of the arrangement throughout France, until, by resuming that ascendency with which he had still the presumption to flatter himself, he might be enabled to trample on the whole ecclesiastical body. He hastened accordingly to publish the pretended Concordat through all the empire, but failed in fulfilling his promise to alleviate the distresses of the clergy who were suffering exile and want. The Pope, on obtaining a knowlege of this perfidy, wrote a reproachful letter to Bonaparte, declared the projected arrangement broken, and added that he would consent to no Concordat, unless it embraced all the points at issue between them. He followed up this spirited measure by circular letters to the French archbishops, warning them against paying attention to the reports so industriously circulated respecting the completion of the Concordat. It was in vain that Bonaparte, with his usual intemperance, issued, on the 26th March 1813, a high-sounding decree against all who should venture to attack his Concordat, and increased the severity of the treatment of the Pope and the Cardinals. They all remained true to their principles; and it is asserted as a fact that none of the French archbishops would consecrate the clergy nominated by Bonaparte: whether in consequence of the inhibition of his Holiness, or because the caution of the French government delayed the enforcement of so repugnant an innovation until the fate of war should restore to them their former preponderance.

Part III. of M. SCHOELL'S collection contains The Retreat from Moscow,' being a translation, with some modification, of the tract under this title which we formerly noticed; — and also Spanish papers, the most interesting of which is a reprint of the well known document published in our journals in the summer of 1808, under the title of "Precautions." The substance of these prudent admonitions was to "avoid all general actions with the French, to carry on the war by detached parties, to cut off the enemy's provisions, to break down bridges, and to obstruct the roads." Had these judicious and self-evident propositions been closely followed, the Spaniards would not have witnessed the disastrous encounters which took place in the years 1808 and 1809.-The other documents have all appeared in their season in our news-papers, and other publications.

Part IV. consists chiefly of proclamations and military reports of the campaign of 1814, beginning from the entrance of the allied troops into Swisserland. - Part V. is a sequel of the same documents, and closes with what may be called the "last sound of the voice of Blucher" under the walls of Paris. All these papers are useful to those who desire to have official

statements

statements in a connected shape: but we perceive nothing in either No. IV. or No. V. which has not been already before the public through the medium of the periodical channels.

THE

of

ART. VII. Mémoire, &c.; i. e. Memorial of Marshal DAVOÛT, Prince of Eckmuhl, to the King. 8vo. pp. 160. Paris. 1814. HE conduct of Marshal DAVOÛT, in his late government at Hamburgh, having been marked with a severity which excited serious complaints, the court of France deemed it incumbent on them to prevent this warm adherent of Bonaparte from taking up his residence within Paris, until he had justified the questionable parts of his administration. Notice was therefore given to him by the minister that the charges against him were reducible to three points, viz. 1st, that of firing on the white cockade from the batteries of Hamburgh, after he had obtained positive information of the overthrow of Bonaparte, and the reestablishment of the Bourbons; 2dly, of having forcibly seized the money in the Hamburgh bank; and 3dly, of having committed arbitrary acts calculated to throw odium on the French name. To these accusations a very clear and well-written answer has been composed in the shape of a memorial; and, could we persuade ourselves that it proceeded from the pen the Marshal, we should be disposed to give him credit for more knowlege and reflection than have in general marked the military adventurers of the French Revolution. From the prudence, however, with which this defence is composed, and particularly from the judgment with which all matters extraneous to the main question are omitted, we are led to think that he must have availed himself of the assistance of a literary co-operator. It remains to be seen with what view the French court were induced to demand the justification in question; whether by a real feeling of resentment and indignation at the acts already mentioned, or by a wish to remove from themselves the odium attached to forgiveness of a conduct so obnoxious to their allies, in putting it regularly in the power of DAVOÛT to exculpate himself by producing the mandates of Bonaparte. The latter appears to us the more probable consideration, both from the general conduct of the ministers of Louis XVIII., and from the probability that they were privately apprized beforehand of all the evidence which the measure in question has now rendered public. If this supposition be correct, the ministerial notice to DAVOÛT is to be regarded chiefly as a sanction for him to disclose, without the charge of disloyalty, the instructions of his late master; and the circulation given to the present defence may be viewed in the light of a justification to the world

Ii 2

world of the clemency intended to be exercised by the house of Bourbon. In political life, the treatment of an individual is decided less by a conviction of his personal merits, than by a reference to more general considerations; and, in the present case, the feeling of the French army at large is likely to be the chief rule for the conduct of the government.

The Marshal begins by referring to the original order of Bonaparte, dated in April 1813, for his appointment to the command of what was then called the 32d military division; in other words, the lately annexed departments of the Elbe and Weser. The approach of Russian and Prussian partizans had encouraged the spirited inhabitants of Hamburgh and the surrounding country to throw off the detested yoke of Bonaparte; who, in return, lost no time in putting them under martial law, and in fixing on DAVOÛT as a fit instrument for the execution of the attendant severities. The ensuing letter was written by Berthier to that officer a few days after the battle of Lutzen:

"Waldeim, 7th May, 1813.

"I have already informed you, by my letter of 5th, of the complete victory obtained by the Emperor on the 2d. We shall probably be to-morrow at Dresden. The Duke of Elchingen is to pass the Elbe, and to march against Berlin. - The Emperor desires me to apprize you that it is indispensable for you to advance to Hamburgh, to take possession of that city, and to make General Vandamme march in the direction of Mecklenburgh. The following is the course of conduct which you are to adopt.

