CONNECTICUT: Provision in her Constitution
concerning elections, 410; One branch of
her Legislature so constituted. that each
member of it is elected by the whole
State, 440; Has no constitutional provision
for jury trial, in either criminal or civil
cases, 626.

CONSOLIDATION: The plan of the Union aims
only at a partial consolidation, 249; Desire
of the States to guard against improper
consolidation of themselves into one simple
republic, 467.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: (See
"Union," "Confederation," "Standing ar-
mies," "States," "House of Representa
tives," "Slaves,"); Its economy, 128.
180; Answer to an objection drawn from
the extent of the Country, 181: Its guar-
anty to the States of a republican form
of Government, 179, 180; Necessity for
strength in the Federal Government, 196,
200; Wisdom of the provision in the Con-
stitution concerning the military force,
201, 216, 217, 218, 267, 322; Answer to the
objection, That it cannot operate without
the aid of a military force to execute its
laws, 220, 229; Reason why the execution
of it will probably be popular, 223; Laws
under it, as to the enumerated and legiti-
mate objects of its jurisdiction, will be
the supreme law of the land, 223, 224;
Number and inconsistency of the objec-
tions to it, 295, 297; Most of the capital
objections to it lie with tenfold weight
against the confederation, 295, 298; Its
conformity to republican principles, 301,
804; Analogy between the mode of ap-
pointments under it, and under the State
Governments, 303, 304; Neither a National
nor a Federal Constitution, but a composi
tion of both, 304, 308; General view of the
powers which it proposes to vest in the
Union, 818; The power of declaring war,
819; The power of providing a Navy, 324;
The power of making Treaties, &c., 829;
The power of defining and punishing offen-
330; Prohibition of

ces on the high laves after 1808, 831;

the importation of

Power of regulating commerce, 332; Pow-
ers to coin money, to punish counterfeiters
and to regulate weights and measures,
834; Power to establish a uniform mode of
naturalization, 335, 336; Power to estab-
lish uniform laws of bankruptcy, 336;
Power concerning public acts, records, &c.,
&c., 338; Power of establishing post roads,
836; Power of granting copyrights, 338;
Power to exercise exclusive legislation
over a District not exceeding ten miles
square, if ceded to the United States, 338;
Power concerning treason, 340; Power of
admitting new States, 840; Power con-
cerning territory, &c., belonging to the
United States, 841; Obligation to guaranty
a republican form of government to every
State of the Union, 341, 844; Obligation
concerning public debts prior to the adop-
tion of the Constitution, 315; Provision
concerning amendments, 845; Provision
concerning the ratification by nine States,
346; Question, what relation is to exist be-
tween the nine or more ratifying States,
and the not-ratifying States, 346; Disabili-
ties of the States created by the Constitu-
tion, 349, 852; Power given by it to Con-
gress, to make all laws necessary and
proper for executing its enumerated powers,
852

Four other possible alternatives,
which the Constitution might have adopt-

ed, 353, 354; Provision, that the Constita-
tion, Laws and Treaties of the United
States shall be the supreme law of the
land, 855; Oath, &c., of officers, &c., to sup-
port the Constitution, 856; Consists much
less in the addition of new powers to the
Union, than in the invigoration of its orig
inal powers, 363; Its provisions concerning
the proper degree of separation between
the legislative, executive, and judiciary
powers, 373, 885; Peculiar division under
it, of the power surrendered by the people,
400; Its mode of protecting the minority
from usurpations by the majority, 401;
Three characteristics of the Federal Legis-
lature, 407; Answer to the objection that
it contains no Bill of Rights, 627, 682; In
the sense, and to the extent contended for,
Bills of Rights are unnecessary and would
be dangerous to the Constitution, 631;
Omission of a provision concerning the
liberty of the press defended, 631; The
Constitution itself is a Bill of Rights, 632;
Answer to an objection to the Constitution,
founded on the remoteness of the seat of
Government from many of the States, 638,
634; Answer to the objection, that it wants
a provision concerning debts due to the
United States, 634, 635; Answer to the ob-
jection as to expense, 635.
CONSTRUCTION, Two rules of, 310, 311.
CONTRACTS: Laws in violation of private con-
tracts, a source of collision between the
separate States or Confederacies, 89: Pro-
vision of the Constitution concerning
them, 351.

CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, 56,
57, 58; The difficulties it must have expe-
rienced in the formuation of a proper plan,
282, 800; One difficulty, that of combining
the requisite degree of stability and energy
in government, with the inviolable atten-
tion due to liberty and the republican
form, 284; Another, making the partition
between the authority of the General Gov-
ernment and that of the State Govern-
ments, 255; Its authority to propose s
mixed Constitution, 307, 814; Its duties
under existing circumstances, $14, 315; Its
plan, only recommendatory, 317; One par-
ticular in which it has departed from the
tenor of its commission, 313, 814.
CONVENTIONS, for correcting breaches of a Con-
stitution, 888: Dangers and inconveniences
of frequent appeals to the people, 390, 331.
COPY RIGHTS: Power of the Constitution con
cerning them, 838.

CRETE, Cosmi of, 479.
DELAWARE: (See "States,") Provision in her

constitution concerning the separation of
the legislative, executive and judiciary
powers, 879; Number of Representatives
in the more numerous branch of her Legis-
lature, 423.

DEMOCRACY: A pure one defined, 109; Its dis-
advantages, 109.

DEPARTMENTS OF POWER: (See "States,"

under their several titles) Meaning of the
maxim which requires a separation of
them, 373, 881: Principles of the British
Constitution on this subject, 374, 875; Pro-
visions of the State Constitutions concern-
ing it, 876, 881; The partition among them
to be maintained, not by exterior provis
fons, but by the interior structure of the
Government, 397.

DISTRICT: Exclusive legislation of Congress
over one, not exceeding ten miles square,
333.

ECONOMY: The money saved from one object

may be usefully applied to another," 128.
ELECTIONS: Frequency of them in the choice

of the Senate would be inconsistent with
a due responsibility in the Government to
the people, 474, 476.

EUROPE: Her arrogant pretensions, 119, 120.
FACTION: Defined, 105; Its latent cause in-

herent in human nature, 106; The various
and unequal distribution of property the
most common and durable source of it,
106, 107.

FEDERAL FARMER: An opponent of the Con-
stitution, 508.

FEUDAL SYSTEM Account of it, 156, 360.
FISHERIES, The: 117.

FOX, CHARLES JAMES: His India Bill, 536.
GEOMETRY: Why its principles are received

without difficulty, 244; Incomprehensibil-
ity of one of them, 244.

GEORGIA: Provision in her constitution, con-

cerning the separation of the legislative,
executive, and judiciary powers, 850;
Number of Representatives in the more
numerous branch of her legislature, 423.
GERMANIC EMPIRE: Its origin, constitution,
and disadvantages, 165, 169.

GOLD AND SILVER: Principle on which the
States are inhibited to make anything else
a tender in payment of debts, 850, 351.
GOVERNMENT: (See "Minorities,") A Govern-
ment, the constitution of which renders it
unfit to be entrusted with all the powers
which a free people ought to delegate to
any government, would be an unsafe and
improper depository of the National Inter-
ests, 193, 199; The danger of fettering it
with restrictions which cannot be observed,
211; Examples among the States of im-
practicable restrictions, 211, 212; Remark-
able feature of every Government reported
by ancient history which was established
by deliberation and consent, 291: The reason
of it, 292; Ought to control the passions,
and to be controlled by the reason of the
public, 393; The greatest of all reflections
on human nature, 898; Wise kings will al-
ways be served by able ministers, 484; The
true test of a good government, is its apti-
tude and tendency to produce a good ad-
ministration, 511; Definition of a limited
constitution, 576; The general genius of a
government is all that can be substantially
relied on for permanent effects, 626.
GREAT BRITAIN: (See "Standing Armies,") Her
Government, 802; The House of Commons,
405, 406, 432, 438, 439; The House of Lords,
481, 482; Why the king's power of an ab-
solute negative on bills has been long dis-
used, 514; Constitution of Great Britain,
concerning a separation of the departments
of power, 874, 875.

HOLLAND: Not a Republic, 801, 802.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: (See "Constitu-
tion," "Treaties,") Qualifications of the
electors and the elected, 408, 404; Term of
a member's service, 404, 409, 415; Bien-
nial elections defended, 410, 415; Argu-
ment in their favor derived from the time
they afford a Representative for acquiring
the requisite information, 411, 413, 422; The
ratio of Representation, 416, 421; Its pro-
posed number of members defended, 422,
488; Provision of the Constitution concern-
ing the ineligibility of its members under

certain circumstances, to civil offices, 427;
Imputed tendency of the plan for the House
of Representatives, to elevate the few above
the many, 434; Provision for the future
augmentation of its members considered,
441; Economy consulted by the provision
for its temporary number, 445; Dangers of
a multitudinous representative assembly,
446; Maxim as to the proper number of
representatives, 445, 446; Why more than
a majority ought not to be required for a
quorum, 446, 447; Provision for regulating
elections to it, 448, 465; Less likely than
local legislatures to be partial to particular
interests, 456, 457; Advantage of uniform-
ity in the time of elections, 464; Why it
ought to have no power in the formation
of treaties, 559; Why it ought to have no
power in the appointment of Federal of-
ficers, 572.

