few words recommend to his confideration, how he is to get off the dangerous idea. of taxing a publick fund, if he levies thofe duties in England; and if he is to levy them in India, what provifion he has made for a revenue establishment there; fuppofing that he undertakes this new fcheme of finance independently of the company, and againft its inclinations. So much for thefe revenues; which are nothing but his vifions, or already the national poffeffions without any act of his. It is easy to parade with a high talk of parliamentary rights, of the univerfality of legiflative powers, and of uniform taxation. Men of fenfe, when new projects come before them, always think a difcourse proving the mere right or mere power of acting in the manner propofed, to be no more than a very unpleasant way of mif-spending time. They muft fee the object to be of proper magnitude to engage them; they muft fee the means of compaffing it to be next to certain; the mifchiefs not to counterbalance the profit; they will examine how a propofed impofition or regulation agrees with the opinion of those who are likely to be affected by it; they will not defpife the confideration even of their habitudes and prejudices. They wish to know how it accords or difagrees with the true fpirit of prior establishments, whether of government or of finance; because they well know, that in the com plicated œconomy of great kingdoms, and immenfe revenues, which in a length of time, and by a variety of accidents, have coalefced into a fort of body, an attempt towards a compulfory equality in all circumftances, and an exact practical definition of the fupreme rights in every cafe, is the moft dangerous and chimerical of all enterprises. The old building ftands well enough, though part Gothick, part Grecian, and part Chinese, until an attempt is made to fquare it into uniformity. Then it may come down upon our heads all together, in much uniformity of ruin; and great will be the fall thereof. Some people, instead of inclining to debate the matter, only feel a fort of 'naufea, when they are told, that "protection calls "for fupply," and that "all the parts ought to "contribute to the fupport of the whole." Strange argument for great and grave deliberation! As if the fame end may not, and muft not, be compaffed, according to it's circumftances, by a great diverfity of ways. Thus in Great Britain fome of our ef tablishments are apt for the fupport of credit. They ftand therefore upon a principle of their own, diftinct from, and in fome refpects contrary to, the relation between prince and fubject. It is a new fpecies of contract fuperinduced upon the old contract of the ftate. The idea of power muft as much as poffible be banished from it; for power and credit are things adverfe, incompatible; Non bene Such bene conveniunt, nec in una fede morantur. establishments are our great monied companies. To tax them would be critical and dangerous, and contradictory to the very purpose of their inftitution; which is credit, and cannot therefore be taxation. But the nation, when it gave up that power, did not give up the advantage; but fuppofed, and with reason, that government was overpaid in credit, for what it seemed to lofe in authority. In fuch a cafe to talk of the rights of fovereignty, is quite idle. Other establishments supply other modes of publick contribution. Our trading companies, as well as individual importers, are a fit fubject of revenue by cuftoms. Some establishments pay us by a monopoly of their confumption and their produce. This, nominally no tax, in reality comprehends all taxes. Such eftablishments are our colonies. To tax them would be as erroneous in policy, as rigorous in equity. Ireland supplies us by furnishing troops in war; and by bearing part of our foreign establishment in peace. She aids us at all times by the money that her abfentées fpend amongst us; which is no fmall part of the rental of that kingdom. Thus Ireland contributes her part. Some objects bear port duties. Some are fitter for an inland excife. The mode varies, the object is the fame. To ftrain these from their old and inveterate leanings, might impair the old benefit, and not anfwer the end of the new pró K 3 ₹ ject. ject. Among all the great men of antiquity, Procruftes fhall never be my hero of legislation; with his iron bed, the allegory of his government, and the type of fome modern policy, by which the long limb was to, be cut short, and the fhort tortured into length. Such was the ftate-bed of uniformity! He would, I conceive, be a very indifferent farmer, who complained that his fheep did not plough, or his horfes yield him wool, though it would be an idea full of equality. They may think this right in ruftick œconomy, who think it available in the politick; Qui Bavium non odit, amet tua carmina, Mævi! i. As the author has ftated this Indian taxation for no vifible purpofe relative to his plan of fupply; fo he has stated many other projects with as little, if any diftinct end; unless perhaps to shew you how full he is of projects for the publick good; and what vaft expectations may be formed of him or his friends, if they should be tranflated into adminiftration. It is always from fome opinion that thefe fpeculations may one day become our publick measures, that I think it worth while to trouble the reader at all about them. Two of them ftand out in high relievo beyond the reft. The firft is a change in the internal reprefentation prefentation of this country, by enlarging our number of conftituents. The fecond is an addition to our representatives, by new American members of parliament. I pafs over here all confiderations how far fuch a fyftem will be an improvement of our conftitution according to any found theory. Not that I mean to condemn fuch fpeculative enquiries concerning this great object of the national attention. They may tend to clear doubtful points, and poffibly may lead, as they have often done, to real improvements. What I object to, is their introduction into a difcourfe relating to the immediate state of our affairs, and recommending plans of practical government. In this view, I fee nothing in them but what is ufual with the author; an attempt to raise discontent in the people of England, to balance thofe difcontents the meafures of his friends had already raised in America. What other reafon can he have for fuggefting, that we are not happy enough to enjoy a fufficient number of voters in England? I believe that most fober thinkers on this fubject are rather of opinion, that our fault is on the other fide; and that it would be more in the fpirit of our conftitution, and more agreeable to the pattern of our best laws, by leffening the number, to add to the weight and independency of our voters. And truly, confidering the immenfe and dangerous charge of elections; the prostitute and daring venality, the corK 4 ruption |