THE

NINETEENTH

CENTURY.

No. LII.-JUNE 1881.

A CIVILIAN'S

ANSWER TO SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

IN the multitude of counsellors there is safety,' says the wise king, and, if the rule be without exception, the British army is indeed beyond the reach of peril.

Despite, however, the undeniable authority of the proverb, there is perhaps some reason to doubt the soundness of the conclusion. There are certainly many who are of opinion that, notwithstanding the number and variety of the suggestions that have been made for its improvement, notwithstanding the exhaustive reports that have been furnished as to its condition, the safety of that time-honoured institution is anything but assured.

And yet to those who read the recently published report of Lord Airey's commission, side by side with the speech of the Secretary for War on introducing his new scheme, it did seem as if a time had at last come when diversity of views had for once disappeared, and that, for a short period at any rate, our military chiefs and their civil coadjutors were about to dwell together in harmony.

From the report one thing at least was plain-namely, that the enormous majority of combatant officers believed the system as existing at present to be intolerable; and in the speech signs were not wanting that Pall Mall was of the same opinion as Whitehall.

So novel and satisfactory a conjunction of views could not fail to be gratifying to those outsiders who had so long contemplated VOL. IX.-No. 52.

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with sorrow and amazement the results of each successive army reform.'

How rudely this pleasant picture has been shattered by the appearance of Sir Garnet Wolseley's recent article in the Nineteenth Century, it is easy to imagine. So far from being dissatisfied with existing arrangements, we find one of our most experienced and most brilliant officers devoting his facile pen to the task of showing that the system, which so many hoped was about to disappear, is in reality a useful, a well-designed, and a practical method of providing for the defence of the nation; and that to depart from it can only be the work of prejudice or ignorance.

It is intended in this paper to suggest some reasons why the public should in this case accept the view of the great majority of the army as against that of one of its members, accomplished soldier and clever littérateur though he be.

It is intended at any rate to enforce this conclusion, that whatever may have been the faults of the systems which preceded it, whatever may be the merits of plans which it is proposed to substitute for it, the present organisation is, to all intents and purposes, an absolute and disastrous failure.

It may seem somewhat presumptuous for a civilian to enter upon the discussion of army matters with a military man, especially when his opponent is an officer of such great and well-deserved reputation as Sir Garnet Wolseley. But a not unnatural diffidence upon this subject is to some extent dispelled by the words of the gallant writer himself. It would doubtless be eminently desirable that some soldier of high standing and wide experience should take up the cudgels in favour of a reform which, it is well known, is almost universally desired throughout the army. But, unfortunately, Sir Garnet Wolseley has so effectually ruled out of court all those of his own cloth, that it seems reasonable that one of that large body of civilians, to whose intelligence he pays a graceful if indirect compliment, should enter the lists.

It is of course unfortunate that our officers-especially those of the old school-are 'prejudiced in so unreasoning a manner that they combine to condemn a system of which a large proportion of them know scarcely anything.' It is to be regretted that the 'young gentlemen joining a regiment adopt unhesitatingly and in an unquestioning spirit' the opinion of their seniors. But, if it be the fact, it is plain that no contribution on the other side of the question from a military writer could be of much value except as representing prejudice and ignorance.

However this may be, it is at any rate somewhat hard to lay down as a general proposition that it is an article of the British soldier's faith to look to the authorities of the Horse Guards as his

natural protectors, whilst he regards the War Department officials as his enemies.'

It is perfectly true that a large number of officers disapproved of the short service reforms which emanated from the War Office. It is equally true, however, that a very large number of them hailed with satisfaction the recent proposals which have been made by Mr. Childers, and have only complained that they do not go far enough. It is plain, therefore, that there is a method in their madness; and that if they distrust the War Office it is because the Department in Pall Mall has been responsible for changes of which they distinctly disapproved, and not from any blind prejudice against the Department as such.

It is not uncommon to hear those who defend Lord Cardwell's short service scheme assert that in fact it has never had fair play, and that any shortcomings which may appear in our present organisation are due, not to the imperfections of the plan, but to the defective way in which it has been worked. It may be said that Sir Garnet Wolseley is one of this number, and that the short service system which he defends is some unknown quantity, made up of what the present system ought to be and what he wishes it were. If that be so, there is, of course, nothing more to be said; there are probably a good many other ideal systems which, never having passed out of the region of thought, are not likely, for the present at any rate, to be of much service for the defence of the country. But it is evident that Sir Garnet Wolseley is not content to figure as the champion of our system as it might have been ; for the greater part of his article is devoted to defending it as it is.

To one part of the working of our present arrangements Sir Garnet frankly does object, and, in justice to his argument, this objection should be stated as early as possible, in order to give it due weight, and in order to enable us to judge how far the removal of this particular fault would affect the other shortcomings to which we shall shortly refer.

