use fictitious names as their own, and when there is a real party in existence who uses a fictitious name as descriptive. of, and with intent to bind himself, it is the same in law as if it were his real name; and he may be sued by the holder, and declared against as having contracted by such adopted name.1 But if it were not a name which he adopted and used as his own, the only civil remedy of the holder would be a suit in tort for the false representation."

SECTION III.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED IN BLANK.

142. In subsequent portions of this work will be found the citation and discussion of cases illustrating the rights of holders of negotiable instruments intrusted to another with blanks, and of holders of such instruments altered after issue; but we deem it proper here to state the general principles applicable to them. Parties often lend their mercantile credit to others by signing their names to blank papers to be afterward filled as bills of exchange or promissory notes written over their signatures as drawers or makers; or by signing their names in the appropriate manner to indicate that they design to bind themselves as acceptors or indorsers of the instrument which it is contemplated to complete upon such blank papers. And it is a settled principle of commercial law, that when such instruments are afterward completed by the holder of such blanks, to whom they are loaned, such parties become as absolutely bound as if they had signed them after their terms were written out; and further, that the presence of their names upon blanks purports an

1 Ladd v. Rogers, 11 Allen, 209.

2 Bartlett v. Tucker, 104 Mass., 345.

* See chapter XXVI, sec. iii, Vol. 1, § 843 et seq. See chapter XLIII, sec. vi, Vol. 2, § 1405 et seq VOL. I.-10

authority granted to the holder to fill them for any sum, and with any terms as to time, place, and conditions of payment. And that although the party may prescribe limits to the holder, a bona fide transferee from him, ignorant of such limitation of authority, when he takes an instrument which has exceeded it, may recover upon it.1

In an early case, where the party had indorsed his name on the back of five copper-plate checks, blank as to sums, dates, and times of payment, and Galley, the holder, filled them up as his own notes, with dif ferent dates, sums, and times of payment, the indorser was held bound to the plaintiff, who had discounted them, and Lord Mansfield said: "The indorsement on a blank note is a letter of credit for an indefinite sum. The defendant said: 'Trust Galley to any amount, and I will be his security.' It does not lie in his mouth to say the indorsements were not regular." 2 And this admirable statement of the law is almost universally quoted with approval, and followed as a precedent, applying equally to maker, acceptor, and drawer, as to the indorser.3 The United States Supreme Court has said on the same subject:

This text is approvingly cited in Frank v. Lilienfeld, 33 Grat., 384. In Snyder v. Van Doren, 46 Wisc., 602, this doctrine was applied where a note was signed by the first maker for accommodation, leaving blanks for words, making it a joint or several obligation, and in that form he delivered it to the person accominodated. The latter procured other parties to sign it as joint makers with the first; and the first maker was held liable to the holder, although but for the blanks being left, the note would have been regarded as altered and avoided. 2 Russel v. Langstaffe, 2 Doug., 514 (1781).

१

Usher v. Dauncey, 4 Camp., 97 (1814) (Bill); Bulkley v. Butler, 2 B. & C., 425; (Bill held good, though sum not filled up till after bankruptcy of acceptor); Powell v. Duff, 3 Camp., 182; Schultz v. Astley, 29 E. C. L. R., 414; Mahone v. Central Bank, 17 Ga., 111; Fullerton v. Sturgiss, 4 Ohio N. S., 529; Bank of Commonwealth v. Curry, 2 Dana, 142; Bank of Limestone v. Perrick, 5 T. B. Mon., 25; Jones v. Shelbyville Ins. Co., 1 Metc. (Ky.), 58; Michigan Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt., 11; Androscoggin Bank v. Kimball, 10 Cush., 373; Nichol v. Bate. 10 Yerg., 429; Ives v. Farmers' Bank, 2 Allen, 236; Rich v. Starbuck, 51 Ind., 87; Hardy v. Norton, 66 Barbour, 527; Joseph v. National Bank, 17 Kansas, 259; Waldron v. Young, 9 Heiskell, 777; Snyder v. Van Doren, 46 Wisc., 602; Coburn v. Webb., 56 Ind., 96; Thomson on Bills, 37.

"Where a party to a negotiable instrument intrusts it to the custody of another, with blanks not filled up, whether it be for the purpose to accommodate the person to whom it was intrusted, or to be used for his own benefit, such negotiable instrument carries on its face an implied authority to fill up the blanks and perfect the instrument; and as between such party and innocent third parties, the person to whom it was so intrusted must be deemed the agent of the party who committed such instrument to his custody --or, in other words, it is the act of the principal, and he is bound by it." And again: "But the authority implied. from the existence of the blanks would not authorize the person intrusted with the instrument to vary or alter the material terms of the instrument by erasing what is written or printed as part of the same, nor pervert the meaning and scope of the same by filling the blanks with stipulations repugnant to what was plainly and clearly expressed in the instrument before it was so delivered." 2

.. "And

it does not confer authority to make any additions to the terms of the note; and if any such of a material character are made by such a party, without the consent of the party from whom the paper was received, it will avoid the note even in the hands of an innocent holder." 3 It has been held that if the blank space be filled with terms foreign to the apparent object of such a blank, an innocent holder can not recover.1

§ 143. Illustrations of authority implied. The authority implied by a signature to a blank, and the credit. granted, are so extensive, that the party so signing, will be bound to a bona fide transferee in due course, though

1

Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal, 22 How., 107; Davidson v. Lanier, 4 Wall., 457; Angle v. N. W., etc., Ins. Co., 92 U. S. (2 Otto), 330.

