SECTION II. WHAT BILLS REQUIRE ACCEPTANCE, AND BY WHOM AND WHEN THEY SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. § 482. We come now to consider the formal procedure in procuring acceptance. And in the first place: There are some bills, such as are drawn payable immediately on demand, which are not presented for acceptance, but only for payment. They are considered in the preceding chapter on "Presentment for Acceptance." And there are some bills which do not need acceptance, in order to bind the drawee, or rather in which the act of drawing itself constitutes acceptance. Thus, a bill drawn without being addressed to any drawee,1 or drawn by a party upon himself, or by a partner upon the firm of which he is a member, for partnership purposes. A bill drawn by the president of a corporation in its behalf, on the treasurer thereof, would be a bill drawn by the corporation on itself, and hence not need acceptance; but if not drawn on the treasurer in his official character, it would be otherwise.5 § 483. Either of a set of bills may be presented for acceptance, and if not accepted, a right of action accrues immediately upon due notice against all the antecedent parties. to the bill, without any others of the set being presented. But the drawee should accept but one of the set, for if two or more of the set should be accepted, and should come 'Marion, etc., R. Co. v. Hodge, 9 Ind., 163; Dougal v. Cowles, 5 Day, 511. Hasey v. White Pigeon Company, 1 Doug. (Mich.), 193; Cunningham v Wardwell, 3 Fairf., 466; Roach v. Ostler, 1 Man. & R., 120; cited 1 Pars. N. & B., 288. See ante, § 128. 'Dougal v. Cowles, 5 Day, 511; Miller v. Thompson, 3 Man. & G., 576. 'Hasey v. White Pigeon Company, 1 Doug. (Mich.), 193. See ante, § 129. "Halsted v. The Mayor, 5 Barb., 218. 'Downes v. Church, 13 Pet., 207; Bank of Pittsburg v. Neal, 22 How., 108. into the hands of different holders, and the acceptor should pay one, he might also be obliged to pay the others also.1 Where one of a set which was made and accepted in blank is filled up, varying from the others, not only in date and amount, but also as to time and place of payment, and is negotiated by the correspondent of the acceptor to a bona fide party, without notice that such act was done. without authority, the acceptor is liable to such bona fide holder.2 It seems that if the drawee accept two or more parts of a set of bills, and the several parts come into the hands of different bona fide holders without notice, he will be liable to pay on each part.3 484. In the second place, as to the person who may accept a bill. The drawing of a bill imports a contract on the part of the drawer that the drawee is a person competent to accept; and, therefore, if the holder upon presentment of the bill ascertains that the drawee is incapable of contracting-for instance, is a minor, an idiot, or a married woman he may cause it to be protested, and proceed against antecedent parties, as usual in cases of dishonor.* § 485. Stranger can not accept bill except for honor.Except in cases of acceptance for honor, no one can accept a bill except the party on whom it is drawn, or his authorized agent. Thus, if it be addressed to A., an acceptance by B., unless for honor, will not bind him as acceptor. But the holder of such a paper might treat it as a note." 1 Bank of Pittsburg v. Neal, 22 How., 109. Edwards on Bills, 381; Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*192], 221; Thomson on Bills, 92; Story on Bills, § 107; see Mellish v. Simeon, 2 H. Bl., 378; Tooting v. Hubbard, 3 Bos. & Pul., 291. Davis v. Clarke, 6 Q. B., 16 (51 E. C. L. R.); Jenkins v. Hutchinson, 13 Q B., 744 (66 E. C. L. R.); Polhill v. Walter, 3 B. & Ad., 114 (23 E. C. L. R.) May v. Kelly, 27 Ala., 497; Keenan v. Nash, 8 Minn., 409. Davis v. Clarke, 6 Q. B., 16 (51 E. C. L. R.); 'Fielder v. Marshall, 30 L. J. C. P., 158 (1861); B. & N., III; Benjamin's Chalmers' Digest, 67. May v. Kelly, 27 Ala., 497. There can not be a series of acceptors;1 and if a bill addressed to one be accepted by two persons, it has been thought that the acceptance of the first will be vitiated by having been altered in an essential part, unless made with the acceptor's consent. But if any other person, after an acceptance, subsequently accepts the bill for the purpose of guaranteeing its credit, at the acceptor's request, in the usual form of an acceptance, then, if there is a sufficient consideration, he may be bound thereby as a guarantor; but he is not liable as an acceptor. And the addition will not be a material alteration.* In an English case, where the bill was addressed by John 'Jackson v. Hudson, 2 Camp., 447; Bayley on Bills, 100; Story on Bills, § 254. In Malcomson v. Malcomson, 1 L. R. Ireland, 228 (1878), a bill was drawn on a firm doing business in the name of the "Milford Spinning Co.," and Mr. Malcomson, a member, acccepted it for M. S. Co. and self." The vicechancellor said: "There was no legal acceptance by Mr. M., and it is not his bill." 3 Thomson on Bills, 112, 212. There being no agreement as to any guaranty. Story on Bills, § 254; Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.), 321; Jackson v. Hudson, 2 Camp., 447. In this case the bill was drawn on and accepted by I. Irving. Under his acceptance a defendant wrote, " 'Accepted, Jos. Hudson, payable at, etc." Hudson was sued as acceptor; and plaintiff offered to prove that he had had dealings with Irving, and had refused to trust him further, unless defendant would become his surety; and the defendant, in order to guarantee Irving's credit, wrote the acceptance in the bill. Lord Ellenborough said this was no acceptance, but a collateral undertaking, which should have been declared on as such. See Bayley on Bills, 100. In Thomson on