41, "It is the intention which affects the character of the entry and possession." And as was said in McCracken v. City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 635, "The statute of limitation runs only in favor of parties in possession claiming title adverse to the whole world." There can be no doubt but that, after the conveyance to Smith, plantiff in error retained possession with the understanding upon his part that such possession was entirely agreeable to Smith; and while he says in his testimony that it was his purpose to hold it as long as he could, yet we found nothing which would show a purpose to hold as owner, and against Smith's title; the statute of limitations, therefore, did not run in his favor, and it must be presumed that his possession was in accordance with or subservient to the title conveyed to Smith: Jackson v. Parker, 3 Johns. Cas. 124; Thompson v. Pioche, 44 Cal. 508; Campau v. Lafferty, 50 Mich. 114; Greenhill v. Biggs, 85 Ky. 155.

It is contended that the court erred in giving instructions to the jury upon its own motion and upon the request of defendants in error, and in refusing to give instructions asked by plaintiff in error. These instructions are quite lengthy, and it is not deemed necessary to copy them here. It must be sufficient to say that the views taken by the trial court, as expressed in the instructions given and those refused, correspond with those here expressed, and there was no error.

Upon the trial, it was sought to prove by plaintiff in error, upon the witness-stand, that he had not received the consideration for which he conveyed the land; but this testimony, upon objection, was excluded, and we think rightly, for the reason that there was nothing in the issues presented which would warrant any such proof. The simple questions presented were the title of the defendant in error and the plea of the statute of limitations. No equities were presented by the answer, and therefore none could be proven. The judgment is therefore affirmed.

ADVERSE POSSESSION, NATURE OF TO SET IN OPERATION STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: Evans v. Templeton, 69 Tex. 375; 5 Am. St. Rep. 71, note 74; Woods v. Montevallo etc. Co., 84 Ala. 560; 5 Am. St. Rep. 393; Sherin v. Brackett, 36 Minn. 152.

CERTIFIED COPY OF DEED, when admissible in evidence: Chamberlain v. Bradley, 101 Mass. 188; 3 Am. Rep. 331; Hicks v. Coleman, 25 Cal. 122; 85 Am. Dec. 103, note 124.

EVIDENCE IS INADMISSIBLE to prove facts not alleged: Shilling v. Carson, 27 Md. 175; 92 Am. Dec. 632; Maynard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 34 Cal.

48; 91 Am. Dec. 672; Finley v. Quirk, 9 Minn. 194; 86 Am. Dec. 93, and note; Boswell v. Goodwin, 31 Conn. 74; 81 Am. Dec. 169.

PROOF THAT SEAL AFFIXED TO DEED IS CORPORATE SEAL IS UNNECES BARY when the deed is shown to have been duly executed by one having authority: Phillips v. Coffee, 17 Ill. 154; 63 Am. Dec. 357.

SPECKLEMEYER v. Dailey.

[23 NEBRASKA, 101.]

FOREIGN JUDGMENT-PLEADING JURISDICTION.—In an action in Nebraska on a judgment rendered by the circuit court of Boone County, Indiana, it is not necessary to allege in direct terms that the foreign court is a court of general jurisdiction, nor that jurisdiction was acquired by personal service of summons, nor that judgment was rendered as required by statute. The court in which the action is brought will take judicial notice that the court rendering the judgment had general jurisdiction. J. N. Rickards and D. P. Newcomer, for the plaintiff in

error.

Agee and Stevenson, for the defendants in error.

REESE, C. J. This action was commenced in the district court of Webster County by defendants in error against plaintiff in error, and was founded upon a judgment rendered by the circuit court of Boone County, Indiana. The petition is in the usual form, with the exceptions hereafter referred to, for declaring upon judgments rendered by the courts of general jurisdiction in other states.

Plaintiff in error filed a general demurrer, which was overruled, and failing to answer further, a judgment was rendered for the amount due upon the judgment record referred to in the petition. Upon the overruling of the demurrer, plaintiff in error excepted, and now prosecutes error in this court, assigning for error the ruling of the district court upon such demurrer.

That part of the petition to which our attention is especially directed is as follows: "The said plaintiffs complain of the said defendant for that, on the twenty-second day of February, 1878, the said plaintiffs recovered a judgment against said defendant as administrator of the estate of Stephen Specklemeyer, then deceased, and also against said defendant, in his own right and person, in the Boone County circuit court, in the state of Indiana, in the sum of $1,146.66, and $12.95 costs of suit, in an action then pending in said court,

wherein the said Marcus C. Dailey and Samuel S. Dailey were plaintiffs, and the said Levi J. Specklemeyer, as administrator of Stephen Specklemeyer, deceased, and said Levi J. Specklemeyer was defendant. Said judgment has not been paid, nor any part thereof, except the sum of $126.49, which was paid on said judgment on the first day of December, 1884, . . . . wherefore said plaintiffs pray judgment," etc.

The question presented is as to the sufficiency of the petition in not alleging in direct terms that the circuit court of Boone County, of Indiana, is a court of general jurisdiction, nor was it alleged jurisdiction was acquired by personal service of summons, nor that judgment or determination was duly made or given as required by section 127 of the Civil Code.

