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North-Eastern Railway Company, which was decided by the English Court of Appeal in the latter part of February. The plaintiff was the widow of a signalman porter in the service of the Great Northern Company, who was killed in the Leeds station by the negligence of an engine driver of the North-Eastern Company. The Leeds station is occupied by both companies under an agreement, and the expenses of that station are jointly defrayed by both companies. Amongst these expenses came the wages of the deceased signalman, and upon this ground it was argued that the Great Northern signalman was a collaborateur with the North-Eastern engine driver, whose negligence caused his death. The court below yielded to this argument, but it is not surprising to find that the Court of Appeal has unanimously reversed the decision of the Court below, and given judgment for the plaintiff. If the decision for the company had been allowed to stand, the collaborateurs which the law would have created might have been counted by thousands, for there are few large railway stations which are not occupied and paid for by more companies than one.

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To the Honorable the Senate of the United States:
IN SUPPORT OF HOUSE BILL No. 1077, FNTITLED,
BILL TO RELIEVE CERTAIN DISABILITIES OF WO-
MEN."

The provisions of this bill are so stringent that, to the ordinary mind, it would seem that the conditions are hard enough for the applicant to have well earned the honour of the preferment, without making sex a disability.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution declares that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they

reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

To deny the right asked to be granted in this bill, would be to deny to your relator and other women citizens the rights guaranteed in the Declaration of Independence to be self-evident and inalienable, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," a denial of one of the fundamental rights and privileges of citizenship ; "the denial of the right of a portion of the citizens of the commonwealth to acquire property in the most honorable profession of the law, thereby perpetuating an invidious distinction between male and female citizens equally amenable to the law," and having an equal interest in all of the institutions created and perpetuated by this Government.

The Articles of Confederation declare that "The free inhabitants of each of these States (paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted) shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States."

Article 4th of the Constitution says: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State"

Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Wyoming, Utah, and the District of Columbia admit women to the bar. What then? Shall the second co-ordinate branch of the Government, "the Judiciary," refuse to grant what it will not permit the States to deny, the privileges and immunities of citizens, and say to these women attorneys, when they have followed their cases through the State courts to that high tribunal beyond which there is no appeal, "you cannot come in here, we are too holy;" or, in the words of the learned Chancellor, declare that "By the uniform practice of the Court, from its organization to the present time, and by a fair construction of its rules, none but men are admitted to practice before it as attorneys and counsellors. This is in accordance with immemorial usage in England, and the law and practice in all the States until within a recent period, and the

Court does not feel called upon to make a change until such a change is required by statute, or a more extended practice in the highest courts of the State." With all due respect for this opinion, we beg leave to quote the rule for admission to the bar of that court as laid down in the Rule Book:

"RULE NO. 2.-Attorneys.

"It shall be requisite to the admission of attorneys or counsellors, to practice in this court, that they shall have been such for three years past in the Supreme Courts of the States to which they respectively belong, and that their private and professional character shall appear to be fair."

There is nothing in this rule, or in the oath which follows it, either express or implied, which confines the membership of the Bar of the U. S. Supreme Court to the male sex. Had any such term been included therein it would virtually be nullified by the 1st paragraph of the United States Revised Statutes, ratified by the 43rd Congress, December 1, 1873, in which occur the following words: "In determining the meaning of the Revised Statutes, or of any act or resolution of Congress passed subsequent to February 25, 1871, words importing the singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things; words importing the masculine gender may be applied to females," etc., etc.

Now as to "immemorial usage in England." The Executive branch of that government has been vested in an honored and honourable woman for the past 40 years. Now is it to be supposed that if this distinguished lady, or any one of her accomplished daughters, should ask to be heard at the Bar of the Court of the Queen's Bench, that Court, the practice of which the United States Supreme Court has set up as its model, that she would be refused?

Blackstone recounts that Ann, Countess of Pembroke, held the office of Sheriff of Westmoreland, and exercised its duties in person. At the assizes at Appleby she sat with the judges on the bench. See Coke on Lit., p. 326. The Scotch sheriff is properly a judge, and by the statute 20 Geo II., c. 43, he must be a lawyer of three years' standing.