2

Angle v. N. W. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 92 U. S. (2 Otto), 331. See also Goodman v. Simonds, 20 Howard, 361; Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal, 22d Id., 108. Coburn v. Webb, 56 Ind., 100; Ivory v. Michael, 33 Mo., 400. See McGrath v. Clark, 56 N. Y., 36, and vol. 2, § 1406.

2

the holder was only authorized to use it for one purpose, and has perverted it to another,' though authorized to be filled for a certain amount and a greater is inserted; and though the authority was limited to a time which has expired, or was only to be exercised upon a condition which has not happened. If the date be left blank, any holder has a right to insert the true date; and should he insert an improper date, the parties will still be bound to a bona fide holder for value and without notice of the impropriety, but a party having notice, could not recover, unless he acquired it from one who took it bona fide without notice. The marginal figures being no part of the instrument, it has been held that where the holder of a note, in blank, filled it up and negotiated it for a larger amount than was indicated by the marginal figures, this did not vitiate the note although he also altered the figures. If the place of payment be left blank, the principles above stated apply, and so if there be left a blank for the name of the promisor, so that words may be inserted making it joint or several, and additional makers sign and unite in the note, it will not be a material alteration unless it was known to the holder that authority was exceeded to fill the blanks.'

143a. A bill without a drawer is a contradiction of terms, and the acceptance of a bill, blank as to the drawer,

In

1 Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass., 45; Frank v. Lilienfeld, 33 Grat., 384. this case a wife indorsed for her husband's accommodation, a note blank as to date, time, and place of payment, amount, and name of payee. It was filled up in excess of authority, and the bona fide holder recovered against her, and subjected her separate estate. See chapter XXVI, on rights of bona fide holder, 843, et seq., and chapter XI, for agents.

2 London & S. W. Bank v. Wentworth, 42 L. T. R., 188; Diercks v. Roberts, 13 S. C., 338.

'Montague v. Perkins, 22 Eng. L. & Eq., 516.

* See chapter XXVI, on Rights of Bona Fide Holder, sec. VII, § 854, et seq. Page v. Morrel, 3 Abb. N. Y. App. Dec., 433; Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y., 238; Fank v. Lilienfeld, 33 Grat., 378; Overton v. Mathews, 35 Ark., 154.

7

• Emmons v. Meeker, 55 Ind., 321. Schryver v. Hawkes, 22 Ohio St., 308.

• Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y., 238; Marshall v. Drescher, 68 Ind., 242 (semble). * Snyder v. Van Doren, 46 Wisc., 602.

9

amounts to nothing so long as it so remains, as already seen.1 But if the acceptance of such a paper be given, and it be delivered in that form to a creditor, a right to insert his name as drawer would be inferred, and also to use the paper in negotiation, the transferee inserting his own name. And it might be filled up by the personal representative of the holder for value after the latter's death. Even where there had been given no authority to insert any one's name as drawer, yet when the insertion of a name is actually made, the instrument would be binding as an acceptance to a bona fide holder in the usual course of business. There are some cases in which a party signing his name on the back of a bill drawn payable to the order of another, with a view to guarantee its payment by the acceptor, may be held liable as a drawer. Thus in England before the bill was drawn the defendant wrote his name on the back of the paper. It was afterward filled up payable to the drawer's order and accepted by the drawee. He was held liable as drawer.5

144. The authority implied by one signing a blank paper is so extensive that such paper will be valid in the hands of a bona fide holder, whether it be framed as a negotiable instrument or otherwise. In Virginia, where a paper was signed and indorsed in blank, and intrusted to the maker for whose accommodation it was made, it was held that a bona fide holder who had advanced money upon it, and who knew that it was made in blank, could recover against such party whether it were filled up as a common promissory note, or as a negotiable note. So in Indiana,

1 See ante, § 92.

Harvey v. Cane, 34 L. T. R. 64 (1876); Ames on B. & N., 1 vol., 881; In re Duffy, 5 L. R. Ireland, 92.

4

Post §§ 843, 844.

In re Duffy, 5 L. R. Ireland, 92. Mathews v. Bloxsome, 33 L. J. R., 209 (1864). This case is questioned in Steele v. McKinlay, 43 L. T. R., 358 (1880), 5 App. Cases, 754, Lord Watson saying of it, "there is room for doubt whether the decision was intended to go so far as the reports state. If it was I can not avoid the conclusion that it is at variance with sound principle."

• Orrick v. Colston, 7 Grat., 189 (1850); Daniel, J., saying: "It is well settled that a blank indorsement on a negotiable instrument, blank as to date or amount