it by deputation, we say he hath ubiquity, and so of the rest.

G. His majesty then has this property in proxy?

P. Yes; but as our representatives are themselves proxies for us, they cannot vote by proxy, and herein they differ from lords of parliament, who sit there in their own right, and who therefore can vote by proxy. And further, as they cannot delegate any to act in their stead, so it is impossible they should possess any perfections, except such as are personal. These are in some degree in each individual, and in a high degree in the collective body, and these I call the nature of representation.

G. You said independence was one property of parliament.

P. It is an essential property interwoven in the constitution, and it implies the absence of all undue influence of every kind. Neither the crown, by means of the army, or the officers of some branches of the revenue, nor the peers, by means of lords of parliament, or lords lieutenants of counties, may interfere. No, nor may the candidates ́themselves use any bribery or corrupt influence under heavy penalties.

G. You said incorruption was another property.

P. Yes, for a man may go uninfluenced into the house, and become corruptible by strong temptations there: in such a case, he would cease to be faithful to the trust reposed in him by the people, and of course would lay aside all that eleva

tion of soul, which we call magnanimity, and would sink from the noblest of all creatures, an object of public confidence, to the despicable state of a minister's tool.

G. Have not our legislators claimed these excellent properties, and passed many laws to secure them?

P. They have: but it is confessed, all means have been found inadequate.

G. Who can help it?

P. Not they who are so infatuated as not to see it, nor they who are so interested as to deny it, nor they who spend life in declaiming against human depravity.

G. Who then?

P. Such as understand the Lord's prayer, lead us not into temptation.

G. How do you mean, Sir?

P. Why I mean, that if human frailty is so great, it ought not to be put to such severe trials as endanger the virtue and felicity of a person, a family, a county, a kingdom, a world; for a British parliament may affect all these.

G. So you would keep men virtuous, by putting it out of their power to be vicious.

P. What can you do with them?
G. But is this possible?

P. Every thing that ought to be is possible. How much money do you think was spent at our last election?

U

G. It was reported above a hundred thousand pounds.

P. Well, let us suppose only a hundred thousand pounds. Upon whom was this spent?

G. Upon freehold electors. Old Sam was drunk for a week.

P. Suppose the electors had been ten times as many?

G. Why then ten times as much must have been spent. It would have cost a million.

P. And suppose instead of electing representatives for seven years, we had elected them only for one?

G. Then our seat in parliament would cost a million a year.

P. Would not annual parliaments and equal representation, put it absolutely out of the power of the whole world to destroy the independence of parliament ?

G. It should seem so; at least it is worth trying. But have we a RIGHT to these?

P. We have both a natural and constitutional right to these. Septennial parliaments are of late date, triennial are not much older, and it was no longer ago than the reign of Henry VI. that the people at large were deprived of this right, and the qualification of electors for knights of the shire determined, to be the owning of a freehold of the value of forty shillings a year, which by the way was then equivalent to twenty pounds of present value. As to boroughs, we say nothing of the m under this article; they do not deserve it.

G. You spoke of the subject of representation, Sir?

P. Yes, I ask what is represented. What ought to be represented?

G. The people undoubtedly.

P. Not dead houses and lands?

G. No. Bona fide, the people themselves.
P. What! all the people?

G. If all the people have lives, liberties, and properties, all the people have a natural right to choose the guardians of them.

P. They have also a constitutional one.

G. Would not this endanger property, by putting the poor on a level with the rich?

P. Neither property nor person ought to be endangered; but if one must suffer, better damage property than person: however, this is no question here, for the danger of both lies elsewhere, I mean in undue influence, not in the numbers of electors or elected. Keep representation pure and uninfluenced, and all things are safe

G. But is such an election practicable?

P. As easy as the election of a coroner, or a sheriff in the city.

G. What fault do you find, Sir, with the mode of representation ?

P. The establishment of the forementioned qualification having changed the subject of representation from person to property, you would suppose property was equally represented.

G. Certainly I should; whatever is represented ought to be equally represented.

P. Look at this scheme.

"A scheme of the proportions of the several counties in England paid to the landtax in 1693, and to the subsidies in 1697, compared with the number of members they send to parliament."

"In this scheme the proportions are thus considered, viz. That as the whole kingdom sends 513 members to parliament, so the whole of each tax is divided into 513 equal parts; and the first column shewing the name of the county, the second shews how many of the 513 parts each county paid to the land-tax in 1693, the third how many of the 513 parts each county paid to the subsidies in 1697, and the fourth, how many of the 513 members each county sends to parliament."