Eleanor, Queen of Henry Third of England, in the year 1253, was appointed Lady Keeper of the Great Seal, or the Supreme Chancellor

of England, and sat in the Aula Regia or King's Court. She in turn appointed Kilkenny, Archdeacon of Coventry, as the sealer of writs and common law instruments, but the more important matters she executed in person.

Queen Elizabeth held the Great Seal at three several times during her remarkable reign. After the death of Lord Keeper Bacon she presided for two months in the Aula Regia.

It is claimed that "admission to the bar constitutes an office." Every woman post mistress, pension agent, and notary public throughout the land is a bonded officer of the Government. The Western States have appointed women as school superintendents, enrolling and engrossing clerks for their several Legislatures and State Librarians.

Of what use are our seminaries and colleges for women if after they have passed through the curriculum of the schools there is for them no preferment, and no emolument; no application of the knowledge of the arts and sciences acquired, and no recognition of the excellence attained.

But this country, now in the second year of the second century of her history, is no longer in her leading strings, that she should look to Mother England for a precedent to do justice to the daughters of the land. She had to make a precedent when the first male lawyer was admitted to the bar of the United States

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EXCLUSIVE TELEGRAPHIC PRIVILEGES A REGULATION OF COMMI MERCE.-On Monday the Supreme Court of the United States, by Chief Justice Waite, filed an opinion, from which Field and Hunt, JJ., dissent, holding that the granting by a State to a company exclusive telegraphic privileges is a regulation of commerce within the meaning of the Federal Constitution; that the telegraph has become indispensable to the business of the world, both as to private persons and Governments, and that it cannot be thus limited or restricted by State law. This is an opinion of the greatest importance, as it virtually takes all power from the States to regulate telegraphs or telegraph companies, a power which they have exercised ever since there was a telegraph. We are not prepared to say the opinion is not right; in fact we think | it is. Are not railroads "indispensable to the business of the world, both as to private persons and Governments," and if so, can a State give a railroad company any exclusive privileges?-Chicago Legal News.

THE U. S. BANKRUPT ACT.-The Senate committee on judiciary have reported, without recommendation, a bill to repeal the bankrupt law. The views of the members of the committee were not at all harmonious, but a majority directed the report made, and several who did not favor repeal consented that the bill should be reported without recommendation. If the feeling of the committee is an index of that of the Senate the passage of the bill by that body seems certain. The House is sure to take like action on the matter, and the only hope of those interested in a perpetu- | ation of the law is in delaying action in one or the other of the two houses. We sincerely hope that they may not be able to do so, for the great majority of the people, both business men and lawyers, have become convinced that the bankrupt law is productive of much more harm than good, not only to business interests but to those of the legal profession In one or two instances the courts have severely animadverted on the opportunities for fraud it affords. Matter of Allen, 17 Alb. L. J. 170. In various ways it operates to injure the community, and even its friends admit that essential amendments are needed if it should remain in force. No two persons agree as to what amendments should be made, and the

only solution of the difficulty is that proposed by the Senate committee, namely, unconditional repeal.-Albany Law Journal.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN IOWA.-The State of Iowa, after an experience of several years under legislation not permitting capital punishment for murder, has restored the death penalty. This State is very favorably situated for testing whether it is better for the community to inflict death as a penalty for murder, having an agricultural community with fertile lands, and with no large centres of population so as to develop what is known in our great cities as the criminal class. If an experiment of this kind ought to succeed anywhere it is in Iowa, but we judge that it has not from the circumstance that the change mentioned has been made.—Ib.

VANDERBILT'S WILL.-The Vanderbilt will case, which has for some months occupied most of the spare time of the surrogate of New York, has been productive at length of an opinion from that official, wherein the question whether the declarations or admissions of a legatee under the will tending to show undue influence, or the absence of testamentary capacity are admissible in evidence in behalf of the contestants, is elaborately and learnedly discussed. Numerous authorities, American and English, are examined, and the conclusion reached that the declarations and admissions should be excluded.-Ib. ·

PROPERTY IN A CORPSE.-The case of Guthrie v. Weaver, 1 Mo. App. Rep. 136, was an action of replevin to obtain what was described to be a coffin of the value of $90, with its contents. The contents were the dead body of plaintiff's wife, who was the daughter of defendant. The body had, with the consent of plaintiff, who had paid for the coffin containing it, been buried in a cemetery lot belonging to defendant. Thereafter plaintiff demanded a delivery of the coffin and body to him that he might reinter them, and this being refused, he brought this action. The court held that there is no property in a corpse, that the relatives have only the right of interment; that this right in the case at bar, having been exercised by burial in the father's lot, with the consent of the husband, no right to the corpse remained except to protect it from insult. The doctrine that there is no absolute property in a dead body has been asserted in

several cases.

Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42 Penn. St. 293; Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Pt. Cemetery, 10 R. I. 227; 14 Am. Rep. 667; Kemp v. Wickes, 3 Phillim. 264. By the old English law the charge of the body belonged exclusively to the ecclesiastical courts. The only common law remedy for a wrongful removal was by criminal process. In Rex v. Sharpe, Dears. & B. 160, an indictment against a man for removing his mother's body from one graveyard for the purpose of burying it in another, was sustained. But under the old English law it was the practice to arrest and detain dead bodies for debt. In several States, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, etc., there are statutes forbidding this. For an interesting discussion of the subject, see Pierce v. Proprietors, etc., supra, and notes, 14 Am. Rep. 676, 678.

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Henwood v. Harrison, L. R. 7 C. P. 606; Fry v.
Bennett, 28 N. Y. 324; Gregory v. Duke of
Brunswick, 6 M. & G. 953.—Ib.

AGENCY-A SUMMARY OF RECENT
DECISIONS.

[Wm. Evans, in Law Times, London.]
First, as to the authority of joint principal
and joint agents:

Each of several co-owners of a thing can only sell or authorize the sale of his own interest in that thing; but all the co-owners may combine to sell or authorize the sale of the whole thing. There is, again, nothing which precludes several co-owners from jointly retaining a solicitor to bring or defend an action relating to their common property. Whether they have done so or not, depends upon the circumstances of the particular case: Keay v. Fenwick, 1 C. P. Div., 745.

The mere taking of a bill from one of several joint owners of a ship, who is also the ship's husband, is no legal release of the liability of his co-owners.

In an action for commission, brought by shipping agents against all the co-owners of a ship, with the exception of one, D, the ship's husband, the mere fact that the plaintiffs, kuowing that the defendants were co-owners of a ship with D, took a bill from him for the amount due to them, and proved against his estate in respect of such bill, is not sufficient to discharge the defendants: Bottemley v. Nuttall, 5 C. B. N. S., 122; 28 L. J., 110, C. P.; Keay v. Fenwick, 1 C. P. Div., 745.

NEWSPAPER CENSURE, WHEN PRIVILEGED.-In the case of Gott v. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235, plaintiff brought action for an alleged false and malicious libel published concerning the image known as the "Cardiff Giant," in defendants' newspaper. The image belonged at the time to plaintiff, and he had made a contract with one Palmer to sell it to him for $30,000. Defendants' newspaper in a humorous article charged that the "giant" was a humbug, and that it had been sold in New Orleans for the sum of eight dollars. In consequence of the appearance of this article the sale to Palmer was not made. The jury found for defendants. The Supreme Court sustained certain exceptions taken by the plaintiff and gave a new trial, saying, however, that "the editor of a newspaper has the right, if not the duty, of publishing for the information of the public, fair and reasonable comments, however severe in terms, upon anything which is made by its owner a subject of public exhibition as upon any other matter of public interest; and such a publication falls within the class of privileged communications for which no action can be maintained without proof of actual malice." See, as supporting this rule, Dibden v. With respect to the evidence of an agent's Swan, 1 Esp. Cas. 28, where Lord Kenyon authority to sell goods in his own name, it has charged that the editor of a newspaper may been decided that the fact that a principal has fairly and candidly comment on any place or intrusted an agent with the possession of goods species of public entertainment, and that if done for the purpose of selling them is, as between fairly and without malice or view to injure the the agent and third parties buying the goods, proprietor, however severe the censure, the jus- prima facie evidence that the agent is authorized tice of it screens the editor from legal animad- to sell them in his own name. Hence, if the version. See also Carr v. Hood, 1 Campb. 355; | court is satisfied that no limitation of the

An unauthorized order to sell, given by one joint owner, is ratified by the other joint owners joining in a power of attorney, erabling their agents to convey their respective shares: Keay v. Fenwick, 1 C. P. Div., 745.

