demeanor, which the House of Representatives alone has the power to prefer; that we impeached the Presi dent, tried him without a hearing, prejudicated his cause, convicted him, and only abstained form passing sentence of incapacitation upon him. This argument was first suggested to my mind by a gentleman from New York, [Mr. WRIGHT,] in a speech in the debate on the resolution; and I then weighed it well. It was repeated in the President's protest against our proceedings, and in the debate which ensued; I re-examined it; I expected to hear it reiterated on this occasion; but if it be well considered, I am persuaded it will never be repeated again. The resolution declares "that the President, in the late executive proceedings in relation to the revenue, had assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both." The words cannot be tortured into an allegation that the President wilfully assumed and exercised illegal and unconstitutional power; no criminal intent is charged, expressly or by implication; the language is (and was, in fact, intended to be) carefully confined to the acts of the President, without impugning or touching his motives at all. If this is not plain upon the face of the res olution itself, no argument can make it plainer. The gentleman from Missouri, as if sensible that the resolution itself imported no criminal charge, has, in the preamble to the resolution he has now offered us, recited the resolution which was first proposed concerning the removal of the public deposites from the Bank of the United States, as a key, I suppose, to unlock the meaning of the resolution that was adopted; and, in his speech, he has referred to speeches made in the debate on the subject, in order to ascertain from them that criminal motives and design were intended to be imputed to the President. Sir, to my mind, the first resolution proposed, concerning the removal of the deposites, does not vary, in this particular, from the resolution that was finally adopted: there is no charge of criminal intent, no imputation on the President's motives, in the first any more than in the last. But suppose there were, with what color of reason or justice can the gentleman from Missouri, in order to ascertain the meaning of the language which the Senate used, have recourse to language which it did not use-resort to a resolution which the Senate did not adopt, to find a reason for reprobation of that which it did adopt? As to the speeches that were made on this floor, which, in the gentleman's appreliension, distinctly imputed wilful guilt to the President, I cannot take upon me to contradict him, for I was not then here, and did not hear them; the debate was drawing to a close when I took my seat in the Senate. I can only say that I read no reported speech containing any violent denunciations of guilt and crime, at all answering the description he has given. But here, again, I ask, what right has he thus to take the senti ments of particular members expressed in debate, as a certain exponent of the sentiments of every other Senator who, in the result, votes with him? Does he suppose that every gentleman who votes with him, on any question which he debates, enters into all the feelings, motives, and sentiments, adopt all arguments that influence his judgment an! conduct, and makes them his own? But I recall the attention of the Senate to this singular method of detecting offence in the resolution of March, 1834, chiefly for the purpose of showing the manner in which it effects the freedom of speech in this body, and the reverential awe with which it supposes we ought to examine the official acts of the President. All proper decorum and respect ought to be preserved towards him, I agree-for his sake, for our sake, out of respect to the public-out of a just sense of the dignity of the Government: but shall those strong (if you please, [APRIL 4, 1836. too strong) expressions of disapprobation or censure which fall from gentlemen in the ardor of extemporary debate, which, perhaps, in cooler moments they would have left unsaid--shall these be treasured up in memory, and urged as a censure, not only against them, but all that vote with them upon the question in debate? What is this sanctity in the office of President of the United States, which all men should have for ever before their eyes, present in their thoughts, inviolable in their speech? No such sanctity hedges the impeachable ministers of the British Government. Lord Chatham once said, in the House of Lords, that the minister (the prime minister) had advised the King to tell a deliberate falsehood. The gentleman from Missouri says, "we have borrowed largely from our English ancestors; and, because we have so borrowed, results the precious and proud gratification that our America now ranks among the great and liberal Powers of the world;" and he traces our dearest institutions to English origin. I hope we have not forgotten to borrow from them freedom of parliamentary debate. That high encomium which the gentleman pronounced upon our English ancestors is just and true, and, therefore, I was pleased to hear it fall from his lips; but if it had come from me, it would have been regarded as a proof of my aristocracy; for it has often been imputed as aristocracy in me, that I