Stanley v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Albany. upon information and belief, that chapter 761 of the Laws of 1866 was in conflict with the laws of the United States, and especially with the provisions that taxation by State authority of shares of stock in banking associations shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State, for the reason, among others, that the said act of New York did not permit debts of the owners of the bank stock to be deducted from the value thereof in its assessment, although such deduction of the debts of the owner was at the time, and is still permitted and required by the laws of New York to be made from the value of every other kind of personal property, and moneyed capital other than bank stock, in assessing the same for the purpose of taxation. They also alleged, upon information and belief, that the assessment of the shares of stock of the said banking association by the board of assessors was at a greater rate than their assessment upon shares of stock of bank organized under the laws of New York, and located in the same ward of the city, and was at a greater rate than was assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of the State. For these reasons the plaintiff alleged that the assessment of the shares of stock, and the levy of the tax thereunder, were illegal and void, and that the money received therefor was wrongfully collected and paid into the county treasury, and belonged of right to the shareholders, and not to the county. The fourth count differed from the others in averring that the assignor of the plaintiff named in this count, Chauncey P. Williams, had presented to the board of assessors an affidavit stating that the value of his personal estate, including his bank stock, after deducting his just debts and property invested in the stock of corporations or associations liable to be taxed therefor, and his investments in the obligations of the United States, did not exceed $1, and requested the board of assessors to reduce his assessment to that amount, but that the board had refused to make such reduction; and that thereupon said Williams applied to the Supreme Court of the State for a writ of mandamus to compel the assessors to make the reduction; that the Supreme Court denied the application on the ground that the act of the Legislature Stanley v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Albany. did not permit such reduction, but required the assessment of the bank stock at its full value; that the Court of Appeals of the State, on appeal, affirmed the decision and judgment of the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and held that the statute, chapter 761 of the Laws of the State, of 1866, in that it did not permit a reduction for indebtedness from the assessment of bank stock, which by the laws of the State was required to be made from the assessment of every other kind of personal estate and moneyed capital, was in conflict with the laws of the United States. The answer of the defendant consisted in a specific denial of the several allegations of the complaint, with an averment that the assessments were duly and regularly made by a board of assessors having jurisdiction of the matter. In a supplementary answer, the defendant also set up that the assignment of the amounts in suit to the plaintiff was improperly and collusively made for the purpose of giving the court jurisdiction. The action was twice tried; at both times by the court without the intervention of a jury, by consent of parties. On the first trial, which took place in October, 1880, the plaintiff recovered the whole amount upon the first ground stated that the act of New York, chapter 761 of the Laws of 1866, was in conflict with the act of Congress, in not permitting in the assessment of the value of the stock of the bank a reduction for the debts of the holder. The second ground of objection to the validity of the assessmentthat it was at a greater rate than was assessed on other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens was not considered. The case was then brought to this court for review. After full consideration, we held substantially this: that the statute of New York was in conflict with the act of Congress, so far as it did not permit a stockholder of a National bank to deduct the amount of his just debts from the assessed value of his stock, while by the laws of the State the owner of all other personal taxable property was allowed to deduct such debts from its value; but that neither the statute nor the assessment under it was for that reason void. If the stockholder had no debts to deduct, the mode of assessment adopted was not invalid as to him; he could not complain Stanley v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Albany. assessment. of it, nor recover the taxes paid pursuant to it. If he had debts, the assessment without a deduction for them in the estimate of the taxable value of the stock was only voidable. The assessing officers, in making the assessment, were acting within their authority until duly notified of the debts which were to be deducted. In such case therefore the duty devolved upon the stockholder to show to the assessing officers what his debts were, and to take such steps as were required by law to obtain a correction of the overWe therefore decided that for the taxes collected upon the assessment alleged in the fourth count the plaintiff was entitled to judgment; this court having held, in People v. Weaver, that assessment invalid, for the reason that the assessors had not allowed any deduction for the debts of the stockholder; but that for the taxes collected upon the assessments alleged in the other counts no recovery could be had; the stockholders there mentioned not having produced any evidence that they had presented to the assessors an affidavit of the amount which they would be entitled to deduct from the assessment of their shares, if the same rule had been applied to the assessment of bank shares which was applied to the assessment of other personal property, or any evidence that they owed any thing whatever to be deducted, or that they had taken any steps under the laws of New York to correct the over-assessment complained of. The judgment of the Circuit Court was accordingly reversed, and judgment ordered for the plaintiff upon the fourth count, and for the defendants on the other counts. Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U. S. 305, 316; ante 33. Subsequently, upon the attention of the court being called to the fact that there was evidence in the case upon the allegation that the assessment of the shares of stock in the National Banking Association was at a greater rate than was assessed upon shares of stock in banks organized under the laws of New York, and located in the same city, and at a greater rate than was assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hauds of individual citizens of the State, upon which the court below did not pass, the judgment was so far modified as to permit that court, in its discretion, to hear evidence on that point, and, if necessary, to allow an amendment of the pleadings to present it properly. Stanley v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Albany. When the case was remanded, on application to the Circuit Court, all the counts except the fourth were amended. The substance of the amendments consisted in allegations that the assessors, by a rule prescribed by themselves, assessed the shares of the National Albany Exchange Bank at such greater rate; that the rule adopted was to assess all shares of stock in State and National banks in the city of Albany at par, without regard to their actual or market value, making the requisite deduction for real estate owned by the banks; that this rule necessarily resulted in imposing upon the shares of the National Albany Exchange Bank a greater rate of taxation than was assessed upon other moneyed capital generally; that there were in the Sixth ward of the city, at the time of the assessments, several banks, State and National; and that the actual value of the stock of the banks varied — that of the shares of stock in the National Albany Exchange Bank being considerably less than that of the stock of most of the other banks in the city. Several of the counts were afterward abandoned, those remaining applying only to the taxes of the years 1873, 1874 and 1875. The case came on for a second trial in March, 1883, and, after hearing the proofs, the court filed its findings of fact on the issues presented by the pleadings, and gave judgment for the plaintiff on the fourth count, and for the defendants on the other counts. To review this judgment the case is brought to this court on a writ of error. Several of the assignments of error presented for our consideration are to rulings of the court below upon the evidence before it; to its finding of particular facts; and to its refusal to find. other facts. Such rulings are not open to review here; they can be considered only by the court below. Where a case is tried by the court without a jury, its findings upon questions of fact are conclusive here; it matters not how convincing the argument that upon the evidence the findings should have been different. Thus, the principal finding of the court is "that the plaintiff has failed to establish the allegations in said complaint, that the several assessments herein referred to were at a greater rate than was assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual. citizens of this State." And the first assignment of error is that VOL. III-35. Stanley v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Albany. the court erred in deciding that the plaintiff failed to establish the allegations mentioned, and the greater part of the oral argument of the plaintiff's counsel and of his printed brief was devoted to the maintenance of this proposition; which is nothing more than that the court below found against the evidence a question not open to review or consideration in this court. Only rulings upon matters of law, when properly presented in a bill of exceptions, can be considered here, in addition to the question, when the findings are special, whether the facts found are sufficient to sustain the judgment rendered. This limitation upon our revisory power on a writ of error in such cases is by express statutory enactment. Act March 3, 1865 (13 Stat., chap. 86, § 4; R. S., § 700). The same answer will apply to the exceptions taken to the refusal of the court to make certain additional findings. If error was thus committed, it was not in giving sufficient weight to the evidence offered a matter determinable only in the court below. To recover in this case, the plaintiff was required to prove, under the decision when the case was first here, that "the assessors habitually and intentionally, or by some rule prescribed by themselves, or by some one whom they were bound to obey, assessed the shares of the National banks higher, in proportion to their actual value, than other moneyed capital generally." The court below specially found the negative of this; that the assessors did not, at any of the times in question, habitually or intentionally, or by any rule prescribed by themselves, or by any one whom they were bound to obey, thus assess the shares of National banks. The counsel for the plaintiff insists however, notwithstanding this finding, that the inference of such habitual assessment at a higher rate follows from the findings that within the city of Albany there were nine banks, and that the actual value of the shares in all of them except one exceeded their par value, varying in that respect from ten to seventy per cent, premium, and yet the value of all was assessed at par. The actual value of shares of the National Albany Exchange Bank was thirty-five per cent above par, and the actual value of the shares of some of the other banks was above and some below that figure. The court found that the method pursued by the assessors was generally satisfactory to the owners of National bank stock in the city of Albany, with the |