What is the political system of the United States, and wherein does it differ from other republics?

As we have already observed, its bases are that the sovereign power resides in the people, being separate and distinct from the governing power; that the latter was, in the first instance, constituted by them, and afterwards is exercised by agents, appointed either directly or indirectly by the people, and for their benefit, this being what is called the representative principle, and is an essential characteristic of the republican form. The different descriptions of power, the legislative, executive, and judicial, are separated and confided to distinct departments, forming co-ordinate branches of the government. These are the leading principles of the republican theory; but our system embraces a new principle, and one of the utmost importance, as it removes the greatest objection to the republican form of government. This principle, as has been remarked, originated from the existence of the state authorities at the time the system was matured and adopted, and consists of a division and separation of the active powers of government, and confiding them to different bodies; those which more immediately relate to the national sovereignty and appertain to the rights and interests of the people, considered as forming one nation, constitute the first or su preme division of authority, and are confided to one body of magistracy; and those which concern the rights of individuals, in their relations with each other, the protection of persons and property, the enacting and administering laws for these objects, are confided to numerous bodies of magistracy, each having jurisdiction over a certain portion of territory, and the population within the same. The local, or state authorities, exercise most of the powers of independent states, as it respects the rights and interests of individuals; they possess, in general, as it respects the persons and subjects over which they have jurisdiction, the complete and plenary powers of inde pendent communities; and the persons who administer them, being a part of the people, and entirely dependent upon them for their offices, will be likely both to know and respect their rights and their wants. Where there is but one source of legislation, for a nation of extensive territory and large population, local interests and objects cannot well be attended to, nor the wishes of the people properly known or consulted. In a representative government, where there is but a single legislature, the members must either be too numerous to transact business, on the one hand, or on the other, the people will not be properly represented. But the greatest objection to reposing the whole powers of government in the hands of one body of magistracy, in a republic, is, that the government must possess a degree of energy, in order to sustain itself, dangerous to the liberties of the people. From these and other reasons, it has generally been considered by political writers that the republican form of government was adapted only to a small state; this was the opinion of Montesquieu, and hence he considered that a republic possesses the greatest

internal advantages, but that it has not sufficient force for external defence; and he considered that the only remedy for this evil, deemed to be inherent in the republican form, was a confederate republic. But a confederative republic, according to his ideas, is entirely different from the government of the United States, although the national division or branch of our system is commonly called the federal or federative government. The opinion that ours is a confederative republic, is wholly fallacious. The following extract from the author referred to, gives a correct view of a federal republic. "It is probable," says he, "that mankind would have been obliged at length, to live constantly under the government of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution which has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchial government,-I mean a confederate republic. This form of government is a convention, by which several smaller states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies, that constitutes a new one, capable of increasing by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united body. As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each, and with respect to its external situation, it possesses, by means of association, all the advantages of large monarchies."* A confederate republic is here defined to be an assemblage of societies;" or a "convention, by which several small states agree to become members of a larger one." It is simply a compact between two or more independent states, whereby they agree to form a union, for their common defence, or other objects. This compact or union may be perpetual or for a definite period; and the principles of it, may be variously modified. But the association, being the act of the states who become members of the confederacy in their corporate capacity, the authorities constituted to superintend their common or national concerns, deriving their powers from the members, can exercise it only over the confederates as corporate bodies; and the radical defect of this government, arises from the difficulty of making and enforcing laws, over a community in their collective and corporate character.

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There has been numerous examples of confederate governments, both in ancient and modern times. Of the ancient confederate republics, that of the Grecian States, under the Amphyctonic council, was the most important. The confederates retained their independence and sovereignty. The federal council, in which the members had equal votes, possessed the power to regulate the common concerns of the confederacy; their intercourse with foreign states; to declare and carry on war, and to preserve internal peace, by deciding all controversies between the members in the last resort; they enforced their decisions by fining the aggressing party, or by employing the force of the confederacy against him. The federal or Amphyctonic authority, was exercised by senators or deputies appointed by the

Spirit of Laws, vol. i. book 9-Chap. i.

confederates in their corporate capacity, and over the states in the same capacity. The consequence was that the more powerful members always controuled the affairs of Greece. Athens, as Demosthenes informs us, was arbiter of Greece for seventy-three years the Lacedæmonians governed afterwards for twenty-nine years, and after the battle of Luctra it fell under the dominion of the Thebans for a considerable period. The powerful members not only engaged in foreign wars, which compromited the peace and security of the confederacy, but also in war with one another; the rivalship and jealousy of Athens and Sparty resulted in the Pelopponesian war, which ended in the ruin of Athens and paved the way for the slavery of all Greece.

The Achæan league, was another of the ancient confederacies; and consisted of a union of the smaller Grecian republics or cities. The union was more intimate than in the Amphyctonic confederacy, as the confederates were required to have the same laws and internal regulations; and in this respect it approached nearer to a consolidated government than that of the United States; for here the states have different laws, and manage their affairs differently, and congress has no other authority than to compel them to maintain the republican form. But notwithstanding the closeness of union in this particular, the Achæan league was only an "assemblage of societies," in their corporate capacities, only a compact among the states composing it; its principle was that of a confederacy of independent communities, and its fate was similar to what has attended all others. The Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three small republics or cities, the largest of which had three, the middle class two and the smallest three votes in the confederative council, is pronounced by Montesquieu, the most excellent model of a federal republic.