make frequent reference to English history, (which, in truth, I have read more of than any other, but only because it has been more accessible to me;) that I have studied the history of the English Government and laws, and imagine that instruction may be found in them applicable to our own. I am content to bear the imputation; if the fact, without any criminal intent, constitutes guilt, I must be convicted: I know no method of acquiring a thorough knowledge of our own institutions, but by cultivating a knowledge of English institutions. In all impeachments that I have ever seen, the facts of misconduct are specifically alleged, and some criminal intent, more or less heinous, expressly imputed to the accused. We have seen that in the articles of impeachment against Sir Robert Berkley, for his extra. judicial opinions, and his concurrence in the judgment against Mr. Hampden, in the case of ship-money, the opinions and the judgment are set out at large; the fact that he gave them, and the gross illegality of them, are distinctly alleged; and then it is charged that all those "words, opinions, and actions, were so done and spoken by the said Sir Robert Berkley, traitorously and wickedly, to alienate the hearts of his Majesty's liege people from him, and to set a division betwixt them, and to subvert the fundamental laws and established Government of his Majesty's realm of England." And whoever will search the numerous precedents of articles of impeachment in England, I will answer for it that he will find this precedent substantially complied with, in charging the facts and laying the criminal intent. The gentleman from Missouri says that no criminal intent is charged in three of the articles of impeachment against Judge Chase, and (as I understand him) in one of the articles against Judge Pickering. The gentleman is certainly mistaken. The criminal intent is distinctly charged in all of the eight acticles against Judge Chase except one; that, namely in which it is alleged that, in Callender's case, he did not conform with a statute of Virginia regulating the process in prosecutions for misdemeanor. That article alleges the departure from the law, but omits to allege that he did so wilfully, or even that he was aware of the provisions of the statute; and upon that charge he was, of course, unanimously acquitted. The article of impeachment against Judge Pickering, in which the gentleman supposes no criminal intent was laid, imputes to the judge the grossest intemperance and indecency in the judgment seat; nor could the criminality of such conduct (than which hardly any official misconduct could be more clearly criminal, however it might be more heinous) have been more strongly and expressly charged. He was convicted upon this charge. The gentleman says that, in fact, the judge was insane, and was incapable of crime. How the gentleman got his information I do not know, he certainly did not get it from the record. [Here Mr. LEIGH referred to the record of the impeachments and trials of Judge Pickering and Judge Chase, in the journals of the Senate, and showed the exact state of the facts.] Gen The resolution of the 28th of March, 1834, declares that the President's conduct in relation to the revenue was illegal and unconstitutional, without more. tlemen say that the fact alleged implies crime; that it implies a violation of his official oath "to preserve, protect, and defend the constitution of the United States." Now, in the first place, let us advert once more to the proceedings in the ship-money case, which my colleague has quoted with so much approbation, where the House of Lords declared the extra-judicial opinions of the judges, and the judgment against Mr. Hampden, illegal and unconstitutional, in the strongest terms, without imagining that that declaration was a prejudication of the impeachment against one of the judges then pending, which the Lords, as the high court of impeachment, were to try; in other words, that it did not occur to them that the fact of extra-judicial illegal conduct implied crime. In the next place, let me ask gentlemen whether they suppose that, in maintaining that this expunging process, they are so intent upon, is unconstitutional; in declaring my opinion (as I do most conscientiously) that it is a plain violation of the constitution, I mean to charge them with a wilful violation of the constitution, and of their official oaths? I know mankind too well. It has been said that, if men's passions could be made to enter into the question, they would differ and dispute upon the plainest proposition in Euclid; and there is no passion so apt and so potential to influence and determine the judgments of public men as party spirit. Gentlemen, in both Houses of Congress, are daily alleging that measures strenuously maintained by others are unconstitutional, plainly unconstitutional; yet no one ever thinks of giving or taking offence, which, surely, all would do if they thought that to allege unconstitutional conduct is to charge wilful guilt. The President has often put his veto on acts passed by both Houses of Congress, on the ground that he thought them unconstitutional. I can hardly believe that he meant to charge the majority of both Houses with an intentional violation of the constitution and breach