cessions from a foreign government, and the other between the defendants, C. & P., as promoters, and the defendant G., by which the former were to pay the latter a certain sum if he would procure them a certain contract with the company to be formed. The jury found these contracts material to be made known, that the plaintiff would not have bought the shares had they been inserted in the prospectus, and that the defendants acted in good faith in not inserting them, under the impression that it was not legally necessary to set them forth. Held, that the plaintiff could recover from the defendants, and the measure of damages was the sum paid for the shares.-Twycross v. Grant et al., 2 C. P. D. 469. 6. B., wishing to sell his colliery, had it valued in 1871. The valuers' estimate was £300,000; and B. promised them a commission of £60,000 if they sold the property at that figure. B. died in 1872; and his representatives offered his and their solicitors, D. & L., £1,500 if they would find a purchaser. In pursuance thereof, D. & L. saw R., a financial agent, who introduced them to C.; and an agreement was made between D. & L., representing the owners, and C., by which C. was to get up a company, with a capital of £300,000, to buy the colliery for £290,370, part cash and part bonds. If C. succeeded, he was to receive £85,000; if he failed, he was to forfeit £20,000. C., G., and R. made an agreement, unknown to the vendors and D. & L., by which G. should undertake all the risk of getting up the company, and should receive $65,000, and C. should have £20,000, and therefrom pay R. £10.000. Subsequently, an agreement of purchase was executed between the vendors and G. B., as trustee for the proposed company, for the property at £290,370. At the same time an agreement was made between C. and the vendors, by which C. was to carry through the project for a company, which should take the property according to the agreement with G. B., and to receive from the vendors £85,000 therefor. The company was formed, R. procuring the directors. The prospectus and articles, drawn by D. & L., as solicitors of the company, referred only to the agreement between the vendors and G. B., as trustee for the company. This agreement was carried out, the vendors receiving the purchase money, out of which they paid C. £85,000, of which he gave G. £65,000, R. £7,500, and kept £12,500 himself. Some time afterwards, the directors learned for the first time of these transactions, and brought suit against the vendors, R., C., G., and D. & L., to compel rescission of the sale, or payment to the company of the £85,000, less reasonable charges and commissions in getting up the company. The vendors compromised for £31,000, and the prayer for rescission was withdrawn. Held, that R., C., and G. were in a fiduciary relation to the company, and could not be allowed to profit from the agreement made without the knowledge of the company; that they should be allowed the proper expenses incurred in bringing out the company, but that commission was allowed them because the plaintiff had offered it in the bill, and not otherwise; that the compromise with the vendors in no way affected the case as against R., C., and G.; and that as against D. & L. the suit be dismissed, without their costs to the time of the compromise, and with their costs since that time.-Bagnall v. Carlton, 6 Ch. D. 371. 7. The memorandum of a company formed under the Companies Act, 1856, with a capital of 16,000 shares of £10 each, stated the company to be limited. The articles stated that a debt of £30,000 existed, for which six shareholders had made themselves liable; and if the funds of the company became insufficient to pay this debt and interest, each shareholder should pay the company a proportionate amount of the debt, "according to the number of shares held by" him. Only about 12,000 shares were ever taken. On an order to wind up the company, held, that the agreement to contribute was valid under the Act, in respect of fully paid-up shares, in spite of the declaration of limitation of liability that the amount to be paid in respect of each share was to be fixed according to the number of shares actually allotted, and not according to the whole number authorized; and if any shareholders were insolvent and unable to pay, the solvent ones were not liable for their proportion.-In re Maria Anna & Steinbank Coal & Coke Co. McKewan's case, 6 Ch. D. 447. Concealment.-See Company, 6. Consideration.-See Husband and Wife, 2. Embezzlement.-See Jurisdiction. Executor and Administrator.-An executor or administrator stands in the relation of gratuitous bailee, and is not to be charged, either at law or in equity, for loss of goods, except through his wilful default.—Job v. Job, 6 Ch. D. 562. Fiduciary Relation.—See Company, 6. Forfeiture.-Claim of forfeiture of the British ship A. for violation of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, § 103, sub § 2, in that the owner, on July 18, 1874, falsely represented that said ship had been sold to foreigners, in consequence of which representation she was stricken from the registry. A foreigner entered an appearance, and set up that, on July 6, he became the bona fide owner of said ship, without having any knowledge of the transactions alleged in the complaint. Held, that the forfeiture was immediate upon the false statement of July 18th, 1874, and a demurrer to the foreigner's statement of defence was sustained.-The Annandale, 2 P. D. 218; s. c, 2 P. D. 179. Contract.