Councils, would be the judges of the facts in any complaint brought before them, framed upon the by-laws, specifying the offences. They would be judges under a code of laws framed to give them jurisdiction, and thereupon any party considering himself aggrieved by their judgments, would have no other recourse save an appeal to the General Council. "The complaint in such case would require a specification of facts constituting the offence as defined by the By-law. The form prescribed for voting guilty or not guilty, is peculiarly applicable as going to show the intention of the law.

"In the present instance there is a specification of facts, but there is no law to constitute these facts an offence. Mr. O'Farrell very naturally says: I was not warned that acting as a constable, or assisting a constable in arresting a person accused of crime, would be considered an offence, and up to the bringing of the complaint against me I considered it not only a proper but a laudable act, and I had this security that I knew there was no law against it; but had the Bar promulgated a By-law declaring it an infraction of discipline, or a degradation of its honor, to assist a common bailiff or constable, I should have been forewarned, and have avoided doing so. As matters stand, I feel that I have done no wrong, have broken no law.' It has been argued that he might have been compelled to act as constable. I concede that the Bar could make no law to punish him for acting by compulsion, but I can see no reason to prevent them from making a By-law to visit with their displeasure members of their Body who may volunteer to assume the lower-class duties of constable, particularly in cases where the same party had acted as attorney or advocate, and to prescribe that such conduct would be held derogatory to the honor of their body. I think that such a By-law would be perfectly within their powers; but without such forewarning prescribed in a legal manner, if to-day they can make a crime of acting as a constable, they may on any future occasion, without rule, and according to caprice, decree some other state of facts to constitute a like offence. If they can do so in regard to a constable, without previous warning, they might as well without such previous warning decree that Mr. O'Farrell should be suspended for acting as Colonel to a Regiment of volunteers.

I think an analogy may be drawn from the practice in the Courts Martial, and the principles by which these tribunals are guided in their decisions. By reference to Simmons on Courts Martial, I find that Her Majesty was empowered by the Mutiny Act to make articles of war, under certain limitations, for the maintenance of discipline in the army, but there is no such thing as a prosecution for infraction of discipline generally. On the contrary, the articles of war carefully specify what shall be considered infractions of discipline, and prosecutions are required to specify the facts which bring each particular case within the article, of which the facts constitute an infraction; and cases are given where the findings were set aside for want of such specification; as, for instance, the case of Lieut. Imlack, found guilty of ungentlemanly conduct. Thus, the charge has to be supported by a statement of facts, and these facts must bring the case within one of the articles of war, defining the offence. In the present case we have a state of facts, but we have no article or By-law declaring any offence to which the state of facts can apply.

"I apprehend the customs prevailing in England or France, do not much assist by way of precedent. The associations of the Bar there were voluntary organizations and I believe in France, the decrees involved no consequences, that could be enforced by compulsion, save that the association struck from their roll whom they chose. This they could do without being accountable to anybody. The Courts, if they chose, being the actual power, could recoguise the acts of the Bar, and through courtesy probably did, although not bound to do so. But as a person might be expelled from the society simply because he might have made himself disagreeable to the majority, and was conse. quently struck off their roll, there was really no power in the Courts to restore him, but the Courts themselves, possessing the power over the Advocates or Barristers, probably, and I believe did, always recognise the discretion exercised by the Bar in excluding those they had disapproved of, provided they deemed the discretion reasonably exercised. Nor is it likely they would without very strong reasons interfere between the Bar and a member they had excluded to permit him to practise against their decision. The difference here seems to be

company, and was never promised any remuneration for his exertions on its behalf.

The Court below (Mackay, J.) maintained the action for the sum of $2000. The company having appealed,

RAMSAY, J., dissenting, would be for dismissng the action altogether. There was no tvidence of any engagement or promise of payment by the company. Bury, apparently, wished to be paid for the use of his influence But he had personal grounds for doing as he did, it being proved that he had real estate o the value of $20,000 in the immediate vicinity of the line of railway.

DORION, C. J., for the majority of the Court, considered that Bury was entitled to be paid. He worked to promote the prosperity of a company already in existence, not to organize anew company, and the Vice-President testified tiat his services had been valuable. Too much, however, had been allowed for the work done, and this Court would reduce the amount te $750.

MONK, J., concurring, remarked that there vas nothing illegal or immoral in what Bury dd, and the value of the services was fully stablished.

Judgment reformed.

J. M. Loranger for Appellants. Doutre, Doutre, Robidoux, Hutchinson & Walker for Respondent.

THE ETNA LIFE INSURANCE Co. (plffs. below), Apellants; and ROOKLIDGE (deft. below), Respadent.

Surety-Novation.

The appellants sent to a local agent a letter in the teras cited below, making an offer which the agent acepted. Held, that a new agreement was effected by be letter, and the surety was discharged.