of their official oaths. I have heard the judgments of the Supreme Court publicly impugned, as being contrary to the constitution. Í have heard Chief Justice Marshall's opinions so impugned by men who entertained the highest respect for his abilities and integrity, and would have considered it a reproach to themselves if they had been gravely told that they imputed to the court a wilful departure from right, truth, and justice. Sir, there is but one hypothesis upon which the allegation made in the resolution of March, 1834, that the President's conduct was illegal and unconstitutional, can imply crime, and that is, that his judgment is infallible, and that it is morally impossible for him to do an illegal and unconstitutional act, through error of judgment. That is very far from my opinion. There is no man whose judgment I should esteem infallible on such a subject, and the President is one of the last men to whom I should attribute any such infallibility. And, though I believed at the time I gave my vote on the resolution of March, 1834, that the conduct of the President therein referred to was illegal and unconstitutional, and though that is still, and [SENATE. probably will always continue to be, my firm, undoubting opinion, I have no hesitation in saying that, if the President had been regularly impeached for that conduct, and I had been called upon to decide his cause as one of his judges, upon all the evidence then (or, indeed, yet) known to me, touching the motives of his conduct, my voice must have been for his acquittal. I could not have found the wilful criminal intent essential to constitute guilt. The gentleman from Missouri loudly reprobates the resolution in question, on the ground that its allegations are vague and indefinite; not perceiving that that very circumstance furnishes the strongest proof that criminal accusation was not made or intended. The idea of impeaching the President of crime or misdemeanor never entered into the thoughts of any Senator who voted for the resolution; and there was not a human being, I am quite sure, who so much as imagined the possibility of an act of impeachment by the House of Representatives; the case of such impeachment was only supposed in argument, never apprehended in fact. It is said that the resolution of March, 1834, cannot be regarded as a proceeding in our legislative capacity; and, in proof of this, it has been observed that no legislative measure was founded upon it, and that none was intended. This appears to my mind the most gratuitous assumption that ever was made. It was the opinion of the mover in those proceedings, that the public depos ites, at least of the revenue which should afterwards accrue, ought to be restored to the Bank of the United States; and it was proper to ascertain the sense of the Senate on the question, whether (for the reasons assigned by the Executive) they had been constitutionally and legally withdrawn or not; for, if the Senate had held the affirmative on that point, it would have been vain and idle to prepare and bring in a bill for the pur pose. The course pursued is usual in all legislative bodies. As it was, I have not the least doubt that the known state of opinion in the House of Representatives upon the subject alone prevented the Senate from passing a bill for the restoration of the deposites. The Senate did take measures, some time after, to ascertain the sense of the House: on the 4th of June, 1834, it passed a joint resolution directing the deposite of the public moneys to be made with the Bank of the United States and its branches. The House never acted upon it. But let us examine more closely the reason and foundation of this opinion, that the Senate cannot, in its legislative capacity, discuss and determine upon the constitutionality or legality of any act of the President; and let us see, too, the extent of the principle. It is supposed that the judicial power vested in the Senate, as the court for the trial of impeachments, operates as a limitation upon the action of the Senate in its legislative capacity; that the Senate cannot, in its legislative capacity, express any opinion impugning the constitutionality or legality of any official act of the President, because it may be called upon to decide the same question judicially, upon an impeachment against him for the same act. Now, it is obvious that if the Senate is, for this reason, incompetent to pass any resolution impugning the conduct of the President as unconstitutional, neither is it competent to pass a resolution approving his conduct as constitutional and proper; for it can be no more within the competency of the Senate to prejudge the President's cause, and acquit him, than to prejudge and condemn. Partiality in judges towards the accused is as vicious as prejudice against him. Nay, more: it is the duty of every Senator to avoid the forming, and expression of, an opinion on the constitutionality of the President's conduct; to close his mind against all information on the subject; to hold his judgment in suspense. Nor is this all. The Senate and House of Representatives are made by the constitution co-ordinate branches of the Legislature, and their legislative powers are co-equal, too, with the single excep tion that money bills can only be originated