Secondly, as to the existence of implied authority to bind the principal:

agent's authority was disclosed to the buyer, a set-off of a debt due from the agent is a good defence to a claim by the principal against the buyer, notwithstanding that the agent, though so intrusted with the goods, was under an agreement with his principal not to sell in his own name: Ex parte Dixon; Re Henley, L. Rep. 4 Ch. Div., 133; 46 L. J. 20, Bank.; 35 L. T. Rep. N. S., 644.

Lord Justice Brett explained, in a subsequent case, that the statement by Mr. Justice Willes, in Semonza v. Brimley, 18 C. B. N. S., 467, to the effect that it must be shown that the agent acted with the authority of his principal, was due to the fact that he was dealing with the demurrer; and that such authority is shown when the facts prove that he is intrusted as a factor: Ex parte Dixon; Re Henley, 4 Ch. Div.,

133.

An agent to whom bills of lading are handed for the purpose of obtaining possession of the cargo of a stranded vessel, has implied authority to bind the owner by an agreement to pay, on condition of the cargo being given up, charges for which there is a lien on the cargo: Hingston v. Wendt, 1 Q. B. Div., 367.

An auctioneer has a possession coupled with an interest in goods which he is employed to sell; not a bare custody, like a servant or shopDian. There is no difference whether the sale be on the premises of the owner or in a public auction room. The auctioneer has also a special property in such goods, with a lien for the charges of sale, commission and the auction duty Williams v. Millington, 1 H. Bl., 81, 84, 85. The catalogue and conditions may afford evidence that he has contracted personally, and so be liable for the non-delivery of goods and the like: Woolfe v. Horne, 2 Q. B. Div., 355. The authorities are conclusive to show that a broker acting for one of the contracting parties making a contract for the other, is not authorized by both to bind both; but the broker who makes a contract for one may be authorized by that person to make and sign a memorandum of the contract, and the signed entry in the broker's book is a sufficient memorandum of the bargain to satisfy the Statute of Frauds: Thomson v. Gardiner, 1 C. P. Div., 777.

A broker who acted for the plaintiff, made a contract for the sale of goods to the defendant. He sent a note to each party, but signed only

that which was sent to the seller. The con tract was entered in the book and duly signed The defendant kept the note which was sent to him, and made no objection until called upon to accept the goods. The court held that the conduct of the defendant amounted to an admission that the broker had authority to make the contract for him: Thomson v. Gardiner, 1 C. P. Div., 777.

Thirdly, as to questions of ratification :

In order to amount to a ratification after attaining a full age, within 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, 8. 5,Chief Justice Cockburn states the rule that "there must be a recognition by the debtor, after he has attained his majority, of the debt as a debt binding upon him:" Rowe v. Hopof full age, and a promise to pay it " as a debt wood, L. Rep. 4 Q. B., 1. A recognition when of honor," when of ability, is not such a ratification: Maccord v. Osborne, 1 C. P. Div., 568. By ratification is meant an admission that the party is liable and bound to pay the debt: Per 10 Ex. 206-210. Parke, B., Mawson v. Blane, 23 L. J., 342 Ex. ;

When a policy of marine insurance is made by one person on behalf of another without authority, it may be ratified after the loss of the thing insured by the party on whose behalf it is made, though he knew of the loss at the time of the ratification: Williams v. North China Insurance Company, 1 C. P. Div., 757. The justice as well as the authority of this principle was insisted upon by the Court of Appeal, in a case decided in 1876, where Chief Justice Cockburn pointed out that, where an agent effects an insurance subject to ratification the loss insured against is very likely to happen before ratification, and it must be taken that the insurance so effected, involves that possibility of the contract: Ib.

A set-off cannot be maintained of a debt contracted by the plaintiff during infancy, and not ratified by him in writing after full age: Rawley v. Rawley 1 Q. B. Div., 460.

Fourthly, as to the agent's right to commission:

In considering whether an agent is entitled to commission for the introduction of a purchaser or capital, the question is whether the purchase or advance was the result of that introduction, or of an independent negotiation between the parties. Causa proxima is not the

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