This contention is based upon a decision of this court in Tessier v. Englehart, 18 Neb. 167. In that case, the judgment declared on in the answer had been rendered by the superior court of Cook County, Illinois. In writing the opinion, the then chief justice, Cobb, uses the following language: "This defense was demurrable in not alleging either that the superior court of Cook County, Illinois, is a court of general jurisdiction, or that it had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the judgment or of the person of said defendant. Said court being a foreign tribunal in the sense of the law and authorities, such allegation was necessary, and its absence could be taken advantage of, either by demurrer or by objection to the introduction of testimony under that paragraph of the answer, and perhaps in other ways."

We have no doubt of the correctness of that decision, but do not deem it authority in this case. There is nothing in the title of the court referred to which, by its terms, would indicate that it is a court of general jurisdiction, and therefore it was necessary that the facts conferring such jurisdiction should be pleaded. But in the case at bar the allegation that the judgment was rendered by the Boone County circuit court, in the state of Indiana, was a sufficient allegation that the court rendering the judgment was a court of general jurisdiction.

This question was before the supreme court of the state of Wisconsin, in Jarvis v. Robinson, 21 Wis. 523, 94 Am. Dec. 560, and it was there held that the allegation in the petition that the judgment upon which the action was brought was rendered in the circuit court of Kane County, state of Michigan, was a sufficient allegation that the court was one of

title clearly indicates a be so understood, and averment of that fact.

general jurisdiction. The following language occurs in an opinion written by Chief Justice Dixon: "I think where the court of general jurisdiction it must is equivalent in pleading to express Such is the title here. We all know that the circuit courts of the several states are courts of general jurisdiction, as well as we know that the courts of the justices of the peace are not. But why should judges assume a degree of ignorance on the bench which would be unpardonable in them when off of it?”

In Shotwell v. Harrison, 22 Mich. 410, it was decided that the courts of Michigan would take judicial notice that the supreme court of Massachusetts was a court of record. And in Butcher v. Bank of Brownsville, 2 Kan. 70, 83 Am. Dec. 446, it was decided that where a petition set out a judgment recovered in the court of common pleas in Pennsylvania, the courts of Kansas would take judicial notice of the constitutions of sister states, and that the court of common pleas was a court of general jurisdiction.

We therefore hold that the allegation of the petition was sufficient in this respect, and that the demurrer was properly overruled.

The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed.

COMPLAINT ON FOREIGN JUDGMENT need not allege that the court rendering it had jurisdiction either of the cause or the parties. Such judgment, if complete and regular on its face, is prima facie valid: Gunn v. Peakes, 36 Minn. 177; 1 Am. St. Rep. 661, note 663; Jarvis v. Robinson, 21 Wis. 530; 94 Am. Dec. 560; contra, Gebhard v. Garnier, 12 Bush, 321; 23 Am. Rep. 721.

MORGAN V. DINGES.

[23 NEBRASKA, 271.]

VENDOR AND VENDEE-CANCELLATION OF DEED FOR FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS BY VENDEE. -Where parties to a deed stand on an equal footing, expressions of opinion as to the value of the property, whether true or false, will not constitute fraud. But if the purchaser resides near the property, and has full knowledge of its situation and approximate value, and the owner resides in another state, without any knowledge on the subject, opinions as to value by the purchaser, which he knows to be much below the real value of the property, and statements made by him that the owner's title has been abrogated by tax sales, will be sufficient, where the property was purchased for a grossly inadequate consideration, to set aside and cancel the deed.

VENDOR AND VENDEE - CANCELLATION OF DEED FOR MISREPRESENTATIONS BY VENDEE. - Where the purchaser does any act, or makes any declaration, with the intention of misleading the seller, and preventing him from ascertaining the real situation of the property, and at the same time conceals from him a material fact upon which he relies, and of which the vendee has knowledge, the latter is guilty of fraudulent deception, for which the deed may be canceled.

Sawyer and Snell, for the appellant.

Billingsley and Woodward, and G. M. Lambertson, for the appellee.

MAXWELL, J. The plaintiff alleges in her petition that she resides in Denver, Colorado, and has been absent from Lincoln since 1874; that she was the owner of lot 2, in block 31, in the city of Lincoln, which lot was then worth between six and eight thousand dollars; that for the purpose of inducing her to sell said lot for a wholly inadequate consideration, Dinges called on her at her home in Denver, with his attorney, and concealed from her the true value of the lot, and falsely and fraudulently represented that the value of the lot, exclusive of the house, was not more than two or three hundred dollars; that her title had been extinguished by reason of a tax deed, but in order to clear up a flaw, he wished her signature to a deed as a simple formality; that the attorney of Dinges, at his instigation and in his presence, professionally advised her that under the Nebraska law and decisions her title had been extinguished by the tax deed, when both Dinges and the attorney knew that such was not the fact; that Dinges falsely represented that he was the holder of said tax title, and that he would bring suit against her, and put her to great trouble and expense, and that she would be arrested and brought to Lincoln, unless she consented to give him a deed to the lot for one hundred dollars; that on account of sickness in her family, she had no opportunity to consult with an attorney as to her rights; that she was wholly ignorant of her rights, except as advised by Dinges and his attorney; that she had no knowledge of the real value of her lot, and had heard nothing concerning its value for a number of years; that she was distressed by sickness in her family, by poverty, and the need of money, and, relying wholly and implicity upon the statements of Dinges and his attorney, for one hundred dollars she executed a warranty deed, with full covenants except as to taxes; that Dinges is not and never was the owner of a tax title to said lot, and never had any contract or arrange