of this agreement, held, that A. could recover only the value of his time, and not the profits he might have made from sales, if the goods See Agent, 1; Consideration; Damages, 1; Evidence, 2; Illegal Contract; Insurance; Interest; Rescission; Surety; Tax, 1. Contributory Negligence.-See Negligence, 1, 2; had been supplied as agreed. Howe Machine Railroad. Conviction-See Judgment, 2. Corporation.-1. In general, the forfeiture of a corporate franchise can be taken advantage of only by the State; but where a corporation chartered to erect and maintain a bridge, with power to take tolls on the same for twenty years, brought an action to recover tolls, it was held that the defendant might show that the twenty years had expired.—Grand Rapids Bridge Co. v. Prange, 35 Mich. 400. 2. A corporation is liable in an action of tort for the fraud and deceit of its agent in making a sale.-Peebles v. Patapsco Guano Co., 77 N. C. 233. 3. Bringing an action to recover damages for wrongful expulsion from a corporation is a waiver of the plaintiff's right to be restored to membership by mandamus.-State v. Lipa, 28 Ohio St. 665. 4. One stockholder in a corporation cannot maintain an action at law against the directors for damages suffered by him, in common with other stockholders, by their negligence.-Craig v. Gregg, 83 Penn. St. 19. See Trust, 1, 2, 3. See Tender, 2. County. See Charity, 2; Contract. Creditor.-See Fraudulent Conveyance, 1. Co. v. Bryson, 44 Iowa, 159. 2. Action for ejecting plaintiff from defendant's cars, for non-payment of the fare established by defendant's rules, plaintiff having tendered what he claimed, and what was ultimately held by the court, to be the lawful fare. Held, that defendant might introduce evidence of plaintiff's subsequent declarations, to show that he took passage in order to test the question of fares, and expecting to be ejected, and to make money out of the transaction; and that this, being shown, was a bar to his recovery of exemplary damages.-Cincinnati, Dayton & Hamilton R. R. Co. v. Cole, 29 Ohio St. 126. See Interest; Libel. Deceit.-See Corporation, 2. Deed. See Evidence, 6; Mistake. Devise and Legacy.-A bequest of threequarters of the principal and interest on a bond given to the testator, held, a specific legacy, and not to be made up out of the general assets, the estate being insolvent.-Titus v. McLanahan, 2 Del. Ch. 200. 2. Under a gift by will of income to a man and his wife for life, each is entitled to onehalf the income.-See v. Zabriskie, 28 N. J. Eq. 422. 3. Testator gave to each of his children a pecuniary legacy "when the youngest shall arrive at the age of twelve years," and directed that his widow and children should hold all his estate in common till that time. Held, that the legacies were vested.-Sutton v. West, 77 N. C. 429. 4. The rules of a benevolent society provided for the payment of a sum, on the decease of any member, to his family, as described in the rules, if not otherwise directed by him before his death. A member died, bequeathing his Damages.—1. A. undertook to sell the goods estate and property, real, personal, and mixed. of B., to provide a room, a team, and other Held, that this bequest was not an execution of necessary means for carrying on the business, his power over the fund due from the society. and to devote all his time to it; and B. agreed│—Arthur v. Odd Fellows' Beneficial Association, to furnish him with all the goods he could sell, at a price twenty-five per cent. below the retail rate. In an action by A. against B. for breach 29 Ohio St. 557. 5. A testator gave his wife a legacy in lieu of dower, directed his executors to sell all his real estate, gave certain pecuniary legacies, and the residue to A. B. and C., their heirs and assigns, to be equally divided between said A. B. and C. C. died before the testator. Held (1) that the legacy to him lapsed; (2), that it went to the testator's next of kin, and not to the other residuary legatees; (3), that the testator's widow was not barred from claiming a share in it by accepting the provision in lieu of dower. -Hand v. Marcy, 28 N. J. Eq. 59. See Charity. Divorce.-Fraud of wife, in not disclosing her pregnancy at the time of marriage, held, no cause of divorce.-Long v. Long, 77 N. C. 304. Drunkenness.-See Insurance (Life), 2. Easement-See Way. Eminent Domain.-Land which had been taken and used, under statutory authority, for a canal, may be used, under like authority, for a road, without additional compensation to the owner. Malone v. Toledo, 28 Ohio St. 643. Shanklin v. Evansville, 55 Ind. 240.-Stoudinger v. Newark, 28 N. J. Eq. 187, 446. Equity.-See Injunction. To the prisoner was not informed, was admissible to corroborate the former evidence, and to show quo animo the deceased entered the house. Held, also, that evidence of the violent and dangerous character of the deceased was admissible.-State v. Turpin, 77 N. C. 473. 