The question was whether a surety had been disaarged by a change in the terms of the enggement of the person for whom he was surdy. The respondent, Rooklidge, was surety for me Reed, the agent of the appellants at St.öhn, N.B. The bond was conditioned for $1,00, that Reed should faithfully discharge his uties in soliciting insurances for the company and should pay over all moneys. On the 30th of November, 1874, the appellants wrote the illowing letter:

J. A. REED, Esq., St. Johns, N.B.

Dear Sir,-By referring to my letter of 21st inst., it will be observed that the old balance due from you is $309.14 United States currency.

If you will remain in New Brunswick during the year 1875, giving your entire energies exclusively to promoting the Ætna Life Insurance Company's business therein, taking pay therefor in the shape of a commission of twenty per cent. on new business procured after January 1st, 1875, together with five per cent. on the renewals of all the Company's business in that Province, as they are collected by you, as specified in your original contract, I will wipe out all the above balance of $309.14, and interest thereon, at the end of said twelve months-that is on December 31st, 1875.

It is understood that you may take the one-third out of the first premiums paid on any new business procured before the 1st of January, 1875, whether it be annually or semi-annually, and whether paid this year or during next, provided they are paid within the Company's rule of sixty days.

Your acceptance or rejection of this offer, expressed in fewest possible words, you will please indicate to me some time previous to the 15th of December, and oblige.

This was followed by a second letter, informing Reed that the balance against him was somewhat greater than mentioned above, but concluding as follows:-" However, it will all go into the one lump and be cancelled on the 31st of December, 1875, if you work the business through on commission during 1875, as stated in my last letter, and keep your accounts square with this office on that basis."

Reed accepted the terms proposed, but continuing to be remiss in his accounts, he was dismissed on the 21st August, 1875, when the deficiency had increased to $830.

The Company having sued the surety, the latter pleaded that there was a new agreement effected by the letter cited above, of which he had no notice, and that he was discharged from liability. The Superior Court, Mackay, J., sustained the plea and dismissed the action as against the surety. On appeal by the Company the judgment was confirmed.

Judgment confirmed.
Trenholme & Maclaren, for Appellants.
A. & W. Robertson for Respondent.

the sum of $4520, and by the same writing acknowledged receipt of the wood, declared himself satisfied therewith, and discharged the vendor, "de toute garantie ultérieure." The purchaser having measured the wood, found it 423 cords short, and a portion of it rotten. Suit for value of wood not delivered and of the part that was rotten. Held, that by the terms of the agreement the sale was en bloc and not by the cord, and the purchaser could not recover.

Judgment confirmed.

M. E. Charpentier for appellant.
Duhamel & Rainville for respondent.

THE EASTERN TOWNSHIPS' BANK (plffs. below), Appellants; and MORRILL (one of the defts. below), Respondent.

Amendment of writ-Erroneous description of firm—

Exception to the form.

A firm, originally composed of two partners, admitted a third. The change was not registered, and the firm was sued as if composed of the first two partners only. Service was made at the place of business of the new firm. Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to amend the writ by inserting the name of the new partner, and an exception to the form, attacking the amendment, pleaded by the new partner when thus brought into the case, was dismissed.

The appellants sued a firm of H. S. Beebe & Co. on promissory notes. The firm was described as composed of Anson Beebe and H. S. Beebe; but it appeared that a third partner, the respondent Morrill, had been admitted into the firm, though the change had not been registered. The service had been made at the place of business of the new firm. The plaintiffs obtained leave to amend the description of the defendants' firm in the writ, so as to include Morrill's name, and a copy of the amended writ was served upon Morrill personally at the place of business of the firm. Morrill appeared and pleaded an exception to the form, based, among other grounds, upon the alleged insufficiency of the service, the return day of the original writ being past before the service of the amended writ.

The Superior Court at Sherbrooke (Doherty, J.,) dismissed the exception, "considering that the allegations of the said exception à la forme are in the nature of an opposition, or protest against the interlocutory judgment of this Court, granting plaintiffs' application to amend the writ of summons in this cause, that plaintiffs' proceedings under and since said amendment are legal and regular, and that the said

allegations are irregularly pleaded in this cause, and moreover insufficient in fact and n law." The Court of Review at Montreal versed this judgment, considering that the exception à la forme filed in this cause is well founded and should have been maintained, and that the plaintiffs' action should have been dimissed with regard to the said John F. Morril." It was from the latter decision that the plainti appealed.

DORION, C. J., for the Court, held that the original judgment should have been maintaineç and that rendered by the Court of Review mus, therefore, be reversed. The grounds assignd by the judgment in appeal are as follows:

"Considering that the writ of summons n this cause was properly amended, leave having first been obtained from the Superior Court, » inserting the name of the respondent Johnf. Morrill, as being one of the partners in the fim of H. S. Beebe & Co., defendants in this cave, and that the amended writ and declaration wre duly served on the said respondent;

..