In modern times, the United Netherlands is the most distinguished example of a confederate republic, or rather confederacy of aristoc racies. The confederate authority was reposed in what was called the States General, and consisted of deputies appointed by the provin ces, who hold their seats, some for life, some for three, six and one years, and some during pleasure. The States General had the power to make peace and declare war, raise armies and equip fleets, and to ascertain the quotas of men and amount of contributions of the provinces, and demand the same. The executive, called the Stadtholder, was an hereditary prince, and was the chief magistrate not only of the confederacy but of each of the provinces. In this im portant particular, the executive power, this system approached much nearer to the consolidation of the provinces and the establishment of one entire government than the constitution of the United States. The stadtholder, likewise possessed important perogatives; he assisted at the deliberations of the states general, settled disputes between the provinces; was the head of the land and naval forces of the confederacy, and disposed of all appointments in the military and naval service: he superintended foreign affairs, gave audience

to foreign ambassadors, and appointed ministers to foreign courts. He commanded a standing army of 40,000 men, and had a revenue of 300,000 florins. This system, where there was a unity of the executive authority, and this authority, hereditary and more extensive than that in many monarchies, instead of uniting the essential advantages of one entire government, union in council and energy in action, was constantly distracted by dissensions among the provinces, exposed to all the dangers of foreign iufluence, to domestic faction and foreign violence. The system possessed few of the advantages of a confederacy, the principal of which according to Montesquieu, is external force, whilst it sacrificed internal tranquillity and happiness in the language of the writer referred to, it "enjoyed neither the internal happiness of a republic nor the external advantages of a monarchy." There was one pernicious principle in this system; the national authorities could not act, in important cases, unless the provinces were unanimous; and not only each province but the cities of which the provinces were composed, and which possessed many of the prerogatives of independence, must also concur. The provinces therefore, were in some measure only confederacies, and the union consequently consisted of a confederacy of confederacies.

Both from ancient and modern examples, it appears that the advantages of a federative republic, are less important than has generally been considered; they seldom secure the principle object intended, external strength, whilst they lead to internal dissension and faction. Such a plan can hardly be considered as a government, and is little more, as we have previously observed than a compact between independent states, in the nature of a perpetual alliance, offensive and defensive, with certain regulations for carrying the same into effect. Where, from the situation of the country, as from some common danger, or in case of war, affecting alike the interest, and perhaps the existence, of each member of the confederacy, this plan may answer tolerably well, as was the case with the United Netherlands in their war with Spain, and the American colonies in their revolutionary contest. But these cases, instead of proving the advantages of the system, rather prove that where a whole nation are animated by the same feelings, and engaged in one common cause, involving their liberty, or independence, almost any plan of government, may answer, as public opinion is in a great measure a substitute for law. This was the case during our revolution. But no sooner was the contest over, and peace made with the common enemy, than the most alarming dissensions broke out, and actual rebellion reared its hydra head, and general anarchy threatened the country, which rendered the defects of the government sufficiently apparent. What was called the continental system, or the confederation, was a union formed on the principle of a confederacy of republics, and possessed all the defects and evils inherent in that plan. Its principle was only a compact or association among independent states, and the confederative council could only legislate for the states in their corporate capacity.

This plan, however, as defective and imperfect as it is, was thought by Montesquieu and other distinguished political authors, the only one which admitted of the adoption of the republican theory on a large scale, over an extensive territory or large population. This being the case, what light has been thrown on the science of government by the experiments and the experience of the United States? How much is the human race indebted to America for having devised a theory, and fully demonstrated the practicability and utility thereof, which really does possess the advantages of small and well regulated republics, as it respects internal tranquillity and happiness, and all the advantages as to external strength, of large monarchies ? A system, founded on the most popular principles, and the most pure republican forms, yet adapted to any extent of territory, or any aggregate of population; which consists of numerous members, or separate republics, and at the same time of one people and one government; which embraces democratic principles, without the evils of a democracy-republican principles, without the difficulties or restrictions, either as to territory or population, of the republican form; and confederative principles without the evils of a confederacy; which is complicated, without tardiness or discord; popular, without anarchy; which affords the greatest security to the liberty of the citizen, without weakness in the government, and possesses sufficient energy without being dangerous to liberty. These advantages, the experience of forty years has fully demonstrated; they are to be attributed in part to the superior intelligence and virtue of our population; yet in no small degree are we indebted for these and all our social blessings, to the excellency of our political system.

As the happiness of mankind is the only valuable object of all science and knowledge, it may truly be affirmed, that not the discovery of the mariner's compass; the art of ship building; not all the discoveries in physics and mechanics which have unfolded the powers and usefulness of steam, and the modern sciences of chemistry and geology, are of equal importance to the human race, as the improvements which have been made in America, in the science of government. Let not this be thought extravagant; on a moment's reflection it will not appear so. The great problem, whether mankind were capable of self government; whether, in a country of great extent and population, the people could retain, in their own hands, the powers of government, and in any form so exercise them as to secure internal tranquillity, and be able to defend themselves from foreign powers, had long been unsettled: authority, and even science, had thrown their weight into the negative scale, and it was only a few original and independent minds that had maintained the affirmative. The dissensions and disorders of the ancient republics, and the failure of all modern attempts, and the reproach which many of them had left behind, had nearly decided this question in a manner derogatory to man and dishonourable to God. Yes, it had almost become an established axiom, that mankind were incapable of self