-Prior to November, 1871, B. & Co., colliery owners, had been in the habit of supplying coal to the M. Co., at varying prices, without any formal contract. In that month, pursuant to a suggestion of B. & Co. for a contract, a draft agreement was drawn up, providing for the delivery of coal on terms stated, from Jan. 1, 1872, for two years, subject to termination on two months' notice. The M. Co. prepared this draft agreement, and sent it to B., the senior of the three partners of B. & Co., who left the date blank as he found it, inserted the names of himself and his partners in the blank left for that purpose, filled in the blank in the arbitration clause with a name, made two or three not very important alterations, wrote "approved" at the end, appended his individual signature, and returned the document to the M. Co. The latter laid it away, and nothing further was done with it. Coal was furnished according to the terms of this document, and correspondence was had, in which reference was often make to the "contract," and complaints made of violation of it and excuses given therefor. In December, 1873, B. & Co. refused to deliver more coal. In Fraud.-S., the defendant, sold the plaintiffs an action for damages, they denied the existence a lot of land as freehold. It turned out, after of any contract. Held, that these facts fur-the purchase-money had been paid, that almost nished evidence of the existence of a contract, the entire lot was copy-hold and not freehold. and that B. & Co. were liable for a breach S. alleged that his statement that the land was thereof. Brogden v. Met. Railway Co., 2 App. freehold was bona fide. Held, that the sale must Cas. 666. be set aside, and the purchase-money refunded with interest, and the plaintiff paid the expenses he had incurred in consequence of the misrepresentation. The defendant had committed a Contributory.-See Company, 4, 7. Criminal Process.-See Injunction, 1. Damages. See Ancient Lights; Mine, 1; Spe- "legal fraud."—Hart v. Swaine, 7 Ch. D. 42. cific Performance, 1. Debt.-See Will. Devise. A testatrix gave property to her daughter and her husband for their lives, and after the death of the survivor to the children of her said daughter who should be living at the testatrix's decease; but provided that, in case any of the children should die "without leaving lawful issue," the portion of those so dying should go to the surviving grandchildren of the testatrix that should "leave such lawful issue." Held, that the words " without leaving lawful issue" applied to the period of distribution; that is, the decease of the surviving tenant for life.-Besant v. Cox, 6 Ch. D. 604. Director.-See Company 1. Frauds, Statute of.-1. Defendants wrote and signed an offer for the lease of a theatre, which offer was attested by the owner's agent. The owner's name did not appear in the writing, which was addressed to "Sir," without more. The offer was accepted by the agent, by a letter signed by himself, but in which the names of the defendants did not appear. Held, that there was not a valid agreement within the Statute of Frauds, and the proposed lessees were not bound to specific performance. Williams v. Jordan, 6 Ch. D. 517. 2. A party entitled to declare a trust on certain land wrote to the mother of her infant grandchild a letter, signed with the writer's initials, and inclosed in the envelope another paper, headed Supplement," beginning, "I quite omitted to tell you," &c., and unsigned. There was no reference in the letter proper to the "Supplement." Held, that the unsigned document was not a sufficient declaration of trust under the Statute of Frauds.-Kronheim v. Johnson, 7 Ch. D. 60. See Lease; Specific Performance, 1. Guarantee.-See Husband and Wife, 2. Husband and Wife.-1. A husband and wife, married since the Married Woman's Property Act, 1870, gave a joint and several promissory note. The husband took the money, and afterwards became bankrupt. Held, that the wife's separate property was liable on the note, and there was no necessity to make the trustees of her estate parties.-Davies v. Jenkins, 6 Ch. D. 728. 2. The wife of C., a retail trader, who was possessed of separate estate in her own right, without restraint to anticipate, gave a guarantee in writing to the plaintiff, a dealer with whom C. traded, as follows: "in consideration of you, M., having at my request agreed to supply and furnish goods to C., I do hereby guarantee to you, the said M., the sum of £500. This guarantee is to continue in force for a period of six years, and no longer." C. had previously dealt with M., and at the time of the guarantee a bill of exchange drawn by M. on C. for a balance had been dishonoured, and another bill was soon coming due. Held, that the guarantee applied to any moneys to the extent of £500 which should be due during six years, including the dishonoured bill; that the fact that goods were furnished subsequently created a good consideration to the wife for the guarantee; and that the separate estate of the wife was liable for any balance due M. from C., to the extent of £500. Morrell v. Cowan, 6 Ch. D. 166. Injunction.-1. Where a statutory board has power to recover a penalty by criminal proceedings for violation of a statute regulation, a court of equity will not interfere by injunction to restrain those proceedings.-Kerr v. Corporation of Preston, 6 Ch. D. 463. 