in the House; and then a distinct judicial function is assigned to each. The House is the grand inquest of the nation to accuse and impeach; the Senate is the court to try and determine. As to all matters of criminal accusation and impeachment, the action of the House is just as much judicial in its nature as the action of the Senate; the only difference is, that their judicial functions are different. If the Senate, in its legislative capacity, is incompetent to examine the constitutionality of the Pres ident's conduct, and express its opinion upon it, the House, also, in its legislative capacity, is incompetent to do so. [APRIL 4, 1836. Office Department, without authority given by any law of Congress; and that, as Congress alone possesses the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, all such contracts for loans by the Postmaster General are illegal and void." This was at least as strong a condemnation of the conduct of the Postmaster General as the resolution concerning the conduct of the President in relation to the public revenue contained. I should certainly have voted for it myself, had I been in my place at the time, because the proposition it asserted was true in fact, and just in law; but, in giving that vote, I should not have been influenced by any opinion that the illegal conduct of the Postmaster General was imputable to criminal motives and designs. Enough had appeared to satisfy my mind that the grossest abuses and corruptions had crept into the administration of the Department; enough to convince me that Mr. Barry was wholly unfit for his office; but the very circumstance of his unfitness, and much more besides, that came to my knowledge, inclined me to take a char than once publicly intimated this sentiment. And, now If, therefore, the President shall, upon any occasion, adopt any measure questionable on constitutional grounds, no matter how mischievous the measure may be in its operation--no matter how urgent the necessity for prompt and decisive legislative action, to correct the procedure and arrest the progress of the evil-itable view of his conduct and character; and I more neither branch of the Legislature can examine, or even inquire into, the subject in its legislative character, much more pass an act to remedy the mischief. The House of Representatives must first resolve itself into a grand inquest; examine the President's conduct in that character; impeach him, if it find just cause for impeachment; prosecute him before the Senate, and prosecute him to conviction by the judgment of two-thirds of the Senators sitting on the trial; and then, and not till then, the two Houses may set about devising measures to counteract the unconstitutional and illegal measures of the Executive. And furthermore, as the Senate cannot convict the President, without being satisfied in its conscientious judgment that his unconstitu tional proceedings are justly imputable to criminal motives and designs, no unconstitutional acts of the President can be corrected by any legislative measures of Congress, if the President's violation of the constitution and laws shall appear to be justly imputable to an innocent error of judgment as to the extent of his own powersan error into which (of all others that can be conceived) men in power are most apt to fall. Meanwhile, the measures of the Executive continue in operation, and perhaps work their full effect, unchecked, unembarrassed, by any manner of counteraction which the Legisla ture can constitutionally devise and provide. Sir, if this doctrine that the Senate, and, by parity of reasoning, the House of Representatives also, are incompetent, in their legislative capacity, to examine and determine upon the constitutionality or legality of executive acts, shall be established, then I say that the Executive is, really and truly, the Government, and the whole Government; that the President is, in every practical view, absolutely irresponsible; that he is a more absolute potentate than any prince, king, or emperor, in Europe, except, perhaps, the autocrat of all the Russias, and the grand seignior of Turkey. And this process of expunction of our resolution of March, 1834, is to be resorted to on the supposition that this doctrine is just and true, and to establish it as a constitutional principle of this federal republican Government! During the same session of 1833-'34, at which the resolution concerning the President's conduct in relation to the revenue was adopted, there was an inquiry into the state of the Post Office Department, and the administration of its affairs by the then Postmaster General, Mr. Barry; and that proceeding of the Senate resulted in the following resolution, passed on the 27th June, 1834: "That it is proved and admitted that large sums of money had been borrowed at different banks by the Postmaster General, in order to make up the deficiency of the means of carrying on the business of the Post case, Now, I ask, if a negative vote admitted the jurisdiction just as much as an affirmative one, in Mr. Barry's how is it that the negative vote which the gentleman gave in the President's case had no effect to admit the jurisdiction of the Senate to entertain and pass the resolution of March, 1834? But this may be thought an argumentum ad