A letter of Dr. Fanklin to Gov. Shirley, written at this time, "on the subject of uniting the colonies more intimately with Great Britain, by allowing them Representatives in Parliament," deserves a place in this work.

Sir,

BOSTON, DEC. 22, 1754.

Since the conversation your Excellency was pleased to honour me with, on the subject of uniting the colonies more intimately with Great Britain, by allowing them representatives in Parliament, I have something further considered that matter; and am of opinion, that such an union would be very acceptable to the colonies; provided they had a reasonable number of representatives allowed them; and that all the old acts of Parliament restraining the trade or cramping the manufactures of the colonies, be at the same time repealed, and the British subjects on this side the water, put, in those respects, on the same footing with those in Great Britain, till the new Parliament, representing the whole, shall think it for the interest of the whole to re-enact some or all of them: it is not that I imagine so many representatives will be allowed the colonies, as to have any great weight by their numbers; but I think there might be sufficient, to occasion those laws to be better and more impartially considered, and perhaps to overcome the interest of a petty corporation, or of any particular set of artificers or traders in England, who heretofore seem, in some instances, to have been more regarded than all the colonies, or than was consistent with the general interest, or best national good. I think too that the government of the colonies, by a Parliament, in which they are fairly represented, would be vastly more agreeable to the people, than the method lately attempted to be introduced by royal instruction; as well as more agreeable to the nature of an English constitution, and to English liberty; and that such laws as now seem to bear hard on the colonies, would (when judged by such a Parliament for the best interest of the whole) be more cheerfully submitted to, and more easily executed.

I should hope too, that by such an union, the people of Great Britain, and the people of the colonies, would learn to consider themselves, as not belonging to different communities with different interests, but to one community with one interest; which I imagine would contribute to strengthen the whole, and greatly lessen the danger of future separations.

It is, I suppose, agreed to be the general interest of any state, that its people be numerous and rich; men enow to fight in its defence, and enow to pay sufficient taxes to defray the charge; for these circumstances tend to the security of the state, and its protection from foreign power. But it seems not of so much importance whether the fighting be done by John or Thomas, or the tax paid by William or Charles. The iron manufacture employs and enriches British subjects, but is it of any importance to the state,

whether the manufacturer lives at Birmingham or Sheffield, or both; 1; since they are still within its bounds, and their wealth and persons still at its command? Could the Goodwin Sands be laid dry by banks, and land equal to a large country thereby gained to England, and presently filled with English inhabitants; would it be right to deprive such inhabitants of the common privileges enjoyed by other Englishmen, the right of vending their produce in the same ports, or of making their own shoes; because a merchant or a shoemaker, living on the old land, might fancy it more for his advantage to trade or make shoes for them? Would this be right, even if the land were gained at the expense of the state? And would it not seem less right if the charge and labour of gaining the additional territory to Britain had been borne by the settlers themselves? And would not the hardship appear yet greater, if the people of the new country should be allowed no representatives in Parliament enacting such impositions? Now I look on the colonies as so many countries gained to Great Britain; and more advantageous to it, than if they had been gained out of the sea around our coasts, and joined to its land; for being in different climates, they afford greater variety of produce, and materials for more manufactures; and being separated by the ocean, they increase much more its shipping and seamen and, since they are all included in the British empire, which has only extended itself by their means; and the strength and wealth of the parts is the strength and wealth of the whole; what imports it to the general state, whether a merchant, a smith, or a hatter, grow rich in Old or New-England? And if through increase of people, two smiths are wanted for one employed before, why may not the new smith be allowed to live and thrive in the new country, as well as the old one in the old? In fine, why should the countenance of a state be partially afforded to its people, unless it be most in favour of those who have most merit? And, if there be any difference, those who have most contributed to enlarge Britain's empire and commerce, increase her strength, her wealth, and the numbers of her people, at the risque of their own lives and private fortunes in new and strange. countries, methinks ought rather to expect some preference. With the greatest respect and esteem, I have the honour to be

Your Excellency's most obedient,

and humble Servant,

B. FRANKLIN..

Plan for settling two Western Colonies in North America, with Reasons for

the Pian, 1754.