Sir Garnet Wolseley speaks out very plainly upon what he considers to be the inadequate amount of work done by our regimental officers; and there can be no doubt that the requirements of modern warfare do demand closer application and more complete knowledge than have hitherto been considered necessary. Before, however, we accept the suggestion that our officers dislike the present system on the ground that it gives them too much work, and before we commit ourselves to the conclusion that there is no remedy, short of demanding from them the same sort of attention which a Prussian officer gives to his company, two points should be considered. In the first place, in justice to our own captains and subalterns, it should

be said that they are just as often idle because they have no men to instruct, as from any disinclination to work. And, in the second place, it is most important to bear in mind that as our rank and file are recruited on a different system from that of other armies, so our officers serve on conditions which have no parallel elsewhere. An officer, like any other member of the community, must receive some consideration for his services. This consideration may take many forms. In the case of the British officer it takes the form of social position and a certain amount of freedom; it is emphatically not of a pecuniary nature. Practically, an officer does not, and indeed it is hardly contemplated that he should, live upon his pay. Turn his work into drudgery, deprive him of his freedom, and you take away from him the main inducements which he now has to serve his country for nothing. It may be, of course, that even under these strict conditions our officers may be willing to show by their sacrifices another proof of the military spirit which has always animated them. But it is hardly a thing that can be safely counted upon. It is no answer to say that in Germany the career of an officer is as honourable, though far more arduous than it is here. In the first place, in Germany military service is an aid to civil advancement, instead of being, as with us, a heavy drag. Again, the style of living on the Continent is such that military pay is far more nearly equiva lent to an actual livelihood than it is here. And, lastly, it is more than doubtful whether the class from which we draw our officers has really any parallel in Prussia.

It may be said, and with truth, that all these considerations are beside the mark; that what is wanted is men who will work hard, and work under prescribed conditions; and that if the present holders of commissions are not prepared to render their services on those terms they should be replaced by others who will do so. This is a wery strong argument, and possibly unanswerable; only it is as well to bear in mind what the change may involve. A captain, like a carpenter, must be paid in some way. He may take prestige and position instead of cash, but most assuredly he will not be content without either the one or the other.

But apart from this need for reform, Sir Garnet Wolseley sees much in our present organisation to rejoice at. Let us therefore note what are the circumstances which give him so much satisfaction, and inquire how far they commend themselves to those who are not committed to the merits of any particular set of principles.

And here we may pause for a moment to call to mind what are the points of real interest to a civilian, what are the essentials which he demands, and what are the failings which he cannot pardon.

In the first place be it remembered that the country pays at this moment for its military forces an annual sum of nearly 25,000,000%.1 For this sum it naturally desires to obtain a force which shall be as near perfection as possible, which shall be able to fight its battles abroad, and defend its liberties at home. As to the nature and composition of the force which will best satisfy these requirements, the people of England have always shown themselves careless to a degree most surprising in a nation so imbued with the military instinct, and at the same time so jealous in controlling its own affairs. For many years past the organisation of the army has been left more entirely in the hands of those technically responsible for it than that of any other branch of the public service. The public have hoped, with a confidence as amazing as it was complete, that everything would be done for the best if only they would provide the money necessary for the undertaking. This being so, we must put ourselves in the position of the great mass of Englishmen, and, demanding only the amount of efficiency above referred to, consult those who regulate our military matters as to the best way of obtaining it.

It is fair then to follow Sir Garnet Wolseley's advice, and turn to the proposals which Lord Cardwell himself brought forward, and to the various suggestions to which they gave rise, all, we may presume, made with the hope of remedying existing evils, and of supplying a sufficient and serviceable army in the future.

Foremost among the benefits which the short service system was to secure for us was the formation of two army corps, the regiments composing which were to be kept up to a war footing, or very near it, and which were to be ready at a moment's notice to undertake duty in any part of the world. Nothing could look better on paper than these compact little armies of 37,000 men apiece always ready to bear the brunt of the first attack, and to give us time to complete. and strengthen the weaker regiments which remained. What, however, would have been the result had a sudden emergency arisen to put the efficiency of these arrangements to the test?

The following figures, which are given at page 471 of the Blue Book, form an instructive answer:

1 I include the approximate cost of the British troops in India, who, although not paid for out of the home revenues, are in fact a portion of the home army.

2 I am aware that in the original scheme the two complete army corps were not an essential feature. In the Commander-in-Chief's minute and the report upon it, published in 1872, the state of preparedness is made to apply to the first thirty-six regiments on the roster, of which half were to be maintained at a strength of 820, and the remainder at a strength of 700 each. The division into corps adopted in the Army List, however, naturally led to the idea of maintaining one, and eventually two such divisions in a state to take the field at the earliest opportunity. This intention seems to have been recognised in the compilation given at page 471 of the report of Lord Airey's commission.