multiplied into a, &c; the combination, by addition or subtraction, being also expressed by the signs and — .

Now, it is when applied to this latter purpose that the algebraic language possesses such exclusive excellence. The mere magnitudes themselves might be represented by figures,as in geometry, as well as in any way whatever; but the operations they are to be subjected to,if described in words, must be set before the mind slowly, and in succession, so that the impression is weakened, and the clear apprehension rendered difficult. In the algebraic expression, on the other hand, so much meaning is concentrated into a narrow space, and the impression made by all the parts is so simultaneous, that nothing can be more favourable to the exertion of the reasoning powers, to the continuance of their action, and their security against error."

CHAPTER FOURTH.

RIGHT USE OF WORDS.

§. 137. Imperfections of artificial language or words.

We now find men furnished, in addition to the language of natural signs, with the artificial forms of oral, and alphabetical or written language, and possessed of the great advantages, which may be supposed to flow from these powerful instruments of mental action and communication. Artificial or conventional language may be said without exaggeration not only to express ideas, but to multiply them. At least, the facility of expressing and communicating thought by means of it sets men upon renewed thinking, and the result is wider views, more correct principles, moral, civil, and scientific improvement. And notwithstanding, it cannot be denied, that language, (we have reference in this chapter particularly to artificial language or WORDS, which is a term standing both for oral and written signs,) is not without its imperfections. It may be said in general, to be imperfect, or to fail of its object, whenever the same ideas are not excited in the mind of the hearer or reader, as in that of the speaker or writer. Nor can we reasonably expect, when we look at the cause or foundation of this imperfection, that it will ever be otherwise; since that cause will be found to exist ultimately in the condition of the mind and in our ideas, rath

er than in the words, which stand for them. This requires a brief illustration.

It often happens, that men view the same object and actions in different lights; whether it be owing to some difference in early education, or to local prejudices, or to some other cause, the fact itself is well known, and may well be considered, as frequently unavoidable. Hence different persons very often attach the same name to certain objects and actions, when their views of those actions. and objects are not the same. One has a greater number, than another, of simple ideas entering into his complex notions, and perhaps, in the formation of the compound, they respectively give to those simple ideas a different relation to each other. The consequence, therefore, is, that, in such cases, as have now been mentioned, the names or words, which are used, necessarily fail of exciting in the hearer the same ideas, that exist in the mind of the speaker.

Many of the disputes, which have existed in the world, (and the history of philosophical opinions shows, how numerous they have been,) have been caused by a misunderstanding of this sort; different persons using the same terms, when their ideas are not the same. In support of this remark, it will be enough merely to refer to the often repeated discussions upon virtue, conscience, faith, free will, obligation, nature, religion, infinity, miracles, &c.

-But language, in so far as it is imperfect, fails of the great object, for which it was invented and agreed upon, and it, therefore, becomes important to diminish the amount of this failure and to guard against it, as far as possible. To this end, the following rules on the right use of words may be laid down.

§. 138. Words are not to be used without meaning.

RULE FIRST. In the employment of language, the first rule to be laid down, is this, that we should never use a word without some meaning. It may be thought extraordinary, that any should use words in this way, but a little examination cannot fail to convince one of the fact. Let any one inquire of those persons, who are in the habit

of employing such words, as instinct, sympathy, infinity, antipathy, and a variety of others, which might be mentioned, and it will speedily appear, that while some are greatly at a loss to assign any sort of meaning to them, others are utterly unable to do it. They are applied, as one may say, by rote; they have been learnt from hearing others use them, and are repeated, because they have been learnt, without their significancy having ever been inquired into.

There are not only words used in this way, but whole phrases, of which the Peripatetic philosophy readily affords many instances. What can be said of "vegetative souls," "intentional species," "substantial forms,” “abhorrence of a vacuum," and the like, but that they are combinations of terms without meaning; and while they have the appearance of science, are no better, than an intended imposition on the understanding?

This error is much more frequent, than has generally been supposed;-many words go down from one to another by a sort of hereditary descent, and are passively received and adopted, like a thousand opinions and prejudices, which exist again, merely because they have existed before. We are exceedingly apt to adopt words from our parents and instructers, and to repeat the peculiar phraseology of our favourite sect or party, and either out of our great reverence for them, or from the circumstance of our being too indolent to make careful inquiries, we rest satisfied in a shameful ignorance of every thing but a mere sound. Hence, if it be considered desirable, that language should retain its value, which chiefly consists in recording and communicating thought, the rule laid down should be strictly observed,-not to employ words without meaning.

§. 139. Words should stand for distinct and determinate ideas.

SECOND RULE-It is not enough, that we use words with meaning or have ideas for them, but a second rule is, that the meaning or the ideas be distinct and determinate.

We apply the epithet, DISTINCT, to simple ideas, mean

ing by the expression, that they should carefully be kept separate from and not confounded with other simple ideas. The epithet, DETERMINATE, may more properly be applied to the class of our ideas called complex. As complex ideas are made up of simple ones, when we say, that they should be determinate, the meaning is, that a precise collection of simple ideas should be fixed upon in the mind; that it should not remain a matter of uncertainty what simple ideas are included, and what are not. We at once see the value of this rule. If our simple ideas are confounded, one with another, or if we know not accurately the elements of our complex states of mind, these circumstances necessarily diminish very much from the value of the words, standing for them. With this explanation, the rule cannot fail to be understood, viz.-That our words should have a distinct and determinate meaning; or what is the same thing, that the ideas should be distinct and determinate, which the words express.

The application of this rule seems to be particularly important in regard to terms, standing for complex ideas of internal origin, what Mr. Locke calls MIXED MODES; espepecially such names of mixed modes, as are of a moral kind. And one reason of this is, that these terms have no settled objects in nature, no archetypes, to which they can be referred, which are external to, and independent of the mind itself. They have been rightly regarded, as a species of mental creations. The materials or simple ideas, which compose them, are in a certain sense independent of the mind, but the arrangement of them is not; and they, therefore, have an existence by the mere choice and act of the mind, and are properly intellectual formations.

The word JUSTICE comes within the class of ideas which we have now referred to, and, being a moral term, is of frequent occurrence; but, although every person may be supposed to attach some meaning to it, that meaning is not always determinate, and, in consequence, the term often causes perplexity. We will imagine the proper definition of it to be this,-The assigning to any one reward or punishment agreeably to LAW. It will readily occur, that the complex