The sanctity of an oath would be less regarded where perjury was looked upon more in the light of a civil injury than a public offence. The aggrieved party might (for the recovery of his own rights) maintain an action against the false witness. It is true, the jury were at liberty to disfranchise the defendant if they convicted him; but then the cause might be compromised by the plaintiff at any time before the verdict was actually pronounced3.

Let us hear what Cicero' says, making allowance for the zeal of an advocate:

Hoc dico de toto genere Græcorum. Tribuo illis literas; do multarum artium disciplinam; non adimo sermonis leporem, ingeniorum acumen, dicendi copiam; denique etiam si qua sibi alia sumunt, non repugno; testimoniorum religionem et fidem nunquam ista natio coluit; totiusque hujusce rei quæ sit vis, quæ auctoritas, quod pondus, ig

norant.

To shew how a man might speculate upon a verdict at Athens, and seek to take advantage of his own wrong, I subjoin a little narrative; a plaintiff's statement of his own case, written for him by Demosthenes.

First be it observed, that when a man died

2 Of this there is an instance in Isæus (on the estate of Dicæogenes,) after the jury had given their votes, but before they were counted.

3 Pro Flacco. It was sufficient for his argument, to decry the Asiatic Greeks.

without issue, and the title to his inheritance was disputed, the various claimants were required to come before the court and interplead. One trial was appointed for all, and the estate was adjudged to the person or persons, who appeared to have the best title. This was a good regulation enough; but there seems to have been mismanagement in the details. Each party was allowed a certain time for speaking, measured by the water-glass; and there were as many balloting urns for the jury, as there were parties in distinct interests. Room was thus afforded for collusion, if the weaker titles coalesced against the stronger, or if unfounded claims were put in, to embarrass the court and the opponent. The adjudication was not final. New claimants, who by absence, or some other reason, were prevented from trying their right before, might at any time come in and sue the successful party.

Conon, a relation of the plaintiff, died without issue. The plaintiff sent for his brother in law, Olympiodorus, to assist him in performing the last offices to the deceased. He attended as desired, and took occasion to mention, that his mother was related to Conon, and he considered himself entitled to a share in the inheritance. This astonished the plaintiff, who knew the claim to be unfounded. A warm dispute ensued, but ended in a compromise, and an agreement to share the deceased's property between them. The terms

were reduced to writing; they bound themselves to make a fair and equal division, and to take all measures in concert for the preservation of the estate. This last clause was dictated by a wellgrounded apprehension, that other persons would put in claims, and especially Callippus, the plaintiff's brother, who was at that time abroad. Claimants, in fact, soon appeared, and among others Callippus, who demanded a moiety of the estate. Olympiodorus and the plaintiff determined to resist them all; and it was settled that the former should make title to the whole inheritance, the latter to a moiety. The parties were called before the court in the usual way; but, just as the trial was coming on, our confederates (such was the number of claimants, and the suddenness of their appearance) found themselves unprepared with their case. They then deliberated how they could get the trial put off, and (says the plaintiff) "by good luck it so happened, the Athenians were persuaded to send troops into Acarnania, and Olympiodorus was compelled to join the army." The cause, however, came on. The plaintiff made an affidavit, stating the absence of Olympiodorus, and the cause thereof; on the other hand it was sworn, that he had gone abroad for delay; the latter view of the case being taken by the jury, the trial proceeded, and the plaintiff declining to defend for the moiety, judgment was given for some of the other parties. On the return of Olympiodorus, he and the plain

tiff instantly took measures for the recovery of the estate; and they resolved to proceed as before, putting in separate claims, but secretly co-operating with each other. This was done. The holders of the estate are again brought into court, to try the title. Olympiodorus produces false evidence, which the plaintiff, appearing ostensibly as a distinct party, supports and corroborates; and by this means he obtains a verdict. Upon taking possession, he is required by the plaintiff to give him his share, in pursuance of the agreement. This he refuses to do, and the plaintiff thereupon commences an action against him.

Such is the plaintiff's own account of the transaction; and, in so far as he criminates himself, it may be relied on as correct. The facts, thus admitted, would in this country have stamped him with infamy, and subjected him to penalties for a misdemeanor; yet he calmly urges them as the foundation of a legal demand, and seeks to recover contribution from his partner in fraud.

If the tone of moral feeling at Athens was thus relaxed, it was the more necessary to guard against human frailty by a good system of jurisprudence. We are not so surprised at corruption of morals, among a people who had no sound religious belief; but when we consider the wisdom of their legislator, the number of their laws, and the various minute provisions which they contained, we cannot help wondering that no better

system was devised for the administration of jus

tice.

Athens seriously felt the want of a permanent civil tribunal, composed of men conversant with the laws, and responsible for their due execution. The magistrate, who presided over the conduct of a cause, had no judicial power at the trial; he merely regulated matters of form. It was his business to examine the parties in the first instance, to see that the court had jurisdiction to try the question in dispute, and to settle certain preliminary matters with respect to the pleadings and the evidence; and by law, indeed, he had power to dismiss the suit, or to quash the proceedings, either for want of form or on the merits; but, in practice, his discretion was confined within very narrow bounds, and he was generally compelled to bring the cause, in some shape or other, into court. The persons, upon whom substantially devolved the whole power of decision, were the jury, who were chosen (one may almost say) without any regard to qualification. It is true that, whenever a jury was impanelled, they were taken (as I shall hereafter explain) from a body of six thousand, who had been appointed for the service of the current year; but this select body were themselves chosen by lot, from the whole body of citizens, who were above thirty, and in possession of their civil rights.

To the more strictly political functions of the