as the same should be estimated in such manner as congress might from time to time prescribe. But congress had no power to compel the states to fulfil those engagements; the moral bond was all they had to rely upon, and every one knows how weak is that tie upon states as well as upon individuals, if not strengthened by a power, which they cannot resist, and which they are forced to obey. To increase the difficulty, congress could not exercise the powers which we have enumerated without the concurrence of the delegates of more than two-thirds of the states, that is to say, of nine out of thirteen. The votes were taken by states, represented by their delegates. If the members of a delegation were equally divided in opinion on a particular point, it followed that the state that they represented, was so far deprived of a voice, which still increased the difficulty of obtaining the required majority.

The states, it is true, were prohibited from separately exercising the powers which they had conferred on the congress; they could not, without the consent of that body, send or receive embassies, or make treaties with foreign governments; neither could they, without such consent, engage in war, unless in case of actual invasion, or of imminent danger of being attacked by the Indians. They could not grant commissions to ships of war, or issue letters of marque or reprisal, except after a declaration of war by congress, or in case of their being infested by pirates, and then only until congress

should determine otherwise; nor could they keep on foot any body of forces in time of peace, except such as congress should think necessary for garrisoning their forts; and in order to prevent their confederating with each other, to the detriment of the union, no two or more states were to enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever with each other, without the consent of the United States in congress assembled. But those prohibitions, while they paralyzed the action of the states, added no strength to that of the union, which still was dependent on the precarious compliance of each individual state with the requisitions of the federal head.

As congress had no power to levy taxes or imposts of any kind, the regulation of commerce remained entirely with the individual states. Each state might act in that respect as it thought proper; and therefore the nation, as such, could not countervail the fiscal regulations of foreign powers, however much they might tend to the detriment of the agriculture, commerce or manufactures of the country; while, on the other hand, it was lawful for the states to carry on a war of commercial regulations against each other, which would inevitably have resulted in a dissolution of the union, and perhaps at last in bloody hostilities between its members.

Such were the most prominent features of that confederation, which, as it were by a miracle, carried the

United States through the "war of independence." A few years of peace made its imperfections manifest to all; and in the year 1787, a convention of delegates from all the states met at Philadelphia, in order to remedy its defects. The result of their labours was the present constitution of the United States.

CHAPTER II.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION.

THE title of this instrument at once points out the difference between it and the confederation that existed before. It bears on its face the stamp of a national government; and it was, no doubt, the view of the framers to give the character to the new compact that the was about to be entered into, without, however, infringing on the sovereignty of the states more than was absolutely necessary to attain the objects declared in the instrument, and those were expressed to be "to form a more perfect union; to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure for ever the blessings of liberty."

This was a most difficult task to be accomplished. A confederation, in the strict sense of the word, had been attempted and had failed; a consolidation of the states under one general government, of which they should be mere subordinate districts or provinces, was not even thought of, it being well understood that such a government could not exist over such a widely extended coun

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try under republican forms, and that it would inevitably lead to a monarchy, and perhaps to despotism. A form of government therefore was resolved upon, which should be compounded of both, in such a manner as not to deprive the states of more of their sovereignty and independence, than was necessary to insure the permanency of the union and the welfare and safety of the whole.

To designate this new form of government, the word constitution was substituted to that of confederation, while on the other hand the denomination of United States was retained, the former being expressiva national, the latter of a federal system. The purely federal clauses by which, in the articles of confederation, the states are said to retain their "sovereignty, freedom and independence," "to be bound to each other in a firm league of friendship, and to bind themselves to assist each other against foreign aggression," were left out of the new compact, as inconsistent with its spirit, and what remained of sovereignty in the states after the concessions made to the government of the union, was left, as a matter of inference, to be gathered from the context of the whole instrument, in which the word "sovereignty" is not once used, as applied to the states. And in order to stamp the national character upon it from the very outset, the preamble begins with these remarkable words. "We, the people of the United States ... do ordain and establish this constitution for the