Opinion of the Court

the petitions for direct review at issue in this case and that petitioners must, therefore, proceed with their petitions for habeas corpus if they wish to obtain relief.

As part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-546, Congress adopted new provisions governing the judicial review of immigration orders. See 8 U. S. C. § 1252 (1994 ed., Supp. V) (codifying these procedures). Like the prior statute, the new provision vests the courts of appeals with the authority to consider petitions challenging "final orders" commanding the "removal" of aliens from the United States. § 1252(a)(1).1 However, unlike the previous provisions, the new statute expressly precludes the courts of appeals from exercising "jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against any alien who is removable by reason of” a conviction for certain criminal offenses, including any aggravated felony. § 1252(a)(2)(C).2

1 An additional difference between the old and the new statute with regard to petitions for review is one of nomenclature. In keeping with a statute-wide change in terminology, the new provision refers to orders of "removal" rather than orders of "deportation" or "exclusion." Compare 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. V), with § 1105a (1994 ed.).

2 The scope of this preclusion is not entirely clear. Though the text of the provision is quite broad, it is not without its ambiguities. Throughout this litigation, the Government has conceded that the courts of appeals have the power to hear petitions challenging the factual determinations thought to trigger the jurisdiction-stripping provision (such as whether an individual is an alien and whether he or she has been convicted of an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of the statute). See Brief for Respondent 22-23. In addition, the Government has also conceded that the courts of appeals retain jurisdiction to review "substantial constitutional challenges" raised by aliens who come within the strictures of § 1252(a)(2)(C). See id., at 23-24. As the petitions in this case do not raise any of these types of issues, we need not address this point further. Nonetheless, it remains instructive that the Government acknowledges that background principles of statutory construction and constitutional concerns must be considered in determining the scope of IIRIRA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions.

Opinion of the Court

As petitioners in this case were convicted of "aggravated felonies" within the meaning of the relevant statutes,3 the plain language of § 1252(a)(2)(C) fairly explicitly strips the courts of appeals of jurisdiction to hear their claims on petitions for direct review. Without much discussion, the Court of Appeals so held. 232 F. 3d, at 342-343.

Before this Court, petitioners primarily argue that constitutional considerations and background principles of statutory interpretation require that they be afforded some forum for the adjudication of the merits of their claims. They devote the bulk of their briefs to arguing that the Court of Appeals—motivated by these concerns-properly interpreted IIRIRA's jurisdiction-stripping provision not to preclude aliens such as petitioners from pursuing habeas relief pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2241. Brief for Petitioners 12-42, 44–49. In the alternative, they argue that we might construe the same provisions as stripping jurisdiction from the courts of appeals over only some matters, leaving in place their jurisdiction to directly review petitions raising claims previously cognizable under § 2241. Id., at 42-44.

We agree with petitioners that leaving aliens without a forum for adjudicating claims such as those raised in this case would raise serious constitutional questions. We also agree with petitioners-and the Court of Appeals-that these concerns can best be alleviated by construing the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of that statute not to preclude aliens such as petitioners from pursuing habeas relief pursuant to § 2241. See St. Cyr, ante, at 314.

Finding no support in the text or history of § 1252 for concluding that the courts of appeals retain jurisdiction to hear petitions such as those brought in this case, but concluding

3 All three petitioners were convicted of controlled substance offenses for which they served between four months and four years in prison. Each concedes that his or her crime is an "aggravated felony" as defined in 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43), which renders him or her removable pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).

SCALIA, J., dissenting

that Congress has not spoken with sufficient clarity to strip the district courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions raising identical claims, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in all particulars.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting.

It is so ordered.

For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in the companion case of INS v. St. Cyr, ante, p. 326, I agree with JUSTICE SCALIA's proposed disposition of the instant case.

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.

For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in the companion case of INS v. St. Cyr, ante, p. 326, I would vacate the judgment of the court below and remand with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, with prejudice to petitioners Calcano-Martinez's and Madrid's refiling in the District Court.

Syllabus

NEVADA ET AL. v. HICKS ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-1994. Argued March 21, 2001-Decided June 25, 2001 Respondent Hicks is a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes of western Nevada and lives on the Tribes' reservation. After petitioner state game wardens executed state-court and tribal-court search warrants to search Hicks's home for evidence of an off-reservation crime, he filed suit in the Tribal Court against, inter alios, the wardens in their individual capacities and petitioner Nevada, alleging trespass, abuse of process, and violation of constitutional rights remediable under 42 U.S. C. § 1983. The Tribal Court held that it had jurisdiction over the tribal tort and federal civil rights claims, and the Tribal Appeals Court affirmed. Petitioners then sought, in Federal District Court, a declaratory judgment that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction over the claims. The District Court granted respondents summary judgment on that issue and held that the wardens would have to exhaust their qualified immunity claims in the Tribal Court. In affirming, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the fact that Hicks's home is on tribe-owned reservation land is sufficient to support tribal jurisdiction over civil claims against nonmembers arising from their activities on that land.

Held:

1. The Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the wardens' alleged tortious conduct in executing a search warrant for an offreservation crime. Pp. 357-366.

(a) As to nonmembers, a tribal court's inherent adjudicatory authority is at most as broad as the tribe's regulatory authority. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U. S. 438, 453. Pp. 357-358.

(b) The rule that, where nonmembers are concerned, "the exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations . . . cannot survive without express congressional delegation," Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 564, applies to both Indian and non-Indian land. The land's ownership status is only one factor to be considered, and while that factor may sometimes be dispositive, tribal ownership is not alone enough to support regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers. Pp. 358-360.

(c) Tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process related to the off-reservation violation of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government or internal relations. The State's interest in

Syllabus

executing process is considerable, and it no more impairs the Tribes' self-government than federal enforcement of federal law impairs state government. The State's interest is not diminished because this suit is against officials in their individual capacities. Pp. 360-365.

(d) Congress has not stripped the States of their inherent jurisdiction on reservations with regard to off-reservation violations of state law. The federal statutory scheme neither prescribes nor suggests that state officers cannot enter a reservation to investigate or prosecute such violations. Pp. 365-366.

2. The Tribal Court had no jurisdiction over the $1983 claims. Tribal courts are not courts of "general jurisdiction." The historical and constitutional assumption of concurrent state-court jurisdiction over cases involving federal statutes is missing with respect to tribal courts, and their inherent adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers is at most only as broad as their legislative jurisdiction. Congress has not purported to grant tribal courts jurisdiction over § 1983 claims, and such jurisdiction would create serious anomalies under 28 U. S. C. §1441. Pp. 366–369.

3. Petitioners were not required to exhaust their claims in the Tribal Court before bringing them in the Federal District Court. Because the rule that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over state officials for causes of action relating to their performance of official duties is clear, adherence to the tribal exhaustion requirement would serve no purpose other than delay and is therefore unnecessary. P. 369.

4. Various arguments to the contrary lack merit. Pp. 370-375. 196 F.3d 1020, reversed and remanded.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KENNEDY and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post, p. 375. GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 386. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which STEVENS and BREYER, JJ., joined, post, p. 387. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BREYER, J., joined, post, p. 401.

C. Wayne Howle, Senior Deputy Attorney General of Nevada, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General, Paul G. Taggart, Deputy Attorney General, and Jeffrey S. Sutton.

S. James Anaya argued the cause for respondents and filed a brief for respondent Hicks. Kim Jerome Gottschalk