and issue to said Acres, Blackmore, & Co. the certain warrant of said village, numbered one, duly signed by E. B. Murphy, who was the chairman of said board of trustees, and countersigned by C. F. Colwell, clerk of said village and of said board, and attested by the seal of said village, and directed to the treasurer thereof, and which commands the treasurer to pay to Acres, Blackmore, & Co., or bearer, the sum of $69.35 out of the general fund of said village. On the tenth day of March, 1874, said warrant was duly presented for payment to, and payment thereof duly demanded from, the treasurer of said village, and said treasurer thereupon indorsed upon said warrant the following words:

"Registered for payment, March 10, 1874; not paid for want of funds, and there never has been any funds to pay the same. "G. W. COLVIN, Treasurer."

And then and there said treasurer, for want of funds, refused to pay said warrant, or any part thereof. Said warrant was in words and figures following, to wit:

"$69.35.

STATE OF NEBRASKA,

"TOWN OF ARAPAHOE, Dec. 27, 1873. "Treasurer of the town of Arapahoe: Pay Acres, Blackmore, & Co., or bearer, $69.35, and charge to account of general fund. By order of the town council. No. 1.

"E. B. MURPHY, Chairman Board of Trustees. "C. COLWELL, Clerk.

"Registered for payment, March 10, 1874.

"G. W. COLVIN, Treasurer." Subsequently, but before the commencement of this action, said warrant was, by said Acres, Blackmore, & Co., for a valuable consideration, transferred and delivered to the plaintiff, who is now the lawful holder and owner thereof, but that no part of said warrant has been paid, nor is there now, nor has there been at any time, any funds or moneys in the treasury of said village for application to the payment of said warrant; and said defendant has at all times neglected, and still neglects and refuses, by levy of taxes or otherwise, to provide for the payment of the same, or any part thereof, and there is now due the plaintiff thereon the sum of $69.35, and ten per cent interest from the twenty-seventh day of December, 1873, for which amount plaintiff asks judgment.

There are eleven counts in the petition upon causes of action similar to that above set forth.

The village filed an answer, in which,-1. It denies that it was incorporated at the time said indebtedness was incurred; 2. Interposes a plea of the statute of limitations; 3. That certain warrants described in specified counts of the petition were issued to aid in constructing a water grist-mill in said village without being authorized by a vote of the electors thereof; 4. That a portion of the indebtedness (describing it) was incurred for stationery and letter-heads for the use of the people of the village.

There is a stipulation of facts set out in the record which need not be copied.

On the trial of the cause the court found the issues against the village, in all matters except as to the warrants issued for the water grist-mill, and rendered judgment accordingly. Both parties prosecute error to this court.

The agreed statement of facts shows that all the warrants were issued in 1873 and 1874, and in the latter year were presented to the treasurer of the village for payment, and payment refused for want of funds, and this refusal and the reason therefor were indorsed on each of the warrants. Nothing has been paid on any of them from that time until the present; and the question arises whether or not the action is barred by the statute of limitations.

In Brewer v. Otoe County, 1 Neb. 373, it was held that the statute of limitations did not apply to county warrants. In that case certain warrants had been presented for payment, running from the year 1858 to 1863, and indorsed, not paid for want of funds. The court, by Lake, J., say (page 383):

"That the legislature never intended that county warrants should be affected by the limitation act before referred to is evident, I think, from the whole course of legislation respecting them. As late as the 12th of February, 1866, it was enacted that 'all debts heretofore incurred by the county commissioners of any county, acting in good faith, and duly recorded at the time on their books, shall be deemed valid, and the county shall be held liable for the same': R. S., c. 5, sec. 1.

"Chapter 9, section 1, provides that 'all county orders heretofore drawn, or that may hereafter be drawn, by the proper authorities of any county, shall, after having been presented to the county treasurer, and by him indorsed, not paid for want of funds in the treasury, draw interest from said date at the rate of ten per cent per annum.'

"From these, as well as numerous other enactments of the legislature that might be cited, I have reached the conclusion that the plea of the statute of limitations cannot be successfully made against these warrants, and that whenever it can be shown that the funds have been collected out of which they can be paid, or sufficient time has been given to do so in the mode pointed out in the statutes, their payment may be demanded, and if refused, legally coerced."

In view of this and other special legislation in regard to county warrants, the court held that they were excluded from the operation of the statute of limitations. That decision is no doubt correct as applied to the facts of that case. A considerable part of the debts for which those warrants were issued was incurred before the act "to prevent overdrawing public funds in counties," etc., was passed: Laws of 1859, pp. 101, 102. Prior to the passage of that act there was practically no restriction upon the power of county commissioners to issue warrants, and in more than one county this power had been recklessly exercised, and a very large number of warrants issued. Hence, the necessity for special legislation. We know of no legislation, however, which prevents the statute from running in favor of cities and villages. In May v. School District, 22 Neb. 205, 3 Am. St. Rep. 266, where an action was brought on a school district warrant more than five years after it was due, it was held that the plea of the statute of limitations was a complete defense. That decision was rendered after careful consideration of the question, and we believe it is a correct statement of the law. The statute of limitations is a statute of repose, and the reasons which operate in favor of an individual are at least equally as strong in favor of a municipal corporation. The law favors diligence, and compels a party holding a warrant of a municipal corporation to take the necessary steps to enforce the payment of the same within the period fixed by statute, or be barred. If this were not so, warrants might be fraudulently issued by the authorities of a municipal corporation, and held for ten, fifteen, or twenty years, or more, and then presented for payment, when the evidence of their fraudulent character had become obscure or inaccessible. In our view, the ends of justice will be better subserved by placing individuals and municipal corporations on the same plane and governed by the same law of limitations. It follows that all the causes of action were barred when the action was brought.

