which every mode of defpotifm has been defended, I fhall not be inclined to pay it any great compliment. The people are fatisfied to truft themfelves with the exercife of their own privileges, and do not defire this kind intervention of the houfe of commons to free them from the burthen. They are certainly in the right. They ought not to truft the houfe of commons with a power over their franchifes: because the constitution, which placed two other co-ordinate powers to controul it, repofed no fuch confidence in that body. It were a folly well deferving fervitude for its punishment, to be full of confidence where the laws are full of diftruft; and to give to a houfe of commons, arrogating to its fole refolution the most harsh and odious part of legislative authority, that degree of fubmiffion which is due only to the legiflature itself.

When the house of commons, in an endeavour to obtain new advantages at the expence of the other orders of the state, for the benefit of the commons at large, have pursued strong measures; if it were not juft, it was at leaft natural, that the conftituents should connive at all their proceedings; because we were ourselves ultimately to profit. But when this fubmiffion is urged to us, in a conteft between the reprefentatives and ourselves, and where nothing can be put into their scale which is not taken from ours, they fancy us to be children

children when they tell us they are our repre. fentatives, our own flesh and blood, and that all the stripes they give us are for our good. The very defire of that body to have fuch a truft contrary to law repofed in them, fhews that they are not worthy of it. They certainly will abuse it; because all men poffeffed of an uncontrouled difcretionary power leading to the aggrandizement and profit of their own body have always abufed it and I fee no particular fanctity in our times, that is at all likely, by a miraculous operation, tq overrule the course of nature.

But we must purpofely fhut our eyes, if we confider this matter merely as a contest between the houfe of commons and the electors. The true conteft is between the electors of the kingdom and the crown; the crown acting by an inftrumental house of commons. It is precifely the fame, whether the minifters of the crown can difqualify by a dependent houfe of commons, or by a dependent court of star chamber, or by a dependent court of king's bench. If once members of parliament can be practically convinced, that they do not depend on the affection or opinion of the people for their political being, they will give themselves over, without even an appearance of referve, to the influence of the court.

Indeed, a parliament unconnected with the people, is effential to a miniftry unconnected with the people;

X 2

people; and therefore thofe who faw through what mighty difficulties the interiour miniftry waded, and the exterior were dragged, in this bufinefs, will conceive of what prodigious importance, the new corps of king's men held this principle of occafional and perfonal incapacitation, to the whole body of their design.

When the houfe of commons was thus made to confider itself as the mafter of its conftituents, there wanted but one thing to fecure that house against all poffible future deviation towards popularity; an unlimited fund of money to be laid out according to the pleasure of the court.

To complete the scheme of bringing our court to a refemblance to the neighbouring monarchies, it was neceffary, in effect, to destroy thofe appropriations of revenue, which feem to limit the property, as the other laws had done the powers, of the crown. An opportunity for this purpose was taken, upon an application to parliament for payment of the debts of the civil lift; which in 1769 had amounted to 513,000/. Such application had been made upon former occafions; but to do it in the former manner would by no means answer the prefent purpose.

Whenever the crown had come to the commons to defire a fupply for the difcharging of debts due on the civil lift; it was always afked and granted with one of the three following qualifications;

fometimes

fometimes with all of them.

Either it was ftated,

that the revenue had been diverted from its purposes by parliament; or that thofe duties had fallen fhort of the fum for which they were given by parliament, and that the intention of the legislature had not been fulfilled; or that the money required to discharge the civil lift debt, was to be raised chargeable on the civil lift duties. In the reign of Queen Anne, the crown was found in debt. The leffening and granting away fome part of her revenue by parliament was alleged as the cause of that debt, and pleaded as an equitable ground, fuch it certainly was, for difcharging it. It does not appear that the duties which were then applied to the ordinary government produced clear above 580,000l. a year; because, when they were afterwards granted to George the First, 120,0007. was added, to complete the whole to 700,000l. a year. Indeed it was then afferted, and, I have no doubt, truly, that for many years the net produce did not amount to above 550,000l. The Queen's extraordinary charges were befides very confiderable; equal, at leaft, to any we have known in our time. The application to parliament was not for an abfolute grant of money; but to empower the Queen to raise it by borrowing upon the civil lift funds.

The civil lift debt was twice paid in the reign of George the Firft. The money was granted

upon the fame plan which had been followed in the reign of Queen Anne. The civil lift revenues were then mortgaged for the fum to be raised, and stood charged with the ranfom of their own deliverance.

George the fecond received an addition to his civil lift. Duties were granted for the purpose of raifing 800,000l. a year. It was not until he had reigned nineteen years, and after the laft rebellion, that he called upon parliament for a difcharge of the civil lift debt. The extraordinary charges brought on by the rebellion, account fully for the neceffities of the crown. However, the extraordinary charges of government were not thought a ground fit to be relied on.

A deficiency of the civil lift duties for several years before, was ftated as the principal, if not the fole, ground on which an application to parliament could be juftified. About this time the produce of these duties had fallen pretty low; and even upon an average of the whole reign they never produced 800,000l. a year clear to the treafury.

That prince reigned fourteen years afterwards: not only no new demands were made; but with fo much good order were his revenues and expences regulated, that, although many parts of the establishment of the court were upon a larger and more liberal scale than they have been fince, there

was