grace, and which will leave unsettled grievances and wrongs; they may enter upon a wrangle with the Lower House on such points, and compel them to make concessions for the sake of securing the main principles at issue, and unwillingly to give way on points which they know to be detrimental. They have adopted this course in many cases, such as Irish Parliamentary Reform and the Land Act of 1870. It is demonstrable that the Lords' amendments on the last of these measures did much to prevent it being a settlement of the question. It is above all things necessary that when the main principles of a measure are conceded, its details should be framed in the most liberal spirit, and not in a grudging mood. Its prospects of ultimate success depend greatly upon removing minor points of difficulty and complaint.

4. They may accept the measure frankly, and endeavour to make the best of it rather than the worst of it; and fortunately there is a precedent of this kind in the Church Disestablishment Act of 1869, which, treated in this manner, has been one of the most successful of the achievements of the Imperial Parliament on Irish questions, and which has left no remnant of the grievance it was intended to allay.

It is greatly to be hoped the Peers will deal with the Land Bill in the same wise and politic manner. Looking broadly at the Irish Land Question, it must be clear that we are passing through an agrarian movement not dissimilar in its tendencies and objects from those of which most countries in Europe have had experience during the present century; one closely connected with the advance of democracy, and aiming at greater independence for the cultivating class. The first act of this movement was in 1870; we are now in the second act. Whether there is to be a third and more extreme movement must depend upon whether in the main the present measure will remedy the grievances and wrongs of which immediate complaint is made; and whether it will satisfy the yearnings for greater independence and security on the part of existing tenants, and provide machinery for the rapid extension of full ownerships in the future.

G. SHAW LEFEVRE.

VOL. IX.-No. 52.

4 B

To the Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

SIR,-A very able and weighty article from the pen of Lord Dunsany appeared in the May number of this Review. It pointed out with remarkable clearness that the Silver Streak' had been transformed from an impassable ditch to a magnificent highway, and proceeded to deduce some extremely logical conclusions from this fact, basing and enforcing his reasoning to a considerable extent on a description of England as a naval power which I had written, and which was published in No. 37 of the Nineteenth Century.

A writer in the Pall Mall Gazette, taking quite a different view of the question from that enforced by Lord Dunsany, impugned the accuracy of my description of the English and French fleets, quoting an American publication by Mr. King as having clearly established the inaccuracy of my comparisons, on which Lord Dunsany had for the most part relied. I found the work referred to, War Ships and Navies of the World, was written by a distinguished engineer officer of the United States Navy, Mr. J. W. King. Mr. King had enjoyed considerable opportunities of forming a judgment on the navies of Europe, and I believe had made valuable reports to his Government as the result of his observations. He quotes at some length, at pages 262-265 of the American edition of his work, that part of my article which includes a comparison between the fleets of France and England, and criticises it to the following effect. He says in substance that I disparagingly analysed the matériel of the British navy; that my acknowledged want of familiarity with the condition and real efficiency of the French ships precludes any attempt at a thorough analysis of their list; that if I had applied the same severe rules (which I used in reducing the number of effective English ships) to the French fleet, there would not have remained more than six or seven of the same class; that it is improper to exclude from the effective fleets of either nation new ships not fully completed, or those undergoing or needing repairs or requiring new boilers. He illustrates the erroneous and misleading nature of my comparison by saying that I have included among the French ships of the first class wooden ships of the old type having thin armour; that I set them against modern ships like the 'Devastation' and the ‘Thunderer;' that to make out the number of French ironclads of the second class I must have taken ships rated as coast defenders, or incompleted ships, or obsolete ships, such ships being expressly deducted from the English fleet; and that my comparison of the unarmoured fleets is equally misleading.

On reading these remarks I thought it would not be proper, considering my position as a British admiral, formerly Controller of the Navy, to let them pass unnoticed.

I think that even those who are most opposed to the convictions to which I have given utterance in this Review would agree with me on the impolicy and unwisdom of overrating our naval strength, or of relying on such statements of the efficiency of our fleets as could not be sustained if critically tested.

With this object in view I wrote in February 1880 the article on England as a Naval Power,' which appeared in No. 37 of this Review. I endeavoured to do so impartially, and in answer to Mr. King's criticism I will proceed to show how the results I gave were obtained.

In the first place, my object was to make evident that a wide distinction existed between paper or dummy ships, as they have been called, and ships effective and absolutely ready for service at a given date; and, in the second place, to indicate

what would be the comparative fleet-fighting force of the two countries after a reasonable time for preparing on both sides had been allowed. For the first purpose I took a parliamentary return, moved for by Sir John Hay, which gave an accurate and complete account of the state and condition of every ship of the British navy on the 1st of January, 1879. Excluding the three monitors given or lent to the colonies, Sir John Hay's list included sixty-six ironclads.

After deducting from that list all ships recorded by the parliamentary return as incomplete or not ready for actual service, from whatever cause, and also a large number of ships which for given reasons were not qualified to act as fleet-fighting ships, though capable of performing other service in a navy, I found that the number of fleet-fighting ships ready on the 1st of January, 1879, was thirteen; of these I remarked that six of these ships are unequalled by the like number in any navy of the world,' a statement which might perhaps have been challenged as rather boastful, but which in my judgment is far from disparaging.

