president, general manager, or other officer of any corporation making such false report shall be subject to the same penalty as prescribed in this section. § 1238. Census Reports Cotton Confidential. Statistics - Information Section 3 of the Act of July 22, 1912, c. 249, 37 Stat. 198, is as follows: The information furnished by any individual establishment under the provisions of this Act shall be considered as strictly confidential and shall be used only for the statistical purpose for which it is supplied. Any employee of the Bureau of the Census who, without the written authority of the Director of the Census, shall publish or communicate any information given into his possession by reason of his employment under the provisions of this Act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not less than three hundred dollars or more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned for a period of not exceeding one year, or both so fined and imprisoned, at the discretion of the court. CHAPTER LXXVIII SMUGGLING § 1239. Smuggling Goods, or Making or Passing False Invoices. § 1240. Elements of the Offense. § 1239. Smuggling Goods, or Making or Passing False Invoices. Section 2865 of the Revised Statutes, as amended Feb. 27, 1877, c. 69, 19 Stat. 247, provides that: If any person shall knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the revenue of the United States, smuggle, or clandestinely introduce, into the United States, any goods, wares, or merchandise, subject to duty by law, and which should have been invoiced, without paying or accounting for the duty, or shall make out or pass, or attempt to pass, through the custom-house any false, forged, or fraudulent invoice, every such person, his, her, or their aiders and abettors, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding five thousand dollars, or imprisoned for any term of time not exceeding two years, or both, at the discretion of the court. This section does not repeal Rev. Stat. § 3082, declaring a forfeiture of goods imported contrary to law.1 The Supreme Court of the United States expressly held that this section in its complete state is but a reproduction of Section 19 of the tariff act of August 30, 1842.2 That portion of the section which made it an offense to smuggle or clandestinely introduce articles into the United States was omitted in the revision of 1874, but the act of February 27, 1877,3 which recites that it was enacted "for the pur § 1239. United States v. A Lot of Jewelry, 59 Fed. 684; United States v. Ortega, 66 Fed. 713. 25 Stat. L. 565, ch. 270. pose of correcting errors and supplying omissions in the revision", reinstated the omitted clause by an amendment to Section 2865. The Court further held that whatever may be the difficulty of deducing solely from the text of the statute a comprehensive definition of smuggling or clandestine introduction, two conclusions arise from the plain text of the law: First. That whilst it embraces the act of smuggling or clandestine introduction, it does not include mere attempts to commit the same. Nothing in the statute by the remotest possible implication can be found to cover mere attempts to commit the offense referred to. It was contended that as the concealment of goods at the time of entering the waters of the United States tended to render possible a subsequent smuggling, therefore such acts should be considered and treated as smuggling; but this contention was held to be untenable because it overlooked the plain distinction between the attempt to commit an offense and its actual commission. The Court reasoned that, if this premise were true, then every unlawful act which had a tendency to lead up to the subsequent commission of an offense would become the offense itself; that is to say, that one would be guilty of an offense without having done the overt act essential to create the offense, because something had been done which, if carried into further execution, might have constituted the crime. Second. That the smuggling or clandestine introduction of goods referred to in the statute must be "without paying or accounting for the duty" is also beyond question. From the first of the foregoing conclusions it follows that mere acts of concealment of merchandise on entering the waters of the United States, however preparatory they may be and however cogently they may indicate an intention of thereafter smuggling or clandestinely introducing, at best are but steps or attempts not alone in themselves constituting smuggling or clandestine introduction. From the second, it results that as the words "without paying or accounting for the duty" imply the existence of the obligation to pay or account at the time of the commission of the offense, which duty is evaded by the guilty act, it follows that the offense is not committed by an act done before the obligation to pay or account