which they had become accustomed ; and secondly, that there was not that full and profound consideration bestowed on the subject which its importance demanded. To the causes specified, are to be referred many of the defects in the constitutions of the original states. But, on the other hand, it is to one of these causes, namely, the character of the institutions existing at the time of the separation, and the fruits which they had produced, to which we are indebted, not only for many of the excellencies of our system, but in some degree for the effecting of our independence, and still more for permanently securing the blessings of civil liberty upon the most rational principles and durable foundations.

But, notwithstanding the difference in the theory, or minuter features of the constitutions of the original states, they were all established on the same bases, and possessed the essential outlines of a republican form. These bases are, first, the sovereignty of the people, which implies that they are the only legitimate source of all authority and government, and that the constitution emanates from them, and is only a formal declaration of their will, as to the manner in which they will be governed, or rather will govern themselves; and consequently admits that they retain the power of altering or abolishing the same, either in a way prescribed in the constitution itself, or from an original exertion of power; in the former case, the act would be done under, and by the authority of the existing constitution, and in the latter, from the power inherent in the people, and which, from the aforesaid principle constituting the basis of our political systems, that the sovereign power resides in the people, they cannot divest themselves of. The power which can create, can alter or abolish; and if the people, in framing a constitution, should insert in it an express provision, that it was never to be altered or amended, this could no more take away the right of the citizens of the same state, at any subsequent period, to alter or abolish such constitution, and to provide such new forms as the change in their situation might require, than a provision in the statute of the ordinary legislature, that the same should never be repealed or altered, can tie up the hands of a subsequent legislature; and it is an established principle, wherever legislation exists, whatever may be its forms, that the prior legisla ture possesses no greater authority than any subsequent ones, and that it can enact no law but what may be repealed by a subsequent legislature.

The essential republican forms, which belong to the constitutions of the several states, consist in this: that the powers of government, delegated or constituted, are to be exercised by persons elected by the people, either primarily or secondarily, for limited periods. This is what is called the elective, or representative principle, and constitutes the fundamental feature in the republican form of government. The forms, founded on this principle, may be variously modified; but where the principle is not essentially departed from, they must be regarded as republican. From this view of the principles of our

government, the inconsistency which many have supposed involved in the notion that the sovereign power existed in the people, while they were obliged to submit to the laws of the legislature and e authority of the magistrate, is obviated; as it will be perceived that the sovereign power existing in the people at large, is that natural inherent right of self government, which has not and cannot be delegated, and is separate and distinct from the ordinary powers of government. This power is paramount to the constituted authority, and is not ordinarily exerted; and as long as this is the case, it does not controul or counteract the exertion and authority of the powers delegated.

The constitution of the United States established a national government, or a government for the several states, united as one people and one independent nation. To form one common government for a country of great extent and diversity of climate, consisting of thirteen distinct and essentially sovereign states, held together only by some common sympathies and the mere semblance of general authority, was an object attended with apparently insurmountable difficul ties. A national government could be established in one only of three ways. First, by a consolidation of the states, the abolition of the state authorities, and the institution of one simple government, possessing a unity of authority; secondly, by a compact or union of the states in their corporate capacities, which could be little more than a permanent alliance, offensive and defensive, between the states; or, thirdly, a mixed and compound government, containing a modification of the features and principles of both of these two plans.

From the general unsettled aspect of affairs, and the alarming condition of the country at the time the formation of a more efficient government was agitated, a dangerous spirit of insubordination and actual rebellion having shewn themselves in some of the states, and many enlightened citizens and good patriots having lost their confidence in the capacity of the people for self government, there is no doubt, that at that dark period in our history, there was a portion of our citizens, a small minority of the whole, yet respectable in point of numbers as well as talents, who preferred a government of the first description-an efficient national government. But the temper of the times was little calculated to favour so great a change in the institutions of the country; and those most inclined this way, limited their views to what they called a permanent and efficient national government, without a consolidation of the states or abolition of the local authorities. Indeed no one thought the first plan practicable; and as to the second, it was substantially the system then existing, called the confederation, the insufficiency and defects of which were so sensibly felt, and the very evils which the nation was attempting to remedy. The third plan only remained; and on that the convention proceeded to deliberate and act, and finally matured the system comprised in the present constitution of the United States. It is

however evident, that it was not the original intention, either of the people or the legislatures of the states which appointed members to the convention, or of the congress which recommended the same, that a government should be established on this basis, or that a new system should be introduced; the only expectation was to revise and improve the old one, so as to give additional authority to congress, especially as to the regulation of commerce and raising a revenue from imposts. This formed one of the most powerful objections to the constitution. It was claimed that the convention had exceeded their powers, and that, instead of their revising and proposing alterations in the existing system, they had devised and framed an entire new system of government. This ground of objection was urged with great vehemence, eloquence and effect, by the great orator of Virginia, Patrick Henry, in the convention of that state. He asked by what authority the convention had framed a constitution in the name and behalf of the people-by what authority they used the language, "we the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union," &c. when they were appointed by the states" for the sole and express purpose of revising the articles of confederation, and reporting to congress alterations therein,"* which articles were established by the states, and were the offspring of their power and will.