In making this analysis; I had before me for the English fleet a public document accessible to all the world; no such documents respecting the French fleet are made public; and the information sought for by a careful inquirer is often furnished confidentially, and can only be used, as I have said, with considerable reserve. Perfect accuracy as to the state and condition of every ship in the French navy on the 1st of January 1879 being unattainable by a foreigner, I did not attempt to compare a perfect with an imperfect list, acknowledging that in that respect my information with respect to French ships was not complete. But though I did not and could not give a n analysis of the sixty-two French ironclads similar to that I had made of the sixty-six English ships, I could accomplish the second object I had in view-that of com paring the relative force of the two Powers in fleet-fighting ships as it would probably be about the middle of the year 1880, the basis of this comparison being the exclusion from it of all ships of either Power only protected by 44-inch armour, and the supposition that all the ships on the respective official lists of the 1st of January, 1879, whether repairing at that time, or requiring repair, or completing after launching, could be and would be ready for active service shortly after the middle of the year 1880. According to my judgment and experience this was the fairest comparison possible, and it is that which I adopted. I found as the result of an investigation on this basis that England would have eleven and France ten fleetfighting ironclads of the first class, and of the second class England would have thirteen and France twelve. For reasons which I think conclusive, ships not launched when the article was written were not included in these numbers. Mr. King apparently objects to three French ships, the Suffren,' the 'Océan,' and the 'Marengo,' being ranked in the first class of fleet-fighting ships; he says that I have set them against the Thunderer' and 'Devastation.' I have, on the contrary, included one of this class, which was ready for sea on the 1st of January, 1879, as among the six ships which I said were unequalled by the like number in any navy of the world.

In my judgment ships of 7,500 tons and upwards, plated with armour 7-8 inches thick, possessing a speed of 14 knots, cannot be excluded from first class fleet-ships at the present m oment, whatever may be the case in 1885, on the pretext that they are built of wood.

Neither in our own nor any other navy is it the case that ships of the same class are of equal fighting value. The displacement and thickness of armour, approximate indications of this quality, vary extremely in the first class ships of both nations. In our navy the displacement of such ships ranges from 8,320 tons to 11,500 tons,

1 From information I obtained since writing in February 1880 I find that I reckoned amongst the thirteen English ironclads of the second class one ship, the • Belleisle,' which would much more properly have been ranked as a special ship, and that I had thus over-estimated by one the true number of English second class fleetfighting ships. In the same way, two French ships with 13-inch armour, though classed officially among the cuirassés d'escadre, or fleet-fighting ships, would be more properly placed among the special ships.

in the French navy from 7,500 to 10,500; and the thickness of armour-plating with us from 7 to 24 inches, with them from 7-8 to 21.87 inches.

The same remark holds good with reference to the second class ironclads of both countries. On the English side the displacement varies from 4,390 tons to 7,830 tons, the armour from 6 to 9 inches. This thickness of 9 inches is found in three ships only, and there partially distributed. On the French side the displacement varies from 5,588 to 6,429 tons, the armour from 5.9 inches to 13 inches in two ships only.

All the ships composing the French second class in this comparison are counted as first class by the French official list; they figure as cuirassés d'escadre, as does the 'Amiral Duperré.' Though nine out of the twelve are built of wood, and are not modern ships indeed, they will, without doubt, in the course of time, be replaced by others yet hitherto they have always formed part of the squadrons of evolution; five were in commission in 1879, and three in 1880. I see no reason for excluding from the second class ships whose speed is 14 knots, and whose displacement and thickness of armour have been given above; who are, moreover, very much alike, and well calculated to act together.

As I said, when comparing the second class ironclads of the two countries, that the displacement and thickness of armour of the English ships were very much in excess of those of the French, I can see no ground for the assertion that I have criti. cised disparagingly the English matériel, or applied different rules as to the efficiency, of ironclads according as they were French or English. It would take up too much space if I were to attempt to enter into any details as to the comparative efficiency for the work they have to do, of the unarmoured fleets of the two countries. It is enough for me to say that the insufficiency of fast cruisers to defend our commerce insisted upon in that article is universally admitted, and that serious and welldirected efforts have been made to remove the danger of such a state of things. In numbers and size the English unarmoured fleet was greatly superior, but in fast cruisers, able to realise a speed of 14 knots and upwards, such as are necessary for the protection of our trade, we were inferior to the French.

The length to which this defence has already extended precludes me from adding to it by giving the names of the ironclads referred to. To 'experts' the indications given at pages 397 and 398 of the article in No. 37 sufficiently point out the ships I have enumerated; while to non-experts a long list of Devastations,'' Fulminants,' and Thunderers' could convey no further knowledge, neither could it add force to the plain statement of facts which I have already given. These, I confidently submit, entirely exonerate me from the serious charges brought against me in the War Ships of the World.

ROBERT SPENCER ROBINSON.

61, Eaton Place: May 18, 1881.

INDEX TO
TO VOL. IX.

The titles of articles are printed in italics.