Isle Ronde contains about 500 acres of excellent land, which are wholly applied to pasturage, and the cultivation of cotton. It is situated about midway between Cariacou and the north end of Grenada, about four leagues from each.

I shall close my account of this colony, as of Barbadoes, with an authentic return by the Inspector general of Great Britain, of the exports from Grenada and its dependencies, for the year 1787; containing also an estimate of the actual value of the several articles at the British market:

80

No. Tons. Men Cwt. qrs. lb. Galls. Galls. Cwt. qr. lb. Cwt. qr. lb.

9670390 4,300 8,812 2 4 2,716 3 18 2,062,427 2810 64,5450

3 614,908 9 3

POSTCRIPT

TO THE HISTORY OF GRENADA.

The first edition of this work having fallen into the hands of a gentleman of distinguished abilities and learning, (one of his majesty's serjeants at law), he was pleased, at the author's request, to communicate his thoughts in writing on the doctrine maintained by lord Mansfield, concerning the legal authority of the crown over conquered countries, as stated in page 54 of this volume, which I have great pleasure in presenting to the reader in the precise words in which they were given:

"HE ground upon which the court rested their judg

THE

ment in the case of Grenada, was clearly sufficient to warrant that judgment, even admitting the doctrine laid down by lord Mansfield on the other point to be well founded; but nothing can be more unfounded than that doctrine:

every proposition upon which it is made to rest is a fallacy. I deny that the king (at least since the constitution has had its present form) can "arbitrarily grant or refuse a capitulation." The power of granting or refusing a capitulation, in the case of a siege or invasion, is certainly vestVol. II. 11

ed in him; but it is vested in him like every other power with which he is intrusted by the British constitution, to be exercised according to the usage which has prevailed in like cases. If that power should be abused, his officers and ministers must answer to the public for their misconduct.

For the same reason I deny, that "the king can put the inhabitants of a conquered country to the sword, or otherwise exterminate them," unless such severity be fully justified by the laws of war, as they are understood amongst civilized nations.

But, supposing that a case should happen wherein such severity would be justifiable, I deny that, upon the extermination of the enemy, the lands would belong to the king himself: I say they would belong to the state; and that they would be subject, not merely to the king, but to the sovereign power which governs the British dominions. If the king receives the inhabitants under his protection, and grants them their property, I deny that he has power to fix such terms and conditions as he thinks proper; for he cannot reserve to himself in his individual capacity, legislative power over them: that would be to exclude the authority of the British legislature from the government of a country subdued by British forces, and would be an attempt to erect imperium in imperio. One consequence of this would be, that such conquered territory might descend to an heir of the king not qualified, according to the act of settlement, to succeed to the crown of Great Britain. The king might give it to a younger son, or bestow it on a stranger. A thousand other absurd consequences might be pointed out, as resulting from such incongruity.

I admit that the king (subject to the responsibility of his ministers) may yield up a conquest, or retain it, as he sees best: but I deny, for the reasons above hinted at, that he

can impose what terms he pleases, or that he can arbitrarily change the law or political form of its government. I think he may agree, upon the capitulation, that the conquered people shall continue to enjoy their ancient religion and laws, and even this must be sub modo; but I deny that he could, by his own authority, grant these things after the capitulation; for that would amount to an exercise of independent sovereignty. The fallacy of lord Mansfield's argument, proceeds from an endeavour to confound the king's civil and military characters, and to perpetuate in the chief executive magistrate, the vast powers with which it is necessary to invest the generalissimo of the armies, during the continuance of military operations. The moment these operations cease, he resumes his civil character, and in that character no man will venture to assert that, as king of Great Britain, he has the prerogative of being a despot in any part of his dominions.

With respect to the cases of Ireland, Wales, and Berwick, even taking them precisely as lord Mansfield puts them, I think they do not weigh a feather in the argument. Those cases happened long before the English constitution had reduced itself to its present form, consequently, before the rights of the people were ascertained and defined as they exist at present. If a few instances of the exercise of arbitrary power by the ancient kings of England, are to be received as decisive cases, to shew what are the powers of the crown at this day, I think it would be no very difficult task to find authorities, even as low down as the reigns of the Plantagenets and Stuarts, to prove, that the British govern ment ought to be a pure despotism!