perial majesty perceives its evidence, but because we have examined it ourselves, and cannot help admitting conclusions, having allowed the arguments from which they flow. No, Sir; our religion is founded not on the fear of the emperor, but on the love of God; and was there neither an emperor, nor a penal law, nor a sword upon earth, we should be obliged, if we reasoned justly, to worship God in spirit and in truth. Take back then your ungenerous reflection, beseech your imperial coadjutor to put up his sword in its sheath, and only, (as his office requires) to stand by and keep the peace, while you learn that orthodoxy has nothing in the world to fear, for she is indestructible; she may be attacked, she can never be destroyed.

Orthodoxy, (like almost all the martial terms of controvertists) is a very vague, equivocal word. -In its original and true import, it signifies a right belief: but, such is the fate of language, in one latitude it means a belief of one thing, in another the belief of another thing, quite contrary. In this lettter, let it stand for what St. Paul calls the belief of the truth, not the belief of the truth as it is in this creed, or in that, or in any other, but as it is in Jesus; and, without enquiring who is in possession of this truth (which is foreign from the purpose) let it only be examined, whether the truth, or faith in it, be exposed to danger by an universal toleration ?

Evidence is the characteristic of truth; and, if father Thomassin means any thing by his assertion,

he means, that penal laws have the power of con ferring the characteristic of truth upon falshood. -But what power can give falshood the evidence of truth? If evidence be the support of a true proposition, the truth stands independent of the magistrate's power, and, supported by evidence, there is nothing left for the magistrate to do. If he means that the bulk of mankind, from the base principles of avarice or fear, will profess to be of the magistrate's sentiments, and without examining, will maintain his creed, all this is granted; but that such slaves to interest are orthodox believers, or believers at all, is denied. If it be said that the profession of the truth by such respectable personages, will always influence people to examine what they believe, it is readily granted; but this very examination proves that neither pomp nor penalties characterise truth: it is evidence. Is it credible that such numbers of people in all Europe would have suffered martyrdom for their own sentiments, if punishments could have made that true which was false before, or could have prevailed on the martyrs to believe what they could not perceive the evidence of?

Propositions in books are pictures of objects in nature, and their truth lays in the exact conformity of the picture to its original: but what, in the name of logic, has the truth of this conformity, or the perception of this truth to do with imperial penalties? Suppose a skilful artist should present to public judgment an exact representar tion of the emperor on canvass. It is a fine

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painting says one; it is a striking resemblance a second; I am surprized at your infatuation, says a third, it is not at all like his majesty. A dispute originates, the emperor interests himself in it. Did his majesty condescend to allow the disputants the honour of comparing the picture with the original, probably the difference might be adjusted yet perhaps not, for, after all, their different judgments might originate in a difference of their organs; or in a hundred things more. But, originate where it would, should his majesty say, "Gentlemen, this picture is a true representation of my person; and this proposition is a true representation of the picture: and if you do not bebelieve both these, I shall refuse you my protection, I shall expose you to a fine, to an imprisonment, to death itself:"-Does any body imagine that the emperor would maintain orthodoxy? Silence might be imposed, but belief would not be. produced.

To the belief of a truth three things are essential; an object, a proposition representative of that object, and an operation of an intelligent being assenting to that representation; which assent can be obtained no other way than by the mind's perceiving the agreement of the proposition with its object. Belief or assent is an after operation of the mind, fixed by the God of nature as immutably as the parts of the body are, and as nature never produced eyes in the hands, nor ears in the heels, so neither did that man ever exist, who could disconcert the order of the operations of his

mind. It is not in his power to believe, it is not in the power of any body else to make him believe truth without evidence. Take the first of these essentials; an object: God; Moses, Christ, Paul, heaven, hell, death, judgment. All these objects are what they are, independent of emperors, establishments, penalties, oaths, or any thing else of the kind. Take the second, a proposition exactly representing the object. That proposition is the truth. Now what have emperors, or establishments, or oaths, or penalties to do with the truth of the proposition? Every proposition is either true or false independent of imperial conduct. Moses was a faithful historian, is either true or false, government can vary nothing. Should government enact, Moses was a faithful historian; or on the contrary, Moses was an impostor, it would not at all affect the truth of the proposition. If he was a faithful historian, no act of government can make him an impostor; if he was an impostor, no government can establish his fidelity. So that the object, and the truth of the object, described in a proposition, are as independent on magistracy as the being and motions of the planets. Every proposition in scripture was the same when Juvenal ridiculed it, as when Milton revered it the same when Nero persecuted as when Elizabeth established it: and had poets and princes never existed, what the bible says of Moses would have been either true or false. Poetry and

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principality, a canon and a ballad are of equal ef ficacy here, that is, they effect nothing at all.

If neither an object of thought, nor a proposition descriptive of that object, at all depend on the will of the emperor, the only question that remains is, whether the assent of the mind to the truth of the description depends on his establishing the proposition by law? His majesty requires all his subjects to believe a proposition under pain of his displeasure; but no imperial edict can alter that order of the operations of the mind, which the king of kings, and lord of lords hath established in nature. The subject cannot believe or assent to a truth without evidence; he cannot receive that evidence without examination. In order to perceive the conformity of a proposition with the object it describes, his mind must compare the two together; and if, through a defect in his intellects, he should think the proposition affirms too much of the object, or if, through an abundance of intelligence, he should think the proposition affirms too little, in both cases he would deny the truth of the proposition, or the exactness of the description. What must he do in such a case? Can he assent to what he cannot perceive the evidence of? It is impossible. Shall he incur his majesty's displeasure by declaring he cannot receive the proposition for a true one? Shall he, to retain his majesty's favour, make oath against his conscience that he does believe the truth of the proposition? O cruel dilemma! That offends my prince; this affronts my God!