as part of a line of railroad with all its incidents, including the business and profits to be derived therefrom. . . . The property in question would be worth practically nothing except for its position as part of a railroad system. It has a value as part of the whole property, and practically no value when detached or severed from it. But the question still remains, what is the reasonable and practical method of estimating that value?"

To the same effect the Supreme Court of Tennessee said: 11 "The value of the roadway at any given time is not the original cost, nor, a fortiori, its ultimate cost after years of expenditure in repairs and improvements. On the other hand, its value cannot be determined by ascertaining the value of the land included in the roadway assessed at the market price of adjacent lands, and adding the value of the cross-ties, rails, and spikes. The value of land depends largely upon the use to which it can be put, and the character of the improvements upon it. The assessable value for taxation of a railroad track can only be determined by looking at the elements on which the financial condition of the company depends,-its traffic, as evidenced by the rolling stock and gross earnings, in connection with its capital stock. No local estimate of the fraction in one county of a railroad track running through several counties can be based upon sufficient data to make it at all reliable, unless, indeed, the local assessors are furnished with the means of estimating the whole road." 12

This point, that the whole property is to be valued together and for the purpose for which it is used, was held in Massachusetts, under the statute by which machinery is to be taxed. locally with real estate. 13 Chief Justice Field said: "The whole manufacturing plant of land, buildings, and machinery locally taxable has been found to be of more value if kept

11 Quoted with approval in Columbus S. R. R. v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470, 38 L. ed. 238.

12 Franklin Co. v. R. R., 12 Lea (Tenn.), 521, 539.

13 Troy C. & W. Manufactory v. Fall River, 167 Mass. 517, 46 N. E. 99.

together and used for mill purposes than if the machinery is removed from the buildings, or the buildings with the machinery are removed from the land; and, as they all belong to the petitioner, we are of opinion that each of these items should be valued as it is used in its connection with the others." 14

On the other hand, where a statute provided for the assessment locally of telegraph lines, including the poles and the interest in the land on which the poles stand, it was held that the poles and wires should be valued as mere chattels, and the value of the company's interest in the land, if any, added. Judge Peckham said: "Taking the cost of the production of those articles, which are in their nature personal property, and capable of infinite production, as above described, and adding to that cost the value of the interest in the land on which the poles stand and the value of the right to erect such poles on the land, upon the principles above indicated, and we have the total elements entering into the full and true value of the property of the company subject to taxation under the act of 1886 above cited. In the assessment for taxation under that act the property is not to be regarded as a part of a whole, nor as a complete telegraph line in operation. Its value for telegraph purposes, and its position, with its connections, and its productive capacity, are not considerations entering into the value of the property under the act last named. These considerations are foreign to its purpose. They largely enter into the question of the value of the business and the franchises of the company; and the value of such business and franchises is to be assessed under the act of 1881."

The company, he added, did not own the land on which the poles stood, but had at most a revocable license to sue the land; and the case therefore differed from that of the taxation of railroads. "Most of this property, it is seen, is personal property, and it is called land although the poles are placed in streets which do not belong to the company, and

14 See also Lowell v. Comrs., 152 Mass. 372, 25 N. E. 469, 9 L. R. A. 356.

in which the company has, as we have seen, no interest of a strictly legal nature. The railroad or the bridge company on the contrary, does own the fee of the real estate upon which it places its superstructure of rails or bridge, and the question arises, What is the value of this real estate owned by the company upon which this superstructure has been placed, and which is used for railroad or bridge purposes? That question involves almost necessarily the inquiry as to the profitableness of the superstructure which has been placed thereon, and which forms part and parcel of the real estate upon which it is laid; and this can only be answered by regarding the real estate as part of a whole portion of real estate devoted to the railroad or bridge purpose. The land-the portion of the earth on which the rails rest-is owned by the company, and the company to that extent has a monopoly. This land cannot be increased or reproduced. The structure, having been placed on it, becomes a part of it, and it must all be appraised at its full value as an integral part of a whole or completed instrument created for the purpose of realizing pecuniary profit. The cost of each particular portion of real estate, while one element to be considered for the purpose of determining the question of profits, cannot, in the nature of the property, be regarded as the one important consideration for the purpose of arriving at its full value for taxation. Without continuing the comparison further, it seems to me there is a clear, radical, and important difference in the very nature of the properties to be taxed, and which should lead to a different rule in the assessment of what is in fact real estate or earth in the one case and personal property in the other, although called 'land.'" 15

$483. Taxation of tangible personal property.

