of immediate and perfonal favour, fometimes from a confidence in their own ftrength natural and acquired; fometimes from a fear of offending their friends, and weakening that lead in the country, which gave them a confideration independent of the court. Men acted as if the court could receive, as well as confer, an obligation. The influence of government, thus divided in appearance between the court and the leaders of parties, became in many cafes an acceffion rather to the popular than to the royal fcale; and fome part of that influence which would otherwife have been poffeffed as in a fort of mortmain and unalienable domain, returned again to the great ocean from whence it arofe, and circulated among the people. This method therefore of governing, by men of great natural intereft or great acquired confideration, was viewed in a very invidious light by the true lovers of abfolute monarchy. It is the nature of defpotifm to abhor power held by any means but its own momentary pleafure; and to annihilate all intermediate fituations between boundless strength on its own part, and total debility on the part of the people.

To get rid of all this intermediate and indepen⚫ dent importance and to fecure to the court the unlimited and uncontrouled ufe of its own vaft influence, under the fole direction of its own private favour, has for fome years paft been the great object of policy, Q 4

If

If this were compaffed, the influence of the crown muft of course produce all the effects which the moft fanguine partifans of the court could poffibly defire. Government might then be carried on without any concurrence on the part of the people; without any attention to the dignity of the greater, or to the affections of the lower forts. A new project was therefore devifed, by a certain fet of intriguing men, totally different from the fyftem of administration which had prevailed fince the acceffion of the Haufe of Brunswick. This project, I have heard, was firft conceived by fome perfons in the court of Frederick Prince of Wales.

The earliest attempt in the execution of this defign was to fet up for minifter, a perfon, in rank indeed refpectable, and very ample in fortune; but who, to the moment of this vaft and fudden elevation, was little known or confidered in the kingdom. To him the whole nation was to yield an immediate and implicit fubmiffion. But whether it was for want of firmness to bear up against the firft oppofition; or that things were not yet fully ripened, or that this method was not found the moft eligible; that idea was soon abandoned. The inftrumental part of the project was a little altered, to accommodate it to the time, and to bring things more gradually and more furely to the one great end propofed.

The first part of the reformed plan was to draw

a line which should feparate the court from the miniftry. Hitherto thefe names had been looked upon as fynonymous; but for the future, court and administration were to be confidered as things totally diftinct. By this operation, two systems of adminiftration were to be formed; one which fhould be in the real fecret and confidence; the other merely oftenfible to perform the official and executory duties of government. The latter were alone to be refponsible; whilft the real advisers, who enjoyed all the power, were effectually removed from all the danger.

Secondly, A party under thefe leaders was to be formed in favour of the court against the miniftry: this party was to have a large share in the emoluments of government, and to hold it totally feparatè from, and independent of, oftenfible administration.

The third point, and that on which the fuccefs of the whole fcheme ultimately depended, was to bring parliament to an acquiefcence in this Project. Parliament was therefore to be taught by degrees a total indifference to the perfons, rank, influence, abilities, connexions, and character, of the minifters of the crown. By means of a difcipline, on which I fhall fay more hereafter, that body was to be habituated to the moft oppofite interefts, and the moft difcordant politicks. All connexions and dependencies among fubjects were to be entirely diffolved. As hitherto bufinefs had gone through

the

the hands of leaders of Whigs or Tories, men of talents to conciliate the people, and engage to their confidence, now the method was to be altered; and the lead was to be given to men of no fort of confideration or credit in the country. This want of natural importance was to be their very title to delegated power. Members of parliament were to be hardened into an infenfibility to pride as well as to duty. Thofe high and haughty fentiments, which are the great fupport of independence, were to be let down gradually. Point of honour and precedence were no more to be regarded in parliamentary decorum, than in a Turkish army. It was to be avowed as a conftitutional maxim, that the king might appoint one of his footmen, or one of your footmen, for minifter; and that he ought to be, and that he would be, as well followed as the first name for rank or wifdom in the nation. Thus parliament was to look on, as if perfectly unconcerned, while a cabal of the clofet and backstairs was substituted in the place of a national administration.

With fuch a degree of acquiefcence, any measure of any court might well be deemed thoroughly fecure. The capital objects, and by much the most flattering characteristicks of arbitrary power, would be obtained. Every thing would be drawn from its holdings in the country to the perfonal favour and inclination of the prince. This favour would

be

be the fole introduction to power, and the only tenure by which it was to be held: fo that no perfon looking towards another, and all looking to wards the court, it was impoffible but that the motive which folely influenced every man's hopes must come in time to govern every man's conduct; till at laft the fervility became univerfal, in fpite of the dead letter of any laws or inftitutions whatsoever.

How it should happen that any man could be tempted to venture upon fuch a project of government, may at firft view appear furprifing. But the fact is, that opportunities very inviting to fuch an attempt have offered; and the scheme itself was not deftitute of fome arguments not wholly unplaufible to recommend it. These opportunities and these arguments, the ufe that has been made of both, the plan for carrying this new scheme of government into execution, and the effects which it has produced, are in my opinion worthy of our ferious confideration.

His majesty came to the throne of these kingdoms with more advantages than any of his predeceffors fince the revolution. Fourth in descent, and third in fucceffion of his royal family, even the zealots of hereditary right, in him, faw fomething to flatter their favourite prejudices; and to juftify a transfer of their attachments, without a change in their principles. The perfon and cause of the Pretender were become contemptible; his title dif owned

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