Congruity, fays he, is the genus, of which propriety is the fpecies. For we call nothing propriety, but that congruity or fuitableness which ought to fubfitt between fenfible beings, and their thoughts, words, and actions.

But is not this running the circle? Might we not as well fay, that we can call nothing congruity, but that propriety or fuitableness, which ought to fubfift between fenfible beings, and their thoughts, words, and actions? If it is neceffary to raise a diftinction between them, would it not be better to fay, that the fuitableness of any thought, word, or action, when confidered with regard to a fingle relation, is strictly termed Propriety: but when viewed with respect to various relations, is more properly termed Congruity?

In explaining the final caufe of propriety he takes notice, that the fenfe of propriety cannot justly be confidered in any other light than as the natural law that regulates our conduct with refpect to ourselves; as the fenfe of juftice is the natural law that regulates our conduct with refpect to others. His reflections on this head give intire fatisfaction, and speak the genuine principles of unaffected virtue and manly devotion.

Dignity and Meannefs are the fubjects of the eleventh chapter. "Man, fays our Author, is endued with a fenfe of the worth and excellence of his nature. To exprefs this fenfe the term Dignity is appropriated. Farther, to behave with dignity, and to refrain from all mean actions, is felt to be not a virtue only, but a duty." On this occafion, his Lordship enquires how it comes, that generofity and courage are more valued, and bestow more dignity than good-nature or even justice, though the latter contribute more than the former to private as well as to public happiness? The anfwer, in our judgment is clear and obvious: Juftice and good-nature are a fort of negative virtues, that make no figure unless they are tranfgreffed. Courage and generosity, producing elevated emotions, enliven greatly the fenfe of a man's dignity, both in himself and others; and for that reafon, courage and generofity are in higher regard than the other virtues mentioned. This leads our author to examine more directly the emotions and paffions with refpect to thefe heads; on which his reflections are too copious for abridg

ment.

The next chapter treats of Ridicule, a fubject which has been much controverted by the Critics. He first establishes a diftinction between rifible and ridiculous objects. A rifible object produceth merely an emotion of laughter; a ridiculous

object

object is improper as well as rifible, and produceth a mixed emotion, which is vented by a laugh of derifion or fcorn. In the course of this enquiry, his Lordship enters upon the difcuffion of that celebrated queftion, Whether Ridicule be or be not the teft of Truth?

"The question, according to his Lordship, ftated in accurate terms, is, Whether the fenfe of ridicule be the proper teft for diftinguifhing ridiculous objects from those that are not fo? To answer this question with precision, I must premife, that ridicule is not a fubject of reafoning, but of fenfe or tafte. This being taken for granted, I proceed thus. No perfon doubts that our fenfe of beauty is the true teft of what is beautiful, and our fenfe of grandeur, of what is great or fublime. Is it more doubtful whether our fenfe of ridicule be the true teft of what is ridiculous? It is not only the true teft, but indeed the only teft. For this is a fubject that comes not, more than beauty or grandeur, under the province of reafon. If any fubject, by the influence of fashion or cuftom, have acquired a degree of veneration or esteem to which naturally it is not intitled, what are the proper means for wiping off the artificial colouring, and difplaying the fubject in its true light? Reafoning, as obferved, cannot be applied. And therefore the only means is to judge by tafte. The teft of ridicule which feparates it from its artificial connections, expofes it naked with all its native improprieties.

"But it is urged, that the gravest and most serious matters may be fet in a ridiculous light. Hardly fo; for where an object is neither rifible nor improper, it lies not open in any quarter to an attack from ridicule. But fuppofing the fact, I forefee not any harmful confequence. By the fame fort of reafoning, a talent for wit ought to be condemned, because it may be employed to burlefque a great or lofty subject. Such irregular ufe made of a talent for wit or ridicule cannot long impofe upon mankind. It cannot ftand the teft of correct and delicate tafte; and truth will at last prevail even with the vulgar. To condemn a talent for ridicule because it may be perverted to wrong purposes, is not a little ridiculous. Could one forbear to fmile, if a talent for reafoning were condemned because it alfo may be perverted? And yet the conclufion in the latter cafe, would be not lefs juft than in the former; perhaps more juft, for no talent is fo often perverted as that of reafon."

This, it must be confeffed, is the best defence which has been hitherto offered in vindication of Lord Shaftesbury's propofition, yet we cannot but fufpect that there is fome fallacy in the foregoing arguments. Ridicule, it is faid, is not a fubject of reafoning, but of fenfe or tafte. But is there not a just taste and a falfe tafte? And by what criterion are we to distinguish one from the other? Is not reafon given us to correct the errors of fenfe? Does not every man's recollection convince him, that objects have appeared beautiful, fublime, or ridiculous, which upon reflection have presented themselves in a very different light? Does not that appear abfurd and ridiculous to one man, which to another feems proper and congruous? Do not the folemn forms of juftice, and the gravity of a coiffed head, ftrike one with a fenfe of ridicule, and make an impreffion of awe on another? In thefe cafes, which man's fenfe fhall be preferred? If the one fays, this object must be ridiculous, becaufe it moves in me a fenfe of ridicule; has not the other as good a right to anfwer, this object cannot be ridiculous, because it does not affect my fenfe of ridicule? How then can ridicule be the test of truth, which itself requires fome criterion, whereby to determine whether it be juft or falfe? It may be objected indeed, that reafon itself is fallible; but nevertheless it is the fuperior faculty of human beings, and is lefs prone to error than fenfe, which is often affected by a fingle and feemingly fantastic relation that frequently changes its appearance, when reafon takes its turn to operate, and to weigh the whole combination of circumftances.