2. W. sold S. land adjoining other land of W., under which there were mines. S. purchased the land for the purpose of erecting heavy buildings for an iron foundry thereon, and W. was aware of this fact. Subsequently W. leased the mines to H. & Co., who began mining. S. hav ing begun to build on his land, applied for an injunction against W. and H. & Co., to restrain the working of the mines in a manner to endanger the support of his buildings. Held, that S. was entitled to an injunction.—Siddons et al. v. Short et al., 2 C. P. D., 572. Innkeeper. By 26 & 27 Vict. c. 41, § 1, no innkeeper is liable for loss of the goods of a guest beyond £30, except where such goods shall have been lost through the wilful neglect of such innkeeper, or any servant in his employ. Section 3 requires every innkeeper to keep section 1 posted in a conspicuous place in his inn, in order to entitle him to the benefit therof. The defendant had what purported to be section 1 posted properly in his inn; but by an unintentional misprint, it read thus: "Through the wilful default or neglect of such innkeeper, or any servant in his employ." Held, that the misprint was material, and the innkeeper was not entitled to the benefit of the statute.— Spice v. Bacon, 2 Ex. D. 463. Jurisdiction. The court declined jurisdiction where a foreigner brought an action for coownership against a foreign vessel, and another foreigner appeared to have the petition dismissed, and the consul of the State where the ship was registered declined to interfere.-The Agincourt, 2 P. D. 239. 2. Suit between two foreigners over a foreign vessel, where the court, under the circumstances, assumed jurisdiction for a particular purpose.The Evangelistria, 2 P. D. 241. 3. A clerk employed to collect money, and remit it at once to his employers, collected several sums at a place in Yorkshire, subsequently wrote two letters to his employers in Middlesex, without mentioning the above collections, and afterwards, a letter, intended, as found by the jury, to lead his employers to think that he had collected no money in Yorkshire. Held, that he could be tried for embezzlement in Middlesex, where the letters were received.-The Queen v. Rogers, 3 Q. B. D. 28. Lease. Written agreement by the defendant with the plaintiff, duly signed by both, for the lease of a house for a certain term and price named. It was recited that "this agreement is made subject to the preparation and approval of a formal contract;" but no other contract was ever made. Held, that the agreement was only preliminary, and the defendant was not bound to specific performance.-Winn v. Bull, 7 Ch. pal Church, where the marriage was repeated, D. 29. Libel and Slander.-An editor had been convicted of stealing feathers, and had been sentenced to twelve months' penal labour as a felon, which sentence he had duly served out. Afterwards, a brother editor called him a "felon editor," and justified by asserting the above facts. Replication, that as he, the convict, had served out his sentence, he was no longer "felon." On demurrer, held, a good reply. Leyman v. Latimer, 3 Ex. D. 15. Lien.-See Attorney and Client. Mine.-1. Defendant, a mine-owner, diverted the natural course of a stream for his own purposes; and, in an unusually heavy rain which followed, the water overflowed the new channel, and caused damage to an adjoining mine, belonging to the plaintiff. Held, that defendant might be liable therefor, although if the injury had happened in the ordinary course of working the mine, from a sudden and unusual natural cause not to be foreseen by a prudent person, no liability would have arisen.-Fletcher v. Smith, 2 App. Cas. 781. [To be continued.] GENERAL NOTES. MR. CHITTY relates an anecdote of a young attorney who had been carrying on a correspondence with a young lady, in which he had always, as he thought, expressed the greatest caution. Finding, however, that he did not perform what he had led the lady to believe that he would, she brought an action for breach of promise of marriage against him. When his letters were produced on the trial, it appeared that he had always concluded“this, without prejudice, yours faithfully, C. D.' The judge facetiously left it to the jury to determine whether these concluding words, being from an attorney, did not mean that he did not intend to prejudice the lady; and the jury found accordingly. as bachelor and spinster, there is a false entry. A nobleman was indicted in 1850 for having, on a similar re-marriage with a lady, described himself as a widower and his wife a widow. But the judge said it was difficult to say that it was 'wilfully and corruptly,' and the jury found a verdict of 'not guilty.' MEXICAN LITIGATION.-Few nations are So fond of litigation as the Mexicans; and there is a story which pertinently illustrates the propensity of the Dons for going to law with each other. Don Rafael has been suing Don Esteban for at least ten years in all the courts of the Republic. Over and over again he has lost his cause, and as often has he appealed from the court below to the court above. One day the plaintiff meets the defendant in the Calle San Francisco, Mexico. Th eadversaries bow stiffly "How is it, Don Rafael," asks to one another. Don Esteban, "that you have not yet carried before the Supreme Court your appeal against the Court of Guadalajara, which, if you remember, was adverse to you?" "Of a truth," replies Don Rafael, "I shall appeal no more, and abandon my claim. I am sick and tired of the whole affair; and, moreover, I have not a single dollar left to pay costs withal." "Is that so, caballero ?" quickly Esteban, pulling out his purse. the honour to accept the loan of fifty dollars, and give notice of appeal at once. It would be returns Don "Pray do me a shame and a scandal to let such a fine lawsuit die." THE PETTY JURY SYSTEM.