bond, by which they and their constituents were connected.

G. Did the legislative power in our constitution call the executive to account in their own right, or in that of the people?

P. In that of the people, certainly.

G. Then the people have a right to call them to account?

P. Who can doubt it? But there is one question more concerning expedience.

G. I understand you, Sir. Granting that responsibility is a natural state of right, and that it is allowed and incorporated in our government, and that we have both law and precedent to confirm it, yet it would still remain a question, when is it expedient to make use of this right?

P. I mean exactly so. The expedience of such a measure is a conclusion which ought to be drawn from a great many cool, deliberate, well-weighed premises. Do you think this the time?

G. By no means.

P. Why.

G. Because under such an administration as the present, (I only take the liberty to repeat what you said last night at supper to my uncle) composed of as great and good statesmen as ever adorned this, or any other country, we may expect the radical evils, that have accidentally crept into our government, to be thoroughly cleared away. You said, their wisdom, application and fidelity, were equal to the government of half a world.

P. I spoke as I thought, and I own I expect

from their beneficent hands not a temporary quietus, but substantial and lasting improvements, founding in our liberty the happiness of posterity, and an immortality of reputation to themselves. G. Suppose you should be deceived? P. It is not to be supposed.

G. May we not for argument sake imagine the worst?

P. Imagine the worst. Suppose only a few popular acts done to ingratiate administration with the people, and no attempts made to restore to the people at large that equal and universal representation, that purity of the democratical part of our constitution, to which we have an indubitable right, and which is a certain and effectual relief for many of the ills of which we so openly complain. Suppose all this, what then?

G. Why then where is your power to enforce responsibility?

P. Where it always was, in the people themselves.

G. But by what exertions?

P. By a general, calm, peaceable, but firm and resolute declaration of right. Governors know the people must be heard, when they are unanimous and firm. You have supposed a case or two, give me leave in my turn to suppose one founded on a fact. There was once a parliament in England, which expressly gave to royal proclamations the force of law. Suppose a modern parliament should do so?

G. I should say they were guilty of breach of trust, and had subverted the constitution.

P. You would say, with the great Locke, that there remains at all times inherent in the people, A SUPREME POWER to alter or remove the legislative, for when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them, the trust is abused and forfeited, and devolves to those who gave it.

MONDAY.

GENERALISSIMO,

G. A Generalissimo is a supreme commander.

P. Of what?

G. I thought of the military: but my uncle has puzzled me. I went to his room this morning as usual to pay my respects to him, and to enquire after his health; and, among other things, he said, George, ask your father who is general of the excise army, and who is Lord of hosts, or general of the church army, and desire him to inform you who raises, and officers, and animates, and pays these troops, who keep garrison, who take the field, to whom they swear, and for whom they fight?

P. I understand him. He loves a little mirth. G. The generalissimo of our contemplation is the supreme commander of the military and maritime force?

P. Yes; and it is this force, chiefly the military, and particularly in the state of a standing army, that we intend to examine. Let us go to the bottom of the subject: on what principle is force necessary to a free state?

G. On the great leading principle the happiness of the state.

P. Of the whole state?

G. Certainly, not of a part of it.

P. How does force contribute to this happiness? G. By placing the state in a condition of safety from foreign attempts to injure it.

P. Then armies are not intended in a free state to operate on the people who employ them?

G. No; it is impossible to suppose a people capable of choosing to be dragooned.

P. Then you are no friend to a standing army? G. Pardon me, Sir, the question is complex, and I am not yet master of all the ideas that compose it. Army stands for ten thousand, and army stands for a hundred thousand men. If a country be so extended as to require a hundred thousand men to defend it, then I am a friend to a standing force of a hundred thousand men : but if a country requires only ten thousand men to defend it, then I should think the other ninety thousand might be better cmployed.

P. I see you have a rule of proportion in your mind. You first think, what is the use, the end and design of an army; you next determine the just and proper quantum necessary to answer the end, which is the guard of the inhabitants of a district of a given size, and subject to such and such. injuries; and having determined how many men are necessary to this purpose, you think the rest superfluous.

G. Yes; and I think a superfluity of armed men is a superfluity of fire, active in its nature, and therefore dangerous.