et al. a bill in the Superior Court of Cook County to restrain the enforcement of the ordinance providing for the equipment of oil wagons with drip pans to protect asphalt pavements from injury by leaking oils, the court denied the injunction and sustained the validity of the ordinance. The case is now pending in the Supreme Court.

The Superior Court, in the case of Kappes et al. vs. City, held that a cigarette license must be obtained to authorize the sale or giving away of cigarette papers, that no distinction is made between the sale of made cigarettes and the sale of cigarette papers.

In the mandamus proceedings instituted by one Beamish to compel the Mayor to issue a saloon license for premises 71 Loomis street, the court held that the Mayor had properly denied the license, as the proposed location was in a residence district.

A number of important cases involving the Civil Service Act were decided, of which mention might be made of the following, which lay down new principles:

In McNeil vs. City the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a "holdover," i. e., a person in the city's employ when the civil service law went into effect, was not entitled to the' protection given employes by Section 12 of the Civil Service Act; nor under the allegations of his petition was he entitled to the protec tion afforded officers under the Cities and Villages Act. This case controls some hundred and twenty cases of persons similarly situated.

The Appellate Court, in Heaney vs. City, held that charges against a public official before the Civil Service Commission which stated the offense charged with reasonable definiteness were sufficient to sustain the charges in the certiorari proceeding; that all that was required was that charges should be sufficiently definite to apprise the accused of the nature of the charges brought

against him. The court also intimated that the question of laches could be raised in certiorari proceedings, and constituted an adequate defense. Affirmed judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the city.

In Stitt vs. City of Chicago, the Superior Court held that there was a quantum of evidence before the Civil Service Commission which tended to prove the charges brought against the accused; that the court could not go into the question of whether the evidence was sufficient to convict, nor whether the Civil Service Commission had decided erroneously or not on the evidence, and denied the writ of certiorari.

In Phillips vs. City the Superior Court decided that the relator in a mandamus proceeding who was a probationer under civil service, was not entitled to the notification of a hearing, charges, nor hearings provided by Section 12 of the act; that he could be dismissed at any time during the probationary period of six months by his appointing officer with the approval of the Commission.

In Kusel vs. City, the Superior Court decided that the delay of the relator in certiorari proceedings in bringing his suit for a period of four years after discharge by the Civil Service Commission, was fatal to his recovery; that if a former employe desires reinstatement after discharge by the Civil Service Commission he must act promptly and not sleep upon his legal rights.

A large number of cases were lately decided adversely to the city by a Justice of the Peace in suits brought by police officers who had been tried by the Police Trial Board and fined. The city appealed from these judgments to the Circuit Court.

In the case of O'Regan, a policeman who had been fined on four different occasions by the Police Trial Board claiming to act under powers conferred by Section 12 of the Civil Service Act, Judge Tuley upheld the city's conten

tion that even though the power to fine was not conferred by said Section 12, still, under the Cities and Villages Act, the city ordinances and the rules of the police department promulgated by the General Superintendent, that the General Superintendent did have power to inflict fines; but O'Regan was bound by the rules of the police department, and that even if he were not, he had acquiesced in the infliction of the fines and therefore was barred from recovering the money so held out of his pay.

In a similar suit brought by one Gay, the Circuit Court held that by continuing on the police force for a considerable time after the fines were inflicted that this amounted to an acquiescence and barred any recovery, although at the time of payment he protested against the withholding of the amount of the fine from his pay. An appeal has been prosecuted from this judgment by the claimant.

In certiorari proceedings instituted by one Clifford, a police officer, to review the proceedings of the Civil Service Commission, in discharging him for a violation of Rule 67 of the police department, the Superior Court held that the City of Chicago, and through it, the General Superintendent of Police, had the power under the Cities and Villages Act to pass rules and regulations for the government of the police department and that this power had not been repealed by the Civil Service Act; that it was not necessary for the Civil Service Commission to enact all the rules by which it could discharge employes, but the rules of the police department being valid, the Commission had jurisdiction to discharge policemen for violating them.

