gives us advantages, for which we were not allowed to credit the nation for the Havannah itself; a place furely full as well fituated for every external purpose as Penfacola, and of more internal benefit than ten thoufand Penfacolas.

The author fets very little by conquefts;* I fuppose it is because he makes them fo very lightly. On this fubject he speaks with the greatest certainty imaginable. We have, according to him, nothing to do, but to go and take poffeffion, whenever we think proper, of the French and Spanish fettlements. It were better that he had examined a little what advantage the peace gave us towards the invasion of thefe colonies, which we did not poffefs before the peace. It would not have been amifs if he had confulted the publick experience, and our commanders, concerning the abfolute certainty of thofe conquests on which he is pleased to found our fecurity. And if, after all, he should have discovered them to be fo very fure, and fo very eafy, he might, at least, to preferve confiftency, have looked a few pages back, and (no unpleafing thing to him) liftened to himself, where he fays, t "that the moft fuccefsful enterprise "could not compenfate to the nation for the wafte "of its people, by carrying on war in unhealthy "climates." A pofition which he repeats again,

p. 9. So that, according to himfelf his fecurity is not worth the fuit; according to fact, he has only a chance, God knows what a chance, of getting at it; and therefore, according to reason, the giving up the moft valuable of all poffeffions, in hopes to conquer them back, under any advantage of fituation, is the moft ridiculous fecurity that ever was imagined for the peace of a nation. It is true his friends did not give up Canada; they could not give up every thing; let us make the moft of it. We have Canada, we know its value. We have not the French any longer to fight in North America; and, from this circumstance, we derive confiderable advantages. But here let me reft a little. The author touches upon a ftring, which founds under his fingers but a tremulous and melancholy note. North America was once indeed a great ftrength to this nation, in opportunity of ports, in fhips, in provisions, in men. found her a found, an active, a vigorous member of the empire. I hope, by wife management, fhe will again become fo. But one of our capital prefent misfortunes is, her difcontent and difobedi

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To which of the author's favourites this difcontent is owing, we all know but too fufficiently. It would be a difmal event, if this foundation of his fecurity, and indeed of all our publick strength, should, in reality, become our weakness; and if all the powers of this empire, which ought

to

to fall with a compacted weight upon the head of our enemies, should be diffipated and distracted by a jealous vigilance, or by hoftile attempts upon one another. Ten Canadas cannot reftore that fecurity for the peace, and for every thing valuable to this country, which we have loft along with the affection and the obedience of our colonies. He is the wife minifter, he is the true friend to Britain, who fhall be able to restore it.

To return to the fecurity for the peace. The author tells us, that the original great purposes of the war were more than accomplished by the treaty. Surely he has experience and reading enough to know that, in the courfe of a war, events may happen, that render its original very far from being its principal purpose. This original may dwindle by circumftances, fo as to become not a purpose of the fecond or even the third magnitude. I trust this is fo obvious, that it will not be neceffary to put cafes for its illuftration, In that war, as soon as Spain entered into the quarrel, the security of North America was no longer the fole nor the foremost object. The Family Compact had been I know not how long before in agitation. But then it was that we faw produced into day-light and action the most odious and most formidable of all the confpiracies against the liberties of Europe, that ever has been framed. The war with Spain was the firft fruits of that league;

and

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and a fecurity against that league ought to have been the fundamental point of a pacification with the powers who compofe it. We had materials in our hands to have conftructed that fecurity in fuch a manner as never to be fhaken. But how did the virtuous and able men of our author labour for this great end? They took no one step towards it. On the contrary they countenanced, and indeed, as far as it depended on them, recognifed it in all its parts; for our plenipotentiary treated with those who acted for the two crowns, as if they had been different minifters of the fame monarch. The Spanish minifter received his inftructions, not from Madrid; but from Versailles.

This was not hid from our minifters at home, and the discovery ought to have alarmed them, if the good of their country had been the object of their anxiety. They could not but have feen that the whole Spanish monarchy was melted down into the cabinet of Verfailles. But they thought this circumstance an advantage; as it enabled them to go through with their work the more expeditiously. Expedition was every thing to them; because France might happen during a protracted negociation to discover the great impofition of our victories, he is non

2

In the fame fpirit they negotiated the terms of the peace. If it were thought adviseable not to take any pofitive fecurity from Spain, the most

obvious

obvious principles of policy dictated that the burthen of the ceffions ought to fall upon France; and that every thing which was of grace and favour should be given to Spain. Spain could not, on her part, have executed a capital article in the family compact, which obliged her to compensate the loffes of France. At leaft fhe could not do it in America; for fhe was exprefsly precluded by the treaty of Utrecht from ceding any territory or giving any advantage in trade to that power. What did our minifters? They took from Spain the territory of Florida, an object of no value except to fhew our difpofitions to be quite equal at least towards both powers; and they enabled France to compenfate Spain by the gift of Louifiana; loading us with all the harshness, leaving the act of kindness with France, and opening thereby a door to the fulfilling of this the most confolidating article of the family compact. Accordingly that dangerous league, thus abetted and authorized by the English miniftry without an attempt to invalidate it in any way, or in any of its parts, exifts to this hour; and has grown ftronger and stronger every hour of its existence.

As to the fecond component of a good peace, compenfation, I have but little trouble; the author has faid nothing upon that head. He has nothing to say. After a war of fuch expence, this ought to have been a capital confideration. But on what

he