of forming the trust? Why do the Americans change the long established precedent of their international policy? All these might easily be explained, when any one looks at the present condition of the United States, because they are forced from their own necessity and self-expansion to meet the exigency of modern civilization, and they discovered it a great mistake for America to be left behind the current of universal progress, therefore, they determined to assume, in the future, a foremost rank in the commerce and diplomacy of the world. This policy might be termed "Positive Cosmopolitanism."

When the Panama Canal is completed as designed by the United States government, the world's trade between Europe and Asia will be placed under American protection, and the necessity of an economic alliance between the United States, England, and Germany, making America the central figure, will be felt keenly by the people as well as the governments of those respective countries. Such an alliance might be brought forth sooner by England, Germany, and the United States, than the political one schemed by Cecil Rhodes, and in that case the United States will further extend her influence into Asia with the support of England and Germany. Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, the arena of the world's commerce and diplomacy has been transferred from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, regarding Asia as the place where the Golden Fleece is to be discovered and with this view every nation is now trying to shorten the route of access to Asia. At present, the voyage from China to the Pacific coasts of America takes about fifteen or twenty days, while between China and European ports, about thirty-five or fifty days. America being thus situated in a much more advantageous position than European countries, the people as well as the government of the United States have lately become convinced that it is necessary for her to increase her commercial influence in Asia rather than to make an effort to extend her market in the well organized and self-protecting countries of Europe.

Under these circumstances, it is better for the United States to direct her attention towards China with a view to increasing her Chinese trade, where there is no such proposal or alliance to check the American invasion, as is seen in Europe. But here in China, they will be met by a new difficulty, far more intricate and unsurmountable,—in the first place, by the difference in race and language as well as in manners and customs; in the second place, by the unsettled and irritating question in regard to Chinese laborers in America. I have not the slightest doubt that the Americans will be able to conquer this difficulty, for they are the most practical people, and they will try every means to avoid this difficulty.

4

One of the first and perhaps the strongest way is to adopt the policy of forming an economic alliance,-not with the government, but with the Japanese people. It is highly advisable for the American people to take this step for the purpose of avoiding the difficulty, because the Japanese and Chinese belong to the same race, and the early civilization in Japan was introduced from China, and they use the same letter for written language. In spite of the open rupture in 1894, the diplomatic relations between the two countries became closer after peace was restored. Not only have the Chinese now buried their hostile feelings in oblivion, but they have begun to look toward Japan for advice and protection. Japan thus stands in a most advantageous position for extending the commercial influence in China.

Now let us examine the diplomatic relation between Japan and the United States. It has been most cordial ever since 1854, when Commodore Perry came to Japan and concluded the treaty to open Japan to foreign intercourse. It is an indisputable fact that both the people and the government of the United States have continually shown the warmest feeling towards Japan. The commerce between Japan and the United States has, within the last few years, increased beyond any comparison, and our American trade now occupies a foremost position in the report of the foreign trade of the empire. The present state of trade with America will not only continue in the future, but will increase as the years roll on, consequently American capital will in the future gradually be invested in Japanese industry, as well as in various other enterprises, such as the American Tobacco Company's amalgamation with the Murai Brothers Company of Kyoto, and the recent undertaking of the American Standard Oil Company in the oil industry of Yechigo. Let the Japanese, with the advantage of racial and linguistic similarity, clear the way for the American people in their Chinese enterprises, and, on the other hand, let the Americans with their business experience and ample capital, reinforce the Japanese in their business in China. Therefore it will not be surprising if an economic alliance is made before long by the people of the United States and Japan, because the Americans are now most anxious to extend their market in China, and they also know that they cannot do so if they disregard the importance of Japan in Chinese affairs. In this respect, they have already started, in the case of the Hankow Railway Company, recently incorporated by the Americans in China, when they employed ten Japanese engineers as sub-coöperators under the supervision of American engineers. As the Americans are actuated by such an idea, it is important for the Japanese to take a similar step to coöperate with the Americans, and thereby Japan will be benefitted in

her Chinese commerce with the support of America. Thus the people of the two countries might work, hand in hand, on the Asiatic continent, and reap all the harvests of Chinese trade by their mutual support and reciprocal assistance. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902, is highly important in securing the peace in the East, but in order to develop the world's commerce in China, an economic alliance between the people of Japan and the United States is far more important, and will be regarded by the world at large as a prime factor in the open door policy in China.