4. The impeachment of the credit of a witness, by showing that he has made statements at other times contradictory to his testimony at the trial, does not lay a foundation for sustaining him by proof of his reputation for truth.-Webb v. The State, 29 Ohio St. 351. 5. In ejectment, the plaintiff claimed title under J. S., and offered in evidence a deed from J. S. to Rufus V., and a deed from Russel V. to the plaintiff's grantor. Held, that he could not show by parol that Russell and Rufus were the same person, and that the latter name was written in the deed by mistake [there being no evidence that Russel was otherwise known as Rufus].-Pitts v. Brown, 49 Vt. 86. 6. A lease was made of "the premises on the corner of A and B streets, recently occupied by J. S. The shops are not included." Held, that the lease did not necessarily pass the whole building on the corner, except the shops; and that whether a particular part passed as having been occupied by J. S. was a question for the jury, on which parol evidence was admissible. Eviction.-See Landlord and Tenant, 2. Evidence.-1. Indictment for murder. prove that the offence was murder in the first degree, the prosecution undertook to show that it was committed in attempting to commit rape. Held, that evidence that the prisoner had previously committed rape on another person was incompetent.-State v. Lapage, 57-Alger v. Kennedy, 49 Vt. 109. N. H. 245. 2. Plaintiff employed defendants as stockjobbers, and agreed that all transactions should be subject to the usages of their office. They bought stock for his account, and, on his failing to deposit the required "margin," sold it, without notice to him, at a loss; whereupon he sued them in trover. Held, that they might show that they acted according to the usages of their office. And a new trial was granted because such evidence had been excluded; but quare its weight or conclusiveness if admitted, -Baker v. Drake, 66 N. Y. 518. 3. On an indictment for murder, the prisoner contended that the killing was in self-defence. There was evidence that the deceased had followed the prisoner into a house which he had threatened to kill him if he visited, of which threats the prisoner had notice. Held, that evidence of other like threats, of which 7. On the trial of an indictment for adultery, the husband of the particeps criminis is a competent witness to prove circumstances which do not directly criminate, but tend to criminate, her.-State v. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202. 8. In an action to recover personal property on the ground that defendant bought it of plaintiff, not intending to pay for it, evidence that defendant was engaged about the same time in like fraudulent transactions is admissible on the question of intent.-Eastman v. Premo, 49 Vt. 355. See Carrier, 2; Damages, 2; Presumption; Tax, 4; Tria!, 2; Witness. Executor and Administrator.—1. The purchase by an executor of the interest of a particular legatee is no fraud on the residuary legatees, and they cannot hold him to account for the profits he may make by such purchase.--Hale v. Aaron, 77 N. C. 371. 2. A resident of Vermont made a promissory creditor of the defendant, and cannot impeach note. The payee lived and died in Massachu- a conveyance by the latter as made to delay or setts, and administration was there granted on defraud him.—Hill v. Bowman, 35 Mich. 191. his estate. Held, that the administrator might sue on the note in Vermont without taking out administration there; because, as the debt was due and payable in Massachusetts, it could not be assets in Vermont, and therefore there was no ground for granting administration in that State-Purple v. Whithed, 49 Vt. 187. Exemplary Damages.-See Damages, 2. Feræ Naturæ. See Animal. Fire Insurance.-See Insurance (Fire). 2. A. conveyed to B. land on which a crop was growing; the crop was afterwards taken on execution against A., and B. replevied it. Held, that the defendant in the action of replevin might show that the conveyance to B. was made to defraud A.'s creditors.-Pierce v. Hill, 35 Mich. 194. See Executor, 3. Game.-Where a statute forbids the catching of rabbits with ferrets by any person, except on premises owned by him, one who so hunts on premises not owned by him is not protected by having the owner's license, if he does not act as the owner's agent.-Hart v. The State, 29 Ohio St. 666. Garnishment.-See Foreign Attachment. Husband and Wife.-A trustee for his wife and 2. As between a mortgagee and an execution creditor, rolling-stock of a railroad company mortgaged with the road is part of the realty. others, having converted to his own use part of -Williamson v. New Jersey Southern R. R. Co., 28 N. J. Eq. 277. See Covenant. Forbearance.-See Consideration. Foreign Attachment.-1. A railroad company mortgaged its property and income to secure payment of its bonds; and, by the terms of the mortgage, remained in possession until default. Held, that its earnings, while so in possession, might be reached by process of foreign attachment in a suit against it.-Mississippi Valley & Western Ry. Co., v. United States Express Co., 81 Ill. 534. 