Objection is made that the village of Arapahoe was not

legally organized in the year 1873, and that therefore it had no authority to act as a village. The agreed statement of facts shows that in the year 1873 the village was organized, and that this organization continued up to the year 1879, when it reorganized under the laws of the state, and has continued under such organization up to the present time. Village officers were elected each year, except in the year 1877. It is evident that the village was a de facto corporation, and upon the facts stipulated was authorized to transact business. The several causes of action, however, being barred by the statute of limitations, the judgment of the district court against the village of Arapahoe is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

WHEN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS AGAINST COUNTY AND LIKE WarRANTS. It is said in Wood on Limitations, section 53, that "the statute runs for or against towns and cities, and also for or against counties, in the same manner as it does for and against individuals.' See also 2 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, sec. 668. This general proposition is sustained by numerous cases: City of Pella v. Scholte, 24 Iowa, 283; 95 Am. Dec. 729, and note 740; County of St. Charles v. Powell, 22 Mo. 55; 66 Am. Dec. 637; City of Cincinnati v. First Presbyterian Church, 8 Ohio, 298; 32 Am. Dec. 718, and note 719; May v. School District, 22 Neb. 205; 3 Am. St. Rep. 266; Evans v. Erie County, 66 Pa. St. 222; Simplot v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 16 Fed. Rep. 350, 360; School Directors v. Goerges, 50 Mo. 194; Pimental v. San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351; Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 41; Kennebunkport v. Smith, 22 Me. 445; Forsyth v. Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 318, 322; Gaines v. Hot Spring Co., 39 Ark. 262; Oxford v. Columbia, 38 Ohio St. 87; Kellogg v. Decatur County, 38 Iowa, 524; see also Wheeling v. Campbell, 12 W. Va. 36, 66, where the question is fully considered, and the states where the rule obtains, as well as those where it does not, are named. In determining whether the statute runs against county and like warrants, the general rule above given ought to govern, in the absence of legislation to the contra, since there is nothing in the character of such warrants to indicate that a different rule should apply. Bonds issued by municipalities have been held subject to the defense of the statute: De Cordova v. Galveston, 4 Tex. 470, 482; Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 583; Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668; and the statute will also run against an unliquidated claim against a county: Baker v. Johnson County, 33 Iowa, 151. Ordinarily, county and like warrants differ from bonds and negotiable paper in many respects. "Such warrants or orders, drawn for ordinary municipal expenses, are not intended to have the qualities of negotiable paper, but are instruments authorized for convenient use in conducting the current and ordinary business of the corporation, and as a means of anticipating its ordinary revenue": 1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, secs. 487, 503. There would seem, therefore, no reason why the statute should not run equally in case of such warrants as in case of negotiable paper. In Baker v. Johnson County, supra, it was held, however, that the statute would not commence to run until the claim was presented for payment to the board of supervisors. See also Brehm v. Mayor etc. of New York, 104 N. Y. 186. In the case of Justices etc. of Bibb County v. Orr, 12 Ga.

137, the court decided that the statute did not commence to run on certificates issued under a legislative act, in liquidation of a county debt, until payment thereon was denied; and to the same effect is Caldwell County v. Harbert, 68 Tex. 321. So where a county warrant is made payable out of a special fund, no action can be maintained until the fund out of which it is payable comes into existence, and the statute does not begin to run until that time: Wetmore v. Monroe County, 73 Iowa, 88. It is declared in Bank of Gal latin v. Baber, 6 Lea, 273, that in Tennessee such order or warrant, drawn on the county trustee in favor of a teacher for services performed, was not a negotiable instrument of any kind, although payable to her or her order, "nor a liquidated or settled account, signed by the debtor, nor the satisfaction of the original indebtedness," but that it was "only a mode of reaching the money in the county treasury for the payment of county debts," and that a failure on the part of the creditor to present the order within the time limited by statute, after his right of action accrued, would bar the remedy, since the order was only a means of payment, and required diligence in securing the money thereon.

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS FOR AND AGAINST SCHOOL DISTRICTS in the same manner as it does for or against individuals: May v. School Dist. of Cass Co., 22 Neb. 205; 3 Am. St. Rep. 266, and note 267, as to the statute of limitations running against municipal or public corporations, but not against the state or sovereignty.

WILCOX V. RABEN.
[24 NEBRASKA, 368.]

JURISDICTION. - APPEAL BY ONE PARTY TO AN ACTION WHERE THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES ARE INSEPARABLY CONNECTED, removes the case to appellate court for all, and gives that court jurisdiction to render judgment against all; this rule applies to an action against principal debtor and his sureties on their joint and several promissory note. CONFIRMATION OF EXECUTION SALE OF REAL ESTATE CURES ALL DEFECTS

AND IRREGULARITIES in the proceedings relating thereto, where the court making the order is one of competent jurisdiction; such order cannot be collaterally attacked.

ORDER OF CONFIRMATION OF SALE OF REAL ESTATE ON EXECUTION IS VALID, AND ADJUDICATES THE VALIDITY OF SALE, although such order does not fully describe the property sold, if the defective description is aided by a correct description contained in the officer's return, to which reference is made by the date of sale.

Hainer and Kellogg, for the plaintiff in error.

A. W. Agee, for the defendant in error.

REESE, C. J. This was an action in ejectment, instituted in the district court by plaintiff in error, for the recovery of lots No. 3 and 4 in block No. 30 in the original town of Aurora..

It appears from the record that, in the year 1872, Durias Wilcox, the husband of plaintiff in error, and who is now