Nevertheless, we agree with our Author, that an attempt utterly to fupprefs ridicule, would be highly improper and injurious. It is frequently an entertaining, and, on many occafiors, a very ufeful talent. At the fame time, we intirely coincide with his Lordfhip, when he obferves, that a talent for ridicule is feldom united with a tafte for delicate and refined beauties.

The fubject of the next chapter is Cuftom; which, as his Lordship remarks with great accuracy, respects the action: Habit the actor. Things, he obferves, which at firft are but moderately agreeable, are the apteft to become habitual. No man contracts a habit of taking fugar, honey, or fweet-meats, as he doth of tobacco.

Thefe violent delights have violent ends,
And in their rian. h di

'The sweetest honey

Is leathfone in is own deliciou.nefs,

And in the talle confounds the appetite;

Therefore

Therefore love mod'rately, long love doth fo;
Too swift arrives as tardy as too flow.

The fame holds in the caufes of all violent pleasures: great paffions, fuddenly raised, are incompatible with a habit of any ,fort.

Cuftom augments moderate pleafures, and diminishes thofe that are intenfe. It has a different effect with respect to pain; for it blunts the edge of every fort of pain and diftrefs, great and small. and fmall. Moderate pleafures are not long ftationary, for when they are at their height they gradually decay till they vanifh altogether. The pain occafioned by the want of gratification runs a very different courfe. This pain increases uniformly; and at laft becomes extreme, when the pleasure of gratification is reduced to nothing.

It fo falls out,

That what we have we prize not to the worth,
Whiles we enjoy it; but being lacked and loft,
Why then we rack the value; then we find
The virtue that poffeffion would not fhew us,
Whilft it was ours.

With refpect to the efficient cause of the power of cuftom, his Lordship owns that it has unhappily evaded his keenest fearch. But with respect to the final caufe, he thus accounts for it. Exquifite pleasure produceth fatiety; moderate pleafure becomes ftronger by cuftom. Bufinefs is our province, and pleasure our relaxation only. Hence fatiety is neceffary to check exquifite pleasures, which otherwife would engrofs the mind, and unqualify us for bufinefs. On the other hand, habitual increase of moderate pleasure, and even converfion of pain into pleasure, are admirably contrived for disappointing the malice of fortune, and for reconciling us to whatever courfe of life may be Our lot.

How ufe doth breed a habit in a man!

This fhadowy defert, unfrequented wood,
I better brook than flourishing peopled towns.
Here I can fit alone, unfeen of any,

And to the nightingale's complaining notes,
Tune my diftreffes, and record my woes.

In the close of this chapter, his Lordship enquires, What authority cuftom ought to have over our taste in the fine arts? But for this curious and critical difcuffion, we must refer the Reader to the work itself.

REV. July, 1762.

B

In

In the next chapter, which treats of the external figns of emotions and paffions, his Lordship obferves, that the foul and body are fo intimately connected, that there is not a fingle agitation in the former, but what produceth a visible effect upon the latter. We perceive difplayed externally, hope, fear, joy, grief: we can read the character of a man in his face; and beauty, which makes fo ftrong an impreffion, is known to refult not fo much from regular features and a fine complexion, as from good-nature, good-fenfe, sprightlinefs, sweetness, or other mental quality, expreffed fome way upon the countenance.

The external figns of paffion are of two kinds, voluntary and involuntary. The voluntary figns alfo are of two kinds: fome are arbitrary and fome natural. Words are arbitrary figns, but the manner of employing them is not altogether fo; for each paffion has by nature peculiar expreffions and tones fuited to it. "The other kind of voluntary figns comprehends certain attitudes and geftures that naturally accompany certain emotions with a furprifing uniformity."

His Lordship's reflections on the involuntary paffions fhew with what a keen and difcerning eye he has penetrated into the receffes of the human heart. The involuntary figns, he remarks, which are all of them natural, are either peculiar to one paffion, or common to many. Every violent paffion hath an external expreffion peculiar to itfelf, not excepting pleafant paffions: witnefs admiration and mirth. The involuntary figns, fuch as are difplayed upon the countenance, are of two kinds. Some make their appearance occafionally, with the emotions that produce them, and vanish with the emotions others are formed gradually by fome violent paffion often recurring; and, becoming permanent figns of this prevailing paffion, ferve to denote the difpofition or temper. The face of an infant indicates no particular difpofition, because it cannot be marked with any character to which time is neceffary His Lordship, in the next place, examines the effects produced upon a fpectator by external figns of paffion, of which none are beheld with indifference. They are productive of various emotions tending all of them to ends wife and good. Of thefe the ingenious writer gives an accurate enumeration, and proceeds, laftly, in a more particular manner, to unfold the final causes.

Though we cannot but admire the acutenefs, and, in general, the propriety of his Lordship's obfervations on thefe

external