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• General Moreau felt the barbarous decree, but, yielding to the exigency of the time, he stifled the best and warmest feelings of his nature, remounted his charger, and executed the duties of his situation.

So much however was General Moreau exasperated against the inhuman monsters in whose service he was fighting, that he tendered his resignation to General Pichegru. "What do you intend to do?” inquired the latter. "To quit the army and France" was the reply. "To quit the army and France !" repeated Pichegru: do you not then see the manner in which the Emigrés are treated by the Foreign powers? I do not accept of your resignation. I beg of you as a friend, to reflect on the step you intend to take: come to me again to-morrow. It is not thus that you should intend to avenge the death of your father; you must think of acquiring a glory and an importance which may one day put you in a situation to avenge it. I shall soon furnish you with an opportunity of distinguishing yourself."

Pichegru was faithful to his promise, and lost no opportunity of calling forth the services of Moreau; who distinguished himself, during the remainder of the campaign, at the siege of Nimeguen, and in other operations against the forces charged with the defence of Holland. The efforts of the French were, as we well know, effectually seconded by the extraordinary rigour of the winter; and, in the course of January 1795, the whole of the United Provinces were over-run, with the exception of Zealand: where the presence of some British ships of war, and the difficulty of approach from the floating masses of ice, enabled the local government to withhold their surrender for some weeks. During this interval of suspence, Moreau was sent by his commander from the Hague to Middleburg, to quicken the decision of the Zealand government; a mission of little importance compared to the events of his subsequent career, but which shews that he had already excited a strong impression of his ability for diplomatic as well as for military

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The year 1795 was passed in inaction till September; when the French, despairing of obtaining from Austria, by negocia tion, a peace, with the cession of Belgium, determined to compel her to it by force of arms. The Rhine was accordingly passed by two formidable armies, that of Jourdan in the neighbourhood of Cologne, and that of Pichegru at Manheim. It was then that the talents of Clairfait and the advantage of a concentrated position shone forth with lustre; the army of Jourdan having been defeated, the blockading force before Mentz overthrown, and even the judicious movements of Pichegru baffled by the distinguished commander of the Aus Clairfait continued in possession of the superiority,

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until the state of the weather in the end of December forced both parties to conclude an armistice; after which the command of the Austrians was transferred from Clairfait to the Archduke Charles. In the next year, Pichegru declining to undertake a second invasion of Germany, Moreau was appointed his successor, and crossed the Rhine, in the end of June, at the head of nearly 80,000 men. Jourdan, having passed the Lower Rhine three weeks sooner, obtained successes at first, but was soon driven back by a superior force. It was in vain, however, for the Austrians to contend in the field with the large numbers and skilful tactics of Moreau; so that, Jourdan having again, advanced, and the successes of Bonaparte having necessitated a great drain of the Austrian force to Italy, it became necessary to yield province after province, and to permit the French to proceed into the heart of Germany. The whole of July and the first part of August accordingly witnessed little else than a continued retreat of the Austrians, until the time arrived for striking a decisive blow against one of two armies which advanced without sufficient co-operation with each other. That of Jourdan was selected as the object of attack; and his disorderly retreat from Amberg to Wurtzburg, and from Wurtzburg to Bonn, was the reward of this well executed manœuvre. The Austrians, superior in cavalry, soon found means to intercept the communication between Moreau and Jourdan; so that the former, though early apprized of the force directed against his colleague, was greatly at a loss in determining what course to pursue for his support. Instead of persevering in an attempt to march northwards to the relief of Jourdan, he embraced the alternative of advancing eastward into the interior of Bavaria, with the hope of recalling the Austrians to the defence of that important portion of the empire. The latter, however, had the prudence to allow Moreau to occupy as much territory as he chose; satisfied that, when effectually deprived of the support of Jourdan, he must seek his safety in retreat.

The event justified the calculation of the Austrians, and Moreau at last found it necessary to abandon his conquests, and to begin a retrograde movement about the middle of September. The Austrians having had time to throw various detachments in his front, and the mountainous territory of the Brisgau being of a kind the most unfavourable to the movement of a retreating force, the eyes of all Europe were fixed for a month on the army of Moreau; and it would be difficult to find adequate expressions for the admiration excited in France, and throughout Europe, by the success with which he extricated himself from a situation apparently of very imminent danger. To us, however, it has always seemed that the merit

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of this retreat was considerably over-rated. There was a novelty in it, because Frenchmen in the revolutionary war had been distinguished only for offensive operations, and had been accounted ill qualified for the patient and steady conduct which is indispensable in a long retreat. French soldiers, however, when well disciplined, are, from their readiness to acquiesce in privations, and to believe whatever their officers chuse to tell them, scarcely less fitted for one kind of service than the other. Moreau had the great merit of viewing his situation without dismay, and of losing nothing by precipitation. All his retrograde movements were calculated to support each other; and at a particular time, (second of October,) when the Austrians ventured to come too near him, he resumed the offensive with signal success. Here, however, it seems fit that the eulogium should end, because his army was always superior in number to his pursuers, and retreated not from any check or diminu tion experienced by itself, but in consequence of the overthrow of a separate force. The successful retreat of Suwarrow in autumn 1799, through an equally frightful country, is a decisive proof of the impracticability of opposing the movements of an army by the resistance of detachments, however favourably posted.