-At Ballinakill quarter sessions Ellen Moore was indicted for having stolen a shawl. Evidence sustaining the charge having been given, his worship charged the jury, who retired. After a considerable lapse of time one of the jurors came out of the room and was leaving the court. His worship observed the man, and directed the Deputy Clerk of the Peace to ask if he was a juror. Juror.-Yes, sir. Deputy Clerk of the Peace.—Where are you going? The Juror.— Ah, begor, I wouldn't stay there; they're all boxin' and fightin' inside. (Laughter). The MARRIED OR NOT MARRIED ?-A curious juror was then ordered back to the room, and a question has arisen as to Lord Rosebury's mar- constable placed on the door. The prisoner riage. The Solicitors' Journal points out that if, was found guilty, and on the jury being disafter the marriage at the Registrar's, they were charged, one of them was heard to say, 'Only described in the parish register of the Episco- | I threatened to lick him he'd never agree.' EMPLOYER AND WORKMAN. The rule that a workman has no action against his employer for injuries received in the performance of his duty, has been sustained by the English Courts in a long series of decisions. Some of the principal cases referring to the point will be found on turning back to page 159 (No. 14). Of late, however, some have wished to relax the rule a little in the case of railway companies, and to make them liable for the injuries sustained by their employees. The London correspondent of the Gazette notices the proposed change as follows: "Another topic that is being fully ventilated is the propriety of making railway companies liable for the injuries received by their servants. Now the latter are entitled to no compensation for such injuries, a case, which is considered conclusive, having been decided some years ago, in which the learned judges ruled that in the absence of an express contract to the contrary there was an implied contract between employer and servant that the former should not be liable for damages received by the latter in the performance of his duty. The grounds upon which this decision was based have since been admitted to be wrong, but the decision stands nevertheless, the liability of an employer to a stranger for injury caused by his servant being an exception to the general rule, and not a part of the common law. The railway servants demand to be put on the same footing as the public, and they have the able advocacy of Mr. Lowe on their side, but it is extremely doubtful whether they will gain their object, especially as the bill for improving their legal position was talked over just before the recess, and the question has assumed so difficult an appearance that no one seems inclined to revive it." There seems to be no insuperable objection to the proposed alteration of the law. It it were carried out, the companies would become in point of fact the insurers of their employees against accidents, and, if appreciable at all, the effect probably, other things being equal, would be simply to reduce the wages paid to railway servants by so much as would cover the increased risk to the employer. Against the change, it might be urged that there is no occasion for legislating in the interest of a class, seeing that accident insurance companies stand ready, for a small consideration, to afford the insurance desired by employees. FORENSIC ELOQUENCE. The style of speaking in the English House of Commons, as everybody is aware, has changed very greatly within less than a century. The impassioned oratory of Pitt's time is heard no more, and the Commons does its business for the most part in a very matter-of-fact way, with but little toleration and less respect for set speeches. Equally striking, according to the Edinburgh Review, is the change which may be observed in the style of speaking in the English Courts. Noticing Sumner's statement, that he had "heard a style of argument before the Supreme Court at Washington superior to anything he had heard in London," the Review says son. "We are unable to make the compariBut there has long been at the English bar an aversion to oratorical display, except on very rare occasions which seem to admit of it; and, on the whole, the business of our courts is conducted in a very plain, matter-of-fact way which may have seemed tame to an American ear, especially to Sumner, who had in him the instinct and powers of an orator. Indeed, we fear that if he could now renew his visits to Westminster Hall he would not find that an interval of forty years has raised or improved the intellectual, legal, or oratorical powers of those who preside or argue there. On the contrary, with some few exceptions, he would find, we regret to avow it, a great and palpable decline. On the bench he would look in vain for the strength, the concentration, the learning, the masterful authority of those earlier days.. At the bar he would seek in vain for eloquence, or even advocacy, of the highest order, and he would learn with extreme surprise that one of the most eminent members of the English bar in 1878-a man without a superior, and almost without a rival-was the ci-devant Secretary of State of the Southern Confederacy. More |