hominem, which is never quite fair. I am afraid myself that it is not fair; because, though this is one reason which the gentleman assigns for his course, it is not the only reason; and because he has vindicated his general consistency in relation to this question, by showing that he maintained the same opinion he now contends for in February, 1831. I did not myself perceive the inconsistency between the vote against the resolution of the 28th March, 1834, and the vote for that of the 27th June, until it was pointed out to me; and my impression was, that it might be accounted for by the hurry of business when the last vote was given, and the little importance of the subject of that vote, compared with the vast importance of the subject of the first; so that the principle involved escaped attention when the last resolution was adopted. The only question at all material is, whether the opinion the gentleman now advances concerning Mr. Barry's case is right or wrong. I have no wish or care to convict the gentleman of inconsistency, nor was that my purpose in adverting to this topic. My purpose lies much deeper. I pray the Senate to observe that it is now admitted, nay, contended, that the same principle which should interdict the Senate, in its legislative capacity, from examining and determining on the constitutionality of the acts of the President, should interdict it also from examining and determining on the acts of every impeachable executive officer; and then all the consequences follow: the unconstitutional acts of all executive officers can only be examined by the House of Representatives, in its judicial character, as the grand inquest of the nation; can only be examined by the Senate, in its judicial character, as a court of impeachment; can never be corrected by legislative action, until the impeachment is determined; cannot be corrected even then, if the Senate, convinced of the innocence of the accused of all criminal motive and intent, should feel itself bound in conscience to acquit him of guilt; and meantime the unconstitutional measure will have been in full operation. And thus this process of expunction will have the effect of estab lishing a principle vitally affecting the competency of the two Houses of Congress in their legislative character; and a principle that will protect not only the unconstitutional acts of the President, but those of all his subordinate executive officers, from legislative inquiry, examination, counteraction, and correction. I shall not now enter upon a discussion of the question whether it was true, in point of fact and in point of law, as the resolution of March, 1834, declared, that the President's proceedings therein referred to were illegal and unconstitutional; because, supposing that declaration not just and true, yet, if the Senate had competency to act upon the subject, its action did not begin in wrong; and the remedy is to correct our error by rescinding, not by expunging, the resolution. Surely, the present majority of the Senate are not going the length of expunging every proceeding of the then majority which it shall consider erroneous in principle and in fact. The question of the competency of the Senate to pass the resolution of March, 1834, lies at the bottom of the argument of the gentleman from Missouri in support of his motion to expunge, in preference to rescinding. That question I have now discussed. I wish to confine myself to what affects the question of expunging only. If a motion shall be made to rescind, though I shall have no new argu ment of my own to offer, I may find it my duty to recapitulate the conclusive arguments of others to show that the resolution of March, 1834, is just and true in all respects, and that the principle it asserts is essential to the maintenance of our free institutions. The gentleman from Missouri said that to "expunge is a severe remedy, but it is a just one. It reflects reproach; but the fault is not ours, but of those who compelled us to it. Let us go on, then, and neither compromise for difficulties, nor despair for failures. If we fail now, let us try again. If we continue to fail, and have to retire before the good work is accomplished, let us transmit and bequeath it to the democracy of America. Let us give it to the aged sire, that he may hand it down to his heir; to the matron, that she may deliver it to her manly son; to the young mother, that she may teach her infant babe to suck in the avenging word expunge, with the life-sustaining milk which it draws from her bosom." As to that young mother who shall be willing to mix the bitterness of that "avenging word expunge," or any other vengeance, with the milk which, with the sweetness of maternal love, she should minister to her babe, it is to be hoped she will have no more offspring; and if the unhappy VOL. XII.