HUMAN NATURE: Its fair side, 427, 428; A
power over a man's support is a power over
his will, 545.

HUME, DAVID: Citation from his essays, 645,

646.

IMPEACHMENTS: (See "Senate," "Judiciary,”
"States," under their several titles.)
INDIANS Difficulties concerning them when
residing within a State, 834.
INNOVATION: Its dangers exaggerated, some of
its beneficial results, 185, 136, 137.
IRELAND: Elections in, 406.
JEFFERSON, THOMAS: Cited to show the evils
in the Constitution of Virginia, arising from
the want of a barrier between the legisla
tive, executive, and judiciary powers, 855,
386; His draft of a Constitution cited, 358;
His idea of a convention for correcting
breaches of it, 888; Defects of this plan,
889-892.

JENKINSON, CHARLES: H's remarks introductory
to his bill for regulating the commerce be-
tween Great Britain and the United States,
185.
JUDICIARY: (See "Jury Trial,”) Objections to
constituting the Supreme Court a tribunal,
either singly or jointly with the Senate, for
trying impeachments, 492, 495; Mode of
appointing the Judges, 574; Their tenure
of office during good behaviour, 575, 582;
The weakest of the three departments of
power, 575; Vindication of its power to
pronounce legislative acts void, because
contrary to the Constitution, 577, 579; The
independence of the Judges essential, and
why? 579, 582; Peculiar advantages of the
provision in the Constitution for their sup-
port, 588, 584; Precautions for their respon
sibility, 585; Omission of a provision for
removing them on account of inability,
defended, 585; Six classes of cases, to
which the judicial power of the Federal
Government ought to extend, 587, 591;
These classes of cases compared with the
particular powers, 591, given by the Con-
stitution to the judiciary, 591, 592; Distri-
bution of authority in the Judicial Depart-
ment, 595, 605; Statement of objections to
the Supreme Court having undivided
power of final jurisdiction, 595, 596; These
objections answered, 596, 599; The power
in Congress of constituting inferior courts
considered, 599; Why the objects of these
courts would not be accomplished by the
instrumentality of the State Courts, 600;
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court confined to two classes of causes,
601, 602; Whether the Supreme Court
ought to have appellate jurisdiction as to

matters of fact, 602, 605; Such jurisdiction
does not abolish trial by jury, 605; Sum-
mary view of the authority of the Supreme
Court, 605; Whether the State Courts are
to have concurrent jurisdiction in regard to
causes submitted to the Federal jurisdiction,
606, 608; In instances of concurrent juris-
diction between the national and state
courts an appeal would lie from the state
courts to the Supreme Court of the United
States, 608; Whether an appeal would lie
from the state courts to subordinate Federal
judicatories, 609, 610.

JURISDICTION: Literal meaning of the word
noticed, 603. Note.

JURY TRIAL: Answer to the objection that the
constitution contains no provision for the
trial by jury in civil cases, 611, 626; In no
case abolished by the constitution, 614;
Examination of the remark that trial by
jury is a safeguard against an oppressive
exercise of the power of taxation, 615;
The strongest argument in its favor, in
civil cases, is, that it is a security against
corruption, 616, 617: Difference between
the limits of the jury trial in the different
states of the Union, 617, 618; Ineligible in
many cases, 618, 619; Proposition concern-
ing it made by the minority of Pennsyl-
vania, 619; Proposition from Massachusetts,
622.

LEGISLATION: Evils of a mutable, 470, 471, 472,
473.

LEGISLATURE: Danger of its usurpations in a

Representative Republic, 352, 387, 391.
LOUIS XIV: Anecdote of, 64.
LYCIAN CONFEDERACY: 102, 147, 860.
LYCURGUS, 291.

MABLY, Abbé de: His remark concerning a
Confederate Republic, S2; His remark on
the tendency of the Achæan league to mod-
eration in Government, 162.
MAINTENON, Madame de : 78.
MARLBOROUGH, Jons, Duke of: 80; SARAII,
Duchess of, 78.