2. But where a receiver is in possession of a railroad, a creditor of the railroad company cannot attach its earnings in the hands of one of its debtors; and if he does so, without leave of the court by which the receiver is appointed, he is guilty of a contempt.-Richards v. The People, 81 Ill. 551. 3. Money taken by an officer from the person of a prisoner arrested for crime, is attachable in the officer's hands in a civil action against the prisoner. Reifsnyder v. Lee, 44 Iowa, 101. Fraud. See Corporation, 2; Divorce; Evidence, 8; Executor, 2. Fraudulent Conveyance.-1. The plaintiff in an action of tort is not, before judgment, a the trust fund, was removed. Hela, that this was not a reduction to possession of the wife's share; and, therefore, that her share of other money received by the succeeding trustee was not liable to make up the loss of the other cestuis que trust.-Jones v. Randel, 2 Del. Ch. 627. See Devise, 2; Divorce; Evidence, 7; Will. [To be continued.] GENERAL NOTES. The following anecdote is told of Sir John Holker, the English Attorney General:-As Sir John was entering the House recently, he saw a stranger standing in the corridor, inquiring after a member. The member in question happened to be a friend of Sir John's, and desirous of obliging him, he said to the stranger, "Come along, I'll get you in." The stranger followed, and Sir John passed him into the speaker's gallery. As he turned to go away, the man held out his hand, and before the Attorney-General quite realized his position, he found he was the possessor of sixpence. Sir John was very proud of the coin, and showed it to his colleagues on the Treasury Bench, affirming that it was the most easily earned sixpence he possessed. WOMEN IN THE COURTS. The Judiciary Committee of the U. S. Senate hold the view that women are admissible to practice as barristers in the United States Courts. A Bill went before the Committee recently, providing that women who have been members of the bar for three years in any State or territory, shall be admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of the United States, and that no person shall be excluded from practising as attorney or counsellor before any Court of the United States, on account of sex. Holding the view that there is now no law excluding females from the bar in the courts mentioned, the Senate saw no necessity for the passage of the Bill, and accordingly reported adversely to it. the value of the property, the Court held, could not be regarded in any other light than a penalty, not resting in contract, but a penalty or fine for the purpose of punishment. The penalty or fine in the present case was given by the Statute to the party claiming damages for the accidental loss of his property. But there is a provision of the Constitution which declares that "all fines and penalties shall be appropriated exclusively to the use and support of common schools." For this, among other reasons, the Court pronounced the law unconstitutional. It would, indeed, be hard to find any reasonable ground for so extraordinary a piece of legislation. One would be disposed to conjecture that it was framed by a legislature largely bucolic, and that the authors of the provision had in view a profitable means of disposing of old or useless cattle. The slaughter which railroads would make under such circumstances would in all probability be prodigious, and a twelve foot fence on either side of the track would be The friends of the measure regard this action insufficient to prevent it. A Brooklyn clergyof the Senate as an evasion of the issue, be- man, a Sunday or two ago, denounced from the cause, in point of fact, the Courts do not admit pulpit the administration of justice as tending women to practice, and the U. S. Supreme to weigh heavily upon the poor, while the rich Court has refused to entertain any application criminal generally managed to escape unpunfor admission in behalf of a woman. She is in ished. The Nebraska enactment referred to the same position, therefore, as if expressly seems to err in the opposite direction, for it excluded by the law. It is generally conceded fleeces companies for the benefit of cattle that if all restrictions were removed, not a owners;-unless, indeed, the former be condozen women in the Union would avail them-sidered the poorer of the two, as holders of selves of the liberty granted. The easiest unprofitable shares and bonds too often find solution of the difficulty would probably be to themselves at the present day. grart the privilege requested, and the anxiety to appear in the Courts would then fade away. A QUESTION OF DAMAGES. In the State of Nebraska a singular enactment is to be found on the Statute book, by which the owner of live stock is allowed "double the value of his property injured, killed or destroyed" on a railroad track, in case the value be not paid within thirty days after demand on the company therefor. A case came before the Supreme Court of the State lately, in