S232. An admission by the adult, and the declaration that the party would get his pay, but accompanied by a re fusal to give a note, would not amount to a ratification.1 Nor would an admission, accompanied by a promise to endeavor "to get my brother bound with me."" Nor would the language, "I consider your claim worthy my attention, but not my first attention,' "8"I will have to pay, I suppose, but I shall do so at my convenience." Nor would a direction in the adult's will, that his just debts be paid, apply to debts contracted in infancy.' 5 § 233. The promise of the adult must be made to the party with whom he contracted, or his authorized agent, in order to amount to ratification; and if made to a third party, it will be insufficient." "It results from the fact of the original contract not being binding on the infant, that the new promise must possess all the ingredients of a complete agreement, to enable the plaintiff to recover against the infant. Hence, as no agreement is complete until the minds of the contracting parties meet, the new promise, to be binding on the infant, must be made to the creditor in person, or to his agent. The new promise creates a new contract; and the old debt supplies the consideration." And if it be coupled with a condition, as to pay "when able," the plaintiff must show the happening of the contingency, but need not show that payment may be made without inconvenience.8 If the promise be shown to have depended on any other condition, its fulfilment must be proven. 1 Hale v. Gerrish, 8 N. H., 374. Wilcox v. Roath, 12 Conn., 550. 'Smith v. Mayo, 9 Mass., 62. 6 Goodsell v. Myers, 3 Wend., 479; Bigelow v. Grannis, 2 Hill, 150; Hoit v. Underhill, 9 N. H., 439; Reed v. Boshears, 4 Sneed, 118. 'Hogdes v. Hunt, 22 Barb., 150, Paige, J. 8 Thompson v. Lay, 4 Pick., 48; Cole v. Saxby, 3 Esp., 159; Everson v.car◄ penter, 17 Wend., 419. • Ib.; Proctor v. Sears, 4 Allen, 95; Chandler v. Glover, 32 Penn. St., 509. a $ 234. Mere part payment does not amount to ratification by the adult. Nor does a submission to arbitration, unless it proceed to a decision that the adult must pay. But expressions of intention to abide by a former award, or accepting its benefits, would suffice. And the infant's conduct may be such as to amount to ratification. Mere silence and failure to disaffirm will not in general be sufficient alone ;4 but connected with circumstances may become so. Thus, if the adult keep property purchased in infancy, after being requested to return it if he did not intend to keep it, it was held to be a ratification. And where an infant bought a yoke of oxen, for which he gave his note, and after his majority sold them and used the money, the like decision was rendered. And there are other decisions to like effect, where the adult has retained land purchased in infancy,” or personal property,' or taken a deed to property. If the adult refuse to return the consideration when notified to do so, and still has it in his power, it seems clear that he should be bound; but mere retention of the consideration, without such notice to return, would not alone suffice, 10 and if it had been disposed of before the infant reached his majority, the failure to return it would be no ratification. 11 $ 235. Ignorance of the law excuses no one, and therefore it is not necessary to a valid ratification of a contract made by an infant, that the adult ratifying should know the 1 228. Smith v. Mayo, 9 Mass., 62; Robbins v. Eaton, 10 N. H., 561 ; Hinely v. Margaritz, 3 Barr, 428. Benham v. Bishop, 9 Conn., 330; 1 Parsons N. & B., 75, 76. Green v. Green, 69 N. Y., 553, where there was failure to disaffirm for three years. But see Davis v. Dudley, 70 Me., 236, where nine years elapsed. Aldrich v. Grimes, io N. H., 194. • Lawson v. Lovejoy, 8 Greenl., 405. 11 Robbins v. Eaton, 10 N. H., 506, 6 10 fact that his infancy rendered his contract invalid,' and it matters not that he supposed he was already bound.2 A different view has been taken in some cases, but the doctrine of the text is sustained both by decisions of courts and opinions of distinguished juridical writers. It will, at least, be presumed that an adult, ratifying a contract entered into in infancy, knew the fact that he was not legally bound.5 § 236. Written ratifications.-In England and some of the United States, ratification must be in writing. In 1828, Parliament enacted the statute of 9 George IV., c. 14, commonly called Lord Tenterden's act, whereby it is provided that "no action shall be maintained whereby to charge any person, upon any promise made after full age, to pay any debt contracted during infancy, or upon any ratification, after full age, of any promise or simple contract made during infancy, unless such promise or ratification shall be made by some writing signed by the party to be charged therewith." And similar statutes have been enacted in most of the United States. In England, the Court of Exchequer held that the statute made a distinction between new promises and ratification, and that "ratification," as therein used, would go so far as to comprehend such a ratification as would make a person liable as principal for an act done by another in his name. But this view has been criticised. And the view of Martin, B., in a later case, in the same court (in which, however, the judges were divided in opinion), defining ratification to be a "consent by a per-. son, after he becomes of full age, to be liable for a debt 2 King v. Jamison, 66 Mo., 424. 