-69 [SENATE babe shall suck the spirit of vengeance with his mother's milk, what deeds he may perform in his mature manhood it is revolting to reflect. But none of the young mothers are going to take this advice; that I am sure of. And if the democracy of America shall be willing to accept the legacy which the gentleman from Missouri is so bountifully desirous of bequeathing to them, and to improve it to the degree of which it is susceptible, I fear some future advocate of monarchy may find cause to remember and apply to us the contemptuous language which the toryism of Swift has applied to all democratic States: "that a usurping populace is its own dupe; a mere underworker, and a purchaser in trust for some single tyrant, whose state and power they advance to their own ruin, with as blind an instinct as those worms that die with weaving magnificent habits for beings of a nature superior to their own." And, sir, I venture to warn my countrymen that, if they would avoid the reproach of being dupes, they must never indulge the vain-glorious imagination that they are incapable of being deluded; that they must distrust and watch their agents, distrust and watch themselves, watch over their constitution, their laws, and especially their public treasure, upon which the rights they so dearly value essentially depend. Before Mr. LEIGH had finished his speech, at about twenty minutes before 4 o'clock, he gave way, and Mr. MANGUM moved to adjourn, but withdrew the motion; and the subject being informally laid on the table, The Senate, on motion of Mr. WHITE, proceeded to the consideration of executive business; and, after remaining for some time with closed doors, The Senate adjourned. TUESDAY, APRIL 5. BULLION FOR THE MINT. Agreeably to the notice which he had given, Mr. BENTON asked leave to bring in his bill for the better supply of the mint with bullion and metals for coining. Not being a member of the Finance Committee, to which the bill would be referred, Mr. B. said he must claim the indulgence of the Senate to state the reasons which induced him to bring it forward. It was framed, he said, upon the supposition that the mint was not adequately supplied with bullion and metals for coining, and that it was necessary to take legislative measures to ensure its better supply. Both these suppositions were realities, and he had taken care to provide himself with evidence to that effect. He had two letters from the director of the mint, which he would send to the committee with the bill, and which would verify the statements which he made. These letters showed the present capacity of the mint to be equal to the coinage of a million a month, or twelve millions per annum, the coinage to consist of gold and silver and the usual proportions of small coins; and they also showed the coinage of the last year to be about five millions and a half of dollars-that is to say, about half as much as the mint could have done if adequately supplied with bullion. But the letters also state that improvements were now in progress by which steam power would be substituted for manual labor in several parts of the machinery, and the effect of which would be to increase the capacity of the mint three fold-that is to say, to make it equal to three millions a month, or thirty-six millions per annum. When these improvements were completed, and a part of them were already in operation, the mint, unless better supplied, would have stood idle five sixths of its time, as it could execute in two months the whole coinage of the last year. This, said Mr. B., must doubtless result from some great fault in our legislation, and SENATE.] Sufferers by Fire in New York-Incendiary Publications. naturally leads to the inquiry, How is the mint now supplied with bullion and metals for coining? Pursuing this inquiry, he found that the great business of supplying this national establishment was virtually devolved upon individuals and upon banks; and that these individuals and banks were charged a tax of one half of one per centum on the amount coined, either in a direct charge, or in a delay equivalent in loss of interest to the same amount. This, he said, accounted for the lamentable result, that in forty years our coinage had amounted to no more than forty millions; that our mint was but half supplied now, and would soon be not one fifth supplied. Such a result was incompatible with the idea of establishing a mint and of creating a specie currency; and he had been led to pursue the inquiry further, and to ascertain whether it could ever have been the intention of the founders of the mint that that institution was to be thrown upon individuals and corporations, and they discouraged by a tax, for the means of supplying a national coinage? Looking into the early laws, he found the answer which the reason and propriety of the case required to exist; he found that it had never been intended that the mint was to be limited to these precarious sources of supply, but that the national revenues were made a resource by law for that purpose. He found in the act of 1793, sec. 3, this provision: All foreign gold and silver coins, except Spanish milled dollars, and parts of such dollars, which shall be received in payment for moneys due the United States, after the said time when the coinage of gold and silver shall be gin at the mint of the United States, shall, previously to their being issued in circulation, be coined anew, in conformity to the act establishing the mint, &c. This, said Mr. B., establishes the intention of the founders of the mint. That intention was to make the United States the supplier of bullion to the mint, and to devote the revenues of the Union to that object. The effect of this law, Mr. B. said, at the time it was