The great country back of the Apalachian mountains, on both sides the Ohio, and between that river and the lakes, is now well known both to the English and French, to be one of the finest in North America. for the extreme richness and fertility of the land; the

healthy temperature of the air, and mildness of the climate; the plenty of hunting, fishing, and fowling; the facility of trade with the Indians; and the vast convenience of inland navigation or watercarriage by the lakes and great rivers, many hundred of leagues around.

From these natural advantages it must undoubtedly (perhaps in less than another century) become a populous and powerful dominion; and a great accession of power, either to England or France.

The French are now making open encroachments on these territories, in defiance of our known rights; and if we longer delay to settle that country, and suffer them to possess it,-these inconveniences and mischiefs will probably follow:

1. Our people, being confined to the country between the sea and the mountains, cannot much more increase in number; people increasing in proportion to their room and means of subsistence."

2. The French will increase much more, by that acquired room and plenty of subsistence, and become a great people behind us. 3. Many of our debtors, and loose English people, our German servants, and slaves, will probably desert to them; and increase their numbers and strength, to the lessening and weakening of ours.

4. They will cut us off from all commerce and alliance with the western Indians, to the great prejudice of Britain, by preventing the sale and consumption of its manufactures.

5. They will both in time of peace and war (as they have always done against New-England) set the Indians on to harass our frontiers, kill and scalp our people, and drive in the advanced settlers ;* and

*A very intelligent writer, Dr. Clark, in his Observations on the late and present Conduct of the French, &c. printed at Boston 1755, says—

"The Indians in the French interest are, upon all proper opportunities, instigated by their priests, (who have generally the chief management of their public councils,) to acts of hostility against the English, even in time of profound peace between the two crowns. Of this there are many undeniable instances: The war between the Indians and the colonies of the Massachusetts Bay and New-Hampshire, in 1723, by which those colonies suffered so much damage, was begun by the instigation of the French; their supplies were from them; and there are now original letters of several Jesuits to be produced, whereby it evidently appears, that they were continually animating the Indians, when almost tired with the war, to a farther prosecution of it. The French not only excited the Indians, and supported them, but joined their own forces with them in all the late hostilities that have been committed within his Majesty's province of Nova Scotia. And from an intercepted letter this year from the Jesuit at Penobscott, and from other information, it is certain that they have been using their utmost endeavours to excite the Indians to new acts of hostility against his Majesty's colony of the Massachusetts Bay; and some have been committed. The French not only excite the Indians to acts of hostility, but reward them for it, by buying the English prisoners of them for the ransom of each of which they afterwards demand of us the price that is usually given for a slave in these colonies. They do this under the specious pretence of rescuing the poor prisoners from the cruelties and barbarities of the savages; but in reality to encourage them to continue their depredations, as they can, by this means, get more by hunting the English, than by hunting wild beasts; and the French at the same time are thereby enabled to keep up a large body of Indians, entirely at the expense of the English.”

so, in preventing our obtaining more subsistence by cultivating of new lands, they discourage our marriages, and keep our people from increasing; thus (if the expression may be allowed) killing thousands of our children before they are born.

If two strong colonies of English were settled between the Ohio and Lake Erie, in the places hereafter to be mentioned,-these advantages might be expected:

1. They would be a great security to the frontiers of our other colonies; by preventing the incursions of the French and French Indians of Canada, on the back parts of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas; and the frontiers of such new colonies would be much more easily defended, than those of the colonies last mentioned now can be, as will appear hereafter.

2. The dreaded junction of the French settlements in Canada, with those of Louisiana would be prevented.

3. In case of a war, it would be easy, from those new colonies, to annoy Louisiana by going down the Ohio and Mississippi; and the southern part of Canada by sailing over the lakes; and thereby confine the French within narrower limits.