MARYLAND: Provision in her constitution con-

cerning the separation of the legislative,
executive, and judiciary power, 379; con-
cerning her Senate, 481.
MASSACHUSETTS: Insurrections and rebellions
in Massachusetts, 82, 179, 180; Provision in
her constitution concerning the separation
of the legislative, executive and judiciary
powers, 877; Number of Representatives
in the more numerous branch of her Le-
gislature, 423; Size of her senatorial dis-
tricts compared with that of the districts
proposed by the convention, 439; Provision
concerning impeachments, 497. Note. Pro-
position from in regard to jury trial, 622.
MAXIMS: Certain maxims in Geometry, ethics,
and politics, carrying internal evidence, 244.
MILITARY FORCE: (See "Constitution," "Stand-
ing armies.")

MILITIA: Its disadvantages and merits, 210,
211; Power of regulating it, 230, 236.
MINORITIES: Two modes of protecting them
from usurpations by majorities, 400, 401,
402; To give a minority a negative upon a
majority which is always the case where
more than a majority is requisite to a de-
cision, is, in its tendency, to subject the
sense of the greater number to that of the
lesser, 188.

opinion that he considered the republican
polity unsuited to a large extent of coun-
try, and his praise of a confederate repub
lic, 99, 100, 101, 845; True extent of his
doctrine, requiring a separation of the
legislative, executive, and judiciary powers,
874, 876; His remarks concerning the jadi-
ciary, 576. Note.

NATURALIZATION: Provision of the constitu
tion concerning it, 335, 396.
NAVIGATION of the lakes, 117.

NAVY: Practicability of creating a Federal
navy. 115, 116; Its advantages, 117, 118;
The Southern States, the nursery of wood;
and the Northern of men for ships, 115;
Importance of establishing a navy as early
as possible, 206; Power in the Feder
Constitution of erecting one, 824, 325.
NEGATIVE ON BILLS: (See "Great Britain,"
"President.")

NETHERLANDS: Their government, 172; An
evil attending the constitution of the States
General, 560,

NEW HAMPSHIRE: Provision in her constitu-
tion concerning the separation of the legis-
lative, executive, and judiciary powers, 576,
877; The size of her senatorial districts,
compared with the size of the districts pro-
posed by the convention, 439, 440; Provis
ion concerning impeachment, 497. Note
NEW JERSEY: Provision in her constitution
concerning the separation of the legislative,
executive, and judiciary powers, 878; Her
provisions concerning the unity of the exe
cutive and a council of appointment, 524.
NEW YORK: Her controversy with the district
of Vermont, 85; Alleged excellence of ber
constitution, 216; Provision in her consti-
tution concerning the separation of the le-
gislative, executive, and judiciary powers,
378: Number of Representatives in the
more numerous branch of her legislature,
423; Size of her senatorial districts com-
pared with that of the districts proposed
by the convention, 439; Her constitution
makes no provision concerning the locality
of elections, 462; Provision concerning im-
peachments, 497; Provision concerning the
unity of her executive, 524 and Note:
Where, by her constitution, the qualified
power of negativing bills, is vested, 551;
Provision of her constitution prohibiting
any person more than sixty years old from
being a judge, 553, 556.

NORTH CAROLINA: Revolt of a part of 82;
Provision in her constitution concerning a
separation of the legislative, executive, and
judiciary powers, 850.

NUMA: 291.

ation noticed of the authority vested in
him by the Constitution, 303, 304; The
power of filling casual vacancies in the
Senate falsely ascribed to him, 505, 506, 507;
Why the power of filling, during the recess
of the Senate, vacancies in Federal offices,
is contided to him, 506, 507; Peculiar eligi-
bility of the mode provided for his appoint-
ment 598, 510; Why the office of Presi-
dent will seldom fall to the lot of any man
not qualified in any degree to fill it, 511;
His constitution compared with that of the
King of Great Britain, and with that of the
Governor of New York, 513, 515; His
qualified negative on bills, 514, 515, 516; A
shield to the executive, 547; An addition-
al security against the enacting of improp-
er laws, 547; The power likely to be exer-
cised only with great caution, 549; Practice
in Great Britain, 549: Cases for which,
chiefly, it was designed, 549; Where vest-
ed by the constitution of New York, 551;
Refutation of the doctrine that a vigorous
executive is inconsistent with the genius
of a republican government, 522; The
unity of the executive defended, 528; Ob-
jections to a plural executive, 523, 525;
Objections to an executive council, 523,
580; The responsibility of the President,
necessary, 529; The term of four years for
his office defended, 532, 535, 537; His re-
eligibility defended, 588, 543, 544; Danger
of instability in the system of administra-
tion, 539; Danger, particularly, from fre-
quent periodical changes of subordinate
officers, 539; Evils to be apprehended from
the perpetual or temporary ineligibility of
the President, after serving one term, 599,
542; Fallacy of the advantages expected
to arise from it, 543, 544; The provision in
the Constitution for the compensation of
the President, 545, 546; His power as
Commander-in-Chief of the army and
navy, 552; His power of requiring the
opinions in writing of the heads of the ex-
ecutive departments, 552; His power of
pardoning, 553, 554; Answer to the objec
tion against his having the sole power of
pardon in cases of treason, 554; His power
in relation to treaties, 556, 559, 561; His
power in regard to the appointment of Fed-
eral officers, 562, 566; Less apt than a nu-
merous assembly of men, to consult per-
sonal or party feelings in appointments,
563, 564; The cooperation of the Senate, a
check on a spirit of favoritism in the Pres-
ident. 565; His power in regard to the re-
moval of officers, 568; The constitution of
the President combines the requisites to
public safety, 573.