THE FREE TRADE REVOLT IN ENGLAND

Τ'

JOSEPH B. BISHOP

NEW YORK

HE event of the past six months which transcends all others in world-wide importance is the free trade revolt in England, instigated and led by the Premier of the British Cabinet, Mr. Balfour, and its Colonial Secretary, Mr. Chamberlain. In speaking of the situation a few weeks after the movement began, Lord Rosebery said, "We are in an unprecedented and amazing position. Suddenly, without preparation, the nation is brought blindfold to the brink of protection." No one who has followed the developments of the controversy, as they are recorded in the British press, can question the strict accuracy of that statement. Great Britain stands balancing herself on the "brink of protection," with no certainty as to whether she will go over or not. Public opinion is divided, but only a popular election can decide which side is the stronger. A large portion of the press, led by the London "Times," sustains the position of Messrs. Balfour and Chamberlain, and so do many public men of large influence, including several government officials. Enormous audiences attend the public meetings at which advocates of the opposing sides speak, and no parliamentary campaign for many years has aroused so widespread and intense interest as this economic debate over what was supposed to be Great Britain's settled policy.

It is not my purpose to argue in any manner the merits of this controversy, but simply to record as accurately and as concisely as possible the leading points involved in it on both sides, as they are presented by their chief advocates, and to state some of the reasons why it is of absorbing and even momentous interest to the people of the United States.

The revolt was started by Mr. Chamberlain on May fifteen. On that day he made a speech to his constituents at Birmingham which was an earnest appeal in favor of preferential tariffs with the British colonies, especially Canada, basing such action upon the conduct of Germany in penalizing Canada by placing additional duties upon Canadian goods. A few sentences will serve to give the gist of his remarks: "I am no protectionist, but I want to discover if the true interpretation of free trade is that it is our duty to buy in the cheapest market without regard to whether we can sell. If that is the theory of free trade and it finds acceptance here and elsewhere, then you will lose the advantage of the

Copyright, 1903, Frederick A. Richardson, all rights reserved.

further reduction of duty which Canada offers to the manufacturers of this country, and you may lose a great deal more, because the minister of finance of Canada told the Canadian parliament the other day that if they are told definitely that the mother country can do nothing for them in the way of reciprocity they must reconsider the position and reconsider the preferences they have already given. The policy which prevents us from offering an advantage to our colonies prevents us from defending them if attacked." Germany's policy of interference and dictation, he went on to say, was justified by the belief that Great Britain was so wedded to its fiscal system that it could not defend its colonies, and that any one of them which should attempt to establish special relations with it would do so at its own risk, and must be left to bear the brunt of foreign hostility. This was putting Great Britain, he urged, in a humiliating position, and one which would make it difficult for her to approach her colonies with appeals for aid "in promoting the honor of the empire or to ask them to bear a share of the common burden." His conclusion, summed up briefly, was an appeal for preferential tariffs for the colonies, first on imperial grounds of common interest and patriotism, and second as a basis for retaliatory tariff duties against other countries.

This speech profoundly stirred the country. It was regarded as a proposal to make a Zollverein, or tariff union, of the British Empire, precisely like that of Germany, or the United States, with free trade for its members within and a tariff wall against the world without, and with power of levying retaliatory duties upon goods imported from countries outside the empire. On May twenty-eight, Mr. Chamberlain elaborated this idea in a speech in Parliament and supplemented it with the declaration that while it necessarily involved the taxation of the food of the people, and while such taxation must be regarded as in itself undesirable, its disadvantages were counterbalanced by the fact that it would bind the different portions of the empire more closely together, and the direct result of the increase in cost of living because of taxation of food would be increased wages. He also maintained that the increased revenue derived from a protective tariff would make possible the establishment of a system of old age pensions. Mr. Balfour immensely accelerated the popular interest and excitement at this time by partially approving Mr. Chamberlain's proposals, while declining to commit himself to the question of taxing food, saying his mind was not clear about it. He declared that the time had come when it should be publicly discussed whether the doctrine that revenue should not be raised except for purposes of expenditure must be abandoned. It was quite useless, he said, to "wave the ragged, motheaten flags of either the protectionist or the free trade side in this contro