If entry does not comprehend the greatest trade we carry on with any of the Weft India iflands, the fale of negroes: nor does it give any idea of two other advantages we draw from them; the remittances for money spent here, and the payment of part of the balance of the North American trade. It is therefore quite ridiculous, to strike a balance merely on the face of an excess of imports and exports, in that commerce; though, in most foreign branches, it is, on the whole, the beft method. we should take that standard, it would appear, that the balance with our own iflands is, annually, feveral hundred thousand pounds againft this country *. Such is its afpect on the cultom-house entries; but we know the direct contrary to be the fact. We know that the Weft Indians are always indebted to our merchants, and that the value of every fhilling of West India produce is English property. So that our import from them, and not our export, ought always to be confidered as their true value; and this corrective ought to be applied * Total imports from the Weft Indies in 1764, 2,909,411 Exports to ditto in ditto, Excefs of imports, 896,511 - £.2,012,900 In this, which is the common way of ftating the balance, it will appear upwards of two millions against us, which is ridiculous. to to all general balances of our trade, which are formed on the ordinary principles. If poffible, this was more emphatically true of the French Weft India iflands, whilft they continued in our hands. That none, or only a very contemptible part of the value of this produce, could be remitted to France, the author will fee, perhaps with unwillingness, but with the clearest conviction, if he confiders, that in the year 1763, after we had ceafed to export to the ifles of Guadaloupe and Martinico, and to the Havannah, and after the colonies were free to fend all their produce to Old France and Spain, if they had any remittance to make; he will fee, that we imported from thofe places, in that year, to the amount of £1,395,300. So far was the whole annual produce of thefe iflands from being adequate to the payments of their annual call upon us, that this mighty additional importation was neceffary, though not quite fufficient, to difcharge the debts contracted in the few years we held them. The property, therefore, of their whole produce, was ours; not only during the war, but even for more than a year after the peace. The author, I hope, will not again venture upon so rash and discouraging a propofition, concerning the nature and effect of thofe conquefts, as to call them a convenience to the remittances of France; he fees by this ac count, count, that what he afferts is not only without foundation, but even impoffible to be true. As to our trade at that time, he labours with all his might to reprefent it as abfolutely ruined, or on the very edge of ruin. Indeed, as ufual with him, he is often as equivocal in his expreffion, as he is clear in his defign. Sometimes he more than infinuates a decay of our commerce in that war; fometimes he admits an encrease of exports; but it is in order to depreciate the advantages we might appear to derive from that encreafe, whenever it should come to be proved againft him. He tells you, * "that it was chiefly occafioned by the de"mands of our own fleets and armies, and, instead "of bringing wealth to the nation, was to be paid "for by oppreffive taxes upon the people of Eng"land." Never was any thing more deftitute of foundation. It might be proved with the greatest eafe, from the nature and quality of the goods exported, as well as from the fituation of the places to which our merchandise was fent, and which the war could no wife affect, that the fupply of our fleets and armies could not have been the cause of this wonderful increase of trade: its caufe was evident to the whole world; the ruin of the trade of France, and our poffeffion of her colonies. What wonderful effects this caufe produced, the * P. 6. reader reader will see below*; and he will form on that account fome judgment of the author's candour or information. Admit however that a great part of our export, though nothing is more remote from fact, was Here is the state of our trade in 1761, compared with a very good year of profound peace: both are taken from the authentick entries at the custom-house. How the author can contrive to make this encrease of the export of English produce agree with his account of the dreadful want of hands in England, p. 9, unless he fuppofes manufactures to be made without hands, I really do not fee. It is painful to be fo frequently obliged to fet this author right in matters of fact. This state will fully refute all that he has faid or infinuated upon the difficulties and decay of our trade, p. 6, 7, and 9. 1 owing owing to the fupply of our fleets and armies; was it not fomething?---was it not peculiarly fortunate for a nation, that she was able from her own bofom to contribute largely to the fupply of her armies militating in fo many diftant countries? The author allows that France did not enjoy the fame advantages. But it is remarkable throughout his whole book, that thofe circumftances which have ever been confidered as great benefits, and decifive proofs of national fuperiority, are, when in our hands, taken either in diminution of fome other apparent advantage, or even fometimes as pofitive misfortunes. The opticks of that politician must be of a strange conformation, who beholds every thing in this diftorted shape. So far as to our trade. With regard to our navigation, he is still more uneafy at our fituation, and ftill more fallacious in his ftate of it. In his text, he affirms it "to have been entirely engroffed by the neutral nations *." This he afferts roundly and boldly, and without the leaft concern; although it coft no more than a fingle glance of the eye upon his own margin to fee the full refutation of this affertion. His own account proves againft him, that in the year 1761, the British fhipping amounted to 527,557 tons---the foreign to no more than 180,102. The medium of his fix years * P. 7. See also p. 13. British, |