1 Morse v. Wheeler, 4 Allen, 570. 'Harmer v. Killing, 5 Esp., 102; Reed v. Boshears, 4 Sneed, 118; Hinely v. Margaritz, 3 Barr, 428; Curtin v. Patten, 11 Sergt. & R., 305. Schouler on Domestic Relations, 583. "Code of Virginia (ed. 1873), p. 985, ch. Frauds, and Throop on Verbal Agreements. Taft v. Sergeant, 18 Barb., 322. 140. See Brown on Statute of 'I Parsons N. & B., 77; Schouler on Domestic Relations, 576. Harris v. Wall, 1 Exch., 122. contracted during infancy, expressed to the effect that he is willing to affirm it and treat it as valid,”? seems to be a clear and correct conception of the subject. $ 237. If an infant, after he becomes of age, retire from a firm, of which he has been a member, he must give notice of the fact; otherwise he will be bound by its contracts made after his majority. But the mere fact that he con ” tinues in a firm, after his majority, is no ratification of contracts made by the firm while he was an infant. § 238. Note of infant and adult.—If an infant, together with an adult, make a joint promissory note, it has been held, in England, that the payee may bring his action upon it against the adult, without making the infant a party. But in some American cases a different view is taken, the infant's undertaking being voidable, not absolutely void ; and this view is specially applicable when the note is not negotiable. SECTION IV. MARRIED WOMEN. § 239. By the common law of England, and of many of the States of the United States, in which it has been adopted and preserved, the wife merges her personality by marriage in the person of her husband. They two become in law one person, in so far as affects the business concerns of life. Goode v. Mawson v. Blane, 10 Exch., 206. Harrison, 5 B. & Ald., 147. • Crabtree v. May, 1 B. Mon., 289. Burgess v. Merrill, 4 Taunt., 468 ; Chandler v. Parkes, 3 Esp., 76; Jaffray v. Frebain, 5 Esp., 47 ; Edwards on Bills, 67, note ; Byles [*59), 149. In Taylor 1. Dansby, 42 Mich., 84, held that adult co-maker with infant might be treated as sole maker, suit against the infant having been discontinued. Slocum v. Hooker, 12 Barb., 563; 13 Barb., 536. * Cole v. Pennell, 2 Rand., 174; Wamsley v. Lindenberger, 2 Rand., 478 ; Green, J. , saying : "In England, a 'note of hand given by an infant, even for necessaries, is perhaps void, because, having the effect of a bill of exchange by statute , he might be precluded from contesting the consideration against a third person. But no such objection exists as to the note of hand given in this case." That person is the husband, and the wife can make no con. tract binding upon herself, or upon her husband, without his consent. This rule of the common law, which grew out of the feudal system, has been modified or abolished by statute in some of the States, and the tendency of legislation is to enlarge and enfranchise the capacity of married women, especially in those States which are the seats of great commercial centres. Experiments upon social institutions are the order of the day, but innovations of the kind are, to say the least, of very doubtful policy. $ 240. Wherever the common law prevails a married woman can not bind herself as the drawer, acceptor, maker, or indorser of a negotiable instrument, and such instruments signed by her (unless as agent for another) are absolutely void. And even a promise made by her after her husband's death to pay a bill or note which she executed during his lifetime will not bind her unless upon a new and good consideration.8 $ 241. The wife's identity is so completely merged in the husband's that she can no more contract with him than with a stranger. Therefore the drawing or indorsement of a bill or note by a husband to his wife is void, and she can not sue upon it either in his lifetime, or against his executor after his decease. But the husband may endorse it to her in order that she may be the mere conduit, and indorse it a 1 2 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 442; 2 Kent Com., 129. Mason v. Morgan, 2 Ad. & El., 30; Howe v. Wildes, 34 Me., 566; Chouteau v. Merry, 3 Mo., 254; Van Steenburgh v. Hoffman, 15 Barb., 28; Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) (*20], 28. * Loyd v. Lee, i Strange, 94; Chitty, Jr., 242 (1717); Meyer v. Haworth, 8 Ad. & El., 467 ; Littlefield v. Spee, 2 B. & Ad., 811; Eastwood v. Kenyon, il Ad. & El., 438 ; Vance v. Wells, 6 Ala., 737 ; 8 Ala., 399; Watkins v. Halstead, 2 Sandf., 311 ; Schouler on Domestic Relations, 74; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) (*63), 153 Gay v. Kingsley, 11 Allen, 345. Held otherwise in Nebraska under statute, May v. May, 9 Neb., 16. • Jackson v. Parks, 10 Cush., 550 ; Sweat v. Hall, 8 Vt., 187. But held in Tennessee that in equity the wife, then widowed, might enforce a note of her late husband when given during coverture for her moneys collected by him. McCampbell v. McCampbell, 2 Lea., 661. |