which 'a demand was made upon a railroad company under the above Statute, but the Court held that the enactment was repugnant to the Constitution. The excess beyond THE LATE JUDGE DORION. By the death of Mr. Justice V. P. W. Dorion, which occurred somewhat suddenly on Sunday last, the Bench of the Province of Quebec has lost an able and efficient member. The deceased, who was a brother of Sir A. A. Dorion, the present Chief Justice of the Court of Queen's Bench, was born at Ste. Anne de la Perade on the 2nd October, 1827, and was consequently only in his fifty-first year. He came to Montreal about the age of fifteen, was admitted to the practice of the legal profession in due course, and, in partnership with his distinguished brother, the present Chief Justice, enjoyed for many years a very extensive and JOHNSON, J. The plaintiff brings an action for damages against the defendants for malicious prosecution under the following circnmstances : important practice. In 1875 he was raised to the Bench of the Superior Court, and was at first appointed to the Quebec District, but on the death of Judge Mondelet he was transferred-He possessed a property in the Township of to Montreal, where the same vigor, decision, and talent which had marked his career at the bar, distinguished his too brief administration | of judicial office. The bar of Montreal, on Wednesday, unanimously adopted · a resolution expressing their appreciation of "the ability, ntegrity, learning, and invariable affability" with which the deceased discharged his duties, and these words aptly describe the estimable qualities of the learned Judge. REPORTS AND NOTES OF CASES. COURT OF REVIEW. Montreal, May 31, 1878. MACKAY, DUNKIN, RAINVILLE, JJ. MACKAY V. ROUTH et al., and BANK OF MONTREAL, T. S. [From S. C. Montreal. Concurrent Garnishment. Milton, and had given an obligation to Bolduc for $400, on which Bolduc sued him, and got judgment by default. The present plaintiff made a requête civile to get that judgment set aside, and was unsuccessful, and Bolduc brought the land to sale, and became the purchaser for $55. The plaintiff then presented a petition en nullité de décret, which is still pending. The foundation of the requête civile was alleged want of service; and it is the affidavit which the the plaintiff made in support of the requête that was said to be false, and upon which the three present defendants, Bolduc, FrançoisThibault, the bailiff who made the return of service, and Charles Thibault, the attorney for Bolduc in that action, caused him to be arrested for perjury. When the case came before the magistrate, the prisoner-the present plaintiff -who was brought before him to be committed for the offence of perjury, was discharged for want of proof of his identity with the person This was an inscription in Review from the who had made the affidavit. The action as judgment reported ante, page 161. MACKAY, J. A seizure of moneys being made in the hands of the Bank of Montreal, the defendants contested it, because there was a previous saisie-arrêt in their hands against plaintiff at the suit of Duncan Macdonald. This was demurred to, and the Judge a quo had found the demurrer well-founded. The Court here could not but confirm the judgment, as the saisie-arrêt referred to was not disposed of, and there was nothing to show that anything would ever come from that proceeding of Macdonald. Judgment confirmed. Abbott & Co., for plaintiff. SUPERIOR COURT. Montreal, May 31, 1878. LEFUNTUN V. BOLDUC et al. against the attorney has been discontinued, and the two other defendants have pleaded, Bolduc admitting the arrest at his instance, and the bailiff saying that he gave evidence by com-pulsion, but both denying any malice or want of probable cause, and also denying that the plaintiff had suffered any damage. They also plead that the requête civile was dismissed after consultation and evidence. The only points now before me are the malice and want of probable cause for arresting this unfortunate man on a charge of perjury. They are both essentials of the plaintiff's action, and certainly the contestation on the requête civile and between the same persons, at least as far as Bolduc and the plaintiff are concerned, must be taken as decisive of the question whether there had been a legal service or not. But it is also undeniable that there may have been a legal service, and the plaintiff may nevertheless Malicious Prosecution-Whence Malice and want have been in good faith in swearing there was of Probable Cause may be inferred. Malice and want of reasonable and probable cause may be inferred from the acts,conduct and expressions of the party prosecuting, as for example, the existence of a collateral motive, such as a resolution on his part to stop the plaintiff's mouth. not, and may not therefore have committed perjury. That, however, does not touch the real point in the case, which is whether these two defendants acted maliciously, and not bona | fide, in bringing the charge of perjury. The |