Bills, p. 212, it is said : It seems that a second person may accept a bill addressed to a first, if he accept on the footing expressed or understood at the time the bill was issued that he was to be a cautioner for the first; and if a person in this way become validly a party to a bill, he stands toward the holder in the same relation as if he were a coprincipal, his rights as cautioner merely regulating his right of relief against the true principal." But it was recently held by the House of Lords that, in Scotland as in England, a bill can only be accepted by the drawee; and that no other person can be subjected to a joint obligation with him; and further, that a party signing the bill on the back after the acceptor could not be regarded as a guarantor, there being no memorandum within the Statute of Frauds. Steele v. McKinlay, 43 L. J. R., 358. See Malcomson v. Malcomon, 1 L. R. Ireland, 228. 'Smith v. Lockridge, 8 Bush (Ky.), 425 (1871). In this case the bill was addressed to W. T. and George Lane, and by them accepted. It was indorsed by S. H. Lane, H. Smith, and J. J. Anderson, and discounted by D. S. Lockridge. Smith and Anderson, two of the indorsers, claimed that it was accepted by the Lanes only when they indorsed it, and afterward that it was altered by being accepted by J. A. Blaydes, without their knowledge or consent. Blaydes' name was written across the face of the bill as an acceptor; but the court held that he could not be an acceptor, and that it was not an alteration which discharged the indorsers, because in nowise changing their obligations or duties. Hart to "Mr. John Hart, payable to me or order "-across its face was written, "Accepted, H. J. Clarke"-it was held that Clarke could not be sued as acceptor, and Coleridge, J., said: “ Acceptance can only be made by the party addressed, or for his honor. Here the last is not pretended, and the first can not be presumed."1 A party may be bound as an acceptor by any name or designation he may see fit to adopt, provided it clearly appears by extraneous evidence who was intended; and if he intends to contract by a certain designation, he is estopped to deny that the name by which he assumed to enter into the contract was the appropriate appellation. "The West Tennessee Department of the Life Association of America" would therefore be bound upon an acceptance made by its proper officer of a bill addressed to "The Western Department of the Life Association of America."2 § 486. Where a person other than the one addressed as drawee writes his name across the face of the bill, it would be competent for him to show as between immediate parties (and on account of its ambiguity, perhaps, as to others) in what character he intended to be bound.3 But if a party accept a bill in which no drawee is named, it will be regarded as acknowledging that he was the drawee, and will operate as a complete accepted instrument.* § 487. An acceptance may be made by an agent; but, certainly, the holder may require the production by him of clear and explicit authority from his principal to accept in his name, and without its production may treat the bill as dishonored; and it has been doubted whether the holder 'Davis v. Clarke, 6 Ad. & El. (N. S.), 16 (51 E. C. L. R.) 5 "Hascall v. Life Association of America, 12 N. Y. S. C. (5 Hun), 152. See vol. 1, § 399. 'Curry v. Reynolds, 44 Ala., 349. 'Wheeler v. Webster, 1 E. D. Smith, 1; ante, § 97; 1 Pars. N. & B., 289; Gray v. Milner, 8 Taunt., 739; 3 J. B. Moore, 90; Davis v. Clarke, 6 Q. B., 16; Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.), 212; Benjamin's Chalmers' Digest, 50. "Atwood v. Munnings, 7 B. & C., 278 (14 E. C. L. R.); Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.), 113; Chitty (13 Am. ed.), 320; Thomson on Bills, 211; Roscoe on Bills, 71; Beawes, 87. is bound to acquiesce in an acceptance by an agent, as such an acceptance would multiply the proofs of the holder's title. But if the agency were clear, we think the holder would be bound to take the agent's acceptance-acceptance by procuration, as it is termed. If the holder takes an acceptance from one unduly alleging his agency, and withqut giving notice to antecedent parties, they will be released, if the principal refuses to ratify the act. 2 8 If the bill be drawn upon an agent in his individual name, it would seem clear on principle that none but he, as an individual, could accept. But in Georgia, where the drawee was designated simply as "William S. Scruggs," an acceptance by him "for the Opinion Newspaper," was held to bind the firm doing business under that name. This view could only be sustained upon the theory that the firm adopted and used his name. In Colorado, where the bill was addressed to "F. D. H., Treasurer," and accepted in like style, and the direction was to charge to the account of a certain company, evidence was admitted in an action brought by the payee to show that the drawee accepted in an official capacity as treasurer of and for the company he represented. In Mississippi, a client drew on his attorney, and the latter, declining to accept in his own name, accepted as agent of the principal, all the parties being present; and it was held that the circumstances were admissible in evidence, and that the paper might be treated as the note of the principal, and that he was bound without demand or notice of dishonor." § 488. Bills drawn on joint parties and partners.—If a bill is drawn on two persons not partners, both should accept, and if either refuse, the bill may be protested for his 3 1 Coore v. Callaway, 1 Esp., 115; Byles, 113; Chitty, 321; Roscoe, 171. 'Beawes, No. 87; Thomson on Bills, 211. Thomson, 211; Chitty, 321 Markham v. Hazen, 48 Ga., 570. And see also Hardy v. Pilcher, 57 Miss. 18, and § 418. |