for the duties arises, although such act may indicate a future purpose to evade when the period of paying or securing the payment of duties has been reached. An indictment under this statute in the mere language of the statute is insufficient." § 1240. Elements of the Offense. The five specific elements of the offense denounced in this section are: (1) That the goods were, when imported, subject by law to the payment of a customs duty to the United States; (2) were imported clandestinely and secretly; (3) without an entry thereof being made at the custom house of the United States as required by law; (4) without the payment of the duties thereon; and (5) with intent to defraud the United States of its lawful revenue.1 The section does not include a case where merchandise is fraudulently entered at the custom house. It was alleged that an exporter had caused a false and fraudulent invoice to be made out, signed, verified and left with a consul to be transmitted to the collector of customs at an American port, and had then caused the merchandise covered by the invoice to be shipped to said port; but it was not charged nor shown that he had been concerned in importing the goods. It was held that the case was not brought within the prohibition of the section to "make out or pass, or attempt to pass, through the custom house any false, forged, or fraudulent invoice.2 The offense is not committed by an act done before the obligation to pay or account for the duties arises. Mere acts of concealment of merchandise, on entering the waters of the United States, do not, of themselves, constitute smuggling.3 A person becomes guilty of the offense of smuggling by avoiding the first opportunity given to make a customs' declaration and pay the duty. A defendant, having dutiable goods secreted on his person, knowingly passed the customs office at the dock where he entered the United States, and ignored three distinct calls of the customs officer before his further progress was arrested and the goods disclosed, when he stated for the first time that he expected to enter the goods at 4 Keck v. United States, 172 U. S. 434, 43 L. ed. 505, 19 S. C. 254. 5 Ibid. § 1240. 1 Sierra v. United States, 233 Fed. 37, 147 C. C. A. 107 (1st Cir.). 2 United States V. 646 HalfBoxes of Figs, 164 Fed. 778. 3 Keck v. United States, 172 U. S. 434, 43 L. ed. 505, 19 S. C. 254; American Sugar Refining Co. v. Bidwell, 124 Fed. 677. 5 the main customhouse some distance away, instead of at the dock. It was held that a finding that he intended to evade entering the goods or paying the duty at all, and that he was guilty of smuggling was justified. An act of smuggling goods contained in a passenger's clothing was held complete when he had passed from the vessel to the shore, and it was immaterial that he had not gone beyond the customs lines established on the dock for convenience in examining baggage. An indictment charging that the defendant "did knowingly, willfully and unlawfully, and with intent to defraud the revenue of the United States, smuggle and clandestinely introduce into the United States", certain diamonds of a stated value, which should have been invoiced and duty thereon paid or accounted for, but which, to the knowledge of the defendant and with intent to defraud the revenue, were not invoiced, nor the duty paid, or accounted for, was held sufficient. A charge in an indictment that the defendant "did willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly, and with intent to defraud the revenues of the United States, smuggle and clandestinely introduce into the United States" prepared opium was held to carry with it a direct averment that he knew the duties were not fully paid, and that he was seeking to bring such goods into the United States without their just contribution to the revenues, and therefore was not subject to objection that scienter was not alleged. An indictment for conspiracy to smuggle merchandise and defraud the United States of customs duties need not allege that the defendants intended the merchandise should not be invoiced nor describe the exact manner or means by which it was to be passed through the customs lines. In an indictment, words charging that the defendant did "bring into the country clandestinely" certain dutiable goods, were held synonymous with the words "clandestinely introduce" in the section. Persons aiding 4 Rogers v. United States, 180 Fed. 54, 103 C. C. A. 408 (6th Cir.). 5 United States v. 218 Carats Loose Emeralds, 153 Fed. 643. 6 Keck v. United States, 172 U. S. 434, 43 L. ed. 505, 19 S. C. 254, followed in United States v. One Blue Taffeta Evening Coat, etc., 237 Fed. 703, containing approved form of indictment; United States v. White, 171 Fed. 775. 7 Dunbar v. United States, 156 U. S. 185, 39 L. ed. 390, 15 S. C. 325. 8 United States v. Shevlin, 212 Fed. 343. 'Rogers v. United States, 180 |