the fpirited pleasure of independence, and all the grofs lucre and fat emoluments of fervitude.

Here is a sketch, though a flight one, of the conftitution, laws, and policy, of this new court corporation. The name by which they chufe to diftinguish themfelves, is that of king's men, or the king's friends, by an invidious exclufion of the reft of his Majefty's moft loyal and affectionate fubjects. The whole fyftem, comprehending the exterior and interiour adminiftrations is commonly called in the technical language of the court, doublecabinet; in French or English, as you chufe to pronounce it.

"

Whether all this be a vifion of a diftracted brain, or the invention of a malicious heart, or a real faction in the country, muft be judged by the appearances which things have worn for eight years paft. Thus far I am certain, that there is not a fingle publick man, in or out of office, who has not, at fome time or other, borne teftimony to the truth of what I have now related. In particular, no perfons have been more ftrong in their affertions, and louder and more indecent in their complaints, than those who compofe all the exterior part of the prefent adminiftration; in whofe time that faction has arrived at fuch an height of power, and of boldness in the use of it, as may, in the end, perhaps bring about its total deftruction.

་་

It is true, that about four years ago, during the

administration of the Marquis of Rockingham, an attempt was made to carry on government without their concurrence. However, this was only a tranfient cloud; they were hid but for a moment; and their conftellation blazed out with greater brightness, and a far more vigorous influence, fome time after it was blown over. An attempt was at that time made (but without any idea of profcription) to break their corps, to discountenance their doctrines, to revive connexions of a different kind, to restore the principles and policy of the Whigs, to reanimate the cause of liberty by minifterial countenance; and then for the firft time were men feen attached in office to every principle they had maintained in oppofition. No one will doubt, that fuch men were abhorred and violently opposed by the court faction, and that fuch a fyftem could have but a fhort duration.

It may appear fomewhat affected, that in fo much discourse upon this extraordinary party, I fhould fay fo little of the Earl of Bute, who is the fuppofed head of it. But this was neither owing to affectation nor inadvertence. I have carefully avoided the introduction of perfonal reflections of any kind. Much the greater part of the topicks which have been used to blacken this nobleman, are either unjuft or frivolous. At beft, they have a tendency to give the refentment of this bitter calamity a wrong direction, and to turn a

publick

VOL. II.

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grievance

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grievance into a mean, perfonal, or a dangerous national quarrel. Where there is a regular scheme of operations carried on, it is the fyftem, and not any individual perfon who acts in it, that is truly dangerous. This fyftem has not arifen folely from the ambition of Lord Bute, but from the circumftances which favoured it, and from an indifference to the conftitution which had been for fome time growing among our gentry. We should have been tried with it, if the Earl of Bute had never existed; and it will want neither a contriving head nor active members, when the Earl of Bute exifts no longer. It is not, therefore, to rail at Lord Bute, but firmly to embody against this court party sand its practices, which can afford us any profpect of relief in our present condition.

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Another motive induces me to put the perfonal confideration of Lord Bute, wholly out of the queftion. He communicates very little in a direct Imanner with the greater part of our men of bufionefs. This has never been his cuftom. It is -enough for him that he furrounds them with his creatures. Several imagine, therefore, that they have a very good excufe for doing all the work of this faction, when they have no perfonal connexion with Lord Bute. But whoever becomes a party to an adminiftration, compofed of infulated individuals, without faith plighted, tie, or common principle; an adminiftration conftitutionally im

potent,

1

potent, because fupported by no party in the nation; he who contributes to deftroy the connexions of men and their truft in one another, or in any fort to throw the dependence of publick counfels upon private will and favour, poffibly may have nothing to do with the Earl of Bute. It matters little whether he be the friend or the enemy of that particular perfon. But let him be who or what he will, he abets a faction that is driving hard to the ruin of his country. He is fapping the foundation of its liberty, difturbing the fources of its domeftick tranquillity, weakening its government over its dependencies, degrading it from all its importance in the fyftem of Europe.

It is this unnatural infufion of a system of favouritism into a government which in a great part of its constitution is popular, that has raifed the present ferment in the nation. The people, without entering deeply into its principles, could plainly perceive its effects, in much violence, in a great spirit of innovation, and a general diforder in all the functions of government. I keep my eye folely on this system; if I speak of those meafures which have arifen from it, it will be fo far only as they illustrate the general fcheme. This is the fountain of all thofe bitter waters of which, through an hundred different conduits, we have drunk until we are ready to burft. The difcretionary power of the crown in the formation of miniftry, abufed

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abused by bad or weak men, has given rife to a fyftem, which, without directly violating the letter of any law, operates against the spirit of the whole conftitution.

A plan of favouritism for our executory government is effentially at variance with the plan of our legislature. One great end undoubtedly of a mixed government like ours, compofed of monarchy, and of controuls, on the part of the higher people and the lower, is that the prince fhall not be able to violate the laws. This is ufeful indeed and fundamental. But this, even at firft view, is no more than a negative advantage; an armour merely defenfive. It is therefore next in order, and equal in importance, that the difcretionary powers which are neceffarily vested in the monarch, whether for the execution of the laws, or for the nomination to magistracy and office, or for conducting the affairs of peace and war, or for ordering the revenue, Jhould all be exercised upon publick principles and national grounds, and not on the likings or prejudices, the intrigues or policies, of a court. This, I faid, is equal in importance to the fecuring a government according to law. The laws reach but a very little way. Conftitute government how you please, infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon the exercife of the powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightness of minifters of state. Even all the ufe and potency of the laws depends

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upon