As is usually the case with every thing which excites a strong popular feeling and interest, the new constitution was assailed with objections of a directly opposite nature; whilst on the one hand it partook of the nature of an original independent government, and tended to merge and annihilate the state governments, on the other it was too weak, and the states too strong; more power was required in the head and less in the members. It was also objected that the government was neither federative nor independent; but a mixed, compound system, partaking of the nature of both; that the machinery of it was complex and intricate, which would render its operations tedious and uncertain, and produce a jarring of powers and collision of authority, which would tend to confusion; that it created distinct and independent legislative bodies, each possessing the authority of legislating on the same subjects and for the same persons. This last ground of objection was certainly correct, as it respected the fact; but instead of there being any weight in the objection, the reasons on which it rests constitute the excellency of

our system.

no means.

What is the government of the United States? Is it an original, independent government? No. Is it a federative government? By What is it then? We answer-It is a government established in connexion with, and ingrafted upon, the state institutions, so that the whole forms but one system and one government, entire and complete, possessing a unity of power and of action. Whilst it is complicated, in a high degree, its powers are separated and divid

* Resolution of Congress recommending a convention.

ed, adjusted and balanced, with great nicety; its principles stable and energetic; its operations regular, uniform and harmonious, presenting the freest, purest, and most sublime political fabric which the world has ever witnessed. It is a common thing to speak of the national government as one entirely separate and independent of the state authorities; but nothing can be more incorrect than this. The national and state governments are but parts of the same plan; they are inseparably connected, and form but one system and one gov ernment. Because the national constitution was formed after those of the states, it does not follow that the former is carved out of the latter, and wholly disconnected therewith; nor does it follow, that because the parts were once distinct and independent of each other, that they are not now united and formed into one system. Men usually purchase a carriage entire, and in a finished state; but if a person was first to procure the wheels, then the body, and afterwards the other parts, when the whole were united and put together, it would not be the less a carriage because it was not purchased entire. The question in either case would be the same, whether it was a complete and finished vehicle, and this would not at all depend on the order of time or the manner in which the parts were made or procured. It is the same of a theory of government: the order of time in which its parts existed and were brought together, is of no importance; whether it consists of one, or several distinct systems, will depend on the union of its parts and the adjustment of its principles.

Are we not one country, one nation, and one people? If so, we can have but one system of government-a unity of society requires a unity of government. The convention intended to devise and frame a complete system of government, to afford new guards for our security; but in doing this they incorporated the state institutions, so far modifying them and restricting their powers, as became necessary to complete the system, and give it a unity of character and action.

Although the local institutions and state sovereignties interposed an almost insuperable obstacle to the establishment of a national government, yet, nevertheless, that was undoubtedly the cause which gave to our system its greatest excellency and value. As we have already remarked that the condition and character of the political institutions of the colonies, at the time of the separation, had great influence on the state constitutions, so the existence of the latter had perhaps a greater influence on the general system which was established. In the former case, the forms and practices of the colonial governments did not, in themselves, constitute obstacles and constraints, in the formation of the state constitutions, as they were abrogated by the separation; their influence on the new institutions was only from the habits of thinking and acting to which they had given rise; but at the establishment of the constitution of the United States, state institutions and state rights were in existence, and com

prised essentially independent and sovereign power. These were the immediate guardians of the people's rights and liberties, to whom they looked for the protection of their persons and property; and the participation of the people was direct, and having long been familiarized to their authority and enjoyed their protection, it was natural that they should be attached to the state authorities, and be extremely jealous of a new government, which was to be removed from them, of the operations of which they were strangers, and which was calculated to restrict the local authorities and abridge the rights of the states. Every feeling and every prejudice at the time were naturally in favour of the state authorities. This, as has already been observed, was the greatest obstacle with which the convention had to contend. But at the same time it must be regarded as the cause of the establishment of our political system, as it now exists. Had it not been for the existence of the states, as separate and independent communities, undoubtedly one entire government would have been instituted, consisting of a unity of power, with no other division of it, than into the three usual departments, of legislative, executive and judicial. There would have been but one legislative or law-making power for the country, like Great Britain or France, during the days of the republic. Had the country been under one colonial government, and a new and independent one was to have been established, the territory might have been divided into departments, or states, and subdivided into counties, for the conducting of elections, the administration of justice, and other objects, similar to what was done in France; but it is not probable that a system, analogous to that now existing, would ever have been thought of; but if it should have been, and a serious attempt made to establish such a system, it is perfectly clear that it would have been entirely impracticable. There are few instances in history where two independent states have voluntarily united to form one government, and it would be still more difficult for a nation to divide itself, for the purposes of government, into separate communities, or states, each possessing the power of making laws for themselves, administering justice, the punishment of crimes, and exercising all the powers of local government. Such a plan would not only have been opposed from its novelty, but it would have been believed that it would tend to immediate anarchy and confusion, and result in the dismemberment of the nation. It is therefore a position unquestionably correct, that the existence of the state sovereignties, which formed the greatest obstacle to the establishment of a national government, was the sole cause of the formation and adoption of the present system. This is one of the many instances in human affairs, in which, what is regarded as the greatest obstacle to the obtainment of an object, is the cause which gives to it its great value and glory. It is only by grappling with difficulties, that a proper strength is given to the human powers. er any thing superlatively great, or excellent, produced.