quired an influence in the country; the people, on whofe favour that influence depends, and from whom it arofe, will never be duped into an opinion, that fuch greatnefs in a peer is the defpotifin of an ariftocracy, when they know and feel it to be the effect and pledge of their own importance.

I am no friend to ariftocracy, in the fenfe at leaft in which that word is ufually understood. If it were not a bad habit to moot cafes on the supposed ruin of the constitution, I should be free to declare, that if it must perifh, I would rather by far fee it refolved into any other form, than loft in that auftere and infolent domination. But, whatever my diflikes may be, my fears are not upon that quarter. The queftion, on the influence of a court, and of a peerage, is not, which of the two dangers is the moft eligible, but which is the most imminent. He is but a poor obferver, who has not feen, that the generality of peers, far from fupporting themselves in a state of independent greatnefs, are but too apt to fall into an oblivion of their proper dignity, and to run headlong into an abject fervitude. Would to God it were true, that the fault of our peers were too much fpirit! It is worthy of fome obfervation, that these gentlemen, fo jealous of ariftocracy, make no complaints of the power of those peers (neither few for inconfiderable) who are always in the train of ascourt, and whofe whole weight, muft be con

fidered as a portion of the fettled influence of the crown. This is all fafe and right; but if fome peers (I am very forry they are not as many as they ought to be) fet themselves, in the great concern of peers and commons, against a back-stairs influence and clandeftine government, then the alarm begins; then the conftitution is in danger of being forced into an ariftocracy.

I reft a little the longer on this court topick, becaufe it was much infifted upon at the time of the great change, and has been fince frequently revived by many of the agents of that party: for, whilft they are terrifying the great and opulent with the horrours of mob-government, they are by other managers attempting (though hitherto with little fuccefs) to alarm the people with a phantom of tyranny in the nobles. All this is done upon their favourite principle of difunion, of fowing jealoufies amongst the different orders of the ftate, and of disjointing the natural ftrength of the kingdom; that it may be rendered incapable of refifting the finifter defigns of wicked men, who have engroffed the royal power.

Thus much of the topicks chosen by the courtiers to recommend their fyftem; it will be neceffary to open a little more at large the nature of that party which was formed for its fupport. Without this, the whole would have been no better than a vifionary

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vifionary amufement, like the fcheme of Harring ton's political club, and not a bufinefs in which the nation had a real concern. As a powerful party, and a party constructed on a new principle, it is a very inviting object of curiofity.

It must be remembered, that fince the revolution, until the period we are speaking of, the influence of the crown had been always employed in fupporting the minifters of state, and in carrying on the publick business according to their opinions. But the party now in queftion is formed upon a very different idea. It is to intercept the favour, protection and confidence of the crown in the paffage to its minifters; it is to come between them and their importance in parliament; it is to feparate them from all their natural and acquired dependencies; it is intended as the controul, not the support, of administration. The machinery of this fyftem is perplexed in its movements, and false in its principle. It is formed on a fuppofition that the king is fomething external to his government; and that he may be honoured and aggrandized, even by its debility and difgrace. The plan proceeds exprefsly on the idea of enfeebling the regular executory power. It proceeds on the idea of weakening the state in order to ftrengthen the court. The scheme depending entirely on diftruft, on difconnexion, on mutability by principle, on fyftema

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tick weakness in every particular member; it is impoffible that the total refult should be fubftantial ftrength of any kind.

As a foundation of their scheme, the cabal have established a fort of rota in the court. All forts of parties, by this means, have been brought into administration, from whence few have had the good fortune to escape without difgrace; none at all without confiderable loffes. In the beginning of each arrangement no profeffions of confidence and fupport are wanting, to induce the leading men to engage. But while the minifters of the day appear in all the pomp and pride of power, while they have all their canvas spread out to the wind, and every fail, filled with the fair and prosperous gale of royal favour, in a fhort time they find, they know not how, a current, which fets directly against them; which prevents all progrefs; and even drives them backwards. They grow ashamed and mortified in a fituation, which, by its vicinity to power, only ferves to remind them the more ftrongly of their infignificance. They are obliged either to execute the orders of their inferiours, or to see themselves oppofed by the natural inftruments of their office. With the lofs of their dignity they lose their temper. In their turn they grow troublesome to that cabal which, whether it fupports or oppofes, equally difgraces and equally betrays them. It is foon found neceffary to get

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rid of the heads of administration; but it is of the heads only. As there always are many rotten members belonging to the best connexions, it is not hard to perfuade feveral to continue in office without their leaders. By this means the party goes out much thinner than it came in; and is only reduced in strength by its temporary poffeffion of power. Befides, if by accident, or in courfe of changes, that power, fhould be recovered, the junto have thrown up a retrenchment of these carcafes, which may ferve to cover themselves in a day of danger. They conclude, not unwifely, that fuch rotten members will become the firft objects of difguft and refentment to their antient connexions.

They contrive to form in the outward adminif tration two parties at the leaft; which, whilft they are tearing one another to pieces, are both competitors for the favour and protection of the cabal; and, by their emulation, contribute to throw every thing more and more into the hands of the interiour managers.

A minifter of state will fometimes keep himfelf totally eftranged from all his colleagues; will differ from them in their councils, will privately traverfe, and publickly oppose, their measures. He will, however, continue in his employment. Inftead of fuffering any mark of difplèafure, he will be diftinguished by an unbounded profufion of

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