Thus ended in Germany the operations of 1796. In the succeeding spring, the progress of Bonaparte into the heart of Austria enabled the French to cross the Rhine once more with better prospects, and the treaty of Leoben put an end for a season to the effusion of blood. In 1798, when the restless spirit of Bonaparte led him into Egypt, Moreau remained quietly at home, and, on the fresh rupture in 1799, was at hand to command the armies of his country. With that charge, however, the distrust of the Directory prevented him from being invested; and he could serve only as a volunteer in the army in Italy which was commanded by Scherer. The repeated defeats of this force by the Austrians and the Russians led to a degree of participation in the command by Moreau, which was of a nature more suitable to the functions of a General than those of a subordinate; and the safety of the remains of the French army was in a great measure owing to his prudent counsels. At the battle of Novi, in August, Moreau was from the beginning of the action at the side of Joubert, and assumed the direction of the army on the fall of that promising officer. On this occasion, he was opposed to Suwarrow; and it is much to be regretted that his MS. observations on the tactics of the veteran Russian have been subsequently consumed by fire.

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In the campaign of 1800, Moreau appeared once more in his proper sphere, at the head of the army of the Rhine. Having accomplished the passage of that river, and defeated the Austrians in several actions, he was enabled, without losing his superiority, to execute the pre-concerted plan of dispatching, through the heart of Swisserland, a powerful body of troops, to co-operate with Bonaparte in Lombardy and Piedmont. Hence followed the defeat of Melas at Marengo, and the evacuation of Italy, all the way to the Mincio, by the Austrians. The operations at the end of the year in Italy and Germany continued unfavourable to the latter; and the victory of Hohenlinden gave at once a finish to the resistance of the Emperor, and the last wreath to the laurels of Moreau.

When the peace of Luneville and the subsequent treaty with England enabled the French commanders to settle at home, Moreau purchased from Barras the estate of Grosbois near Paris, and married Mademoiselle Hulot, a lady from the Isle of France. It was suitable both to the splendour of Moreau's services and to the artful policy of Bonaparte, to surround him with more éclat than belonged to the situation of a private citizen: but this affectation of attention did not impose on Moreau, nor prevent him from regretting the accumulation of too much power in the hands of a restless usurper. He made no scruple of expressing his sentiments to his friends, and he went at last so far as to listen to the projects contrived to overset Bonaparte. Hence his connection with Pichegru and other well-wishers of the Bourbons; a connection already understood in substance by the public, and on which no new light is thrown by the authors of these volumes. Bonaparte displayed on this occasion his usual hypocrisy; professing loudly his reluctance to believe that Moreau was guilty, and obliging his wife to write the kindest letters to Madame Moreau, at the moment when he was planning the downfall of her husband. With a people so changeable as the French, the exile of Moreau was sufficient to answer the usurper's object, that of making this favourite General be forgotten by the army and the nation. It would have been an additional triumph to Bonaparte, to have been enabled to state that attempts at submission and reconciliation had been made by Moreau, but the latter firmly resisted all insinuations of that nature.

Had the present publications been composed with care, we might have found in them some useful information with regard to the manner in which Moreau passed an interval of eight years in America; during which his life ceased to form a part of history, and fell distinctly within the province of the biographer. It would have been highly interesting to have known

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the nature of his occupations, his favourite course of reading, and the characters of those with whom he chiefly associated. From his early habit of writing, the public had reason to expect that his leisure would have been applied to the composition of a narrative of his campaigns, but no light whatever is thrown on the cause of the disappointment which has occurred.

M. Svinine was the companion of Moreau on the passage from America, as well as during the subsequent journey from Gottenburg to the head quarters of the allies. He observes:

On our passage he often spoke to me with tenderness of General Pichegru, whose great talents and energetie virtues he admired, and whose lamentable end he incessantly deplored. He also delighted to expatiate on the genius and military talents of our immortal Souvoroff, of whom, however, he judged with impartial severity.—

On the 26th of July, we landed at Gottenburg. The first visit of the General was to the Governor; he was afterwards disposed to view the town, but the eagerness of the multitude, and their de monstrations of joy, soon obliged him to give up the walk.'—

During the few days that General Moreau remained at Gottenburg, he busied himself among his country-equipage, that is to say,he caused to be laid aside the greater part of his effects, to be forwarded to Russia, and reserved only some maps, of which he possessed a valuable collection, together with a few changes of linen. Few men were more limited than he was in their personal wants: he could do without every thing that was not strictly necessary; and a servant was, to him, almost a superfluity. When I testified to him my great astonishment at seeing him so independent of all which constitutes the indispensable necessaries of existence, he answered, " Such should be the life of a military man; he must know how to bear the want of every thing; never be discouraged by privations; it is thus that we made war. The General in chief had scarcely a single carriage. Our baggage never encumbered our march; and on our retreat, we were never hampered with those numerous equipages which occasion the loss of more men to an army than a retreat does.".

What I have said of the manner in which Moreau was received in Sweden, scarcely affords an idea of the reception given him in Prussia: every one expressed, in his own way, the joy which his presence caused. The innkeepers refused his money-the post-masters furnished him their best horses; - scarcely did his carriage stop an instant ere it was surrounded by a multitude eager to see him and applaud him. He was far from ascribing to himself all this homage. These good people," said he, "prove by all these demonstrations, the hatred they bear to Bonaparte, and the desire which animates them to be for ever freed from him."

Frederick II. was often the subject of Moreau's conversation, when travelling through the Prussian territory:

"He," said the General, "never abandoned bis army when surrounded by dangers; nor was he ever at a loss how to manage it in the midst of battles. His victories were the fruit of the highest

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