4. We should secure the friendship and trade of the Miamis or Twightwees, (a numerous people, consisting of many tribes, inhabiting the country between the west end of Lake Erie, and the south end of Lake Hurons, and the Ohio ;) who are at present dissatisfied with the French, and fond of the English, and would gladly encourage and protect an infant English settlement in or near their country, as some of their chiefs have declared to the writer of this memoir. Further, by means of the lakes, the Ohio, and the Mississippi, our trade might be extended through a vast country, among many numerous and distant nations, greatly to the benefit of Britain.

5. The settlement of all the intermediate lands, between the present frontiers of our colonies on one side, and the lakes and Mississippi on the other; would be facilitated and speedily executed, to the great increase of Englishmen, English trade, and English power.

The grants to most of the colonies, are of long narrow slips of land, extending west from the Atlantic to the South Sea. They are much too long for their breadth; the extremes at too great a distance; and therefore unfit to be continued under their present dimensions.

Several of the old colonies may conveniently be limited westward by the Alleghany or Apalachian mountains; and new colonies formed west of those mountains.

A single old colony does not seem strong enough to extend itself otherwise than inch by inch: it cannot venture a settlement far distant from the main body, being unable to support it: But if the colonies were united under one governor general and grand council, agreeable to the Albany Plan, they might easily, by their joint force, establish one or more new colonies, whenever they should judge it necessary or advantageous to the interest of the whole.*

*Extract from the "Plan for settling two western colonies," &c!

"A number of noblemen, merchants, and planters of Westminster, London, and Virginia, about the year 1751, obtained a charter grant, of six hundred thousand acres, on and near the Ohio River. In pursuance of the terms of their patent, the lands were surveyed, about two years after the grant, and settlements were soon made.

The governor of Canada, had early intelligence of the transactions of the company, and was alarmed with apprehensions, that they were prosecuting a plan, which would effectually deprive the French of the advantages, which they derived from their trade with the Twightwees; and what was still worse, would cut off the communication between the colonies of Canada and Louisiana. The French claimed all the country from the Mississippi, as far in upon Virginia, as the Alleghany mountains. This claim was founded on the pretence, that they were the first discoverers of that river. To secure their claims and preserve the communication between their two colonies of Canada and Louisana, they had not only erected a fort on the south side of Lake Erie, but one about fifteen miles south of that, on a branch of the Ohio, and another at the conflux of the Ohio and the Wabache. Nothing could be more directly calculated to dash a favourite plan of France, than the settlement of the Ohio. The Governor of Canada therefore wrote to the governors of NewYork and Pennsylvania, representing that the English traders had encroached on the French, by trading with their Indians, and threatening that he would seize them wherever they should be found.

Accordingly, in 1753, a party of French and Indians seized the British traders, among the Twightwees, and carried them to their fort on the south side of Lake Erie. The Twightwees, resenting the injury done to the British traders, their allies, made reprisals on the French, and sent several of their traders to Pennsylvania. The French, however, persisted in their claims and continued to strengthen their fortifications.

The Indians at the same time, jealous that settlements were about to be made on their lands, without purchase or consent from them, threatened the settlers. These claims and encroachments of the French, and threats of the Indians, struck at the very existence of the Ohio Company. Complaints were therefore made to Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie, of Virginia, and the province began to interest themselves warmly in the affair. The Indians were, in some measure, pacified, by a pretended message delivered them from the king. Maj. Washington was despatched to Mr. St. Pierre, the French commandant on the Ohio, to demand the reasons of his hostile conduct, and, at the same time, to insist on the withdrawment of his troops. A party of Virginians were also sent forward to erect a fort at the conflux of the Ohio and Monongahela.

The French commander denied the charge of hostility, and was so far from withdrawing his forces, that he made an absolute claim of the country, as the property of the French king, and declared that, agreeably to his instructions, he would seize and send prisoner to