True taxation of a chattel as property must be at its situs, as there alone can the State control it.16 Every chattel within 15 People v. Dolan, 126 N. Y. 166, 27 N. E. 269, 12 L. R. A. 251. 16 Hoyt v. Comrs., 23 N. Y. 224; Varner v. Calhoun, 48 Ala. 178.

a State may properly be made by taxation to pay its share of the expenses of the State. But since a State has full control of every person domiciled within it, and may properly exact by taxation, in return for its protection of him, an amount based upon his wealth, a State may properly tax a man at his domicil upon the value of his personal property wherever situated.17 The value of his real estate might, of course, be included in the estimate of his wealth; but since the protection of the State can never by any possibility be invoked for foreign land it is the almost universal habit even of States which tax persons at their domicil upon their whole personal estate to refrain from taxing them upon their foreign real estate.

In accordance with this jurisdiction and practice, States usually tax all corporations locally upon their tangible personal property held within the State; and frequently also tax domestic corporations upon personal property situated abroad.

" 18

"All . . . personal property of every corporation shall be taxed the same as the . . . personal property of an individual." "All real and personal estate whether owned by individuals or corporations, resident or non-resident, is liable to taxation." 19 "The personal property of every private corporation is liable to taxation unless otherwise specially provided." 20 The same result is often attained by a more general provision, such as "all property, real, personal or mixed, not expressly exempted, is taxable" locally.21

Any such general provisions would undoubtedly cover the

17 Com. v. Union Refrig. Co., (Ky.) 80 S. W. 490.

18 N. J. Corp. Supp. § 101; to the same effect, Ky. 1902, ch. 128, Art. III, $9; La. Rev. Stat. § 733; Mich. 1893, ch. 6, § 11; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 7538; S. Car. Rev. Stat. 1893, § 250; Tenn. 1901, ch. 174, § 22; Wash. 1897, ch. 71, 20; Ont. Rev. Stat. 1897, ch. 224, § 39.

19 Ga. Code, 1895, § 767. To the same effect, Ohio Rev. Stat. § 2731; Nova Scot. Rev. Stat. ch. 58, § 3.

20 Ore. Misc. L. § 2744. To the same effect, Cal. 1899, ch. 80; Hawaii Laws, 1897, § 830; Nev. 1891, ch. 99, § 13; Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 1508; Mont. Pol. Code, § 3711.

21 Texas Rev. Stat. Art. 5061. To the same effect, Wis. Rev. Stat. §§ 1034, 1040; Neb. Stats. § 3897; S. Car. Rev. Stat. 1893, § 217.

taxation of chattels within the State of foreign corporations; but this is often expressly provided for. 22 And in a few States the taxation of all chattels of domestic corporations, wherever situated, is required. “All . . . personal estate within this State, and all personal estate . . . of all corporations organized under the laws of this State, whether the property be in or out of this State . . . shall be subject to taxation." 23

$484. Place of taxation of chattels.

Chattels are usually taxed locally at the principal office of the company 24 (or if there be no principal office in the State, then at the place in the State where the corporation through its agents does business); 25 or else at the place where the property itself is situated. 26

§ 485. What is tangible property: income.

Income in money is of course tangible property, and may be taxed as such. A direct tax may be laid (in the absence of constitutional restriction) upon the proceeds of the business, as for instance on its gross receipts. Thus an insurance company may be taxed upon the amount of premiums received. within the State.27 And in general a foreign corporation may be taxed on all income received by the corporation within the jurisdiction.28

22 Ore. 1901, p. 142; Ga. Code, 1895, § 767; Hawaii Code, 1897, § 828. 23 Ky. 1902, ch. 128, Art. 1, § 2. To the same effect, N. Dak. 1897, ch. 126, § 2; Minn. Gen. Stat. § 1508.

24 Conn. Stat. § 3834; Ore. Misc. L. § 2744; N. Bruns. Consol. Stat. ch. 100, § 24; N. Y. Tax L. § 11; Wis. Rev. Stat. of 1898, § 1041.

25 Mich. 1893, ch. 6, § 11; Neb. 1903, ch. 73, § 395; Wis. Rev. Stat. 1898, § 1040.

26 Ind. Stat. 1894, § 8426; La. Rev. Stat. § 733; Mont. Pol. Code, § 3711; Nev. 1891 ch. 99, § 13; Tenn. 1901, ch. 174, § 2; Ore. Misc. L. § 2742, amended 1901, p. 142; Ida. Rev. Stat. § 1442.

27 Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566, 19 L. ed. 1029; McNall v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 65 Kan. 694, 70 Pac. 604.

28 Re North of Scotland Can. Mtg. Co., 31 Up. Can. C. P. 552; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Kingston, 7 Ont. 343.