You will arrest forthwith all inhabitants of Hamburgh, who have taken service under the title of Hamburgh senators. You will sequestrate their effects, and declare them confiscated, taking possession of their houses, lands, &c. You will disarm the inhabitants, and impose a contribution of two millions sterling on the cities of Hamburgh and Lubeck, taking measures for the partition and prompt payment of that sum. You will disarm the inhabitants of the surrounding country, and arrest all persons who, having been in the French service, either in the military or in the custom-house departments, proved unfaithful to their oath, and their property shall be confiscated. You will fortify the city of Hamburgh, planting cannon on the ramparts, and forming draw-bridges at the gates; and you will establish a citadel on the side of Haarburgh, in such a manner that four or five thousand men may be sheltered from the populace, and from all insult. In like manner you will fortify Lubeck, and place it out of danger of a coup de main. You will also put Cuxhaven in a proper state. All these orders, Prince, must be rigorously observed; the Emperor leaves you no power to modify any of them.",

On obtaining possession of Hamburgh, M. DAVOÛT proceeded without delay to enforce the contribution, but took on himself,

he

he says, (p. 6.) to modify the execution of his orders as far as they regarded the punishment of individuals. I had long commanded,' he adds, in Germany, and knew the disposition of the inaabitants. I arrested or brought to trial no one for his political opinions or actions: I forbade individual resentments; and I even prevented the pursuit of those who, in the hurry of the insurrection, had laid hands on the property of French subjects. I solicited from the Emperor the forgiveness of those who had been seduced by the promises of the enemy; and, having permission to publish an amnesty with certain exceptions, I reduced the number of the latter to twentyeight.'

By this time, the vindictive impressions of Bonaparte had given way to the dictates of calculation, and his subsequent orders point exclusively to military arrangements:

LETTER FROM BONAPARTE TO DAVOÛT.

"Bunzlau, 7th July, 1813.

"A city of the extent of Hamburgh cannot be defended without a garrison of 25,000 men, and an immense artillery; now, if we run the chance of losing such a number of men and stores, we ought to have a place capable of defending itself at least during two months of open trenches. To put Hamburgh in such a situation would require at least ten years, and an expence of nearly two millions sterling. Still I am solicitous to preserve Hamburgh, not only against the inhabitants and against regular troops, but even against besieging artillery. I am desirous that, in the case of 50,000 men appearing before it, the city should be not only safe from a coup de main, but should oblige the enemy to go the length of opening their trenches, and even hold out a fortnight or three weeks afterward. This result I wish to obtain during the present year at the expence of not more than Ico,oool. (sterling), a train of 100 to 150 cannon, and a garrison not exceeding 6000 men. I am farther desirous that, in the event of the town being taken after the fortnight or three weeks, I shall lose neither cannon nor men; and that the garrison may find refuge in a citadel, where it may make a farther defence of one or two months against open trenches. The explanation which I have given conveys a sufficient idea of the plan; and the execution of it must be begun without the loss of an hour. In the course of one day after the arrival of the officer whom I now send to you, 10,000 workmen must be employed."

After these general observations, we have the specific directions, which begin with an order to destroy all houses on the ramparts, without mercy; on the plan, however, of making the city at large reimburse the particular individuals. Next come a variety of details, all shewing how closely Bonaparte studied the department of engineering, which, it will be remembered, was his original branch in the military line. He continues:

.

"Suppose all these works to be finished, and they may be accomplished in a few months, it is evident that four companies of artillery, and 5500 infantry, will be masters of Hamburgh. To complete the system, make a citadel between the river and the city; so that the citadel, the islands, and Haarburgh, may all be connected. Thus, were the city taken after a regular siege, the garrison would find refuge in the citadel, the islands, and in Haarburgh. All this may be done in the course of the year; and in subsequent years I will construct the citadel in stone-work, and give it all possible strength. Such is the defensive system that I have adopted for Hamburgh; and I have issued orders to General Haxo to study, draw, and execute it. I am aware that he proposed to place the citadel on the side of Altona, but this cannot be; it would have the effect of frightening the Danes. You know at the same time that I never saw Hamburgh, and you will consequently study rather the spirit than the letter of my orders."'

During the armistice, Bonaparte called to the main army the portion of the troops at Hamburgh commanded by Vandamme, leaving DAVOÛT with a body of new levies. His orders to the Marshal were, that, on the recommencement of hostilities, he should be guided by the progress of the army which was about to advance (under Oudinot) in the direction of Berlin. An intercepted letter from the Emperor to DAVOÛT was about this time published by the allies, and found to contain positive orders for the advance of the Marshal; but, whether this was intended to fall into their hands, or not, the object of Bonaparte was effectually foiled by the repulse of Oudinot by Bernadotte. From this time forwards, no instructions reached M. DAVOÛT during several months, his Imperial master being abundantly occupied in Silesia, at Dresden, and at Leipsic; while the superiority of the allies in cavalry rendered the transmission of dispatches extremely hazardous. Thus circumstanced, the Marshal adhered to his general instructions, which directed him to pay little attention to the flying parties of the enemy, but to cling to Hamburgh and the Danish alliance. As long as affairs wore a favourable aspect for the French, he declares (p. 13.) that he delayed the destruction of the dwellings which stood in the way of the prescribed fortifications; and it was not, he says, until the hostile army, first under Bernadotte and afterward under Benningsen, approached Hamburgh, that he resorted to the hard expedient of driving out of the city such of the inhabitants as had not laid in twelve months' stock of provisions. The advance of the allies, after the victory of Leipsic, was so sudden as wholly to prevent the possibility of his retreat by the way of Holland; and it was not until the 11th of November that he received from General Carra St. Cyr the following notice:

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