In the case of Treat vs. City in the Federal Court to restrain the collection of an assessment on the ground that the contract for the construction of the improvement was illegal for the reason that it contained the "eight hour" and "alien labor" clauses, the Circuit Court

adopted the doctrine of the Illinois Supreme Court and held that a property owner cannot remain silent and permit the local improvement to be made, and after receiving the benefits therefrom object to the payment of his assessment on these grounds. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment.

The Appellate Court of the First District reversed the action of the Circuit Court in denying the petition for mandamus instituted in the name of the People on the relation of the City of Chicago to compel the Chicago Union Traction Company and the West Chicago Street Railroad Company to lower the Van Buren Street Tunnel, and held that as said tunnel was an obstruction to navigation its owners must lower it to a sufficient depth to allow the free passage of vessels.

The Supreme Court decided the socalled "Day Labor" case adversely to the position taken by this department. This was the bill filed by one Hanreddy, a contractor, to restrain the city from completing the construction of the Lawrence avenue conduit (a portion of the intercepting sewer system) by day labor and without the letting of a contract. The city had done considerable tunnel work by its own laborers and under the supervision of the Department of Public Works, resulting in very satisfactory work and with less cost to the taxpayers, notably the completion of Section 3 of the Northwest Land Tunnel, the contract for which had been let to Weir, McKechney & Company and which had been forfeited by the city. The city had advertised for bids for the completion of the Lawrence avenue conduit, but before a contract was let the City Council directed the Commissioner of Public Works to do the work by the day-labor system. Hanreddy filed his bill, claiming that under the General Incorporation Act the city must let a contract, where the expense of public improvements exceeded $500. The Supreme Court decided that this contention is correct, and as a

result thereof the city is now compelled to let a contract for all work the cost of which exceeds $500.

The traction litigation has been the most important in which this office has been engaged. The history of this litigation is a matter of common knowledge, and it would not be advisable in the limited space here permitted to more than restate as simply as possible the gist of the recent decision of the United States Court in that feature of the litigation which affects the City of Chicago, to-wit. The right of the companies to operate under ordinances which the city claims expired July 30, 1903, and which the companies claim have not expired and do not until 1958, the extension being claimed under the provisions of the act of the General Assembly of 1865, commonly known as the "99-year act." The gist of that opinion was:

1st. The companies have established a right to the main trunk lines of the North and West Division as they existed in 1875.

2d. They have lost that very large mileage of lines authorized and constructed between 1875 and 1884; and,

3d. They, of course, hold without controversy the unexpired portions of the many outlying feeders and extensions granted by twenty-year ordinances passed after 1884 (during the Yerkes regime), expiring at different dates.

The decree is in the hands of the printer and will probably be entered in a few days. The city has undoubtedly achieved a very great victory, but will no doubt perfect an appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals.

The office has during the past year devoted all the time of one assistant to the prosecution of the so-called "hand book" cases in the police court, and the work of the police department has been materially assisted in the crusade against this form of public gambling by the consistent prosecution of these cases.

The foregoing is only a report of the

court work of the department. No mention is made of the large number of formal opinions rendered by the office to the City Council, its committees, and the officers of the city. The department has during the year spent a great deal of time with the Special Council Committees and the Commissioner of Buildings in the revision of the building ordinances regulating places of public amusement, churches, halls, schools, and large department stores.

The Revised Code of 1897 of the city has been brought down to date, the ordinances revised and galley proofs

printed and the same will in the course of a few weeks be delivered to the Judiciary Committee of the City Council for action and report to the City Council. As soon as that is done and the ordinance passed, the same will be printed in book form.

The department is also engaged in preparing a book containing the most important opinions rendered by the Corporation Counsel and Assistants since 1897, the date a volume of the opinions theretofore rendered by this department was printed.

I have personally attended nearly all the weekly meetings of the Committee on Local Transportation, and also the regular meetings of the Committee on State Legislation, which are held at this office every Wednesday evening and are attended by me and also by members of this department.

I transmit herewith a list of final

judgments rendered in 1904 against the city in cases in which the Corporation Counsel represented the city, which is a duplicate of the judgments certified to the Comptroller.

Eleven hundred twenty-three (1,123) cases are pending at the present time on the office dockets other than special assessment and condemnation cases.

Respectfully submitted,

EDGAR B. TOLMAN,
Corporation Counsel.

Which was placed on file.

