall. 262; Cohen v. Frost, 2 Duer, 335. But the rule that binds common carriers absolutely to insure the safe delivery of the goods, except against the act of God and the public enemy, whatever may be the negligence of the passenger, has never been applied. Talley v. Great W. Ry. Co., L. R., 6 C. P. 44. Here it was shown that the passenger, when changing cars, left his portmanteau unprotected, and the railway company was held not liable for a robbery of the portmanteau. And it has been held that a railway company is not liable for articles carried on the traveller's person, nor for overcoats, canes, and umbrellas, such as he usually has under his exclusive supervision. See Steamboat Palace v. Vanderpoel, 16 B. Monroe, 302; Tower v. Utica & S. R. R. Co., 7 Hill, 47. In Mulliner v. Florence, 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 167, decided by the English Court of Appeal, on the 28th of January last, one Bennet purchased horses and carriages of plaintiff and took them to defendant's inn, where he was entertained, and his horses and carriages kept for a long time. Bennett never paid plaintiff the price of the horses and carriages, and absconded from defendant's inn without paying his bill, and leaving the horses and carriages there. Subsequently, having been takn into custody on a charge of swindling, he re-assigned the horses and carriages to plaintiff, to whom, however, defendant refused to give them up until Bennett's bill was paid. Defendant afterwards sold the horses by public auction, and still retained the carriages. The court held, first, that defendant's lien upon the horses and carriages was a general one for the whole of Bennett's bill, and that Plaintiff, not having tendered the amount of it to defendant was not entitled to maintain his action to recover possession of the carriages or damages for their detention, and second, that the sale by defendant of the horses was a wrongful conversion, for which plaintiff could maintain his action, and that the measure of damages was the value of the horses. The decision as to the lien of an innkeeper, extending to all the the property brought to the inn by the guest for all his expenses, is in accordance with the view taken by Story (Story on Bailm., § 476), who says that the cases do not support the doctrine advanced by some that a horse can be detained only for his own meals. See Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & A. 383; Sunbolf v. Alford, 3 M. & W. 248; Proctor v. Nicholson, T C. & P. 67; Jones v. Thurloe, 8 Mod. 172. The innkeeper cannot sell the property of his guest, but only detain it, and a sale is a conversion. Jones v. Peasle, 1 Stra. 557; Luckbarow v. Mason, 6 East, 21, note; Walter v. Smith, 5 B. & A. 439; Cortelyou v. Lansing, 2 Ca. Cas. 200. UNITED STATES. A singular case is on trial in Brooklyn, where a Mrs. Malloy brings suit against St. Peter's Roman Catholic church, of which she is a communicant, for $10,000 damages on account of injuries received by slipping on the icy steps of the church. She argues that as she was bound to attend mass under pain of mortal sin the church was bound to keep its approaches in a safe condition. MOVABLES ANNEXED TO IMMOVABLES.-In Grosz v. Jackson, 6 Daly, 463, chairs were furnished to a theatre of a pattern that had to be made with special reference to the size, shape, and plan of the auditorium of the theatre in which they were to be placed, and were screwed to the floor, as they could not stand alone. The court held that they formed a part of the building, and that a mechanic's lien could be filed and enforced against the building by the one furnishing them. In Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N.Y. 287, 297, and Voorhees v. McGinnis, 48 id. 278, three tests are given whereby the question whether a given article has become by annexation a part of the freehold: 1. To give to articles, personal in their nature, the character of real estate, the annexation must be of a permanent character. There are exceptions to this rule in those articles which are not themselves annexed, but are deemed to be of the freehold, from their use and character, such as mill stones, statuary and the like. Capen v. Peckham, 35 Conn. 88; Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 McCook, 511. 2. A second test but not so certain in its character, is that of adaptability to the freehold. Voorhis v Freeman, 2 W. & S. 116; Pyle v. Pennock, id. 390. 3. A third test is that of the intention of the parties at the time of making the annexation. See cases above cited, and Murdock v. Gifford, 18 N. Y. 28; Winslow v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 4 Metc. 306; Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63. The English cases go further than the American in the direction of the principles stated. Walmsely v. Milne, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 115; Boyd v. Shorrock, L. R. 5 Eq. 72: Climie v. Wood, L. R., 3 Exch. 257, and 4 id. 328. See also Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344; Cresson v. Stout, 17 Johns. 116; Vanderpoel v. Van Allen, 10 Barb. 157; Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63: Walker v. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636 Taffe v. Warnick, 3 Blackf. 111; Tobias v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425; Gale v. Ward, 14 Mass. 352; Hutchinson v. Kay, 23 Beav. 413. In re Dawson, 16 W. R. 424. Also Pierce v. George (108 Mass. 78), 11 Am. Rep. 310, and note at page 314, where the various authorities are collated.—Albany Law Journal. proceedings therein, and in respect of all pains, penalties and forfeitures which shall have been incurred under any of said acts prior to the day when this act takes effect, or which may be thereafter incurred, under any of those provisions of any of said acts, which for the purposes named in this act, are kept in force, and all penal actions and criminal proceedings for a violation of any of said acts, whether then pending or thereafter instituted, and in respect of all rights of debtors and creditors, except the right of commencing original proceedings in bankruptcy, and all rights of, and suits by, or against assignees, under any or all of said acts, in any matter or case which shall have arisen prior to the day when this act takes effect, which shall be on the 1st of September, 1878, or in any matter or case which shall arise after this act takes effect, in respect of any matter of bankruptcy authorized by this act to be proceeded with after said last-named day, the acts hereby repealed shall continue in full force and effect until the same shall be fully disposed of in the same manner as if said acts had not been repealed." CRIME IN ILLINOIS.-The Chicago Legal News of the 22nd inst., says: "George Sherry and Jeremiah Connolly were hung in the jail of this county, on yesterday morning, by Sheriff Kearn, for murdering McConville. Cook county never had so many prisoners in jail charged with taking human life, as at the present time. People are becoming exercised over the increase of REPEAL OF THE BANKRUPT LAW.-The follow-murders and are demanding that something ing is the full text of the bill repealing the bankrupt law, as it finally passed and received the approval of the President: "Be it enacted, etc., That the bankrupt law, approved March 2nd, 1876, titled 51, Revised Statutes, and an act entitled, An act to amend and supplement an act entitled, An act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States, approved March 2nd, 1867, and for other purposes, approved June 22nd, 1874,'" and all acts in amendment or supplementary thereto, or in explanation thereof, be, and the same are hereby, repealed. Provided, however, that such repeal shall in no manner invalidate or affect any case in bankruptcy instituted and pending in any court prior to the day when this act shall have effect, but as to all such pending cases and all future shall be done to stay the hand of the murderer. It would be well to study the effect of the execution of these two criminals upon the vicious, and see whether it will have a tendency to preven crime." COLLECTING AGENCIES.-The Committee of Clay County Bar publish the following notice respecting the action of the bar, unanimously declining in the future all division of fees with the socalled collecting agencies: "At a recent meeting of the members of the Clay County Bar, it was decided by unanimous vote to decline in the future all division of fees with the so-called collecting agencies, which, by the aid of extensive advertising and persistent dunning, have for years imposed both upon the business men of the city and the attorneys of the country. |