· And considering that the said respondat has pleaded to the action, and has suffered 10 prejudice or injury from the said amendmat being so made, and that the exception à la forse by him filed is not well founded;

"And considering that the appellants hae proved the material allegations of their declastion, and the said respondent has failed to prve the allegations of his several pleadings;

"And considering that there is error in ae judgment rendered by the Judges sitting in Review on the 30th September, 1876, reversing the judgment by the Superior Court sittin at Sherbrooke on the 6th of April, 1876, and lismissing the appellant's action as against the aid respondent John F. Morrill :

"This Court doth reverse and set asid the

said judgment of the 30th Sept., 1876, and loth confirm the said judgment rendered by th Superior Court on the 6th April, 1876."

Judgment reverąd. Brooks, Camirand & Hurd, for Appellans Terrill & Hackett, for Respondent.

NOTE.-The following appeals, also døided on Dec. 14, do not require special notice :

BARTHE & BOYER. - Judgment granting the insolvent Boyer his discharge, was confirmed.

MITCHELL & BURKE.-Mitchell having failed to give Burke, his landlord, due notice of his desire to terminate the lease of a house, paid the next year's rent under protest, and then sued the landlord for the amount, on the ground that he had violated his agreement to do his best to obtain a tenant. Judgment dismissing the action was confirmed, the Court holding that there was no proof of fraud on the part of the landlord. LIONAIS, es qual. & WARD.—Judgment for respondent on a note confirmed.

STEWART & EVANS.—Judgment reducing the bill of appellant, an assignee, for services as receiver of an insolvent estate, from $467.73 to $120, was confirmed.

FARMER & DEVLIN et al. Judgment dismissing an action by Farmer to rescind sale of real estate by O'Neil, one of the respondents, to Devlin, was confirmed. O'Neil had previously sold the property to Farmer, but the Court found no proof of collusion on the part of Devlin.

LAVIGNE & VILLARS.-Judgment awarding Villars $132 as the price of six sewing machines sold to Lavigne, was confirmed.

PARKER & LATOUR.-Judgment, awarding re*pondent $50 damages for gravel carried away by appellant from the beach close to respondent's house, was confirmed.

THE ST. LAWRENCE SALMON FISHING COMPANY & MCKAY.-Judgment condemning appellants to pay respondent a balance of $444.44, in accordance with the report of Mr. Archibald McGonn, accountant named by the Court, was confirmed.

Montreal, Dec. 21, 1877.

Present:-Chief Justice DORION, Justices MONK, RAMSAY, TESSIER, and CROSS.

GRAFFTIS and SLEEPER.

A collector of Customs, by error, sold by public auction for unpaid duties, goods which had never been taken to the examining warehouse, or kept therein.

month, as required by 31 Vic. c. 6. ss. 13 & 14, but had been warehoused by the harbor master for unpaid her -bor dues. Held, that the sale was a nullity, and action of revendication by the purchasers was dismissed.

The respondents by an action of revendic tion, claimed 172 crates of bottles and flasks under the following circumstances. The goods came out to Montreal, and were placed on the wharf, but the harbor dues not being paid, the harbor master had the crates taken away and put in a warehouse until the dues should be paid. The Collector of Customs, supposing that they had been sent to the Customs' examining warehouse, caused them to be advertised and sold at auction, in the ordinary course, as goods o which the customs duties had not been paid. Meanwhile the agent of the consignors paid the harbor dues, and the goods were left in the ware house subject to his order. The customs duties were not paid at the time of the sale. The purchasers at the auction sale brought an action of revendication, claiming the goods as their property. The Superior Court declared the saisie revendication good and valid, and order. ed the defendants (the collector Simpson, and the warehouseman Morin) to give up the property, or pay $2,000 for the value thereof.

In appeal this judgment was reversed by the majority of the Court, (Dorion, C.J., Tessier and Cross, J J.). The sale by the Collector of Cus toms was held a nullity, the goods never having been in his possession, and not having been kept for a month in the examining warehouse, an required by 31 Vict. c. 6, 8s. 13 & 14. The minority of the Court, (Monk and Ramsay, JJ, ) considered that the sale took place under the circumstances contemplated by the law, and that the fact that the goods were not actually in the

Vict., c. 16, s. 128.

vious to the sale made no difference.

Judgment reversed. Geoffrion, for Appellant Simpson. Durand, for Appellant Morin. Doutre & Co., for Respondents.

Sale by Collector of

Present:-DORION, C. J., MONK, RAMSAY, Ts

SIER and CROSS, JJ.