}

To the Honorable the City Council of the City of Chicago:

GENTLEMEN-I return herewith, without my approval, an ordinance passed at the last regular meeting of your Honorable Body, granting permission and authority to Raymond G. Sykes and Frederic de Coningh to construct and operate a railroad switch track across 19th street, and across a certain alley in Lehmer's Subdivision of Block 14, etc., which ordinance is printed at page 1959, et seq., of the current printed Council Proceedings, for the reason that the ordinance does not contain the usual requirements which ought to be in an ordinance of this character.

No plat is referred to in the ordinance, which definitely locates the proposed switch track, which plat is a necessary part of an ordinance of this character; the privilege is granted for ten years, without the usual provision that it shall be subject to modification, amendment or repeal at any time prior there

to; no provision is made for the maintenance of the portions of the street and alley occupied by the switch track, nor for the removal of the track upon the termination of the privilege, and the restoration of the street and alley to a condition safe for public travel and satisfactory to the Commissioner of Public Works. The ordinance does not provide that the operation and maintenance of the switch track shall be subject to ordinances of the city now or hereafter in force relating to the use and operation of switch tracks; there is no provision for the issuance of a permit; the compensation clause is indefinite; there is no provision for the filing of an indemnity bond to protect the city from loss by the operation and maintenance of the switch track, and the ordinance does not provide for the written acceptance by the grantees.

I respectfully suggest that the vote by which the ordinance was passed be reconsidered, and the ordinance re-referred to the Committee on Streets and Alleys, West Division, for the preparation of a proper ordinance. Respectfully,

CARTER H. HARRISON,
Mayor.

MAYOR'S OFFICE,

January 9, 1905.

To the Honorable, the City Council of the City of Chicago:

GENTLEMEN-I return herewith, without my approval, an ordinance passed at the last regular meeting of your Honorable Body, granting permission to John Monighan, doing business as Monighan Machine Works, to erect and operate an elevated switch track across the alley near North Robey street, between West Kinzie street and Carroll avenue, for the reason that the ordinance is not in proper form and does not contain the necessary provisions to properly safeguard the interests of the city.

Section 2 of the ordinance fixes the

term of the privilege at ten years from the date of the passage of the ordinance, but does not provide that the privilege shall be subject to modification, amendment or repeal at any time prior to the expiration of said time. The latter portion of Section 3 reserves the right to the City of Chicago "to remove said elevated switch track from said alley" on failure of the grantee to pay the compensation fixed by the ordinance. This ought to be changed so as to provide that the city may "cause" the removal of the switch track by the grantee and the restoration of the alley by the grantee at his expense, and without any cost or expense to the city. The bond clause is insufficient, in that it omits the following provision, which is an important requirement in ordinances of this character:

"Said bond and the liability of the sureties thereon shall be kept in force throughout the life of this ordinance, and if at any time during the life of this ordinance such bond shall not be in full force, then the privileges and authority herein granted shall thereupon cease."

Section 5 provides that the ordinance shall be in force from and after its passage and the filing of the bond, but does not require the written acceptance of the grantee, and does not limit the time which the grantee shall have in which to exercise the privilege of accepting the ordinance.

After Section 5 appears a provision which is entirely out of its proper place in the ordinance, requiring the grantee to provide "a suitable subway under said elevated switch track at the alley." This provision is very loosely and indefinitely drawn, and as it is one of the most important provisions of the ordinance, ought to be carefully re-drafted. No provision is made for plans and specifications; the height of the subway is not fixed; no reference is made to its character, and as to what is or is not a "suitable" subway is apparently left to the judgment of the Commissioner of

To the Honorable, the City Council of the City of Chicago:

GENTLEMEN-I return herewith, without my approval, an ordinance passed at the last regular meeting of your Honorable Body, entitled "An ordinance providing for compensation from owners of railroad switch tracks."

This ordinance authorizes every person, firm or corporation owning or using any existing switch track occupying any portion of a public street or alley, constructed without proper authority from the city, or for which the authority to maintain and operate the same has terminated by lapse of time, to continue to use and maintain such track upon or across such street or alley by paying to the City Collector of the City of Chicago, within fifteen days after the first day of January, 1905, or of the year in which said franchise shall expire, and annually thereafter, a certain license fee.