enacted, was expected to be great and decisive, for the act of 1789, forbidding any thing but gold and silver to be received on account of the United States, was then in force. No bank notes were then receivable for public dues; so that the revenues, and these revenues in specie, were intended to pass through the mint, and a full and perfect new coinage to be kept up. But this law soon lost its entire force, and has remained for forty years a dead letter on the statute book. The Bank of the United States was chartered, and its notes became receivable in lieu of coin; State banks began to grow up, and their paper also to be received; and eventually all the public moneys came to be deposited in banks, instead of any part going to the mint; and this is the state of things at present. The deposite banks receive all the revenue; and whatever coin they receive is considered as their own, and there is nothing for the act of 1793 to operate upon. This exposition of the evil, continued Mr. B., is in itself an indication of the remedy. The remedy lies in the repeal of the half per cent. tax on coinage, and in reviving and carrying into effect the original intent of the founders of the mint, to make the revenues of the Union the main source of supply to that establishment. For this purpose he had drawn up the bill, which he proposed to bring in, and would say but a word in support of the two provisions which it contained. First. As to the repeal of the tax and the abolition of the charge for refining. The amount of the tax could be no object to the Government, while it was a serious consideration to the depositor, and no doubt often prevented deposites for coinage from being made. It might have been justifiable when the mint was first established, and the national treasury was empty, but could have no apology now, especially with those who were intent upon re-establishing the currency of the constitution. [APRIL 5, 1836. Second. As to coining the revenues. This must have a good effect in a great variety of ways. 1. The revenues of the Union are now received in paper, and there is little or no national check upon the amount of this paper received. Its transfer to the mint will supply a check, and that a serious one; for even now a million a month of the revenues might be sent to the mint; and, with the improvements going on, and the completion of the branch mints, the whole amount of the annual revenue, if necessary, might be coined anew, for the minting establishments will be sufficient to coin forty millions, at least, per annum. 2. It will keep the mint fully supplied, and will furnish the Union with a perfect and beautiful coinage, by coining up all foreign coins, and all domestic ones which become imperfect by wear or by fraudulent diminution. 3. It will put the coinage under the direction of the Government, which can then direct the denominations to be coined, and can supply the country with small change. At present the banks and individuals chiefly direct the denominations which suit themselves, and those are half eagles and half dollars; but the interest of the country, the convenience of the people, and the cultivation of a beneficial spirit of economy in small dealings, requires a great coinage of small change. 4. The transfer of part of the revenues to the mint for coinage will show their capacity to become deposi tories, with a few additional branch mints, for the public moneys, and thus let the banks see that the United States are not dependent upon them for keeping the public moneys, and are in a condition to dictate terms, or to cut the connexion with all banking establishments. 5. It would cause the present surplus revenue to take the solid and substantial form of coin, instead of remaining a light and volatile mass of paper. Mr. B. concluded what he had to say at present, with remarking that the return to a constitutional currency was a work of many steps, and that one step was to supply the mints with metals for coinage, and this was the step which he now proposed to take. The bill was then read twice, and referred to the Committee on Finance. NEW YORK SUFFERERS. A bill was received from the House, amendatory of the act for the relief of the sufferers by fire in New York. Mr. DAVIS stated that it was necessary to pass this bill at once, owing to a misconstruction of the bill which had been previously passed by the collector, who had construed it as extending its benefits to all bonds up to the day of the passage of the bill. The bill was then, without opposition, read a first and second time, considered as in Committee of the Whole, read a third time, and passed. EXPUNGING RESOLUTION. The Senate proceeded to consider the expunging resolution offered by Mr. BENTON. Mr. LEIGH resumed and continued his observations, as given entire in preceding pages. After Mr. LEIGH concluded his speech, On motion of Mr. BENTON, the resolution was laid on the table, and ordered to he printed. INCENDIARY PUBLICATIONS. Mr. CALHOUN moved to postpone the orders preceding the bill to prevent the circulation of incendiary publications, and to take up that bill; which motion was agreed to. The bill was then read; when Mr. WHITE expressed a wish to go into the consideration of executive business; and a motion to that effect was agreed to. |