PRESS: The liberty of the, 681, 632; Tax on
newspapers in Great Britain, 682, Note.
PUBLIC ACTS: Records, &c., Provision of the
Constitution concerning them, 536.
PUBLIC DEBT: Would be a cause of collision
between the separate States or Confedera
cies, 87; Obligation of the Federal Govern-
ment concerning public debts, prior to the
adoption of the Constitution, 345.
PUBLIC LANDS: A fruitful source of contro-
versy, 83, 86.

REMOVALS OF FEDERAL OFFICERS: (See "Presi-
dent.")

REPRESENTATION: The principle of it, said to

be an invention of modern Europe, 132,
405, 479; Idea of an actual representation
of all classes of the people by persons of
each class, visionary, 269, 270; Distinction.

between the principle of representation
among the ancients, and in the United
States, 479.
REPUBLIC: Defined, 109. (See "Confederate
Republic,") Its advantages, 109, 110, 112;
Error of the opinion that it is unsuitable
to a large district of country, 132, 183;
Natural limits of one, 181, 132; One of its
weak sides, the inlets which it affords to
foreign corruption, 189, 190; Defined or
described, 301, 302; Inapplicability of the
title to certain governments which have
received it, 301, 302; Obligation of the
Federal Government to guarantee to every
State a republican form of government,
341.

RHODE ISLAND: Provision in her constitution
concerning elections, 410; Number of rep.
resentatives in the more numerous branch
of her legislature, 423; Iniquitous meas-
ures of, 475.
ROME: Senate of, 477; Tribunes of, 479, 482;
Evils arising from her having plural consuls
and tribunes, 524, 560.

ROMULUS, 291.

RUTHERFORTH, Dr. THOMAS, cited, 635. Note.
SENATE: (See" Elections," "Judiciary,") Will

generally be composed with peculiar care
and judgment, and why? 221; Its consti-
tution, 466, 502; Qualifications of Senators,
466, 467; Appointment of Senators by the
State Legislatures, 467; Equality of repre-
sentations in the Senate, 467, 468; Number
of Senators and duration of their appoint-
ment, 469; Its power in regard to making
treaties, 483, 489; Provision for the bien-
nial succession of one third of new Sena-
tors, 484, 485; Viewed as a court of im-
peachment, 490, 502; the objection which
would substitute the proportion of two-
thirds of all the members composing the
Senate, to that of two-thirds of the mem-
bers present considered, 560, 561: Its cooper-
ation with the President in appointments, a
check on favoritism, 565, 566; Answer to
the objection that the President, by the in-
fluence of the power of nomination, may
secure the complaisance of the Senate to
his views, 566, 567, 568, 569; Its consent
would be necessary to displace as well as
to appoint officers, 568.
SERVIUS TULLIUS, 291.
SHAY'S REBELLION, 78.
SHIP BUILDING: The wood of the Southern
States preferable for it, 118.
SLAVES: The importation of them after the
year 1808, prohibited, 331; Possess the
mixed character of persons and property,
417, 418; Defence of the provision of the
Constitution combining them with free
citizens as a ratio of taxation, 416, 421.
SOCRATES, 424.
SOLON, 291.

SOUTH CAROLINA: Provision in her constitution
concerning the separation of the legisla-
tive, executive, and judiciary powers, 380;
Provision concerning elections, 410; Num-
ber of Representatives in the more nume-
rous branch of her legislature, 428; Pro-
vision concerning impeachments, 497,
Note.

SPARTA: Her Senate, 477; Her Ephori, 479, 482.
STANDING ARMIES: (See "Constitution,") One

advantage of them in Europe, 90, 91; Would
be an inevitable result of the dissolution
of the Confederacy, 92, 95; Their fatal ef-
fects on liberty, 91, 92. See pp. 820, 821;
Why they did not spring up in the Grecian